(CCC0016)

Written evidence submitted by Ben Worthy (Birkbeck College), Cat Morgan (Birkbeck College), and Michele Crepaz (QUB)

Standards Committee Evidence: Evidence on the quality and Impact of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests

This research note focuses on the quality of data on Members’ interests and activity. It is based partly on a Leverhulme trust funded study of MPs and Parliament (by Worthy and Morgan) and on ongoing research on lobbying across the EU (by Crepaz).

Summary

• The UK register contains numerous flaws in terms of its operation and content.
• It has been regularly used by small groups since the 1990s with surges of interest, such as in the wake of the Paterson vote in November 2021.
• The ‘semi-transparency’ of the current register creates suspicion, but better data can have a positive impact on behaviour and public perceptions.

1. How well does the register work?

1.1   In her evidence to the committee, Kathryn Stone set out the clearest idea of what the register is for: ‘the purpose of the register…should be about how we record anything that influences a Member’s thoughts, words and actions, so that it is transparent—not least for members of the public to get a better view’[1]. Taking this definition, the current register falls short.

1.2   Alastair Tibbit spoke in late 2021 of how ‘almost everything about the system for publishing ‘Members’ Financial Interests…is suboptimal, if not outright broken’ and felt that data ‘are almost impossible to find, analyse and follow.’[2] In his 2016 book Parliament Limited Martin Williams estimated that only around 40% of interests were declared on the register.

1.3   There are technical issues with the data. As journalist and academic Dr Maryam Ahmed pointed out, the register ‘is not machine readable’, is ‘available only in a highly variable free text format’ and ‘not available via bulk download’.[3] Dr Simon Weschle agreed that data are not standardised, and extraction for analysis is, in some cases ‘impossible’.[4]

1.4   A wider difficulty, as pointed out by Esther Webber and Henry Dyer, is how the data fails to link to other incomplete data, such as that held by Companies House.

1.5   To find out about MPs’ interests, users need to draw on a combination of internet searches, FOI, and other tools to pull together a proper picture. This makes for a tendency towards investigation and exposes.

2. Monitoring of Interests: who is using it?

2.1   The data on MPs’ interests has been, as Peter Geoghegan put it, ‘hiding in plain sight’ for many years[5]. Our research found that a small number of journalists, campaigners and developers regularly used it. Users include investigative journalists, lobbying and transparency campaigners, as well as analytic sites. Interestingly, local, and regional press also draw on the data (see below).

2.2   There has been interests stories based on data for as long as Registers have existed. Attention has often clustered around scandals, but there is a regular ‘bubbling away’ at national and local level, which can spike around times when data are released (see data box below). Recent stories based on register data include MPs links to fossil fuel interests, MPs employing family members[6] or MPs earnings from their second incomes during the pandemic. [7]Data lobo also conducted detailed analysis of MPs outside interests between June 2017 and October 2019.[8]

2.3   The aftermath of the Paterson vote illustrates the potential of data. Initially a few searchers found out how many MPs voting to scrap the system were either under investigation or were earning second incomes[9]. Data was examined from a Scottish and Welsh angle, and party leaders came in for particular scrutiny. There was a clear trickle-down effect, as the analysis went from the level of all MPs, down to regional groups or individual MPs in the local press. Not all coverage has been negative, and some MPs gained positive coverage, such as the Isle of Wight headline ‘No second job for Isle of Wight MP Bob Seely’.

3. What impact does the register have?

The negative impact

3.1   The danger is that the poor quality of data, and semi-transparency it creates, leads to exposes and scandals which reinforce poor views of all politicians. As past scandals showed, partial data, and the way in which it is exposed, can lead to greater uncertainty and suspicion, which worsens rather than clears up controversy[10].

3.2   Ethan Stone and Ian Hislop pointed to how the number of MPs with large scale earnings from second jobs or potential conflicts of interests is relatively small[11]. However, the exposure and uncertainty ignite suspicion rather than reassures, as Ian Hislop put it ‘the public perception is: “Was this the tip of the iceberg?”. In the wake of the Paterson vote perceptions of corruption increased. As importantly 71% of those polled felt MPs ‘make decisions to a large extent/to some extent benefit their own financial interests’[12]. This is despite the fact that public attitudes can be nuanced. As one study found ‘They do not respond negatively to all second incomes…they are most hostile to politicians who take on part-time company directorships’[13]

The positive impact

3.3   The register has led to transparency and accountability. Between 2010 and 2021 at least 10 MPs were made to apologise for failures to declare interests[14]. Research conducted on a similar Register of Interests in the Republic of Ireland suggests that potential conflict of interest disclosure can reduce people’s perceptions of corruption of MPs, assuming disclosure rules are correctly implemented, and full transparency is pursued[15]

3.4   Even in its current state, research shows the existence of reporting requirements has some effect in deterring certain behaviour. As Henry Dyer pointed out, the requirement to record data on family employees engaged in lobbying may do exactly this-and the lack of use is sign of its preventive effect. He suggested that ‘if you were to scrap it, you might see a resurgence of people whose partners or children are in lobbying’[16].

3.5   So far, in the wake of the Paterson vote, there was also some behaviour change. At least one MP self-reported undeclared interests, two admitted possible breaches and three dropped their second jobs[17].

Recommendations

• Data should be standardised and accessible in an easily searchable format. It should also be combined with the Ministerial Register as Henry Dyer argued, even if this entails some ‘doubling up’. Work by Michele Crepaz found that the Register of Interest of held by the French High Authority for Transparency in Public Life stands out as one of the best examples, as entries are fully digitised (with no pdfs), fully searchable and data is downloadable in line with open data requirements[18].
• It should be linked to other open government registers such as the Register of Consultant Lobbyists.
• It should be kept and enforced by an independent authority which centralises the function of monitoring integrity in public life.

09 February 2022