WRITTEN EVIDENCE BY RESULTS UK TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO EXTREME POVERTY AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

About RESULTS UK

RESULTS UK works to create the public and political will to end poverty through a movement of passionate, everyday people. We undertake strategic policy, parliamentary and grassroots advocacy on four key factors of poverty: economic opportunities, education, citizen voice and health, with a particular focus on child vaccinations, COVID-19, nutrition, foundational literacy and numeracy, and tuberculosis (TB).

2. How might the FCDO’s strategy, policies and programmes need to change as the number of people in extreme poverty grows due to the global pandemic or the effects of climate change?

The UK has, until recently, been a global leader in international development. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been a significant factor in the reduction of the number of people in extreme poverty, from just under 2 billion in 1990 to 689 million today.[1] The COVID-19 pandemic will push an additional 150 million people into extreme poverty[2]; whilst the impact of climate change will push a further 132 million people into extreme poverty by 2030.[3] Evidently, these two factors are severely testing the current approaches to address extreme poverty.

It is evident from current studies that the impact of climate change on poverty can be halved if the Sustainable Development Goals are achieved[4]. More inclusive and equitable societies with universal access to water and sanitation, clean energy, health care, and social protection can build more climate resilient and robust communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. FCDO strategy, policy and programmes, including the imminent International Development Strategy, must be designed primarily to address poverty alleviation, social justice and inequity.  FCDO Programmes should be transparent and measurable in terms of impact on poverty reduction.
2. Alongside the publication of the International Development Strategy, the FCDO should publish an updated, people-centered strategy for how it plans to address future global pandemics and climate change. 
3. UK ODA should be holistic, reactive and address the multiple and overlapping drivers of poverty.
4. FCDO strategy should be guided by local stakeholders in order to best respond to local needs and learn from what works.
5. Model accountability by publishing results regularly, demonstrating lessons learned and not reneging on existing commitments.

6. What effect have the cuts in UK ODA had on the FCDO’s ability to address extreme poverty? What evidence is there to suggest poverty was a key consideration in deciding where the cuts should fall?

Reducing ODA spending to 0.5% of GNI has had a profound impact on the UK’s ability to address extreme poverty. The reduction has impacted education, humanitarian, research & development and nutrition programmes particularly hard[5]. For example, education funding is £210m lower in 2021 than it was in 2019 despite the Government’s rhetoric that girls’ education is a priority. Moreover, the Government’s decision to count elements of the COVID-19 pandemic response as ODA, including donated doses initially purchased for its own domestic population, has further shrunk the fiscal space for development spending.

Politically, the cuts stymie the UK’s ability to act as a political leader in tackling crises.[6] At the GPE Pledging summit in July 2021, the UK, as host, failed to reach the GPE’s target of $5bn, in part because the UK has reduced its ODA education spending by at least 25%. In failing to meet this target, the GPE’s ability to reach the targeted 18 million people in poverty over its strategic period is seriously hindered.[7] The UK’s intransigence to act as a leader in tackling poverty was exemplified at December’s Nutrition for Growth Summit, where the UK - host of the inaugural Nutrition for Growth (N4G) summit in 2013 -  embarrassingly failed to make a financial commitment as part of its efforts to reduce the ODA budget.[8] Whilst the UK has eventually made a pledge to spend £1.5 billion over 8 years on the last possible day to be counted under N4G accountability tools, this number falls disastrously short of calls within the sector for a minimum of £2.7 billion to be spent over 5 years. This demonstrates a serious lack of ambition and leadership and inhibits the UK’s ability to act as a political leader in ending poverty and preventable death from malnutrition.

In May 2021, the Guardian reported that civil servants were given a woefully inadequate ‘5-7 working days’[9] to determine where the 30% cuts to ODA should fall; showing callous disregard for the lives of people in extreme poverty.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. UK spending on the global COVID-19 response should be additional to the ODA budget, not taken from it. Implement the same detailed cost/benefit analysis for cuts as is used when establishing programmes
2. Protect current commitments and continue to invest in multilaterals, such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the Global Fund[10], which have been proven to act as one of the most effective ways of tackling extreme poverty.
3. The UK should re-examine and expand upon its commitment to spending £1.5 billion on nutrition programming at the earliest opportunity, ensuring that both nutrition specific and nutrition sensitive programming are sufficiently accounted for. The UK should also recommit to reaching 50 million women, adolescent girls, and children with high-impact nutrition programming over a set period, as these groups face urgent nutrition needs.
4. The UK should urgently return to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA.

7. How the FCDO can play a more effective part in the eradication of poverty as a convener, thought leader and investor.

In seeking to realise “Global Britain” through foreign trade and investment, the FCDO must not neglect the Global Britain that has, until recently, been a leader, innovator, and top investor in tackling disease, malnutrition, and barriers to education. Cuts to ODA, failure to refresh historic commitments[11], and an inflated focus on economic influence above ODA have jeopardised this reputation. Recent FCDO strategies on Ending Preventable Deaths and Strengthening Global Health Systems are meaningless without the financial backing needed for implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The FCDO must ensure that ODA and the upcoming International Development Strategy remain focused on poverty alleviation instead of being used as soft power tools.
2. FCDO strategies should be guided by local stakeholders in ODA recipient countries and should actively seek opportunities to fund local actors.

8. How has the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development affected the UK’s approach to extreme poverty?

​​The merger has been a major strategic error. It has damaged the UK’s reputation, lowered its aid quality, undermined its focus on poverty reduction, compromised value-for-money investments for the UK taxpayer and caused the loss of a Cabinet-level voice for development. DFID was independently verified and internationally recognised as one of the most effective and transparent institutions delivering international aid[12], whilst the FCO was historically weak in this area[13]. This trend has continued with ICAI recently ranking the FCDO ‘inadequate’ for transparency, stating there has been a clear ‘deterioration during the merger process’[14]. The merger has seen ODA aligned more closely with diplomatic, security and economic interests[15], over poverty eradication. As such, the merger has risked denigrating international partners’ trust in the quality, independence, and motivations behind UK ODA.

The cumbersome merger slowed the UK’s international pandemic response, and cost the UK dearly in human resources. DFID housed immense expertise and institutional knowledge the merger has undermined. By September 2021, over 200 ex-DFID staff had already left the FCDO since the decision to merge[16] whilst foreign nationals, with their crucial local knowledge, are now locked out of joining the FCDO as it has become a ‘reserved department’.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The FCDO must improve the transparency of all its work and expenditure and consultation with outside actors.
2. Arrangements for strategic oversight and accountability for the ODA budget should remain with a single, cabinet-level minister, preferably through a re-established Secretary of State for International Development.
3. The FCDO must reverse its blanket ban on the recruitment of foreign nationals.

If you would like any further information about the recommendations in this submission, please contact Lucy Drescher, Head of Parliamentary Advocacy, at lucy.drescher@results.org.uk.