Written evidence submitted by Wigan Council (IRP0062)
1.1. This written evidence has been submitted by Wigan Council and is intended to support and complement the submission made by Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) on behalf of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA).
2.1. The Golborne Link will provide crucial additional capacity for services running between Scotland, Cumbria, Lancashire, Birmingham and London, by creating an effective bypass of one of the busiest and most congested parts of the West Coast Mainline (WCML), including the Weaver Junction. This section is twin track for the majority of its length between Winsford South Junction and Golborne Junction, and is approaching capacity, as it is regularly utilised by long distance services between Scotland and London and between Liverpool and London, inter-regional services between Liverpool and Birmingham, and large volumes of freight.
2.2. Furthermore, it would also provide the ability for high speed services to bypass this section completely, joining the WCML significantly further north. This, in turn, frees up additional capacity on the WCML for classic compatible services and rail freight. Bypassing the constrained Crewe-Warrington section of the WCML avoids constraints associated with this section, thereby increasing journey time reliability.
2.3. The Golborne Link would also maximise the time that services can travel at high speed on journeys between London / Birmingham and Scotland, minimising end-to-end journey times. The proposed alternative, a longer ‘Preston Link’, is unlikely to generate similar or better benefits given its smaller regional population and less potential to generate economic growth by investing in the local station infrastructure.
2.4. Compared with road, rail provides a more environmentally sustainable way of moving freight, especially for longer distance inter-urban movements. With increasing concern over climate change, a major expansion in rail freight will be needed in the near future. The allocation of limited rail capacity in Greater Manchester (GM) between freight and passenger traffic presents many challenges, including on the WCML.
3.1. The IRP’s inclusion of the Western Leg of HS2 Phase 2b represents major levelling up potential for Wigan. Accompanied with effective links into the wider public transport network, Wigan would be the primary high speed rail station for well over one million people, in an area covering large parts of GM, Merseyside and Lancashire.
3.2. The IRP is written on the basis that the Golborne Link, providing a connection between HS2 and the WCML, is part of the current design and will be in the Western Leg hybrid Bill. This is welcome. However, the IRP also states that a final decision on the Link will be made following the Union Connectivity Review (UCR). That Review recommends the Government should investigate in more detail a potential alternative link south of Preston, on the basis that it might create journey time saves to/from Scotland of two to three minutes.
3.3. To replace the Golborne Link in such a way would be to the clear economic detriment to Wigan and its surrounding communities. The Golborne Link is critical to levelling up the Wigan area. Government should swiftly address the uncertainty created by the IRP and the UCR by confirming the Link as the preferred mechanism to connect HS2 to WCML while also maximising levelling up.
3.4. HS2 is a core part of the Council’s Economic Vision for the borough and Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) for Wigan town centre. The vision within the SRF is to deliver a first-class integrated transport hub for Wigan, using HS2 as the catalyst for a once-in-a-generation opportunity to transform and regenerate the town centre and its surroundings. The prospect of high-speed rail connectivity has already helped to generate interest and investment in and around Wigan town centre.
3.5. Wigan is building on this opportunity by developing a Growth Strategy for high speed rail with the overall aim of maximising the benefits of HS2. The Growth Strategy is being developed around four ‘pillars’ in line with the National Infrastructure Commission’s recommendations. The feasibility phase of this work is due to be completed in 2022 and will set out how HS2 can have maximum impact through station design, wider connectivity improvements, wider regeneration benefits in and around the station gateway, and local skills and supply chain benefits, together with timescales for the implementation of the strategy.
3.6. Losing the Link would have a hugely detrimental impact on levelling up in Wigan. It would remove the basis for the Wigan Station Gateway strategy which aims to leverage the value of at least three HS2 services per hour between London and Scotland while also realising the potential of Wigan’s strategic location on the WCML, population size and existing mainline stations. While circa 3.2 million passengers use Wigan’s existing stations per year (pre Covid figures), of which circa 1 million are interchanging, if passenger numbers were more proportionate to its population and with the Golborne Link plus the necessary associated investment to its stations and public real (including to accommodate 400-metre long trains), Wigan has the opportunity to grow the number of station users significantly.
3.7. Wigan’s Growth Strategy will also examine accessibility to and from Wigan’s rail stations, broadening the catchment area of the station to enable as many people as possible to benefit from the arrival of HS2 at Wigan. Improved interchange and access will support the ‘Station Gateway’ element of this work, with more trips generated through leisure and employment. This work will consider multi-modal links including active modes, Bus Rapid Transit and Tram-Train to maximise connectivity to the HS2 network.
3.8. The uncertainty facing Wigan highlights a tension between the aims of the Government to level up, and of the UCR to look at potential improvements to connections between England and Scotland. In navigating both, there is an opportunity for Government to make gains on both fronts to help deliver levelling up and better connectivity within the union.
3.9. The IRP is not accompanied by any analysis of how it will support levelling up, and the Government should be encouraged to publish or undertake such an analysis to clearly articulate the extent to which levelling up will achieved though the plan.
4.1. As set out in the submission made by TfGM, on behalf of the GMCA, the scope of the IRP was always to set a blueprint for the strategic rail infrastructure to meet the needs of the North and the Midlands. However, the IRP is concerned with infrastructure which almost spans the length of the country, and its schemes are therefore of major national importance. The whole-network benefits likely to accrue through the delivery of IRP schemes will be less than would have been delivered through the pre-IRP status quo position. In particular, the full Y network of HS2 would deliver greater released-capacity on the classic network across a wide geography and contribute to a more resilient network nationally.
4.2. The IRP also risks sending a signal that a downgrading of ambition for rail, and therefore for the role of strategic infrastructure in the UK economy, is politically acceptable. The IRP may, therefore, lead to places outside the Midlands and the North to conclude that their own ambitions for their future strategic infrastructure may also become downgraded.
4.3. Furthermore, the pre-IRP status quo was the result of serious, long-term planning and decision-making on the basis of evidence and cost benefit analysis. For such a body of work to not come to fruition in the IRP could set a worrying precedent for other schemes in the future. It is important that any analysis which was undertaken to inform the IRP is published as soon as possible, and that the design and selection of future projects is routinely justified to the public and industry with reference to their evaluation against key criteria including value for money, decarbonisation, and levelling up.
5.1. As set out in the submission made by TfGM, on behalf of the GMCA, it is understood that the Government seeks to deliver the schemes in the IRP in partnership with local authorities. Wigan welcomes this. However, the lack of scheme-level detail in the IRP presents a number of challenges in order for a successful delivery scheme.
5.2. While Wigan with TfGM have been working with Government and HS2 Ltd for several years in preparation for the Western Leg of HS2 Phase 2b, the IRP has presented significant new uncertainties related to the delivery time of new railway infrastructure. In contrast to the original Phase 2 strategic case which envisaged delivery by 2033, the IRP now describes deliver by the early-mid 2040s. However, this is still vague and does not, for example, detail when construction would be likely to commence, and therefore by when Wigan needs to be ready to prepare for a and mitigate a long and disruptive construction period.
5.3. With the hybrid Bill expected soon (but not deposited at the time of writing), and taking around three years to reach Royal Assent, Wigan may be in the position where the enabling legislation is in place but without clarity over when spades will enter the ground. This uncertainty would be to the detriment of potential developers of the Pocket Nook, Places for Everyone allocation, which will be severed by the Golborne Link. It would make it more difficult to programme the forward plan and the work that is required to ensure the HS2 infrastructure is delivered locally in an appropriate way with effective mitigation in place.
6.1. The IRP does not explain in any detail how schemes will interact with one another, and it is critical to further understand how interactions will be designed as they will have implications for how the infrastructure will be delivered on the ground and how local communities will be impacted, both in construction and in operation.
6.2. It is also noteworthy that there is generally a poor understanding of how the classic network will accommodate HS2 services in future timetables. The IRP does nothing to correct this. Thus, as the IRP schemes start to be delivered, it will be important for the Government to be confident that the classic network will be ready to absorb additional services generated, otherwise there is a risk that any journey times savings and capacity improvements modelled as part of the IRP are not actually delivered when services operate in coming decades.
6.3. In particular, due consideration must be given to the WCML north of Wigan, which is currently two-track with limited capacity for existing classic compatible services and rail freight. It is imperative this section of the rail network is upgraded. Failure to do so could result in the prioritisation of high speed services over classic compatible services and rail freight, ultimately diminishing the local and regional offer in Wigan and Greater Manchester.
6.4. It is well known that the current rail network in GM suffers from a critical lack of capacity in a number of areas. This has been contributing to poor performance and, without appropriate action being taken to improve the infrastructure long-term, will leave GM with a network that cannot accommodate future growth. While work is ongoing through the Manchester Recovery Task Force (MRTF), it is disappointing that the IRP fails to address these pinch points notably the Castlefield Corridor in central Manchester.
6.5. The failure to improve infrastructure long-term including the Castlefield Corridor, has been to the detriment of the proposed new rail station in Golborne. Under December 2022 timetable changes the station is limited to a peak period service only. Golborne is not currently served by rail. The nearest station is over 3km away at Newton-le-Willows, within Merseyside. Demand for the proposed new rail station is therefore forecast to be high due to the sizeable population catchment for whom rail is not currently an option for travel. Without a new station at Golborne that is served throughout the day, car dependency will continue to be incentivised. In order for sustainable growth to occur, it is imperative the existing public transport offer is enhanced, not diminished.
6.6. The MRTF work will also be a reduction of services on the Atherton line and the absence of any service between the Wigan and Manchester Piccadilly and Airport. It is clear that greater investment is needed to ensure better alternatives to car-borne travel are provided for commuting, shopping, entertainment and socialising for residents of Wigan.
6.7. Solving these issues with long-term infrastructure solutions is critical if the network is to be able to accommodate current service level aspirations and contemplate future growth including that required by HS2 and NPR services. The Government needs to ensure that the resolution of these problems are understood as being essential if the services to operate on IRP schemes are able to be feasible.
6.8. The Oakervee Review highlighted the importance that HS2 stations should be properly integrated with the local transport networks in which they will sit and integrating stations with local and regional transport modes, including active travel options, is a key Sponsor’s Requirement. There are a number of concerns about the extent to which current plans will achieve this on HS2 Phase 2b Western Leg and, with the IRP not providing any reason for these concerns to be allayed, Wigan will be looking to the hybrid Bill process to make the case for the interactions between HS2 and the local transport network to be improved in critical areas.
6.9. There is undoubtedly a need to have complementary and supporting investment at a local level. Of particular importance in encouraging a mode shift towards rail, will be the need to ensure effective connections to new and existing rail stations by all modes, and the provision of adequate access facilities, such as parking and drop-off/pick up provision, electric charging points, bus facilities and secure cycle parking. How local rail stations are managed can also aid integration and will also be a key part of future rail franchises.
6.10. Wigan is proposed to be one of the first station stops for HS2 services from London after joining the conventional rail network. The arrival of HS2 into Wigan will be transformational and will act as a catalyst to bring future growth and economic prosperity from new development as well as the enhancement of the status of Wigan North Western as a key regional transport hub.
6.11. This presents Wigan with a unique opportunity to consider the station infrastructure and transport interventions necessary to support this anticipated growth around Wigan North Western station. Wigan’s HS2 Growth Strategy seeks to ensure that Wigan is best placed to maximise the economic growth and regeneration benefits offered by HS2.
7.1. As set out in the submission made by TfGM, on behalf of the GMCA, it is unclear how the schemes in the IRP were selected and clearer understanding of the rationale, backed up with evidence and analysis, if critical if the Government wants to ensure a commitment to making evidence-led decisions on strategic transport infrastructure in the long-term interest of the country.
7.2. It is clear, however, that the IRP was informed, at least in part, by the National Infrastructure Commission’s (NIC) 2020 Rail Needs Assessment (RNA) and appears to set out a blueprint for the future which is somewhere between the RNA’s least ambitious ‘baseline’ budget envelope and its ‘plus 25%’ envelope.
7.3. The baseline package was designed to fit within a baseline budget of £86bn which, in turn, was informed by the Treasury’s requirement that NIC’s proposals in its National Infrastructure Assessment should confirm to its ‘fiscal remit’[1]. This required the NIC’s recommendations to be accommodated within a scenario where gross public investment in economic infrastructure is 1% to 1.2% of GDP per year between 2020 and 2050. This set the NIC on a pathway which led to a particular baseline budget envelop in the RNA and therefore to propose an option which would meet this fiscal constraint by limiting the creation of new rail capacity and, instead, focussing on upgrades.
8.1. As set out in the submission made by TfGM, on behalf of the GMCA, in general terms, investing in rail infrastructure delivers good returns to the taxpayer. According to the report ‘The Economic Contribution of UK Rail 2021’, carried out by Oxford Economics and commissioned by the Railway Industry Association, for each £1 worth of work on the rail network, £2.50 of income was generated in the wider economy.
8.2. It would be helpful for any analysis of ‘value’ to consider what value may have been lost with changes in the IRP versus the pre-IPR status quo. For example, the opportunity of the Eastern Leg of HS2 to create value, particularly from its Leeds terminus, which has been lost.
8.3. Reflecting the Government’s wider public policy agenda and recent changes to the Green Book, any appraisal of value should also, ideally, consider secondary benefits including, for example levelling up and decarbonisation. It should also seek to understand the economic value of creating new railway capacity which a) makes the classic network more resilient and able to grow and b) encourages modal shift from road to rail, and the potential related air quality and consequent health benefits of modal shift to electric railways.
8.4. Finally, considerations of value should also be undertaken based on the whole-life value of a given infrastructure investment, such as a high speed station, which may continue to drive important benefits for the communities it serves for several decades, including when the surrounding land benefits from increased economic activity and land values and the station itself can generate ongoing revenue streams.
January 2022