ISO0007

Written evidence submitted by James London

DEFENCE COMMITTEE - Call for Evidence

Operation ISOTROPE - the use of the military in countering migrant crossings in the Channel

Personal Introduction. 37 years Army experience: 12 years infantry service; 25 years Royal Military Police, of which 4 years at the CBRN Defence centre (Winterbourne Gunner); 2 years UNFICYP as senior UN policeman/ investigator; worked with many UK & overseas police forces, including Met Police (former CT Branch, Royalty & Diplomatic Protection Branch, & GT operations). 6 years NATO (SHAPE), two as CBRN policy adviser & four as nuclear policy adviser.

Opening statement.

  1.                 My submission in June 2021 referred to the need to consider the creation of bespoke Coastal Force [CF] by integrating existing maritime assets currently employed by Border Force, HM Coastguard, RN & any suitable police vessels used in estuaries & the vicinity of ports/harbours. Vessels, crews & existing funding should form the basis of a CF, from which growth & capabilities should be generated. The development of a CF should be progressive, along with the selection of suitable coastal facilities to host such assets. Border Force should then focus on territorial border responsibilities.
  2.                 The ongoing public perception of Border Force attempts to counter the surge of illegal migration [illegals], is one of a transport service to collect & shore the tens of thousands of illegals. Added to which the media reports indicate a reluctance, or inability, of Border Force crews to counter the incessant surge; the RNLI provides their own pick-up delivery service.
  3.                 The government’s approach to illegals is undermined by over-sensitive law & a floundering Border Force.
    1. ECHR protocols, along with EU legislation, have been slavishly embedded into national legislation thereby diluting any prospect of applying robust options.
    2. There has been a dearth of strong political statements without simultaneous preparation to deter illegals.
    3. There is insufficient national capability to safeguard the UK’s maritime space [EEZ], without further dilution to the RN’s core operational tasks.
  4.                 The Armed Forces have been repeatedly deployed to backfill the civil authorities, especially the NHS, to remedy weaknesses & shortfalls in capabilities.
  5.                 The Integrated Review [IR] & the Defence Command Paper [DCP] stated the value & merit of deploying more of our ever-diminishing Armed Forces & their bespoke capabilities on new commitments. Having directed the Armed Forces to resolve civil failures, there are scarce military resources to undertake remedial measures when unsolicited geopolitical challenges arise, especially whilst the Putin-Russia threat bears down upon NATO & an increasingly disunited EU.

Fusion or an Integrated Doctrine?

  1.                 The government’s Fusion Doctrine has an intrinsic weakness, in that it fails to integrate all aspects of government into a clear national strategy. The IR does not clearly identify the requirement for a defence & security doctrine to be integrated into a long-term grand strategic concept.
  2.                 The edifice of a national integration strategy should be reliant upon two fundamental aspects of commitment, without which there will be a continuing failure to adapt to the rapid & diverse changes affecting everyday life, especially evident since the start of the 21st century.
    1. Law Reform. Introducing new legislation absorbs considerable parliamentary time, whereas carefully crafted amendments or codicils to existing statutes would be economical & achieve suitable & necessary improvements. Too much legislation exists which often fails to consider tomorrow’s novelty, more recent examples being the development of electric modes of transport … scooter acid attacks … novel hybrid techniques to cause harm, damage, or destruction … dynamic espionage challenges. The growth in firms specialising in legal avoidance by which advisers find ways to reduce, or avoid, the impact of rules, definitions or laws needs to be countered. Laws should be drafted, taking account of avoidance measures, being adaptable to better cope with the dynamic nature of our changing world.
    2. Tax Reform. A simplification of tax rules, regulations & laws, with prudent adjustments to advantageous tax schemes, would enable much needed public monies to capitalise on & invest in under-funded critical commitments.
  3.                 The migrant crisis will deteriorate unless hard decisions are taken, involving all government departments. Select Committees are invaluable by the nature of their cross-party configuration.

What should the role of the Navy be in countering migrant crossings of the Channel?

  1.                 The rationale for using the RN would be to make good the ongoing failure of the Home Office-Border Force in their dealing with illegals. Without robust law & legal guidance, Rules of Engagement would be worthless, open to legal dispute & further evidence of government-parliamentary failure.
  2.             Assuming the law is sufficient to both deter & constrain illegal crossings, the RN should be given political sanction to take full command all existing Border Force maritime assets. Such a stark decision should initiate the generation of a CF to effectively manage & safeguard the EEZ. Funding is referred to later.
  3.             The MoD needs to state clearly & purposefully of their inability to redeploy multi-committed assets to undertake out-of-the-blue commitments, more so with the clear & present threat from Russia. In the longer term the EEZ, especially the Channel in respect to the ongoing illegals’ crisis, has no effective maritime capabilities to police & safeguard critical offshore infrastructure.

What was the process that led to the decision to start the operation and was the National Security Council (NSC) involved?

  1.             It would appear that the NSC was either ignorant of or simply unaware of the over-committed & diminishing assets readily available within the Armed Forces. The MoD must restate the oft ignored Rule of 3. The justification to retain the CASD [nuclear deterrent] requires a minimum four boats, the Rule of 3 has lapsed throughout the Armed Forces during the last three decades; there is a gross insufficiency of military capability to fulfil both the IR & DCP.
  2.             The use of the Armed Forces to deliver Covid supplies, crew ambulances, initiate vaccinations & more, must not be a never-ending source of relief to civil department failures. The Armed Forces’ reductions, weak recruitment & retention of experienced personnel have deep implications on operational preparedness.

How does this fit within the terms of the Integrated Review (IR)?

  1.             There seems to be no parallel to the IR in respect of the ongoing & increasingly toxic migrant crisis. The RN OPVs were originally considered to be Fishery Protection vessels & these limited assets are deployed within the scope of the DCP; there are no realistic capabilities to manage the EEZ: fishing grounds & offshore critical infrastructure.
  2.             Redeploying the increasingly limited Armed Forces to new commitments leaves too many yawning gaps when comparing readily available assets to operational commitments. All too often reports identify Russian interest in submarine cables & increased maritime activity in, or in close proximity to, our disproportionately large EEZ. Both the IR & DCP identify security of the home base to be of great import, alas, there is a veneer of such capability.

What are the operational and political (A) reporting arrangements and (B) associated chain of command, up to and including Cabinet?

  1.             The question infers the MoD has already accepted this multi-hatted & highly emotive new commitment. Irrespective of the forementioned requirements, the RN should have a taut chain of command from which deployed vessels can gain prompt authorisation.

What capabilities do the Armed Forces, particularly the Royal Navy, bring that were not available to the Border Force?

  1.             Discipline, courage, unity of effort & toughness. The unique Service culture, applicable throughout our Armed Forces, has been proven by RN crewed vessels on demanding & highly sensitive operational deployments.

Is this a permanent move of Border Force policy from Home Office to MOD and will the budget be moved accordingly?

  1.             This a bigger issue than merely countering illegals. Border Force has failed, albeit with an undoubted increase in both funding & patrol vessels. There is scant evidence to suggest that if the RN temporarily assumed this role, that Border Force would be transformed into a robust & capable maritime organisation in the future.
  2.             Though distasteful to some, the role should be not merely adopted by the RN but all current funding, facilities & contracts should be transferred to the RN [MoD]. Government & parliament needs to realise & accept that continuing failure cannot be redeemed by funding increases & additional assets alone, a cultural change & strength of resolve is needed.
  3.             A fundamental change is urgently required to ensure the safety, security & effective management of the EEZ & its increasing size & scale of national infrastructure assets which are unprotected. MoD policing assets could be tasked to provide a law enforcement presence, if considered necessary.
  4.             Border Force should refocus as a territorial organisation responsible for internal border control at ports, harbours, airports & airstrips.

What is the potential impact on other Defence commitments?

  1.             Firstly. Without additional assets & suitable legal authorisation, the ongoing failure would be, to all intents & purposes, a hospital pass to the MoD with the likelihood of failure. There is no fast & positive resolution without undertaking fundamental change.
  2.             Secondly. There needs to be political agreement & authorisation to pass full command of all Border Force maritime assets with the associated funding to the RN. Furthermore, this needs legal top cover & a clear understanding that success can only be achieved with progressive development & continued funding of a CF with additional crews & vessels.

What consideration will be given to training the Border Force to take over operations?

  1.             Border Force has failed to stop the illegals, irrespective of their training, additional assets & certification. Merely passing this failed operational commitment to the RN would be immensely challenging, not forgetting the trade union(s), the different operational culture & an insufficiency of legal certainty

How long is the operation expected to last? How will its success be measured? How will mission creep be prevented?

  1.             Should the RN be authorised to assume full command over Border Force maritime assets, with robust legal safeguards, the more immediate success should be considered in a broad context of coastal security & minimising illegals’ ease of access to the UK; this must be treated as an integrated government response. Success being measured over time & with a desire to minimise, if not stop, illegals’ ease of travel & to safeguard the EEZ.
  2.             Mission extension would apply by generating a CF to manage & secure the EEZ &, in the longer-term, the BOTs.

Summary

  1.             The illegals’ movement from the European continent undermines the Home Office roles & responsibility, without any obvious change being evident. The far-reaching implications, with an increasingly angry public opinion, along with international repercussions have been maturing into a black hole & without clear resolution.
  2.             The idea of moving the Border Force-Home Office failure to the MoD without fundamental political, legal & financial change will not address the situation - it is toxic.
  3.             The plain stark truth is, Border Force is incapable of conducting its maritime mission. Additional funding, more vessels & crews, insufficient legislation & the ease of migrants disappearing within the UK has been clear for decades. Passing this ongoing failure to the MoD without fundamental change will not stop illegals being trafficked to an open UK system.
  4.             There is an absolute need for a fundamental change to generate a strong RN-owned CF with a long-term remit to safeguard the EEZ & the associated critical national infrastructure.

Government Recommended Action

  1.             Reduce & then minimise the current surge of illegals by adopting a dynamic approach to strengthen the law. UK Human Rights legislation is currently weak & insufficient to stop the incessant flow of illegals; those who succeed in their venture should be returned to the European continent, which is deemed safe.
  2.             The government should publicise, unambiguously, that legal migration to the UK will continue via the usual channels, whereas illegal migration will no longer be tolerated.
  3.             Inform the French authorities that illegal migrants will be returned to their coastal zone/shores.
  4.             All Border Force vessels, crews, facilities & associated contracts should be transferred to the MoD [RN], thereafter Border Force should be designated as a territorial based organisation.
  5.             A CF should be funded from former EU/0.2% of Overseas Aid funds to grow into a robust force capable of safeguarding the EEZ & Atlantic Ocean BOTs.
  6.             Legal reform is needed. Simplify laws, remove out of date law from the Statute Book so as to take account of the increasing speed of change.
  7.             Tax reform. Simplify taxation & reduce give-aways; thereafter, funds should be directed to strengthen critical infrastructure & national security requirements.

 

 

24 January 2022