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Introduction

The Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security (IPS) is a research programme of the University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government, housed under the Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict. We provide a space for research on the critical challenges facing the law, norms, and institutions affecting the maintenance and enforcement of international peace and global security, with atrocity prevention and response being one of our core areas of focus. In light of the UK's role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and our stated global commitments, we believe Her Majesty's Government has both the opportunity and a responsibility to improve its approach to atrocity prevention. For this reason, we leverage our researchers' collective insight on issues of interest to the Parliamentary Inquiry by responding to its call for evidence through this submission.

Executive Summary

This evidence submission addresses how Her Majesty's Government (HMG) can improve and restructure its approach to atrocity prevention within and outside conflicts. First and foremost, we recommend HMG clearly distinguish its atrocity prevention strategy from its conflict prevention workstream. Specifically, we recommend the FCDO develop a national, cross-government mass atrocity prevention strategy alongside its conflict prevention strategy. Furthermore, we recommend the FCDO develop an integrated architecture that coordinates the implementation of such new capabilities across the Government. This submission also considers how atrocity prevention can be better embedded in the work of UK posts. We recommend HMG strengthen the role of JACS in atrocity early warning, specify what measures and indicators would lead the R2P Focal Point to declare the imminent risk of atrocity, elevate the role of R2P Focal Point to the ministerial level, include an early warning system in the Situation Centre in the Cabinet Office, and provide atrocity preventing training for UK country teams. We also recommend that Parliament passes atrocity prevention legislation. Finally, this submission advances the view that more studies are needed to understand how atrocity prevention interacts with other HMG government policies and areas of work. We submit that 'mainstreaming' atrocity prevention objectives and an 'atrocity prevention lens' into other, if distinct, thematic areas will go a long way in maximising operational synergies and ensuring strategic alignment to the benefit of overall policy coherence.

I. What role should the FCDO play in convening cross-government work on atrocity prevention?

1. Preventing and responding to atrocities is vital to the UK's standing in the world¹ and to the protection and furtherance of our interests and values.² Indeed, as others have noted, atrocity prevention and response is already implicit in both HMG's national security strategy and its foreign policy priorities,³ with the Integrated Review explicitly anchoring prevention as a key focus of UK policy into 2030 at least.⁴ We

¹ https://una.org.uk/sites/default/files/UNA-UK_GlobalBritain_20190207d.pdf

² <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/25137/pdf/>

³ <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/4373/html/>

also believe, as others do, that the Integrated Review and the decision to merge the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office create a genuine opportunity to better integrate atrocity prevention across UK policy and governmental structure.⁵

2. Against this background, as others have done before this very inquiry,⁶ we have welcome recent developments and commitments HMG has made with respect to atrocity prevention and response, including, *inter alia*: the publication in 2019 of the cross-departmental guidance note on the UK's national approach to atrocity prevention;⁷ the appointment of Lord Ahmad as the minister with responsibility for atrocity prevention; and the announcement of plans to establish a Conflict Centre within FCDO to 'draw on expertise from across government and beyond to develop and lead a strategic conflict agenda'.⁸ At the same time, we believe there still a number of ways in which HMG can yet improve is approach to atrocity prevention and strengthen the FCDO's role in convening cross-governmental work on the subject, many of which we have raised in past submissions to Parliamentary inquiries, and have also been long advocated for by other groups in the civil society. These include, most urgently:
3. **(I) Clearly distinguishing HMG's atrocity prevention strategy from its conflict prevention workstream.** While many atrocities do occur in the context of armed conflict, not all conflicts give rise to mass atrocities, and many atrocities occur in the absence of armed conflict.⁹ Moreover, while aligned strategically, conflict prevention and atrocity prevention have important operational differences and risk, at times, working at cross-purposes.¹⁰ There are three main reasons for this:¹¹
4. **Conflict prevention and atrocity prevention have different logics and separate objectives.** While atrocity prevention targets a specific actor and seeks to dissuade it from committing atrocities, conflict prevention targets all relevant parties and seeks to produce consensus and compromise among them. When an occurring or imminent threat of atrocities arises, preventing the commission of atrocities requires targeted measures designed to persuade, deter, or even coerce specific actors seeking to

⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy>

⁵ <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

⁶ Written evidence from Members of the UK Atrocity Prevention Working Group to the International Development Committee's Parliamentary Inquiry on Promoting dialogue and preventing atrocities: the UK government approach.

⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-approach-to-preventing-mass-atrocities>

⁸ Supra 4.

⁹ Dr Orly Stern, Clare Brown, "Mainstreaming Atrocity Prevention: Seeing fragility, conflict, and violence programming through an atrocity prevention lens, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security," (forthcoming) February 2022. Also see: <https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf>, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/between-war-and-peace-preventing-mass-atrocities-outside-armed-conflict>

¹⁰ Federica D'Alessandra, "Atrocity Prevention in a Multilateral Setting: Integrating research and policy to maximise prevention and protection, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security," (forthcoming) February 2022.

¹¹ Supra 9, Stern. Also see: <https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf>, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/between-war-and-peace-preventing-mass-atrocities-outside-armed-conflict>

commit atrocities. Such measures are rarely suitable for the purposes of conflict prevention in general.

5. **Conflict prevention tools and strategies are sometimes unsuited – or indeed, diametrically opposed – to the prevention of mass atrocities.** In Bosnia during 1990s, for example, the international community prioritised conflict resolution over atrocity prevention while ongoing mass atrocities were committed primarily by one party. When an arms embargo was imposed on both the perpetrators and victims of atrocities – a well-founded conflict prevention strategy – it also inhibited the capacity of victims to protect themselves from imminent threats.¹²
6. **Conflict prevention efforts may inadvertently create perverse incentives in the context of atrocities.** Take, for example, the negotiation of peace and ceasefire agreements: armed groups may utilise violence against civilians as a way to assure themselves a seat at the negotiating table, or to utilise commitments to cease attacks as a bargaining tool in negotiations.¹³ In the long term, peace deals that include amnesties for past atrocities and de-prioritise justice and accountability foster a culture of impunity and may fuel future cycles of violence.¹⁴
7. These are only a few examples of the conceptual and operational differences that characterise these interrelated yet distinct agendas. Yet, we believe, they go a long way to demonstrate the real need to decouple atrocity prevention from conflict prevention. This cannot, however, be an exercise in doctrine exclusively. We believe, in fact, that **(II) the development of a national, cross-government mass atrocity prevention strategy is warranted *alongside* its conflict prevention strategy** – a recommendation already made by the Foreign Affairs Committee in its July 2021 report *Never Again: The UK's Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond*.¹⁵ While acknowledging HMG's position that it 'do[es] not [...] presently believe that a national, cross-departmental strategy is needed' given that 'FCDO geographical departments, working with other government departments, are best placed to decide how to tackle atrocity risks in their region',¹⁶ we remain unconvinced that without a strategy that deliberately distinguishes atrocity prevention conceptually and operationally such an objective can, indeed, be appropriately fulfilled. In line with the recommendations of others,¹⁷ we advise that such a strategy should at least be developed around:
8. **Analysis.** Atrocity-specific analysis would considerably improve cross-government capabilities to prevent atrocities and is necessary to shaping policy and integrating atrocity preventive strategies into the work of all relevant Government bodies.¹⁸

¹² <https://una.org.uk/news/una-uk-disappointed-uk's-response-foreign-affairs-committee-inquiry-humanitarian-intervention>

¹³ <https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf>,

https://consultations.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/consultation-template/world-bank-group-strategy-fragility-conflict-and-violence/submissions/protection_approaches_wbg_submission_150719.pdf

¹⁴ Dr Orly Stern, Clare Brown, "Mainstreaming Atrocity Prevention: Seeing fragility, conflict, and violence programming through an atrocity prevention lens, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security," (forthcoming) February 2022.

¹⁵ <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/6624/documents/71430/default/>

¹⁶ <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/7818/documents/81312/default/>

¹⁷ <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

¹⁸ <https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/files/areorientedapproachtoatrocitypreventioninunpeaceoperationsdsouzapdf>

Atrocities present specific indicators, triggers, and risk factors that are not always overlapping with those of conflict prevention and other frameworks.¹⁹ Appropriately identifying these is key to both early warning systems and integrated risk assessments.²⁰ Such dedicated analysis would facilitate the collection, analysis, and sharing of appropriate intelligence across Government departments which is, in turn, key to shaping policy and identifying the most effective tool or course of action in a given situation.²¹ It is also key to coordinating strategies for multilateral action, including, *inter alia*, scenario planning, engaging allies and partners, and developing the capacity to deploy civilian advisors to situations of imminent risk.²² Current risk assessment tools such as the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stabilisation (JACS) used by HMG have not thus far been effective for atrocity early warnings.²³

9. **Communication.** A dedicated mass atrocity prevention strategy would significantly improve HMG’s internal and strategic communication channels. It should establish a clear internal communications protocol on how to monitor and report early warning signs, as well as when and how to mobilise action through the appropriate governmental channels.²⁴ Likewise, as previous research by our Institute demonstrates, institutions concerned with atrocity prevention benefit of, and should thus establish, a clear external / strategic communications strategy on how to effectively raise atrocity concerns and a policy to consistently utilise atrocity terminology.²⁵
10. Furthermore, we submit – as others have also done²⁶ – that such a strategy would require a certain level of **(III) institutionalisation and the development of an integrated architecture that coordinates the implementation of new atrocity prevention capabilities across Government.** In our view, this could comprise:
11. **A dedicated ‘home’ for atrocity prevention *within FCDO*,** distinct from, but which could fall under, the Conflict Centre announced in the Integrated Review, or take the form of a resourced office of the focal point for the Responsibility to Protect. It would act as a ‘clearing house’ for atrocity prevention policy and analysis, act as a liaison with the private sector and the civil society, and support communication channels and convening capabilities both within FCDO as well as Whitehall. We agree with others that FCDO is uniquely positioned to serve in such capacity, help drive the implementation of a potential strategy, promote cross-departmental coherence, consolidate expertise, and address issues related to duplication and coordination.²⁷

¹⁹ https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf

²⁰ Supra, 18.

²¹ Federica D’Alessandra, “Atrocity Prevention in a Multilateral Setting: Integrating research and policy to maximise prevention and protection,” Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, (forthcoming) February 2022.

²² <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

²³ <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

²⁴ <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

²⁵ <https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/files/areorientedapproachtoatrocitypreventioninunpeaceoperationsdsouzpdf>

²⁶ <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

²⁷ <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/4373/pdf/>

12. Such a group or office could also receive and collate information from other government departments with a view to: **(i) support a cross-government steering committee** or working group²⁸ tasked with *implementing* policy and (ii) supporting policy *setting* deliberations by the **National Security Council and the Cabinet Office**,²⁹ thus helping ensure strategic coherence a whole-of-government approach to prevention.
13. At a minimum, HMG should consider **including an early warning system in the Situation Centre in the Cabinet Office** to monitor and analyse risks of mass atrocities. This internal analysis system should incorporate indicators of grievance, trust, and resilience, and be capable of reporting on real-time trends of marginalisation, exclusion, and violence, as outlined in the Integrated Review.³⁰
14. In implementing these recommendations, HMG might consider studying lessons learned from mainstreaming atrocity prevention in US policy under the Obama and subsequent administrations, and consider how these could inform domestic integration into the national security architecture, top-level strategic direction-setting, and bureaucratic institutionalisation.³¹

II. How can atrocity prevention be embedded in the work of UK posts?

15. The development of a national, cross-government mass atrocity prevention strategy (and its related institutionalisation) would be most consequential on the direction and efficacy of UK preventive efforts. Nevertheless, as others have also stated previously, HMG can take a number of other steps to help embed atrocity prevention in the work of UK posts, including:
16. **Rendering the JACS more effective vis-à-vis atrocity early warnings and publishing the most recent update to the guidance note.** The most recent publicly available guidance note (2017) direct analysts ‘to link analytical findings with key relevant thematic areas of government policy, such as Women, Peace and Security, Organised Crime, and Counter-terrorism’, but not atrocity prevention.³² A footnote adds that ‘other areas of policy interest...should be taken into account as relevant UK government priorities and stances develop. These may include migration and peacebuilding, among others’, but again does not specify atrocity prevention.³³ Although we understand that an update to the guidance note might have added, as recently as last year, atrocity risk indicators and trend analyses, rendering JACS effective vis-à-vis atrocity early warnings might require filling additional monitoring

²⁸ <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/4373/pdf/>

²⁹ <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

³⁰ <https://fpc.org.uk/a-response-to-the-integrated-review/>

³¹ The Obama administration adopted a comprehensive atrocity prevention strategy in 2012, which formalised the cross-government Atrocities Prevention Board (APB). This comprised representatives from the Departments of State, Defence, Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, USAID, US Mission to the UN, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, CIA, and Office of the Vice President. The APB was set up as a budget-neutral interagency process, chaired by the NSC Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, and convened monthly to oversee the development and implementation of US atrocity prevention policy. Also see: <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/13696/pdf/>, <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/4373/html/>

³² <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-analysis-of-conflict-and-stability-jacs-guidance-note>

³³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-analysis-of-conflict-and-stability-jacs-guidance-note>

and analysis gaps. For this reason, we look forward to the updated guidance note to be rendered public and to engaging with its substance with a view to improve and support ever more the JACS preventive capacity.

17. **Specifying what measures and indicators would lead the R2P Focal Point to declare that there is an imminent risk of atrocity crimes and what mechanisms and action this would trigger.** HMG should adopt a consistent strategy for atrocity prevention that abides by international standards. To avoid selectivity, real or perceived, around the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), HMG's national mass atrocity prevention strategy should detail precisely what measures and indicators would lead the UK's R2P Focal Point to declare that there is an imminent risk of atrocity crimes in a given situation, and what mechanisms and actions this would trigger.³⁴
18. **Elevating the role of R2P Focal Point to the ministerial level.** Currently, the FCDO's Director of Multilateral Policy serves as the UK's Focal Point for R2P. Increasing the seniority of the R2P Focal Point to ministerial level could elevate atrocity prevention to a more prominent position in HMG, and better enable the UK to take required actions.³⁵
19. **Providing atrocity prevention training for UK country teams.** We believe, as others do, that HMG should provide atrocity prevention training for UK country teams on how to monitor, analyse, communicate and respond to risks of mass atrocities. Such training could be developed and delivered by the office described at paragraph 11 above. In addition to providing such resources to embassies, HMG could designate a well-resourced staff person with responsibility for coordinating in-country atrocity prevention work. As others have noted, it would be helpful to integrate atrocity prevention into the job descriptions and titles of all staff members currently responsible for UK atrocity prevention work.³⁶
20. **Investing in network analysis capabilities.** While identifying, monitoring, and analysing risk indicators of mass atrocities is critical, stakeholder mapping, or 'network analysis', could be much better used by the UK Government in at least two ways. First, network analysis 'allows states to untangle the complex criminal architectures that perpetuate atrocities, and so encourages a more creative and evidenced focus upon how these networks can be disrupted or dismantled'.³⁷ Second, network analysis can be key to assist external actors navigate complex situations and help policymakers assess the efficacy and targeted needs of civil society groups on the ground, as well as identify the right levers and power brokers that can remove barriers to meaningful action, all to the benefit of locally-led preventive efforts.³⁸ Indeed, as others have eloquently put it, 'without an analysis of actors, power structures, and flows of goods and finances, the analysis of risk factors that conventional frames of

³⁴ <https://una.org.uk/keeping-britain-global-preventing-atrocities>

³⁵ <https://una.org.uk/keeping-britain-global-preventing-atrocities>

³⁶ <https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy>

³⁷ Kate Ferguson, *Architectures of Violence: The Command Structures of Modern Mass Atrocities*, 2020. Also see: <https://protectionapproaches.org/being-the-difference>

³⁸ Federica D'Alessandra, Shannon Raj Singh, Stephen J. Rapp, 'Atrocity Prevention in a Transatlantic Setting' *Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security*, June 2020, available:

<https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/files/atrocitypreventioninatransatlanticsetting-finalpdf> Also see: <https://protectionapproaches.org/being-the-difference>

atrocities prevention capture is only partly useful'.³⁹ Carrying out such an analysis could be a joint venture between in-country teams and the office described at paragraph 11 above.

21. Finally, we believe Parliament can be instrumental in advancing HMG's approach to atrocities prevention by **passing legislation similar to the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act** of 2018 by the US Congress. The Act *inter alia* established a Mass Atrocities Task Force within the State Department with similar functions as those described in paragraph 11-12 above; recommended that the Director of National Intelligence include atrocities crime information in their annual report to Congress; authorised training for US Foreign Service Officers (similarly to what is suggested at paragraph 19 above); authorised the Complex Crises Fund, which supports US prevention of or response to atrocities. Most importantly, the Act requires the US government to periodically report back to Congress on its activities and progress vis-à-vis prevention and response.⁴⁰

III. How does the UK Government's approach to atrocities prevention interact with other government policies and areas of work?

22. The importance of **strategic policy coherence and of a 'whole-of-government' approach** to atrocities prevention and response cannot be overstated. Already in our written submission to the Parliamentary inquiry on the UK Trade and Security Relations with China, for example, we highlighted the relevance of atrocities prevention to these two other areas of policy and recommended that HMG incorporate an 'atrocities prevention lens' in its development and operationalisation of trade and security policy vis-à-vis China.⁴¹ The recommendation was endorsed in the ensuing International Relations and Defence Committee report.⁴² Indeed, we believe that recent developments in technology and its use, alongside shifting geo-strategic dynamics, among other factors, impose a compelling need to revise and re-orient both the implementation and strategic direction of prevention and protection frameworks.⁴³
23. Indeed, atrocities prevention is often marginalised in policy circles because considered of lesser importance than other policy workstreams, even of contiguous policy frameworks that share the agenda's protective and preventive goals. As a consequence, preventive objectives are often siloed from other areas of policy, either because atrocities prevention is rarely seen as a priority, or because of tensions perceived to exist around the interoperability of multiple workstreams. These **'zero sum game' dynamics** are, however, **false dichotomies**: to the contrary, as some of our own research demonstrates,⁴⁴ approaching other workstreams with an atrocities prevention lens will help identify alternative possibilities for action and, at a

³⁹ <https://protectionapproaches.org/being-the-difference>

⁴⁰ <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-115publ441>

⁴¹ <https://committees.parliament.uk/WRITTENEVIDENCE/25137/PDF/>

⁴² <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5802/ldselect/ldintrel/62/6202.htm>

⁴³ Federica D'Alessandra, "Atrocities Prevention in a Multilateral Setting: Integrating research and policy to maximise prevention and protection," Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, (forthcoming) February 2022. Also see <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/13696/pdf/>

⁴⁴ Dr Orly Stern, Clare Brown, "Mainstreaming Atrocities Prevention: Seeing fragility, conflict, and violence programming through an atrocities prevention lens, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security," (forthcoming) February 2022.

minimum, shed light on potentially unforeseen mid and long-term consequences of actions taken in accordance with other policy frameworks or priorities. This does not at all mean ‘displacing’ or ‘co-opting’ other policy frameworks, but simply ensuring strategic alignment while seizing on opportunities for operational synergies.⁴⁵

24. If, as we mention above, we believe it is important to understand the conceptual peculiarities and unique operational needs of atrocity prevention (in order to identify and deploy policy tools more deliberately), we also believe that avoiding conflict across multiple workstreams requires an **intersectional approach to policy analysis to understand how agendas intersect**, and where precisely they might converge and diverge: only such an analysis can provide critical insight into the interlinkages of goals, tools, and strategies and how they can be deployed coherently.⁴⁶
25. For example, although as submitted above (paragraphs 3-6) we believe atrocity prevention should be decoupled from conflict prevention, for this has implications, particularly, when it comes to ‘targeted’ prevention, the further away from the actual *commission* of atrocities HMG’s action is situated, the more opportunities there are for alignment around ‘systemic prevention’.⁴⁷ In other words, when it comes to ‘upstreaming’ prevention objectives, the conflict prevention and atrocity prevention agendas certainly present some level of overlap: for example, in relation to structural measures aimed to reduce economic inequality; governance measures aimed at building institutional capacity and reducing corruption; and security measures centred around ending impunity and strengthening the rule of law.⁴⁸ In another example, operational needs in counter-terrorism settings might, at times, conflict with atrocity prevention or civilian protection imperatives.⁴⁹ Yet, all these policy frameworks converge normatively and strategically, and many strategies and tools deployed in countering violent extremism might be highly relevant to atrocity prevention. Understanding how to minimise the tactical and operational tensions manifesting among these policy frameworks in a specific context while furthering their normative and strategic alignment would advance the objectives under all three policy frameworks simultaneously.⁵⁰
26. We believe there is an urgent need to more **systematically identify potential synergies (and tensions) between mass atrocity prevention and other policy areas**. This is particularly true in light of the high degree of correlation between fragile, unstable states and the commission of atrocity crimes.⁵¹ Doing so could, in turn, assist with coordinating the deployment of specific tools pursuant to multiple

⁴⁵ Federica D’Alessandra, “Atrocity Prevention in a Multilateral Setting: Integrating research and policy to maximise prevention and protection,” Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, (forthcoming) February 2022.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ <https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717782.001.0001/acprof-9780198717782>

⁴⁸ <https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf>

⁴⁹ <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/40095/pdf/>

⁵⁰ Federica D’Alessandra, “Atrocity Prevention in a Multilateral Setting: Integrating research and policy to maximise prevention and protection,” Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, (forthcoming) February 2022.

⁵¹ Dr Orly Stern, Clare Brown, “Mainstreaming Atrocity Prevention: Seeing fragility, conflict, and violence programming through an atrocity prevention lens, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security,” (forthcoming) February 2022.

workstreams, such as: the deployment of rapid-response teams; the imposition of targeted sanctions; recommending a role for regional or U.N. peacekeepers (or other multilateral contingents); supporting refugees fleeing violence and other persons at risk; mobilising trade and other relevant authorities towards supply chains and the provision of dual-use technology, some of which might be leveraged positively for preventive purposes, others which might be potentially harmful or disruptive both to atrocity prevention and to UK national security; funding and otherwise supporting documentation and accountability mechanisms, including international courts and tribunals; addressing dangerous speech on multiple platforms through peace-building initiatives, potential counter-speech, and engagement with the private sector, including social media companies; investing in transitional justice mechanisms, reconciliation and peace-making efforts, social cohesion, and inter-faith dialogues; launching disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs for armed actors; and supplying humanitarian assistance to and through trusted civil society actors.⁵²

27. For this reason, we recommend that HMG commissions and commits to funding further research on the intersection between atrocity prevention and contiguous workstreams including, but not limited to: democracy and the rule of law; civilian protection and humanitarian and emergency relief; countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism; organised crime; addressing global fragility; and international justice, among others.⁵³

⁵² <https://www.justsecurity.org/73141/good-governance-paper-no-13-atrocities-prevention-and-response/>

⁵³ For a list of additional potentially relevant frameworks: Federica D'Alessandra, Shannon Raj Singh, Stephen J. Rapp, *Atrocity Prevention in a Transatlantic Setting*, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, June 2020 (at Annex II, starting page 35), available: <https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/files/atrocitypreventioninatransatlanticsetting-finalpdf>