WRITTEN EVIDENCE BY RESULTS UK TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO THE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE OF UK AID, SECOND SUB-INQUIRY

 

About RESULTS UK

 

RESULTS UK seeks to work with others to create the public and political will to end poverty by enabling people to exercise their own personal and political power for change. RESULTS UK is a movement of passionate, committed, everyday people.  Together we use our voices to influence political decisions that will bring together an end to poverty. We undertake strategic policy, parliamentary and grassroots advocacy on four key determinants of poverty: economic opportunities, education, lack of voice and health, with a particular focus on child vaccinations, COVID-19, nutrition, foundational literacy and numeracy, and tuberculosis (TB).

 

This submission responds to the following questions as outlined in the inquiry’s terms of reference, as we are over the word count, a summary is included at the beginning:

 

       Is international aid effective at reducing poverty?

       Is there a ‘gold standard’ that donors should aspire to and are there examples of best practice among donor countries?

       Should aid be finite and, if so, what should be the trigger to ending it?

       Is it helpful to distinguish between humanitarian aid and long-term development spending?

       Should aid be conditional, and what should those conditions be?

       Should the UK have an aid budget? Why is this?

       What should be included in the UK’s international development strategy

       Should all donors work towards the collective aims set out in the Sustainable Development Goals or should they have flexibility to pursue their own priorities and development strategies outlined by recipient countries?

       How is the UK Government held accountable to the UK taxpayer and the countries and communities where the programmes it funds are delivered?

       How does the UK’s aid spending affect how the UK is seen by other countries?

As a member of Bond, the UK Sustainability and Transition Working Group, and Action for Global Health, RESULTS UK endorses their submissions to this inquiry.

 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS UK’S SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO THE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE OF UK AID, SECOND SUB-INQUIRY

 

RESULTS UK is submitting evidence to this inquiry, and as a member of Bond, the UK Sustainability and Transition Working Group, and Action for Global Health, we also endorse their submissions to this inquiry.

 

This one-page summary gives an overview of the answers we have prepared.

 

Philosophy and culture both have key ramifications for the way in which UK aid is distributed. Government policies change as new Prime Ministers and new parties come into power, all of which can have significant impacts on the philosophy an culture of ODA, and its subsequent effectiveness. The Johnson government has made some of the most sweeping changes to UK Aid financing witnessed since the Cameron government introduced the target to spend 0.7% GNI on ODA, and these sweeping changes have erected new and drastic obstacles as the international development sector aims to ensure that ODA is delivered in the most accountable, transparent and effective way possible. The merger of DFID into the FCO has led ICAI to state that there has been a ‘deterioration’ in the accountability process, as well as fears of an increased politicisation of the manner in which ODA is spent.

 

As our submission shows, when spent properly and adopts the principles listed below, ODA can ensure that the health needs of populations are better met, education provision is increased, and can act as an important factor in lifting people out of poverty, and the UK, as one of the world’s wealthiest countries, has an obligation to maintain their commitment to the world’s poorest. This is why RESULTS UK will continue to call for an immediate return to 0.7% at the earliest possible opportunity, to ensure that the damage currently being done to essential aid programmes is mitigated. However, as we seek to make clear throughout the submission, ODA can only act as a temporary measure. Fundamentally, the only long – term, sustainable way of ensuring that people are lifted out of poverty is through functioning democratic government and an effective economy.

 

       Principled – prioritise poverty reduction, not soft power

       Reliable - deliver on commitments

       Holistic – address multiple overlapping drivers of poverty

       Adaptive – adapt to changing needs and respond to emergencies

       Transparent – demonstrate how aid is spent and decisions are made

       Consultative – informed by needs of local people

       Accountable – publish results regularly

 

As we move into a new era for UK aid, with the merger of the FCO into DFID, it’s essential that these principles are adhered to. Accountability mechanisms such as ICAI and the IDC will play an ever more important role in ensuring that the philosophy and culture of UK aid retains its focus on the world’s poorest and most marginalised, and spent in line with the aims and targets set out in the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals.

 

 

Is international aid effective at reducing poverty?

 

International aid is one of many tools that, when deployed correctly, is very effective at reducing poverty. It is largely due to international aid that the number of people in extreme poverty has fallen from just under 2 billion in 1990 to 689 million today[1].

 

However, international aid is no substitute for a functioning government, healthy democracy and strong economy. Where these things are absent, international aid is often necessary in order to save lives or promote good governance – but poverty is only likely to be reduced to a limited extent.

 

 

Is there a ‘gold standard’ that donors should aspire to and are there examples of best practice among donor countries?

 

There is no ‘gold standard’ for international aid but any aid agency should be:

 

        Principled – prioritise poverty reduction, not soft power

        Reliable - deliver on commitments

        Holistic – address multiple overlapping drivers of poverty

        Adaptive – adapt to changing needs and respond to emergencies

        Transparent – demonstrate how aid is spent and decisions are made

        Consultative – informed by needs of local people

        Accountable – publish results regularly

 

The goal of poverty reduction has historically led UK Aid. The DFID-FCO merger risks undermining the poverty focus of UK Aid by having development staff report to diplomats in country offices. The focus on the Integrated Review in the development of the current International Development Strategy marks a shift from the poverty focus of DFID towards a more diplomacy or security focused strategy. Recent research found development interventions undertaken in the name of security struggled to achieve their intended outputs[2].

 

The IDC, ICAI and other reporting mechanisms have ensured UK Aid is largely transparent and accountable and aspiring to achieving a ‘gold standard’.  Unfortunately, the DFID-FCO merger and the removal of an International Development Secretary have undermined this. ICAI ranked the FCDO ‘inadequate’ for transparency, stating there has been a “deterioration during the merger process[3].”

 

As well as principles, there are evidenced high impact interventions.

 

The Government's Multilateral Development Review[4] scored 21 out of 38 multilateral organisations as either ‘Very Good’ or ‘Good’ against its ‘organisational strength’ indices. The size and buying power of multilaterals enables them to shape markets and spread risk across projects. Gavi provides the full course of WHO recommended vaccines for $28 compared with the US price of $1100[5]. The Global Fund has saved countries $42.3 million by achieving price reductions and preventing wastage.

 

​​Multilateral organisations are highly effective at delivering a specific intervention at scale but not all development challenges are best addressed through a multilateral organisation. For example, interventions tackling malnutrition need to span health systems, food systems, social protection and markets. All these interventions require different infrastructure and expertise far beyond the ability of one organisation. Consequently, nutrition programmes are delivered through a variety of channels.

 

ICAI recently scored UK Aid nutrition programmes as ‘Green/Amber,’ concluding that nutrition interventions are “one of the most cost-effective development actions[6].” Interventions to improve nutrition are so effective because malnutrition prevents the development of a healthy immune system, contributing to 45% of all under-5 deaths and reducing the effectiveness of other interventions, such as vaccines and treatments[7]. Despite the effectiveness of ODA for nutrition, the FCDO is cutting its funding by 80%[8].

 

To maximise the impact of UK ODA, the FCDO should:

 

  1. Prioritise well evidenced high impact interventions like health, nutrition and education;
  2. Channel funding through established partners with a strong record of effectiveness;
  3. Adhere to the basic principles set out at the top of this section.

 

 

Should aid be finite and, if so, what should be the trigger to ending it? ; Should aid be conditional, and what should those conditions be?

As aid advocates and actors it should go without saying that we should all aspire for a world where we cease to exist in our current capacity and there is no longer a need for an ‘aid system’ to address poverty, inequality and other long term development challenges. In this sense, aid in its current form, must ultimately be finite. There are however, some interesting newer concepts such as Global Public Investment[9], which proposes a statutory contribution model as a more sustainable, collective and empowering way to organise international development cooperation and tackle inequality. It presents a number of potentially revolutionary ideas which merit further exploration and serious consideration, including by the International Development Committee.

 

In the meantime, there are a number of core principles that must be considered when assessing the conditionality and finality of development assistance. Firstly, decisions around the withdrawal of ODA must be conducted in a transparent and evidence-based manner, with poverty and inequality alleviation, and sustaining development gains at its heart. Any policy on aid allocation must recognise the context, including the strength of domestic health systems, of countries transitioning from low to middle-income status. Shifts in economic status can trigger an often unmanaged and inflexible reduction in aid support, with domestic resources expected to replace international funding. Decisions to reduce aid to a particular country are usually made using economic indicators alone, such as GNI per capita. However, these indicators often mask inequalities. Recent findings from the World Bank reveal that 82% of “the new poor”[10] may be concentrated in middle income countries. Decisions about aid allocation must, therefore, consider contextual indicators, such as health service coverage, disease burden, political strength and stability, physical infrastructure, and fiscal space.

 

To retain progress on poverty reduction in countries transitioning away from aid, the FCDO should coordinate directly with multilaterals and other donors to mitigate the risks of transitioning out of multiple sources of funding at the same time. Decisions to withdraw aid should not be taken in isolation. Before the decision to withdraw funding is made, the UK should undertake a comprehensive analysis of the health financing landscape in the country. This should also consider national government intentions to increase their domestic contribution to health, the available fiscal space and actively take into consideration changes in financing from other donors (both bilateral and multilateral). This is required if a truly cross sectoral transition plan, which considers the full impact of any individual transition, is to be developed. A timeline of the transition process should also be well communicated to all stakeholders with adequate notice to allow for appropriate planning to sustain progress.

 

Finally, donors like the UK must avoid the temptation to instrumentalise aid as a means of pursuing self-interest and instead allow aid spending to be determined by demonstrated poverty impact and alignment with locally articulated poverty alleviation priorities. In order to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and ensure that ‘no one is left behind’ [11], prioritising and pursuing aid that reaches communities most in need, and moving away from aid as a means to advance national self-interest, will be critical. The UK could serve as an example to other wealthy countries, and contribute to a global shift in aid approach and delivery towards effective poverty alleviation and the attainment of the SDGs. Consultation, communication and coordination with governments in countries of implementation, other donors of aid, civil society, and affected communities will be essential in ensuring this. 

 

Should the UK have an aid budget? Why is this?

As one of the richest economies in the world and a former imperial superpower, there is a moral imperative for the UK to have an aid budget. As a nation of plenty, the UK has an obligation to those who are less fortunate by virtue of where they were born. The notion that those with the broadest shoulders should contribute the most is a widely accepted approach to progressive taxation; thus, the UK should continue to play a leading role in financing and supporting approaches which drive down the levels of global poverty.

It is also widely accepted that European colonialism is a significant cause of ongoing inequity[12]. The UK must continue to play a role addressing the consequences of its historical actions - an aid budget is one way in which it can do this. 

 

What should be included in the UK’s international development strategy

The International Development Strategy is being introduced at a critical juncture for international development outcomes. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen progress on key human development indicators set back by years, and as we move swiftly towards the 2030 deadline for the SDGs, it has never been more urgent to invest in sustainable and ethical international development. 

The SDG framework remains a relevant blueprint to eliminating extreme poverty by 2030. It can only be achieved if all donors, including the UK, ensure that their ODA budget, delivered at 0.7% of GNI, remains focussed on poverty and inequality alleviation. The SDGs are supported by other strategies that have further defined indicators to assist the achievement of these goals. This includes Universal Health Coverage (UHC), Index of Service Coverage and Immunisation Agenda 2030 (IA2030). The International Development Strategy must set out a clear pathway to achieving the SDGs, outlining the UK’s role within the wider global and multilateral ecosystem and setting ambitious, measurable targets for building back on the progress lost through the course of the pandemic. It must commit to tackling the pandemic, and redressing the current inequity in global access to COVID tools, including vaccines, that has resulted from rich countries, including the UK, hoarding these tools. This commitment must be evidenced through genuine, transparent and urgent action on dose sharing, upscaling domestic manufacture through sharing of intellectual property, and financing for the COVID response that comes in addition to the existing 0.5% aid allocation. Diverting the already shrunk aid budget for short term COVID response risks further rolling back progress against the SDGs, and further harming the UK’s reputation on aid.

Broader investment in health systems strengthening is imperative to both an effective and equitable COVID response and getting the world on track to achieving the UN 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development[13]. It is crucial that this 8-year Strategy outlines and commits the UK to an approach of strengthening global health infrastructure that would enable these challenges described above to be met. This must include moving to a system of Universal Health Coverage which comprises appropriate nutrition interventions, support for routine immunisation services and infectious disease control, alongside other key development interventions like education and research and development (R&D).

The International Development Strategy should include a democratic approach to decision making. This will enable a more effective use of ODA, guided by strategic priorities identified by countries of implementation, and subsequently increase opportunities for countries to become self-sustaining. This would require decisions that are based on local and national knowledge that encapsulates the political economy of a country, thus becoming more targeted, realistic in achieving the set goals, and produces long term results. Otherwise, donors can erroneously push plans according to their own priorities, focus on specific issues that may not fit within the wider health or education system, and compose timelines that conflict with the country government’s and other donors’ strategies. Recent research shows that incorrect assumptions around the political economy of the country, over-optimism and ownership issues were common problems that undermined the effectiveness of 144 securitised UK aid projects from 2000 to 2018 in Kenya, South Sudan and Nigeria[14].

It is critical that, in drafting the International Development Strategy, the UK avoids the temptation to instrumentalise aid as a means of pursuing self-interest, whether that be for diplomatic, trade or strategic purposes. Instead, the UK must allow its aid spending to be determined by demonstrated poverty impact, ending preventable deaths and alignment with locally articulated poverty alleviation priorities.

 

Should all donors work towards the collective aims set out in the Sustainable Development Goals or should they have flexibility to pursue their own priorities and development strategies outlined by recipient countries?

The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been designed as a ‘blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all’[15]. These goals, adopted by the United Nations in 2015, committed signatories to working collaboratively to address significant thematic policy challenges both internationally and domestically.

Through the use of international agreements such as the SDGs, the global community can focus its collective resources and capacity on addressing the most acute issues of poverty alleviation, climate change and inequality. Countries often advance their own priorities when they are ‘motivated by the need to control, account and be visible’[16] - but this is not sufficient to address challenges of the 21st Century. Multilateral agreements, such as the SDGs, help to bridge individual countries' domestic political issues and global transnational development, environmental and rights-based challenges. An internationally agreed framework to address global issues decreases the likelihood of them becoming heavily politicised - a common risk factor of bilateral aid[17]. Having nations work through ‘multilateral channels appears less politicised, more demand-driven, more selective in terms of poverty criteria and a better conduit for global public goods’[18] and encourages collaboration rather than fragmentation.

The freedom to set development agendas on a national basis also risks prioritisation of self-interest. As previously mentioned, it is critical that development initiatives are not based on diplomacy or soft power, but are centred around poverty alleviation and ending preventable deaths.

 

How is the UK Government held accountable to the UK taxpayer and the countries and communities where the programmes it funds are delivered?

The IDC and ICAI are important mechanisms for accountability to UK taxpayers. The FCDO should improve its accountability to communities that it delivers programmes in. As evidenced by recent cuts to the UK’s aid budget, ODA spending decisions are often fast tracked by ministers and civil servants in Whitehall with little to no consultation with local NGOs, partner governments or people who will be affected. The FCDO should build on the progress made by DFID in decentralising and localising funding decisions to country offices to ensure consultation with local partners.

The UK Government should increase its partnerships with local civil society organisations from communities where UK aid is spent. It should increase its work with those that have local expertise rather than parachuting in international consultants, alongside reversing its decision to make the FCDO a ‘reserved’ department which bars the hiring of foreign nationals for security concerns[19]. Failing to do so further disenfranchises local communities, perpetuates problematic north-south power dynamics and reduces the impact of aid by side-lining local expertise.

Concentration of funding and resources in northern donors and aid organisations also results in projects being designed, and personnel hired, according to the priorities and perspectives of the funder, rather than the local organisations and communities where it is being spent. Donor reporting is extractive and fails to take into account the realities of small southern NGOs that find it disproportionately burdensome on their organisational capacity. The result is that limited time and resources are exhausted filling in extensive reporting instead of being used for project planning, implementation and activities. The onus of accountability is heavily skewed towards the local partners, rather than donors being accountable to communities. Ultimately, countries like the UK need to be more comfortable with the notion of ceding some power over how and where ODA is spent to partner countries in the Global South for more effective ODA spending.

 

What is the role of different development actors such as International Financial Institutions, multilateral organisations, large International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), small INGOs and national NGOs?

As the previous section covers the need for greater localisation of UK aid and the fostering of closer ties with local and national NGOs, this section will highlight the role of multilateral organisations, as RESULTS UK has significant experience in working with them and advocating for their partnerships with the UK.

A large proportion of the UK’s engagement internationally is through the multilateral system. The UK is the second largest state funder of the WHO, at £340m over the next four years. The UK has also made large commitments to health multilaterals such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (£1.4bn over three years), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the COVAX facility (£1.6bn over five years and £560m respectively), and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (£400m over 4 years).

Some multilaterals are facing devastating cuts, despite the government’s commitments, including several UN agencies whose funding has been cut by over £200 million. For example, the FCDO will give just £5 million to GPEI in 2021 – a 95% cut. The UK’s cut to GPEI is doubly crippling because the FCDO is one of the few donors that gives unrestricted funding, which can be used flexibly and with maximum impact. COVID-19 has decimated already weak health systems around the world and has left more children - almost exclusively in low-income countries - vulnerable to vaccine preventable diseases such as polio. The cuts will profoundly affect the ability of the GPEI to protect communities from polio and the failure to operationalise pledges will result in a resurgence of polio and renewed international spread. They will also hinder the programme’s ability to support work on other health needs. With its extensive outreach in underserved areas, knowledge of vaccine logistics, disease surveillance and ability to reach communities not served by other resources, the polio network has played a unique role in ensuring that COVID-19 countermeasures reach marginalised communities[20].

 

While other multilaterals like Gavi and the Global Fund seem to be relatively protected in comparison, there remains a risk that the UK will not fulfil their existing pledges given that a significant proportion of remaining funding will fall in the scope of the next spending review, which is still yet to be announced. The UK’s existing commitments to Gavi and the Global Fund are based on sound business cases which were accepted by the UK Government, and it’s clear that they are among the best ways to invest ODA to achieve the Government’s priorities of strengthening global health and ending preventable deaths. It is important that the UK keeps these international commitments, even within the reduced overall ODA budget, to ensure these global health partnerships are properly funded to do their vital work, particularly at this time of crisis. Budgeting for a significant financial contribution to future multilateral replenishments, including the upcoming seventh Global Fund replenishment, will also be critical in wider health systems strengthening and pandemic preparedness.

 

The fact that some multilateral financing has been safeguarded is putting extra pressures on the bilateral ODA portfolio. A two-thirds cut to the UK’s bilateral ODA portfolio is being reported[21]. Such a drastic cut will have significant implications and will inevitably lead to some programmes winding down with immediate effect.  Concern Worldwide have been forced to close their health programme in Bangladesh after receiving a 100% funding cut from the FCDO[22]. Similarly, Stir Education had 100% of the FCDO funding for their work in Uganda cut with just three weeks’ notice[23]. These cuts are not unique to these organisations with many others reporting that they are in similar positions. Moreover, the UK’s increased focus on the Indo-Pacific region comes at the expense of Africa, from which UK aid is being disproportionately cut[24]. As previously mentioned, the UK should take a collaborative approach with multilateral organisations and NGOs for spending allocations aligned with recipient priorities. Additionally, a timeline of planned reduction of spending should be well communicated to all stakeholders whilst also allowing for adequate notice to enable appropriate planning.

 

How does the UK’s aid spending affect how the UK is seen by other countries?

The Government’s decision to renege on its manifesto commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA has done significant damage to the UK’s international reputation. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to rage around the world, the UK Government became the only G7 country to cut its aid budget during a time of unprecedented global humanitarian crisis. As others, such as France[25], have stepped up and committed to increase their aid spending, the UK’s decision to cut its ODA budget by over £4 billion signalled a clear lack of solidarity with the global COVID-19 response, an absence of long-term strategy, and a retreat from the international stage.

This insular approach has significantly undermined the strength of UK diplomacy at key fundraising moments such as the Global Education Summit (GES), which it recently co-hosted with Kenya. When it was the UK’s duty to galvanise pledges from other countries so that the target of raising $5 billion for the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) was achieved, the UK instead fell £170 million short of the £600 million that was required from the UK and called for by parliamentarians of all parties. This occurred against the backdrop of cuts where the UK Government slashed its education ODA budget by at least 25%. This meant that for the first time in history, a host of a major education financing conference has simultaneously cut its funding for education. It should come as no surprise that the GPE fundraising target was missed by $1 billion due in large part to the UK failing to inspire other donors to pledge ambitiously.

The Government’s decision to end its commitment to 0.7% also overshadowed the G7 Summit. Sharp criticism came from the US administration with Head of USAID, Samantha Power, calling the UK’s decision a ‘colossal blow to international peace and security’[26]. There was a widespread sense that the cuts hampered a Summit which in different circumstances could have achieved more. Disappointment at the G7 and GES, means that there is now even greater pressure on UK diplomacy to deliver at COP26, a job that has been made much harder by the Government’s recent approach to aid spending.

The UK has not only cut funding of its bilateral ODA programming. Whilst countries such as Canada announced new commitments to help eradicate polio[27] and was elected to GPEI’s Polio Oversight Board[28], helping to set the strategic direction of the partnership[29], the UK further ostracised itself as an donor outlier as they reneged on their aforementioned commitments to GPEI in 2021.

Ultimately, in so dramatically cutting UK spending on ODA, the Government has significantly damaged its international credibility and undermined its ability to influence other countries as a force for good in the world. This has been the UK’s second significant strategic error in the space of a year, after the Government also disbanded its world-leading independent aid agency, DFID, and merged it with the FCO. This further denigrated well-earned trust and admiration for the quality and independence of UK aid programming.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


[1] World Bank 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/10/07/global-action-urgently-needed-to-halt-historic-threats-to-poverty-reduction#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20extremely%20poor,year%20between%202015%20and%202017.

[2] Petrikova, I. and Lazell, M. (2021). “Securitized” UK aid projects in Africa: Evidence from Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan. Development Policy Review.

[3] ​​https://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/How-UK-aid-learns.pdf

[4] Raising the standard: the Multilateral Development Review, 2016, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/573884/Multilateral-Development-Review-Dec2016.pdf

[5] UK Government press release, “UK to host Gavi pledging conference in 2020”, 13 February 2019, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-tohost-gavi-pledging-conference-in-2020

[6] ICAI, Assessing DFID’s Results in Nutrition, 16 September 2020, available at https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/assessing-dfids-results-in-nutrition/summary/

[7] WHO malnutrition factsheet, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malnutrition

[8] https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/media-centre/press-releases/uk-government-set-to-cut-malnutrition-programmes-by-80-percent

[9] https://globalpublicinvestment.org/

[10] Howton, E. (2020). Poverty Overview. [online] World Bank. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview.

[11] https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/leave-no-one-behind

[12] Acemoglu, D, Robinson, J (2017) ‘The economic impact of colonialism’ - VOXEU - https://voxeu.org/article/economic-impact-colonialism

 

[13] https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda

[14] Petrikova, I. and Lazell, M. (2021). “Securitized” UK aid projects in Africa: Evidence from Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan. Development Policy Review.

[15] http://ggim.un.org/meetings/2017-4th_Mtg_IAEG-SDG-NY/documents/A_RES_71_313.pdf

[16] Gulranjani, N (2016) ‘Bilateral versus multilateral aid channels: Strategic choices for donors’ - ODI - https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/10492.pdf - p20

[17] Ibid - p10

[18] Ibid - p20

[19] ​​ William Worley, Exclusive: FCDO to become ‘reserved’ department, will not be hiring foreign nationals, 2020, available from: https://www.devex.com/news/

[20] WHO, Contributions of the Polio Network to the COVID-19 Response, October 2020, available at https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/contributions-of-the-polio-network-to-the-covid-19-response-turning-the-challenge-into-an-opportunity-for-polio-transition

[21] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/foreign-aid-must-be-cut-by-two-thirds-to-meet-target-0lhc3gmxx

[22] https://www.concern.org.uk/news/uk-aid-cuts-sledgehammer-blow-our-health-project-bangladesh

[23] https://stireducation.org/april-media-round-up/

[24] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/apr/28/african-countries-facing-66-cut-in-uk-aid-charities-say

[25] Devex (2021) France approves massive increase of ODA budget. https://www.devex.com/news/france-approves-massive-increase-of-oda-budget-100467#:~:text=French%20lawmakers%20have%20passed%20a,official%20development%20assistance%20by%202025

[26] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-mp-vote-overseas-aid-b1804189.html

[27] GPEI, Canada Announces New Commitments to GPEI Endgame Strategy, available at https://polioeradication.org/news-post/canada-announces-new-commitments-to-gpei-endgame-strategy/

[28] GPEI, POB letter, June 2021, available at https://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Polio-Oversight-Board-Newsletter-20210630.pdf

[29] GPEI, POB Terms of Reference, available at https://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Polio-Oversight-Board-Terms-of-Reference.pdf