5
Memorandum from the Clerk of the Committee
This chronology sets out the key events covered in the Treasury Committee's report into Lessons from Greensill Capital.
Table 1: Greensill Chronology
Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
Late 2011 | Lex Greensill sets up his business, an Australian company. | Oral evidence from Lex Greensill, Q180 Q244
|
2015 | Greensill gains its first customers in the United Kingdom. | Oral evidence from Lex Greensill, Q245
|
End of 2016 | Sanjeev Gupta acquires Wyelands Bank through a Change in Control. | Oral evidence from Andrew Bailey, Q 177, 24 May 2021 |
July 2018 | Taulia replaces Citibank as the provider of the Government’s Pharmacy Early Payment Scheme (PEPS). Taulia contracted Greensill to provide the financing necessary for the scheme. This was the first UK Government contract funded by Greensill. | Written evidence from the Treasury
Oral evidence from Lex Greensill, Q245
|
Late 2018 | PRA becomes aware that Wyelands Bank had adopted a large exposures structure that seemed (to the PRA) to be intended to circumvent the large exposure rules to give it the ability to do "too much lending, more than is safe, to connected members related to or part of the GFG Alliance." | |
18 March 2019 | A Financial Times article reports on concerns around links between Lex Greensill, Sanjeev Gupta, and Tim Haywood, from GAM Holdings, an investment firm, one of whose funds provided finance to Greensill, and reports that Mr Haywood was fired from GAM for “gross misconduct”. | |
10 June 2019 | Lord Myners tables a Parliamentary Question about whether the Government was “investigating, or intend to investigate, the (1) management of, (2) investment valuations used by, and (3) relationships between managers and businesses invested in, the GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund”. | |
19 June 2019 | A Reuters article quotes Lord Myners as saying that “The FCA needs to be looking at the processes followed by GAM and the appropriateness of the investments for a fund that was marketed as low risk”. | |
October / November 2019 | Bank of England informs the National Crime Agency of its concerns around Wyelands Bank. | Oral evidence from Andrew Bailey, Q 153, 24 May 2021 |
December 2019 | From December 2019 onwards, the PRA shares information with the Treasury “pretty fully and fairly regularly” about PRA interactions with Wyelands Bank. | |
Q1 2020 | Wyelands Bank decides to undertake a solvent winddown of its balance sheet, prompted by continued delays in repayments from customers introduced to Wyelands by the GFG Alliance, and ongoing concerns about Wyelands’ other exposures. | |
February 2020 | Bank of England shares its concerns around Wyelands Bank with the Serious Fraud Office. | Oral evidence from Andrew Bailey, Q 153, 24 May 2021 |
March 2020 | As part of a dialogue with the German regulator, BaFin, the PRA receives limited information suggesting that there was a “possible weakness in controls” at Greensill. | |
5 March 2020 | David Cameron asks Sir Tom Scholar for the contact details of Sir Jon Cunliffe. He then emails Sir Jon asking what the Governor meant in remarks to the Treasury Committee about supply chain finance. | |
15 March 2020 | Lex Greensill emails Sir Jon Cunliffe and says that fixed income investors supporting the financing of supply chains had been stepping back over the last week, “meaning liquidity could well become a major issue in the coming days.” | |
17 March 2020 | Lex Greensill writes to the Chancellor recommending the reactivation of the Asset Purchase Facility. | |
20 March 2020 | Greensill makes an application to join the CCFF. | |
21 March 2020 | An email to Charles Roxburgh, apparently from a Treasury official, notes that the Treasury ought to press on the geographical spread of suppliers, since Greensill’s “pitch” was that this was an opportunity to bail out important parts of the UK real economy. | |
22 March 2020 | Bank of England refers Greensill’s application to join the CCFF and its suggested criteria changes to the Treasury. | |
23 March 2020 | The Treasury launches the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS). | |
30 March 2020 | The Treasury responds to the Bank of England to say that the Chancellor did not intend to change the criteria for the CCFF, and the Bank of England informs Greensill of this fact. | |
30 March 2020 | Conference call between Charles Roxburgh, junior Treasury officials, Lex Greensill, and Bill Crothers, where Greensill offers to adapt its proposal to align with CCFF rules. | |
31 March 2020 | David Cameron calls Sir Tom Scholar, emphasising Greensill's willingness to revise its proposal. | |
Between 30 March and 3 April 2020 | Greensill approaches the Treasury again, with further proposals for the change of terms to the CCFF and their application. | |
3 April 2020 | Charles Roxburgh writes to Greensill to say that the Treasury would not consider Greensill's request to expand CCFF to accommodate Greensill's programmes any further. | |
3 April 2020 | David Cameron approaches the Bank asking for clarity on why the Treasury considered that the amended Greensill proposals did not qualify. Mr Cameron is told that it is a matter for the Treasury, and is pointed to the fact that the CCFF was aimed at non-financial corporates. | |
Between 3 and 7 April 2020 | David Cameron contacts the Chancellor, Sir Tom Scholar, Sheridan Westlake OBE, Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, Rt Hon Jesse Norman MP, John Glen MP, Sir Jon Cunliffe. | |
7 April 2020 | Call between David Cameron, Sir Tom Scholar, and Charles Roxburgh. | |
7 April 2020 | The Treasury proposes an option to Greensill that was compatible with the terms of the CCFF. Greensill did not wish to pursue this option. | Written evidence from the Treasury
|
13 April 2020 | Greensill shares a revised proposal with the Treasury. | |
14 April 2020 | Treasury sends the Bank of England a revised proposal from Greensill | |
14 and 15 April | Bank of England analyses the revised proposal and concludes that it did not meet the CCFF’s existing eligibility criteria, and emails the Treasury explaining how Greensill's proposal deviates from the CCFF Market Notice. | |
20 April 2020 | The Treasury contacts the Bank regarding options to extend the CCFF to support supply chain finance to SMEs. | |
20 April 2020 | The Treasury launches the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS). | |
23 April 2020 | The Chancellor texts Mr Cameron and says that he has “pushed the team to explore an alternative with the Bank that might work.” | |
May 2020 | Bank of England formally writes to the Treasury about issues at Wyelands Bank. The Treasury passes the information on to BEIS in May. | |
1 May 2020 | Treasury issues confidential Call for Evidence with “potential targeted changes to the terms of the CCFF which, if implemented, would promote quicker payments of invoices by CCFF-eligible corporates to their UK SME suppliers”. | |
4 May 2020 | The Treasury launches the Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLS). | |
5 May 2020 and 11 May 2020 | The Treasury and Greensill hold phone calls to discuss “Greensill’s views on the call for evidence, Greensill’s business model and the SCF market”. | |
13, 14, and 15 May 2020 | The Treasury and Greensill hold phone calls to discuss how to ensure that the scheme extension should benefit, in the main, UK SMEs. | |
18 May 2020 | The Treasury tells the Bank of England that the Chancellor had decided not to proceed with an extension to the CCFF. | |
18 May 2020 | Greensill sends a revised proposal to the Treasury, and the Treasury passes this on to the Bank of England. | |
27 May 2020 | Treasury officials hold calls with Greensill representatives about Greensill’s new proposals. | |
28 May 2020 | Treasury officials and Bank of England officials hold calls with Greensill representatives about Greensill’s new proposals. | |
1 June 2020 | Sir Tom Scholar’s mobile phone has to be reset, after being automatically locked when an incorrect password was entered several times. | |
4 June 2020 | Greensill is formally accredited under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS). | |
4 June 2020 | The Bank of England shares a note with the Treasury on Greensill’s proposals. | |
26 June 2020 | The Treasury tells Greensill for the final time that it would not be eligible for the CCFF. Charles Roxburgh holds a conference call with Lex Greensill and Bill Crothers; and John Glen MP, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, sends a letter to Lex Greensill and texts David Cameron. | |
July 2020 | The Bond and Credit Co. (BCC) and Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co. Limited (TMNF) start to develop particular concerns about Greensill which make them reluctant to provide any insurance cover. | |
October 2020 | The potentially serious nature of the financial difficulties at Greensill begins to become apparent to PRA supervisors. | |
Mid-December 2020 | BaFin proposes a plan to reduce Greensill’s particular exposure to one customer, which Lex Greensill says “was going to be impossible to comply with”. At this point, according to Lex Greensill, he begins to have concerns about the position of Greensill, the company, as opposed to concerns relating to the impact of Covid on Greensill clients. | Oral evidence from Lex Greensill, Q97
|
December 2020 | Lex Greensill calls David Cameron and tells him that the planned capital raising was not going as well as had been hoped. According to David Cameron, this is the first time he became concerned that the company might be in serious financial difficulty. | |
3 November 2020 | Bank of England passes information about BaFin’s concerns about Greensill Bank on to the Treasury. | |
1 March 2021 | Greensill’s main UK entity, Greensill Capital UK (GCUK) loses the benefit of approximately $4.6bn insurance cover under an insurance policy intended to cover newly originated assets. | |
2 March 2021 | GCUK ceases to originate new assets | |
4 March 2021 | Credit Suisse accelerates a $140m loan to Greensill’s holding company, and demands immediate payment from GCUK, as guarantor. | |
8 March 2021 | Administrators appointed to Greensill Capital |
References to oral and written evidence are references to evidence to the Treasury Committee.