(SCC0047)

Written evidence submitted by Professor Alison L Young

 

 

Select committees and Contempts: Clarifying and Strengthening Powers to Call for Persons, Papers and Records

 

 

  1. This evidence is provided by Professor Alison L Young. I am the Sir David Williams Professor of Public Law at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Robinson College. I have over 20 years of experience of teaching constitutional law at the Universities of Oxford and of Cambridge, as well as an extensive range of publications on issues of public law.

 

Executive Summary

 

  1. I support the introduction of legislation to reinforce the ability of select committees of the House of Commons to call for persons, papers and records.

 

  1. However, I am concerned that, in its current form, the ability of the courts to indirectly question the conclusion of a select committee that a witness did not have a reasonable excuse to fail to comply with a summons of a select committee could potentially breach Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689.

 

  1. In addition, I am concerned that a blanket provision may fail to recognise that select committees of the House of Commons may summon private individuals, as well as members of the Government and the civil service, members of the House of Commons and members of the House of Lords. Moreover, when performing their functions, select committees of the House of Commons may directly or indirectly hold private individuals to account, including private individuals who are not performing governmental functions. The creation of a broad provision to impose fines or imprisonment for failing to comply with a summons without reasonable excuse may create uncertainty, as well as potentially giving rise to situations in which the proposed Draft Bill is applied in a manner that may frustrate its purposes.

 

  1. In order to counter these difficulties, I recommend that a Schedule be added to the proposed Draft Bill to provide a non-exclusive list of reasonable excuses. This would reduce the potential impact of the proposed Draft Bill on Article 9 of the Bill of Rights as courts would be interpreting statutory provisions when assessing whether a witness had a reasonable excuse. The inclusion of a Schedule may minimise potential clashes between Parliament and the courts as to the definition of a reasonable excuse.

 

  1. A non-exclusive list of reasonable excuses may also further legal certainty. The list could take account of how the meaning of a reasonable excuse varies depending on the identity of the person summoned to provide evidence, documents or information, in addition to the purpose of the inquiry of the select committee. The list would need to be non-exclusive to ensure courts were able to develop new examples of a reasonable excuse similar to those listed in the Schedule when this was required to balance individual rights and parliamentary accountability.

 

  1. I also agree that a Standing Order or a resolution of the House of Commons is the best means through which to clarify the protection of the right to a fair hearing for witnesses who appear before select committees. Any such Standing Order or resolution should be based on guiding principles as opposed to rules, providing examples of how these principles apply to different categories of witness and aims of select committee inquiries to provide clarity for both select committees and potential witnesses.

 

What is the primary role of select committees and what should be the practical limits of the application of their powers (as delegated to them by the House)?

 

  1. The primary role of select committees is to hold the Government to account. However, the role of select committees has evolved and it is important to recognise the breadth of new roles of select committees when assessing the practical limits on their powers and also the possible solutions to the problems that arise when witnesses fail to respond to a summons of a select committee.

 

  1. Select committees in the House of Commons may focus on activities other than those of the Government, also evaluating the activities of Members of Parliament who are not members of the Government (for example the Committee on Standards). Other select committees are concerned with the business of the House of Commons more generally (for example, the Backbench Committee, Committee of Privileges, the Procedure Committee and the Petition Committee). Select committees may also scrutinise delegated legislation (e.g. the select committee on Statutory Instruments).

 

  1. Select committees whose primary role is to hold governmental departments to account may also perform other roles. Select committees may also monitor activities. Monitoring focuses more generally on gathering information and less specifically on holding the Government to account. Monitoring may precede accountability or may focus more generally on gathering information relevant to the areas within the specific remit of the select committee.

 

  1. Select committees may also conduct general inquiries that are not concerned specifically with holding the Government to account, focusing instead on providing potential solutions to specific current issues or problems within the ambit of the committee.

 

  1. Moreover, select committees may conduct inquiries that hold others to account for their activities.[1] General inquiries may also indirectly hold non-governmental bodies to account.[2]

 

  1. A recognition of these different functions is important. It is also important to recognise that select committees may hold non-governmental bodies to account, including those who are not performing a governmental function as well as those performing governmental functions. The greatest harm to parliamentary accountability occurs when the failure of a witness to appear before a select committee hinders the primary function of a select committee of holding the government to account. The harm to parliamentary accountability may be less serious when a witness fails to respond to a summons to provide expert evidence in a broader inquiry where evidence can be obtained elsewhere from other experts. However, there may be problems that arise if the select committee is not able to hear evidence from experts presenting a wide range of viewpoints. Although parliamentary accountability may not be harmed directly when select committee inquiries hold non-governmental bodies to account for their actions, this may still harm parliamentary accountability indirectly. There is also greater harm when private individuals or institutions who fail to give evidence are performing governmental functions.

 

  1. Any solution to the practical problems of witnesses who fail to respond to a summons to appear before a select committee of the House of Commons, or who fails to provide information or documents, has to be sensitive to the different purposes of select committee inquiries and the identity of the witness who has failed to respond to a summons. This is necessary to ensure the right balance between upholding parliamentary accountability and protecting the rights of witnesses.

 

Do you agree with our assessment of the three options, and our conclusion that a legislative solution is the best available option?

 

  1. I am broadly in agreement with the assessment of the three options. To do nothing runs the risk of hindering the ability of the House of Commons to hold the Government to account, undermining the constitutional principle of parliamentary accountability.[3] To rely on Standing Orders may provide clarity as to the powers of select committees. However, to use Standing Orders to provide a power to punish those who fail to provide evidence to a Committee may contravene the ECHR, particularly if there is insufficient protection of the right to a fair hearing, under Article 6 ECHR, when determining whether an individual had a reasonable excuse not to appear before a select committee. Article 6 would also require that the imposition of a criminal penalty by an independent as well as an impartial tribunal. This does not include select committees, or the House of Commons. Moreover, there is less democratic and public scrutiny over the modification of a Standing Order than over the enactment of legislation. It is preferable for any modification to occur following as wide a democratic and public scrutiny as possible.

 

  1. Nevertheless, difficulties arise as to the use of legislation as this may potentially contradict parliamentary privilege. It is important to recognise two aspects of parliamentary privilege that may be potentially affected by the proposed Draft Bill: the principle of exclusive cognisance of Parliament over its own internal affairs and the privilege of freedom of expression found in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. These potential breaches have been mitigated in the proposed Draft Bill and may be further mitigated through the way in which courts interpret the proposed Draft Bill. Nevertheless, further changes may be needed to ensure that the proposed Draft Bill does not the upset the delicate balance of powers between the legislature and the courts.

 

  1. The exclusive cognisance of the House of Commons to regulate its own internal affairs is a principle of the common law, based on the separation of powers,[4] and the ‘mutuality of respect between two constitutional sovereignties’.[5] Although the principle is recognised by and enforced through the common law, its confines are also determined through practice, which provides evidence of an understanding between Parliament and the courts as to the scope of Parliament’s exclusive cognisance. Exclusive cognisance extends beyond the protection of freedom of speech. It belongs to Parliament as a whole and so cannot be waived by individual members. The Supreme Court described exclusive cognisance as follows:

 

Exclusive cognisance refers not simply to Parliament, but to the exclusive right of each House to manage its own affairs without interference from the other or from outside Parliament. The boundaries of exclusive cognisance result from accord between the two Houses and the courts as to what falls within the exclusive province of the former.[6]

 

  1. Legislation can set the boundaries of the exclusive cognisance of Parliament.[7] Although difficulties can arise as to whether legislation binds Parliament when Parliament is not expressly referred to in legislation, these difficulties do not arise in the proposed Draft Bill which makes it clear that this is intended to apply to Parliament. In doing so, it sets new boundaries, transferring an activity that would previously have been part of the exclusive competence of Parliament into the competence of the courts.

 

  1. There are two ways in which the proposed Draft Bill may undermine the separation of powers between the legislature and the courts on which the exclusive cognisance of Parliament is based: first by directly and second by indirectly granting too much power to the courts to question parliamentary activities which may thereby hinder Parliament from performing its constitutional functions. This occurs directly through the granting of a specific power to courts to fine or imprison those who fail to comply with a summons of a select committee of the House of Commons. The exclusive competence of Parliament may be undermined indirectly as the granting of one power may be seen as further empowering courts to question other aspects of exclusive cognisance. It may change the nature of understanding between Parliament and the courts as to the scope of exclusive cognisance and the respective comity between Parliament and the courts.

 

 

  1. However, these interferences are mitigated, first, through the wording of the proposed Draft Bill. For example, the potential for direct interference is mitigated by: the requirement that the select committee obtains a certificate from the Speaker that an individual has failed to comply with a summons;[8] that the written certificate of the Speaker should be taken as ‘conclusive’ of the matters set out in the certificate;[9] the restriction of the role of the court to an assessment of whether the individual had a reasonable excuse and the requisite punishment;[10] the restriction of the evidence courts can use when assessing whether a witness had a reasonable excuse, this being limited to the nature and purpose of the committee’s summons and no other aspect of the committee’s proceedings can be referred to. The latter two requirements also restrict the extent to which the proposed Draft Bill may indirectly undermine the exclusive cognisance of Parliament.

 

  1. Second, courts are unlikely to interpret the proposed Draft Bill in a manner that undermines the exclusive cognisance of Parliament. When interpreting legislation, courts aim to determine the intention of Parliament, ‘gathered from the words used by Parliament, considered in the light of their context and their purpose’.[11] In a recent Supreme Court decision, the Court confirmed that:

 

Even where particular words used in a statute appear at first sight to have an apparently clear and unambiguous meaning, it is always necessary to resolve differences of interpretation by setting the particular provision in its context as part of the relevant statutory framework, by having due regard to the historical context in which the relevant enactment came to be made and, to the extent that its purpose can be identified (which may require examination of admissible travaux preparatoires), to arrive at an interpretation which serves, rather than frustrates, that purpose.[12]

 

 

  1. The purpose of the proposed Draft Bill is to facilitate Parliaments ability to hold the Government to account through aiding select committees of the House of Commons to perform their functions. Moreover, it is clear from the report that this is in response to clear evidence of the growing problems concerning witnesses who fail to appear before Committees or fail to provide information or documents, hindering select committees from performing their functions. Courts are therefore likely to interpret the provisions of the proposed Draft Bill in a manner that facilitates parliamentary accountability. Courts are also likely to interpret the proposed Draft Bill in a manner that does not indirectly undermine parliamentary accountability through the courts intruding too greatly on matters that would usually fall in the exclusive cognisance of Parliament.

 

  1. Third, courts will interpret the proposed Draft Bill in line with common law principles, including parliamentary accountability and parliamentary sovereignty.[13] Parliamentary accountability recognises that the Government is accountable to Parliament which, in turn, is accountable to the electorate. Consequently, courts would be likely to interpret the proposed Draft Bill to ensure that it enforces parliamentary accountability, tempered with a need to respect the sovereignty of Parliament. These two principles would mean that courts are likely to construe their new powers restrictively, ensuring accountability without transgressing the ability of Parliament to perform its legislative function.

 

  1. It is unlikely, therefore, that courts will see this transfer of power as giving rise to an ability for courts to adjudicate on other areas that are currently in the exclusive cognisance of Parliament. Moreover, courts are likely to interpret their powers under the proposed Draft Bill restrictively, ensuring they facilitate parliamentary accountability without also undermining Parliament’s legislative function.

 

  1. Similar conclusions can be reached when we examine the potential breach of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, which states ‘That the Freedom of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.’ It is narrower in scope than the principle of exclusive cognisance, applying only to proceedings in Parliament. Moreover, it does not prevent courts from referring to proceedings in Parliament, preventing instead the questioning of these proceedings.[14] It is also established in legislation which has been recognised by the courts as a constitutional statute.[15]

 

  1. As a constitutional statute, the provisions of the Bill of Rights 1689 can only be specifically or expressly repealed by future non-constitutional legislation. Although it is harder to determine whether a later constitutional statute can impliedly repeal the provisions of an earlier constitutional statute, there is evidence in case law that the privilege of freedom of expression is an important constitutional principle and, to the extent that there is a hierarchy between principles and legislation, Article 9 of the Bill of Rights is towards the top of that hierarchy.[16]

 

  1. The proposed Draft Bill does not include a provision expressly or specifically restricting the application of the Bill of Rights 1689. It does not, for example, state that its provisions should take effect notwithstanding the provisions of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is likely, therefore, that the proposed Draft Bill would be interpreted in a manner that ensured its compliance with Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, minimising any potential restriction of parliamentary privilege, rather than being regarded as legislation that is intended to restrict Article 9.

 

  1. In addition, although the Speaker’s certificate is a proceeding in Parliament, there is no ability for the court to question this certificate, which is to be taken to be conclusive (section 1(3)). Clauses 1(3) and 1(1) can be read to mean that the Speaker’s certificate only refers to the existence of a summons by a select committee, providing conclusive proof that the summons was issued. It does not refer to whether an offence has been committed, i.e. whether a witness failed to respond to a summons by a select committee without reasonable excuse. Courts would only by referring to the Speaker’s certificate in order to establish a fact required for an offence to have been committed. This does not, therefore, contradict Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689.[17]

 

  1. Furthermore, clause 1(3) of the proposed Draft Bill is best understood as a justiciability clause as opposed to an ouster clause. It is designed to uphold the separation of powers between the legislature and the courts. Moreover, this clause would not prevent the courts from reviewing a matter that was previously considered to be justiciable, thereby having the same purpose as an ouster clause. Consequently, it is unlikely that the courts would read down the provisions of this clause, enabling them to question whether a Speaker’s certificate was only a ‘purported’ certificate as a legal flaw in the certificate rendered it a nullity.

 

  1. However, difficulties may arise through the empowerment of the court to indirectly question the select committee’s assessment of whether a witness had a reasonable excuse. This would occur were the assessment of the select committee as to whether a witness had a reasonable excuse to be classed as a ‘proceeding in Parliament’ and the assessment of the court as to the existence of a reasonable excuse to be interpreted as questioning this proceeding in Parliament.

 

  1. It is for courts to determine the definition of ‘proceedings in Parliament’.[18] It might be argued that an assessment of whether a witness has a reasonable excuse is not a proceeding in Parliament. It does not concern a speech made in Parliament. Nor does this refer to a report made by a select committee. In addition, the assessment of the select committee is not one as to the trustworthiness, or otherwise, of the witness. [19] Nor is the select committee assessing the relative weight to be given to this evidence when writing its report.

 

  1. Nevertheless, this is still an activity of Parliament, which takes place as part of the functions of Parliament. It also involves an evaluation by the select committee. This assessment may also indirectly impact on the ability of the select committee to perform its functions. As currently written, the proposed Draft Bill would enable a court to reverse a conclusion that a select committee believed that a witness did not have a reasonable excuse. This could hinder the ability of select committees to perform their primary function of holding the Government to account, being unable to call a witness when the select committee felt that the witness had no reasonable excuse, but courts contradicted this finding.

 

  1. Although courts may refer to proceedings in Parliament, they must not question these proceedings.[20] Courts may refer to Parliamentary material: as evidence of proof of what was said or done in Parliament;[21] to aid in the construction of ambiguous legislative provisions;[22] to determine whether legislation is compatible with Convention rights;[23] to ensure the compliance with statutory provisions;[24] to determine the scope and effect of parliamentary privilege;[25] and, in exceptional circumstances, to aid in judicial review proceedings.[26] This latter exception is narrowly construed, relating to ‘the limited purpose of identifying the Government’s purposes and reasons for taking or proposing the action which is being challenged in the proceedings’.[27]

 

  1. It is possible that courts will include the assessment of a reasonable excuse for the purposes of applying the provisions of the proposed Draft Bill as a further exception in which courts may refer to parliamentary material. This exception would be authorised by legislation in a similar manner to the authorisation provided by the Human Rights Act 1998 where parliamentary proceedings can be used when determining the compatibility of legislation with Convention rights. However, whilst this may allow reference to the conclusions of the select committee, it may be deemed as transgressing Article 9 for the courts to indirectly question this assessment when determining for itself whether a witness enjoyed a reasonable excuse.

 

  1. As discussed above, courts will interpret the provisions of the proposed Draft Bill in a manner that facilitates as opposed to frustrates its underlying purpose. Moreover, courts are likely to interpret the proposed Draft Bill so as to ensure it does not undermine the principles of parliamentary accountability and parliamentary sovereignty. These would suggest that courts would be sensitive to the problems that would arise were they to interfere too greatly with the assessments of select committees. Although courts are empowered to determine this issue for themselves, rather than merely reviewing the assessment of the select committee, it is likely that courts would be deferential, giving weight to the assessment of the select committee and only overturning an assessment of the committee when it is clear that the witness had a reasonable excuse.[28] In addition, any reference to parliamentary material is designed to enhance the functions of Parliament, improving the ability of select committees to hold the Government to account.

 

  1. Although this may minimise the extent to which the provisions of the Draft Bill might undermine Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, there nevertheless exists a risk that this would be the case. If this is the intention of the proposed Draft Bill, then this needs to be made clearer in its provisions. In particular, given that the Bill of Rights is a constitutional statute, with Article 9 being considered as a fundamental principle of the UK constitution, the proposed Draft Bill needs to make it clear that the ability of the court to assess whether a witness had a reasonable excuse takes effect notwithstanding the provisions of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. However, I would argue that a better solution would be to modify the proposed Draft Bill to remove any potential conflict with Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, as discussed below.

 

Do you think the proposed draft Bill provides an appropriate solution to the issue of recalcitrant witnesses before committees?

 

  1. The proposed draft Bill does provide a solution to the issue of recalcitrant witnesses before committees that is generally appropriate. Nevertheless, some issues arise that could undermine the aim of the Bill or which could cause further problems for the separation of powers between the legislature and the courts which underpins parliamentary privilege.

 

  1. First, as discussed above, the ability of courts to assess whether a witness had a reasonable excuse could be construed as a breach of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 as it is indirectly questioning the conclusions of a select committee where this conclusion may be construed as part of the proceedings in Parliament. A possible solution to this problem would be for the Bill to include a Schedule setting out a non-exclusive list of reasonable excuses for failing to reply to a summons of a select committee. As discussed above, one of the situations in which courts are permitted to refer to parliamentary material is to ensure compliance with statutory provisions.[29] The inclusion of a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses would also reinforce the argument that legislation had authorised a particular reference to parliamentary material. The list would need to be non-exhaustive to enable courts to develop further reasonable excuses, similar to those listed, in order to protect the rights of witnesses. This is particularly important given that courts could impose fines and potentially imprisonment under the provisions of the proposed Draft Bill.

 

  1. As discussed above, courts will interpret legislation in accordance with its purpose and context, as well as ensuring legislation does not undermine parliamentary privilege and the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. It is likely, therefore, that courts will only add to a non-exclusive definition of a ‘reasonable excuse’ where to do so is necessary to protect the rights of a witness, balanced against the need to uphold parliamentary accountability and parliamentary sovereignty.

 

  1. Second, problems arise as the role of select committees extends beyond that of holding the Government to account for its actions. As discussed above, select committees may also monitor the activities of MPs and of private individuals and may even hold them to account for their actions. They may also carry out general inquiries on a particular issue that are not directly related to holding the Government to account. Select committees can call on a range of individuals to provide evidence, summoning both those who are performing a governmental function and those who are not.

 

  1. In order to effectively perform their functions, select committees need to ensure a steady source of information, as well as compelling attendance of witnesses to receive this information. Whilst this may tip the balance in favour of compelling the appearance of ministers, civil servants, special advisors and those performing governmental functions, this may not be the case for private individuals who are not performing a governmental function. Whilst their information may be helpful, it may be possible to gain this information from other sources and it may be less directly connected to the primary function of select committees of holding the government to account.

 

  1. There are two possible solutions to this potential imbalance. First, legislation could restrict its application to those in Government or those performing governmental functions. Whilst this may provide clarity in one sense, this is likely to create further problems as it may be difficult to clearly delineate between governmental and non-governmental functions.

 

  1. Second, the identity of the witness could be considered when determining whether an individual has a reasonable excuse to fail to comply with the summons of a select committee. The court may have a broader definition of what is reasonable as regards private individuals who are not performing a governmental function as opposed to members of the government or those performing governmental functions.

 

  1. Consequently, I would argue that the proposed Draft Bill include a Schedule setting out a non-exclusive list of possible reasonable excuses, with this list  being sensitive to the range of identities of those summoned to provide evidence.

 

What do you think the maximum sanction should be for an individual found guilty of an offence of failure to comply with a summons?

 

  1. I would be in favour of limiting sanctions to fines as opposed to imprisonment.

 

How should the House set out its internal processes and commitment to fair treatment in a way that provides sufficient due process, whilst maintaining the flexibility and effectiveness of the current select committee system?

 

  1. I agree that it is important to ensure that any principles are established either in Standing Orders or through a resolution of the House of Commons. This is important both to ensure that the rules are easily accessible and also to facilitate more effective compliance with the rules.

 

  1. In addition to relying on general principles of fairness and due process, it would be helpful to provide examples of models of fair treatment that apply to the different nature and purposes of the inquiry of the select committee and the identity of the witness. For example, it would be important to distinguish inquiries whose purpose is generally to gather information and evidence relating to an inquiry into a broader issue from those situations in which the purpose of the inquiry is to hold the Government or others to account for their actions. More procedural protections are needed for those who are being held to account than for those that are merely providing information.

 

  1. It would also be important to distinguish between those witnesses who are or are not members of the Government, as well as distinguishing between witnesses who are or who are not performing a governmental function. More procedural protections are required for those who are not performing a governmental function, particularly those who may directly or indirectly be held to account for their actions.

 

  1. Providing possible frameworks of procedural protections in these cases would help to provide clarity, as well as facilitating committees to take decisions quickly as they would have potential models of fair procedures that they could adopt for specific witnesses or specific types of inquiry. It would need to be made clear that these were only possible models that could be modified to ensure that these models are not overly bureaucratic and are sufficiently flexible to adapt to the broad range of witnesses and the purposes of select committee inquiries.

 

3 June 2021


[1] For example, the report of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘News International and Phone Hacking’ (Eleventh Report of Session 2010-12, HC 903-I)which investigated whether the committee had been misled by witnesses when carrying out previous inquiries into press standards.

[2] See, for example, the report of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, ‘The Collapse of Kids Company: Lessons for charity trustees, professional firms, the Charity Commission, and Whitehall’ (Fourth Report of 2015-16, HC 433).

[3] R (Miller) v Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373.

[4] Prebble v Television New Zealand [1995] 1 AC 321.

[5] Al Fayed [1999] 1 WLR 669 (per Sedley LJ), cited in R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52, [2011] 1 AC 684 and Gannon and Warsama v Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Sasha Wass QC [2020] EWCA Civ 142, [2020] 3 WLR 351.

[6] R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52, [2011] 1 AC 684, [63] (Lord Phillips).

[7] R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52, [2011] 1 AC 684.

[8] Clause 1(3).

[9] Ibid.

[10] Clause 1(5).

[11] R (Black) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 81, [2018] AC 215, [36], Lady Hale.

[12] R (Fylde Coast Farms Ltd) v Fylde Borough Council [2021] UKSC 18, [6], Lord Briggs and Lord Sales.

[13] R (Miller) v Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373.

[14] See M Chamberlain and J Segan, ‘Parliamentary Privilege, Article 9 of the Bill of Rights and Admissibility: What Use Can Be Made of Parliamentary Materials in Litigation?’ (2018) 23 Judicial Review, 11, for an account of situations when courts may refer to proceedings in Parliament. 

[15] Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151 and R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 2 All ER 109.

[16] R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 2 All ER 109.

[17] See R (Heathrow Hub) v The Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 213.

[18] R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52, [2011] 1 AC 684, R (Miller) v Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373, and Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice (25th edition, 2019), para 13.12.

[19] Warsama v Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Speaker of the House of Commons, interested party) [2020] EWCA Civ 142, [2020] QB 1076

[20] See R (Heathrow Hub) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 213 and R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 193.

[21] Prebble v Television New Zealand [1995] 1 AC 321.

[22] Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593.

[23] Wilson v First County Trust (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, R (SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 and R (DA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] UKSC 21, [2015] 1 WLR 1449.

[24] R (Jackson) v Attorney General and R (Heathrow Hub) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 213

[25] Office of Government Commerce v Information Commissioner [2010] QB 98

[26] R (Heathrow Hub) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 213 and R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 193.

[27] R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 193, [105].

[28] R (Lord Carlile of Berriew) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60, [2015] AC 945.

[29] R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262 and R (Heathrow Hub) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 213.

Office of Government Commerce v Information Commissioner [2010] QB 98.