International Rescue Committee-UK submission to the International Development Committee’s inquiry into “Future of UK aid”

 

 

May 2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

  1. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) welcomes the decision of the International Development Committee to hold an inquiry into the future of UK aid, including the spending cuts, the merger of FCO and DFID, and the conclusions of the integrated Review.
  2. The IRC works in conflict-affected and fragile countries around the world to deliver life-saving assistance to people affected by war, disaster and climate change and remains working with communities to assist with rebuilding through the post-crisis phase. Our presence in some 40 countries in education, health, protection, environmental health, women’s protection and empowerment, and economic recovery programming provides us with an expert understanding of humanitarian and development challenges in contexts of conflict and fragility.
  3. The conclusions of the integrated review combined with the decision to reduce the UK’s official development assistance (ODA) spending target from 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.5% demonstrate how this government has downgraded the importance of aid and development in its foreign policy. This move strikes a blow to the UK’s legacy as an international development super-power, it harms the UK’s global reputation and its claim to be a global force for good, and most importantly it removes support from countless communities living in conflict and crisis who depend on UK aid. 
  4. The process the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) have undertaken to deliver two rounds of aid cuts has been chaotic, poorly planned, and has created huge uncertainty for frontline delivery partners. This lack of transparency, communication, and absence of clear and well-managed process for making cuts has caused very real problems for those implementing FCDO-funded work on the ground. Running high-quality and impactful services in war zones is not simple and doing so amidst avoidable and unnecessary day-to-day uncertainty over funding makes things even more challenging.
  5. The forthcoming International Development strategy offers the FCDO an opportunity to reverse mistakes they have made. The strategy must be accompanied by a return to the 0.7% spending target. It must also renew the Department for International Development’s commitment to spend 50% of ODA in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). FCAS increasingly host the vast majority of those living in poverty. Investing in these regions provides the best opportunity for the UK to reduce global humanitarian need and to create a more stable and prosperous world.
  6. The Foreign Secretary’s pledge to prevent 20 million people from experiencing famine is commendable. The IRC estimates that the economic downturn alone will drive the number of hungry people up by an additional 35 million in 2021. Without drastic action, the economic downturn caused by COVID-19 will suspend global progress towards ending hunger by at least five years[1]. The UK Government should work to mobilise other donors to support an immediate humanitarian cash stimulus package by the end of 2022 for those most at risk of hunger.

 

 

 

Strategy

 

The strategic targeting of UK aid spending, including the focus areas set out by the FCDO’s seven global challenges and their alignment with the conclusions of the Integrated Review

 

  1. The Integrated Review (IR) lacks detail or ambition on humanitarian and development issues. The importance of international development policy and Official Development Assistance (ODA) within the broader UK international policy approach is completely diminished. The government’s decision to downgrade international development is confirmed by the decision to move to an ODA spending ceiling of 0.5% of GNI, breaking their legal duties and manifesto commitment. The fact that these cuts were announced just as the defence budget received the biggest spending boost in 30 years[2] indicates that the cuts are borne of a political reprioritisation rather than financial necessity.
  2. The Integrated Review fundamentally fails to recognise the legacy of UK aid and the central position it has played in tackling global challenges, like poverty or hunger. Not only does UK aid help save countless lives, but it also earns the UK influence on the global stage and in countries where it has less diplomatic clout but a large aid budget. Aid is clearly in the national interest.  To gut the UK’s approach to aid in this way, a vital aspect of our international policy through the years, just as the Government seeks to consolidate its influence and global standing post-Brexit, is illogical.
  3. Cutting the aid budget has damaged the UK’s international standing. When she appeared before the Foreign Affairs committee in May 2020 Samantha Power, current Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, said of the potential aid cuts: “It would be a colossal blow to the enterprise of international peace and security. There is a recognition that international development is at the heart of promoting stability in the world[3]” António Guterres, United Nations Secretary General, described the aid cuts as “a death sentence”[4]. The Norwegian Minister for Development criticised the cuts, saying: “It is very unfortunate that the United Kingdom will reduce its aid from 0.7 to 0.5 per cent of gross national income (GNI). The pandemic has worst affected the most vulnerable in the poorest countries.”[5] 
  4. The Integrated Review announced an International Development Strategy to be published in 2022. This strategy offers the Government an opportunity to course-correct. If the FCDO returns to 0.7% in 2022, this would allow the International Development Strategy to be truly long-term and transformative in scope. The strategy could reaffirm the UK as an international development superpower, winning global plaudits in the process. Using the Sustainable Development Goals as a framework, an empowered strategy could be pivotal in tackling global challenges and creating a safer, more prosperous world in which the UK can thrive.
  5. The government paints an ambitious picture with the Integrated Review. However, it consistently says one thing on paper and does the opposite in reality. The Government has pledged to prevent 20 million people from catastrophic famine but has cut aid to countries threatened by famine. It states support for girls’ education but has cut education programming and programmes that tackle barriers to accessing education. The Integrated Review states that the FCDO will be a “springboard for all our international efforts, integrating diplomacy and development to achieve greater impact and address the links between climate change and extreme poverty”. Unless aid cuts are reversed and greater importance is ascribed to development policy within a truly integrated approach, this claim will ring hollow.   

Whether these focus areas address the most pressing global development challenges 

  1. There is an insufficient focus on fragile and conflict affected states[6] in the focus areas and the IR. The geography of global poverty is changing. By 2030, 85 percent of the extreme poor—some 342 million people—will live in fragile and conflict-affected states[7]. The World Bank has warned that conflict is responsible for 80% of all humanitarian need[8], and that the only way to end extreme poverty is by focusing on fragile and conflict-affected settings. Prioritising investment in these countries provides the greatest opportunity to drive down global humanitarian need – a stated UK focus area. The Department for International Development had previously recognised this, committing to spending at least 50% of ODA in FCAS. Yet, indications from the Integrated Review and emerging cuts to the aid budget hint that this commitment will be absent from future UK aid strategies. ODA in fragile states like Yemen[9] and Syria[10] was reduced drastically, whilst reports indicate that other countries affected by conflict are set to receive similarly swingeing cuts[11].   This not only has massive ramifications for the government’s stated goal of poverty reduction and its achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals – it also impacts key pledges on education and famine.
  2. Investing in FCAS is important for the UK’s national security, too. These context risk providing a safe haven for extremists posing severe security risks to the UK and its allies. Impactful humanitarian and development assistance can play an important role in supporting the resilience of local communities, providing a counter-vailing force against the recruitment drives of extremist groups.
  3. We welcome that tackling climate change and biodiversity loss is established as the number one international priority for the UK. Climate is a threat multiplier, driving humanitarian need, including hunger, and displacement. This is reflected clearly in both the focus areas and the integrated review. Whilst it is important for the UK to champion a global approach to reducing emissions, UK aid should also be utilised to support those countries experiencing the real effects of climate change today to mitigate the impact of climate driven conflict and crises and build resilience to future shocks. Whilst the strategic prioritisation of climate change is clear, it is less clear how the UK will ensure these countries are supported through Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). 
  4. Climate finance must be particularly channeled via grants (as opposed to loans) to FCAS, which make up the majority of countries most vulnerable to climate change. Of the ten countries identified by the Notre Dame ND-GAIN index of countries most vulnerable to climate change and other global challenges, seven are classified as FCAS[12].The gulf between the crisis affected countries and the rest of the world is growing. The global average of scores given by ND-GAIN to countries for their resilience to climate change has risen 2.5% over the past two decades, yet the average for countries on the IRC Watchlist[13] countries is falling (down 5% over the same time period). 
  5. Notable is the absence of references to gender equality. Whilst the FCDO has prioritised increasing girls’ education, it has failed to take a more holistic view of gender equality and prioritise other important barriers to the empowerment of women and girls, such as gender-based violence and economic exclusion. Furthermore, the FCDO’s prioritisation of girls’ education is undermined by severe cuts of more than 40%[14]. We know that women and girls are disproportionately impacted by conflict and crisis – as is coming to pass in the COVID-19 pandemic and with the impact of climate change[15].  However, the Integrated Review only references gender equality once, and does not explore ways in which ODA and other foreign policy tools can be used to protect and empower the most vulnerable women and girls affected by fragility and conflict. A narrow focus on girls’ education is inadequate to properly support women and girls, thus imperiling progress on the Sustainable Development Goals[16]. Such a narrow approach will undermine progress on the government’s flagship pledge to ensure all girls can access 12 years of quality of education and risk progress made through years of substantial UK investment in gender-based violence prevention and response, sexual and reproductive health, and other areas.  
  6. There is some recognition of the importance of conflict prevention in the FCDO’s 7 global challenges. Conflict is the biggest driver of humanitarian need. Long-running, protracted conflict situations account for the largest increases in needs because they remain highly volatile contexts and continue to rapidly deteriorate. The Integrated Review sets out a more integrated government approach to conflict, particularly on addressing the drivers of conflict and preventing atrocities and setting up a new Conflict Centre to build on this work. 
  7. UK policy decisions indicate that the focus area of humanitarian preparedness and response has been narrowly interpreted as a focus on famine prevention and response, without sufficient focus on preventative measures, including disaster risk reduction, and climate adaptation or longer-term food security responses and commitments to malnutrition prevention and response. Nor are these commitments matched with adequate resourcing. In fact, estimates are that malnutrition spending has been cut by 80%.
  8. The review contains a new pledge for the UK to “lead a campaign to protect 20 million people from catastrophic famine”[17]. The focus on famine is further exemplified by the Call to Action to Prevent Famine, launched in September 2020, the appointment of Nick Dyer as the first UK Special Envoy for Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Affairs, and the launch of the G7 Gamine Prevention and Humanitarian Crises Compact.
  9. The Integrated Review recognises how important humanitarian access is for responding to crises and famine, and the role that conflict plays in driving hunger. Humanitarian agencies, including the IRC, often face persistent constraints to delivering humanitarian assistance in the very regions at highest risk of famine. The recognition of access constraints as an aggravating factor in food crises means the UK should prioritise diplomatic efforts to address political, bureaucratic and conflict driven access barriers. This requires investment of Ministerial time to consistently raise concerns at the highest level, it requires investment in Embassy staff expertise to support them to engage effectively in access negotiations with state and non-state actors, and it requires UK investment in NGO capacity to lead negotiations on behalf of the NGO sector. 
  10. Pledges on famine prevention must be supported by meaningful financial assistance. One proven way of increasing food security is the delivery of humanitarian cash transfers, which support people to buy essential food for their families and in turn, boost local economies. The IRC estimates that the total humanitarian cash stimulus required to support the additional people at risk of hunger in 2021 at US$2.3 billion.
  11. The focus areas will not address any challenges if the FCDO continues with its damaging aid cuts. Famine prevention and response is a prime example. While the G7 Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Crises compact recognises the vital role of water and sanitation services[18], leaked memos suggest UK aid cuts of up to 80%[19] in this sector alone. Yemen, one of the three countries at most at risk of famine has seen a devastating 50% drop in UK aid funding[20]. Funding for nutrition services, a key plank in the approach to tackling hunger, has been cut by 80%[21].

Recommendations

  1. The forthcoming International Development Strategy must return overall ODA spending to 0.7% of GNI and re-commit to previous UK aid strategies’ pledge to spend 50% of ODA in fragile and conflict affected states[22]. 
  2. The new Conflict Centre’s focus on conflict resolution should be accompanied by extensive humanitarian assistance to address the impacts of conflict on civilians in fragile and conflict affected states. This is important, not just because it alleviates severe suffering, but also because it helps to build the foundations for greater stability and peacebuilding in these regions. 
  3. The UK Government should work to mobilise other donors to support an immediate humanitarian cash stimulus package by the end of 2022 for those most at risk of hunger. Without urgent action, the SDG goal of achieving Zero Hunger could be effectively stalled by at least 5 years.

Administration

The split between bilateral and multilateral ODA spending, and the effectiveness of these channels for the delivery of UK aid

  1. The most recent statistics on UK aid spending show that in 2019 bilateral spending accounted for 67.5% of total spend, whilst multilateral spend amounted to 32.5%[23]. The Foreign Secretary has declared a preference for bilateral spend[24], but due to legally binding multilateral spending commitments, the recent aid cuts have fallen more heavily on bilateral spend[25]. The FCDO should have attempted to balance cuts between multilateral and bilateral commitments. Often bilateral funding is preferrable as funding channeled through multi-lateral usually takes longer to reach front line responders and is not passed on as quality funding (i.e., multi-year and flexible).
  2. Given a large proportion of UK ODA will be spent via multilaterals for years to come, the UK should be motivated to play a leading role in vital reforms to the humanitarian aid system.
  3. The multilateral system failed to mobilise and distribute sufficient quality funding at a sufficient pace in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Out of $3.7 billion raised in 2020 ($9.5 billion pledged) under the Covid-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP), only $772.7 million (or 21%) directly went to implementers through grants. As late as May 2020, NGOs on the ground were still not receiving funds mobilised through the GHRP.
  4. Despite the significant evidence of the benefits of multi-year flexible financing, the multilateral system has not adopted the approach as standard. IRC research has found that multi-year funding is not only more cost-effective, but it delivers better and more trusted programming for the communities we work with[26]. The UK has a strong track record of providing multi-year humanitarian funding. According to the global multi-year study produced by Development Initiatives in 2020, upwards of 90% of DFID grants were multi-year[27]. 

Recommendations

  1. The UK should champion an agreed minimum target for cascading quality funding to frontline implementers as part of reform of the UN system.
  2. The UK should first lead by example by ensuring that its funding agreements are multi-year, flexible and commit to timely disbursements of funding to implementing partners.
  3. The UK should also encourage other donors to champion quality funding to frontline implementers through similar funding arrangements to be agreed at the Grand Bargain five-year anniversary meeting in June.

Process

The FCDO’s approach to the process of implementing in-year changes to the aid budget during the 2020-21 financial year, including its communication with stakeholders

  1. The FCDO indicated that a total of £2.6bn in cuts were needed in-year. Despite the top line figure being announced, it took longer for the implications of the cuts to filter through at a programmatic level. This caused immediate concern at individual country level as programme staff had to plan for the worst. As well as the real-world effect of the cuts, the way in which the FCDO has approached ODA allocations in both 2020-21 and 2021-22 has been highly problematic. The approach in 2021 has not learnt anything from mistakes made in the process of making cuts in 2020. Communication has been vague throughout and lacks substantive information. Despite many requests, it seems that there are no clear criteria for deciding what to cut – or officials have not been allowed to share this. Timelines have been absent altogether or, when they have existed, have not been adhered to. Officials are often constrained by what they can say or, like NGOs, appear to have been left in the dark about what is happening. This lack of transparency, communication, and absence of clear and well-managed process for making cuts has caused very real problems for those implementing FCDO-funded work on the ground. Running high-quality and impactful services in war zones is not simple and doing so amidst avoidable and unnecessary day-to-day uncertainty over funding makes things even more challenging.
  2. At the time, and as has been proven since, international NGOs, including the IRC, were concerned that cuts to budgets were anticipating the worst-case economic scenario. Rather than plan a sliding scale of cuts, FCDO cut too deeply and with little flexibility for changing economic circumstances. The pace of cuts made it difficult to reverse the depth of the cuts and to assess their impact once they had been actioned. 

The FCDO’s approach to setting ODA budget allocations for the 2021-22 financial year, including its communication with stakeholders 

  1. The biggest challenge for delivery agencies during the current round of ODA budget allocations is the lack of certainty around the future of programmes funded by FCDO. The lack of clear communications means agencies do not know which programmes are at risk and thus cannot plan ahead to mitigate potential shortfalls. 
  2. Decision making from the FCDO has been exceptionally delayed. Often, we will be promised a decision by a certain date but then a decision will still not be made. We have had to sign various no-cost extensions (NCE) to create more time for FCDO officials to decide.
  3. Ultimately, this leads to less impactful programming and for the communities with whom we work receive worse outcomes. Rather than concentrating on delivering a quality service, programmes staff have to devote extended periods of time and capacity to generating mitigation plans in case funding is cut, including plans to scale down services. Often, the delays mean that staff have to be let go. Several IRC programmes have been paused completely or run at a reduced level as we await decisions.
  4. Inconsistency, uncertainty, and cuts to UK aid are undermining trust placed in us by the communities we work with. This is particularly acute for areas of government priority, including girls’ education. In many of our education programmes, large elements of the projects are devoted to breaking down cultural and social norms that prevent girls from accessing education. IRC works closely with families and caregivers to raise awareness of the value of education girls and to persuade them to send their girls to school. This trust takes years to cultivate. UK aid cuts threaten to destroy it overnight.
  5. One example is our experience of aid cuts in Syria. In Syria, we received an FCDO Humanitarian and Resilience grant for the financial year 2020/21, totaling £63m. In previous years we had received similar levels of funding and would have normally expected the grant to be rolled over into financial year 2021/22. However, we were told that the overarching humanitarian and resilience programme in Syria would be suspended completely for FY 21/22, and that some extensions would be offered for specific activities. Despite the fact that our grant ended on 31 March 2021, we did not receive a decision on future funding until 23 April – which left a more than three-week period with no funding to sustain our programming. During this period, we had to let go of 20% of our staff, the majority of whom were Syrian nationals. Vital services for highly vulnerable people, including health clinics, effectively closed. On 23 April, we received final confirmation that only the health element of our programming would be extended, totaling £3.5m. 

Impact of the changes

Impact upon communities in lower income countries 

  1. The impact of the aid cuts will be felt disproportionately by women and girls. An estimated 20 million women and girls will no longer be reached by programming. This includes: 700,000 fewer girls supported by Girl’s Education programmes; 2 million fewer women supported by humanitarian assistance; 8 million fewer women and girls supported by nutrition interventions; 9 million fewer women supported to access clean water and sanitation.
  2. The IRC has experienced cuts to many protection programmes, which include programmes to prevent and respond to gender-based violence and support child protection. Follow-on funding for an IRC led project in Lebanon providing protection and legal services was not approved. This means we will not reach 107,000 vulnerable individuals, of whom many were women and girls, who were targeted by the second phase of the project. Our protection programme in North-East Nigeria, identified as a priority country in the Integrated Review, faces cuts of at least 60%. These cuts mean that much fewer people will be able to access our protection services in some of the most fragile and unstable regions in the world.
  3. The UK was previously the second largest government donor in global health[28] but has drastically cut a wide range of health programmes. Funding to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative will drop by 95%, particularly impact children in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan[29]. Funding for water, sanitation and hygiene programmes will be cut by 80%[30]. The United Nations Population Fund saw a cut of 85% to UK contributions, which could have helped prevent 250,000 maternal and child deaths, 14.6 million unintended pregnancies, and 4.3 million unsafe abortions.
  4. Saving Lives in Sierra Leone is one of the IRC health programmes that have been cut, in this case by 60%. This programme included family planning outreach and community-based activities, targeting adolescents and young people in hard-to-reach areas. Given the history of Ebola and the value of community-based healthcare, especially around vaccination campaigns, this is a particular hit during a pandemic. It had previously reached more than 3 million people across the whole of Sierra Leone. These cuts will limit our ability to respond to unforeseen outbreaks and health emergencies or to support COVID-19 activities.

Impact upon organisations implementing UK ODA programmes  

  1. The biggest impact for NGOs implementing UK ODA programmes is having to terminate programmes that expected follow-on funding. This also entails terminating sub-contracts with partners. For example, in Syria we had to stop working with three local partner organisations who supported protection programming. We also stopped working with a further 19 local Syrian organisations who we were providing with capacity building support and coaching. This has a long-term impact for us and our partners. We lose skilled staff from the organisation and trusted partners. Even if funding levels are to return to normal, it would take time to re-build partnerships, re-recruit staff, and re-open centres that had closed.
  2. In addition to the reduced funding, the lack of clarity and delay in communicating budgets has also had a major impact on financial planning and risk. There have been multiple occasions when organisations, including IRC, have had to spend their own funds to continue programmes while waiting for a final decision with no guarantee that these funds will be re-imbursed.

 

For more information, contact Oliver Phelan, Advocacy Officer, IRC-UK: oliver.phelan@rescue.org

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] International Rescue Committee (2021) Ending the hunger crisis: Response, recovery and resilience

[2] Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (2021) Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

 

[3] Foreign Affairs Committee (2021) The implications of Covid-19 for the Integrated Review,

 

[4] Wintour, P (2021) Leak reveals UK Foreign Office discussing aid cuts of more than 50%

[5] Utenriksdepartementet (2021) Svar på spørsmål om Storbritannias bistandskutt

 

[6] The full list of countries classified by the World Bank as fragile and conflict affected can be found here: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/888211594267968803/FCSList-FY21.pdf  

[7] Centre for Global Development, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps (2019) The Role of the World Bank in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

[8] Rutkowski, M (2018) Using adaptive social protection to cope with crisis and build resilience

[9] Worley, W (2021) UK's aid budget to Yemen slashed by nearly 60%

[10] Wintour, P (2021) UK slashes aid to Syria despite direct appeals from UN

[11] Geoghegan, P (2021) UK government accused of ‘grotesque betrayal’ as full foreign aid cuts revealed

[12] Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2021) ND-GAIN Country Index

[13] Countries the IRC has classified as being most likely to deteriorate in 2021, the majority of which are FCAs https://www.rescue-uk.org/sites/default/files/document/2386/2021emergencywatchlistirc.pdf 

[14] Wintour, P (2021) Dominic Raab is challenged to admit 40% cuts to foreign aid for girls’ education

[15] International Rescue Committee (2020) What Happened? How the Humanitarian Response to COVID-19 Failed to Protect Women and Girls

[16] International Rescue Committee (2019) Safety First: Time to deliver on commitments to women and girls in crisis

[17] Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (2021) Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy 

[18] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021) G7 famine prevention and humanitarian crises compact

[19] Lansdale, J (2021) UK's aid cuts for clean water projects criticised

[20] Worley, W (2021) UK's aid budget to Yemen slashed by nearly 60%

[21] McVeigh, K (2021) UK aid cuts will put tens of thousands of children at risk of famine, says charity

[22] Her Majesty's Treasury, Department for International Development (2015) UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest

[23] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021) Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2019

[24] Raab, D. (2021) Letter from the Foreign Secretary regarding the future of the UK aid budget

[25] Landale, J (2021) Charity warns UK aid priorities to see 63% cut in funding

[26] For detailed insights into the effectiveness of multi-year funding, see IRC’s report “A Win-Win: Multi-year flexible funding is better for people and better value for donors” https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/4908/ircwinwinmyffuslv7.pdf 

[27] Tuchel, L (2020) Multi-year humanitarian funding: Global baselines and trends

[28] Action for Global Health (2020) A Stocktake Review: Strengthening the UK’s Commitments to Global Health

[29] Rigby, J (2021) UK set to cut funding for polio eradication by 95%

[30] Haynes, D (2021) UK plans to cut bilateral funding for water projects in developing nations by 80%, leaked memo shows