Written evidence from Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (MYA0026)
1.1 This submission was prepared by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect – an independent organization that conducts research, analysis and advocacy in relation to mass atrocity crimes. The Global Centre is the leading international authority on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and since its inception in 2008 it has expanded and deepened global support for the norm. The Global Centre plays a unique role at the United Nations (UN) as the only organization carrying out monitoring, research and advocacy on all current and potential mass atrocity situations around the globe, as well as working with governments and various UN entities, including the Security Council and Human Rights Council, to translate this research into actionable policy responses. This submission was prepared by Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director, and Ms. Nadira Kourt, Program Manager.
2.1 On 1 February 2021 Myanmar’s military, or Tatmadaw, headed by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, overthrew the civilian-led government and declared a state of emergency. More than 800 people, mostly peaceful protesters, have been killed since then and more than 4,000 people remain detained for resisting the coup. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, have said that abuses committed by the military since the coup may amount to crimes against humanity.
2.2 The military coup and ensuing atrocities were partly a result of impunity for past crimes committed by the military. Just over three years ago, in 2017, Myanmar’s military committed genocide against the Rohingya ethnic minority. It has also committed international crimes against other ethnic minority groups. In 2018 the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, established by the UN Human Rights Council, concluded that senior members of the military, including future coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing, should be prosecuted for genocide as well as crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states. While there were some policy responses by the international community to these atrocities – including targeted sanctions imposed by a number of governments as well as accountability processes at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court – the military was able to maintain its power and influence in the domestic political system. Crucially, the lack of timely and decisive diplomatic action by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the UN Security Council convinced senior members of Myanmar’s military that they could continue to operate in a climate of impunity.
3.1 ASEAN held a high-level summit on 24 April to discuss the coup and ongoing crisis in Myanmar and agreed to a “Five-Point Consensus,” including an immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue among all parties, appointment of a special envoy to facilitate mediation, provision of humanitarian aid and a visit by the envoy to Myanmar. However, Myanmar’s military issued a statement two days later indicating they would only consider ASEAN’s proposal “when the situation returns to stability in the country.” Since then, the security forces have continued their deadly crackdown. On 7 May, referring to the ASEAN envoy proposed during the summit, the Tatmadaw announced that “only after we achieve a certain level of security and stability, we will cooperate regarding that envoy.” With these proclamations, the Tatmadaw has effectively rejected any involvement from ASEAN in mediating a resolution of the current crisis and restoring civilian-led government.
3.2 Weeks after the ASEAN summit, there has been no progress on the implementation of the “Five-Point Consensus,” including the naming of an envoy. Nor have ASEAN members offered any further plans in response to the Tatmadaw’s rejection of their Five-Point Consensus.
3.3 As an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, the UK has high-level access to the regional bloc. The UK government should use this status to push for a speedy adoption of a timeline for the implementation of the “Five-Point Consensus,” including the expeditious appointment of an ASEAN envoy. The UK should also urge ASEAN members to engage in sustained high-level diplomacy to achieve an immediate cessation of violence by the Tatmadaw and secure the release of detainees, including senior leaders of the National League for Democracy.
3.4 While ASEAN members could not agree to publicly call for the release of political prisoners in their Five-Point Consensus, the release of detainees is essential for any meaningful dialogue or mediation. Additionally, ASEAN members should pressure the Tatmadaw to lift the designations of CRPH and the recently formed National Unity Government (NUG) as unlawful organizations and terrorist groups. The UK government should advocate for ASEAN members to prioritize these issues in their engagement with the Tatmadaw.
4.1 The only formal response by the UN Security Council to the genocide against the Rohingya was the adoption of a Presidential Statement on 6 November 2017. Despite the pleas from the Rohingya community and months of advocacy by human rights organizations, including the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Security Council failed to even put a single draft resolution authorizing measures against the Tatmadaw to a vote. As discussed above, the lack of action by the Security Council undoubtedly contributed to a climate of impunity that helped enable the military coup and subsequent atrocities.
4.2 Although the Security Council has met five times on the situation in Myanmar since the coup began on 1 February and have adopted four statements, it has not adopted any legally-binding resolution that would authorize any practical measures. These statements have not deterred the Tatmadaw, who have continued to carry out extrajudicial killings of civilian protesters, torturing detainees and violating universal human rights.
4.3 The government of the UK has a special responsibility to the people of Myanmar due to its role as a “penholder” on the Security Council and its past history as the colonial power in Burma. Given the complete lack of progress following the 24 April ASEAN summit, it is essential for the Security Council to develop a strategy and act in parallel to any ASEAN process, not wait for ASEAN to provide a diplomatic breakthrough that may never occur. The “wait and see” approach did not work in response to the Rohingya genocide. Instead, it fostered a sense of impunity and encouraged the most hardline commanders in the military to seize power. So-called “quiet diplomacy” and acquiescence will not restore civilian-led government or prevent further atrocities.
4.4 On 5 May, more than 200 civilian society organizations from around the world, including the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, issued a joint letter calling on the UN Security Council to impose a global arms embargo on Myanmar.[1] A comprehensive arms embargo could help prevent further violations of human rights against those opposing the military junta. The UK should build on the existing unity of the Council and immediately introduce a draft resolution authorizing an arms embargo. The UK should begin negotiations on a draft text regardless of the threat by some permanent members to veto any coercive measures aimed at Myanmar’s military. Given the scale and scope of the current atrocities being committed in Myanmar, an arms embargo is the very least the UN Security Council should do.
4.5 The UK should also lead efforts at the Security Council to promote accountability for the Rohingya genocide and protect those Rohingya who remain within Myanmar. This is especially urgent given that several senior military officers who were responsible for the genocide, including General Min Aung Hlaing himself, are now leading the military junta. On 11 November 2019, the Republic of The Gambia filed suit against Myanmar at the ICJ for violating the Genocide Convention. On 23 January 2020, the ICJ unanimously ordered four provisional measures with which Myanmar must comply – prevent genocidal acts against the Rohingya, ensure military, police and other forces within its control do not commit genocidal acts, preserve all evidence of genocidal acts, and regularly report on compliance with these measures. The Netherlands and Canada have since indicated they plan to intervene on the side of The Gambia in the case.
4.6 Myanmar submitted its first compliance report to the ICJ in May 2020 and its second in November. Myanmar, now ruled by the military junta, is due to submit its third report this month [May 2021]. So far, the reports have not been made available to any entities outside the case, including the Security Council. The need for transparency in assessing implementation is especially pressing after the coup. Legally, nothing prevents the ICJ from transmitting the reports to the Security Council if requested to do so. We understand that the ICJ President, Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, indicated that the Court was ready to do so. The UK, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, should request access to these compliance reports.
5.1 To its immense credit, the UK government has imposed a number of bilateral measures in response to the military coup in Myanmar. This includes sanctions on General Min Aung Hlaing and other senior military officers, as well as three military-run entities – Myanmar Economic Corporation, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and Myanmar Gems Enterprise.
5.2 These sanctions should be expanded to include additional military officials and members of the State Administrative Council, as well as other entities that the military profits from, including Myanmar Timber Enterprise, Myanmar Pearl Enterprise, Myanmar Ruby Enterprise and Myanmar Imperial Jade Co. Limited.
5.3 The UK government should formally recognize the NUG as the legitimate representatives of the sovereign state of Myanmar and advocate for the NUG to maintain Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations. There should be no formal diplomatic recognition of the illegal military regime in Myanmar that is responsible for ongoing atrocities and other gross violations and abuses of human rights.
May 2021
[1] UN Security Council: Adopt Global Arms Embargo on Myanmar, 5 May 2021, https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/un-security-council-adopt-global-arms-embargo-on-myanmar/