Written evidence submitted by Dr Jonathan Spyer (UKI0020)

Executive Summary

• UK Government policies towards Iran have lacked cohesion in recent years, and would benefit from a comprehensive strategy reflecting UK interests in the region, particularly with reference to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
• The UK’s approach to date has failed to contain Iran’s malign ambitions and regional power projection. It’s narrow focus on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and close alignment with European partners has proven detrimental to UK interests. The UK would do well to appreciate that Iran ultimately seeks nuclear weapons as a hegemonic insurance policy to render itself unassailable while continuing the strategy of regional subversion and influence building by force.
• The UK Government mission in Iran reads: “We have shared interests in a wide range of subjects, including a stable region and effective implementation of the nuclear deal; but believe it is equally important that we have a dialogue on issues where we have differences”.[1] This cuts to the core of the UK’s Iran policy deficiencies; while the UK seeks regional stability, continued instability serves Iranian interests.
• Iran has achieved its long-sought policy of controlling Lebanon, and is now actively replicating this successful blueprint in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The root of these malign activities is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and its success has been significantly aided by the inadequate response from the UK and its allies to prevent and deter Iran’s decades-long efforts to expand its influence and presence throughout the Arab world.
• The assassination of Quds Force Major-General Qassem Soleimani presents Iran with a significant challenge and affords the UK with an invaluable opportunity to weaken Iran’s financing of terror upon which its feared reputation depends. It should also make concerted and essential efforts to strengthen legitimate actors in the region as an additional counterweight against Iranian ambitions and to weaken Iranian clients.

Qassem Soleimani and the IRGC

1. The assassination of the IRGC’s Quds Force Major-General Qassem Soleimani poses a major challenge to Iran’s hegemonic ambitions. As the long-term mastermind behind the Quds Force, the IRGC’s extraterritorial unit, Soleimani oversaw Iran’s establishment and development of well-armed and well-drilled paramilitary franchises in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Palestinian Territories and Yemen. His centrality to the trajectory of Iran’s unprecedented foreign policy successes over the last twenty years cannot be overstated.
2. Soleimani, with the Supreme Leader’s blessing, was pivotal in developing and implementing Iran’s devastatingly effective strategy of exploiting political vacuums throughout the region to shrewdly advance its ambitions via surrogate militias and asymmetric warfare. Time and again it has implemented its tried and tested blueprint – from the early deployment of senior Quds Force officials as advisers and training of militias to the provision of advanced weaponry and communications support, while increasingly utilising soft-power and entrenching its most loyal acolytes in positions of political influence to strengthen its foothold longer-term. In each instance, Iran has incrementally tested Western tolerance-thresholds and in the absence of red-lines being set in response, let alone enforced, it has emboldened Iran to become ever more aggressive and ambitious. This has been a consistent failure of the international community.
3. While Qassem Soleimani was replaced in short order by Esmaail Ghaani, it is unlikely he will be readily accepted by the disparate and self-governing political/military organizations that have been so loyal to Tehran. Herein lies an opportunity - albeit a short-term one - for the UK and its allies.
4. The IRGC has posed a security threat to the UK for decades, and is widely recognised as responsible for the deaths of dozens of British armed personnel, as well as terror attacks throughout the world. Its overdue proscription by the UK, in line with the US, would not only afford greater protection to British citizens at home and abroad, but also hamper its international activities.  
5. Iran’s entanglements are expensive, particularly for a country with a dire economic outlook; reportedly expending tens of billions of dollars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, with an annual bill of $700+ million to Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[2] Further targeted sanctions against the IRGC would hamper its ability to fund its proxies and perpetuate remote warfare. Beyond this, the re-imposition of pre-JCPOA sanctions as the nuclear framework collapses could prove a turning point. Under such circumstances, it will again become harder for Iran to provide the ample resources needed by its many proxies, not least that required for helping the Assad regime with its post-conflict reconstruction. Iran’s regional influence will be harmed and the UK and its allies would do well to use that opportunity to reinforce legitimate governments and entities throughout the region and strengthen them against Iranian influence. 

Iraq

Iranian influence

6. Historic enemies, control of Iraq now affords Iran the opportunity to expel Allied forces and advance its goal of a crescent of influence reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran has seized the opportunity to achieve this ambition through the development of IRGC-franchises and penetration of Iraq’s politics and power structures.
7. Soleimani’s extensive involvement in IRGC-backed campaigns with Iraqi Shia militia named the Popular Mobilization Units (Hashd al-Shaabi) to combat the rise of Daesh was a major step in cementing Quds Force influence. Accordingly, Soleimani’s death has had a significant impact on the IRGC structure in Iraq. The death of Jamal Jaffar Ibrahimi, PMU deputy commander and Soleimani’s right-hand man in Iraq, was a further setback.
8. Iran’s reach into the official bodies of the Iraqi state goes deep. While there is no single Hizballah-type movement in Iraq in direct service to Iran, the PMU acts as a powerful conduit for Shia military influence and Iraq’s ‘Lebanese model’ power-sharing system disproportionately benefits pro-Iranian factions courtesy of the inbuilt Shia ascendancy.
9. There are undoubtedly other major problems facing Iraq, but Iran’s influence should be the most unsettling from a British perspective.

UK interests

10. As a major nation in the Arab-world with historic and contemporary links to UK interests, it is essential the UK continues to support Iraq. While the UK’s stated policy intention is to “support long-term stability” and “support the people and Iraqi government as they build a stable, prosperous and democratic nation”, its failure to tackle Iran’s military and political entrenchment in the country undermines this.[3]
11. The dual assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis have degraded the pro-Iran military and political structure in Iraq. Their replacements have yet to be accepted and there are clear signs Iran’s Iraqi-actors are not acting in a single, unified way as desired by Tehran. This current situation is far from long-term, however, and countries seeking to obstruct Iran’s current trajectory in Iraq ought to seize this rare opportunity to strengthen legitimate Iraqi actors.
12. Good governance will be one of the best weapons in the fight against Iran, and the UK has extensive experience and soft-power to support this effort. There are a number of actors within Iraq that the UK and its international partners can consider engaging, including the Mutahidun alliance, local Sunni groups, the Kurdish Regional Government and the largely Shia demonstrators who take a firm position against Iranian and Hizballah meddling. The long-term goal of constraining and rolling back the deep Iranian influence in the country is set to be a great challenge.
13. The UK continues to retain a military presence in the country and must do everything it can to continue its good work at strengthening Iraq’s security forces, but ought to be conditional upon Iraqi forces ending cooperation with the PMU.[4]
14. The killing of a British servicewoman at Camp Taji on 11th March 2020 demonstrates a direct act of aggression against British forces by an Iran-supported militia. The UK’s apparent lack of response, which stands in contrast to US military response, is likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness in the zero-sum calculus of Iran. Accordingly, clarification ought to be sought on the strength of evidence of Iranian involvement in this incident and an understanding of how the UK and US responses diverged so significantly.
15. The ongoing political crisis in Iraq is symptomatic of Iranian influence. The position of Prime Minister and interim-Prime Minister has been tussled between those seen as having closer links with Iran and those more sympathetic to the US. Iran-backed Shia militias have stoked sectarian protests in apparent attempts to disrupt the process in Iran’s favour, and current nominee Mustafa al-Kadhimi, head of Iraq’s National Intelligence Service, had tacit endorsement from Soleimani’s successor in April – a strong indicator of his likely success. Iran’s ability to disrupt a sovereign country’s democratic process at a whim are concerning, and the UK should consider supporting legitimate forces in Iraq to weaken Iran.
16. The unchecked presence of the Iran-backed Badr Organization in Iraq runs counter to UK interests. The Shiite Islamist group - Iraq’s closest equivalent of Lebanon’s Hizballah - has exploited its freedom to operate in the absence of international proscription to entrench its presence within Iraq’s army and police force. Its influence expanded exponentially during the fight against Daesh despite its continued, brutal repression of Iraq’s Sunni population, and has been seen working alongside Iraq’s UK-supported Army as part of the PMU Shia militias. It’s proscription as a terror organization by the UK would be an important first step in countering its expanding footprint, and restrain its ability to play a mainstream role in Iraqi politics.
17. In April 2019, then-International Trade Secretary Liam Fox announced £1 billion of support available for British firms operating in Iraq, “providing jobs and promoting stability in the region”.[5] The UK’s commercial and strategic interests in promoting Iraqi growth and prosperity through trade offers a tangible route to curtailing Iran and should be encouraged further.

Syria

Iranian influence

18. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Iran has supported President Assad to prevent the loss of its only state ally, maintain logistical support to Hizballah, and provide a land border with Israel. Iran took advantage of the absence of Western attempts to prevent its interference (i.e. missed opportunity to interrupt its air link with Damascus via Iraq).
19. Iran’s interventions have been predictable; provision of advisors, military equipment and Quds Force-linked militias such as Lebanese Hizballah fighters and Iraqi Shia militias including Ktaeb Hizballah.
20. The IRGC established the National Defence Forces (NDF) in parallel with the Syrian Arab Army, with up to 100,000 mainly Alawi militia joining the fighting effort from mid-2013, under the control of Soleimani. In the same way the PMU in Iraq has been formalised, Iran made concerted efforts to guarantee the NDF’s status as an integral pillar in Syria beyond the civil war and embolden political allies in Syria to attain positions of authority.
21. By using proxies, Iran has gained control and leverage in Syria whilst ensuring the regime’s support, and deepened its relationship with Russia – an important future source of weapons and trade. Iran’s involvement cannot be easily disentangled, but it is noteworthy that an Israel Defense Forces Military Intelligence assessment in January 2020 found that Soleimani’s death could provide Israel an opportunity to curb Iranian influence in Syria, demonstrating the vast impact of Soleimani’s singular role.[6]

UK interests

22. While UK interests in Syria are less direct than those in Iraq, the consequences of Iran’s influence in the country are strategically far-reaching.
23. The UK’s stated mission is to work for “a political solution that will establish a lasting settlement to the conflict and protects the rights of all Syrians”.[7] Since 2011, the UK has provided over £3.1 billion in funding to relief efforts in Syria, but no progress has been made towards a political solution and the Assad regime has consolidated its control of the country.[8] Despite the UK identifying Iran’s role in propping up the Syrian government, Iran continues to disregard statements of condemnation not backed up by action – be it sanctions or otherwise.
24. The UK’s acceptance of Iranian assurances that the Adrian Darya 1 tanker, detained in Gibraltar in July 2019, would not discharge its payload of oil in Syria is of particular concern. Iran’s deliberate deception was a timely reminder of Iran’s disregard for international peace and security.
25. The divergence between the UK’s policy positions and those of the US has led to discrepancies in messaging and friction between the two countries; this must end. In May 2019, the most senior British general in the US-led coalition against Daesh, deputy commander of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Major-General Christopher Ghika, claimed there was “no increased threat from Iranian-backed forces in Iraq and Syria”.[9] US Central Command refuted these comments, stating that “recent comments from OIR’s deputy commander run counter to the identified credible threats available to intelligence from US and allies regarding Iranian-backed forces in the region”.[10] Iran will continue to take advantage of divergence in UK and US positions.
26. The restoration of stability to Syria is in the UK’s best interest, yet UK policy has failed to adequately address the causes of unrest. Iranian influence in the country can only be restricted through coordinated efforts by the UK and allies, of which economic counter-pressure would play a major part.

Lebanon

Iranian influence

27. Iran’s approach to building influence, by establishing parallel bodies alongside the organs of state, is fully advanced in Lebanon; it is now a challenge to even differentiate between the Lebanese state and Hizballah. While formally Lebanon’s armed forces, legislative and executive bodies and internal security organizations exist, in reality none of these organs can be mobilized without Hizballah’s – and therefore Iran’s – consent.
28. Created with Iranian assistance in the 1980s, Hizballah now dominates the supposedly legitimate structures of the state. Hizballah is deeply entwined within Lebanon’s economy, with large investments in the Lebanese banking sector, as well as the NGO sector (with many Hizballah-supported social development programs) and the group’s strength in the military, paramilitary and political sectors.
29. Since January 2020, Hizballah and its allies are now the only parties represented in Lebanon’s government – reflecting the long-standing power reality. Hizballah has an estimated 25,000 full time fighters, and 20-30,000 reservists. Israel estimates that they possess as many as 150,000 rockets, as well as thousands of anti-tank missiles.
30. Ostensibly established to resist Israeli occupation of Lebanon, Hizballah – proscribed in the UK since 2019 - has carried out terror attacks globally and today provides training and financial support to other terror groups. The Hizballah-model drives Iran’s efforts to project power, guided by Ayatollah Khamenei’s 1990 doctrine that the Quds Force “establish popular Hizballah cells all over the world”.[11]

UK interests

31. The depth and breadth of Iranian entanglement within the Lebanese state highlights the long-term consequences of Western failure to respond to and counter Iranian interference in a responsive manner.
32. In February 2019, the UK proscribed Hizballah in full, freezing Hizballah’s assets and banning the group from recruiting or fundraising in the country. While a welcome step, the UK’s proscription of Hizballah does not appear to be part of a wider strategy to deal with Iran’s regional expansionism alongside its nuclear ambitions. The UK Government would be well served now focusing on the root cause of instability; Iran’s control over the country.
33. In recent years, the UK has funded the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), despite its well-documented failure to implement UNSCR 1701 and disarm and prevent Hizballah presence in southern Lebanon, as well as reports of LAF cooperation and even sympathy with Hizballah. The UK has also equipped, trained, and mentored the Lebanese Armed Forces’ Border Regiments in order to “prevent spill over from Syria into Lebanon, and improve Lebanese capacity to counter internal and external threats”.[12] The fact that the armed forces of Hizballah are stronger than those of the ‘legitimate’ state army speaks to the extent of the challenge facing the UK. While ostensibly welcome measures, it is difficult to know with certainty whether the proscribed Hizballah is benefitting from such support.
34. There is mounting evidence that Hizballah – the recipient of $700+ million from Iran p/a - has been adversely hit by renewed and intensified US sanctions against Iran. The situation has been compounded by the collapse in oil prices owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, and Hizballah is now reportedly set to lose 40 percent of its income from Iran.[13] The fallibility of this dependency should be encouraging to the UK, and testament to the effectiveness of sanctions in strategic policy making.

Recommendations

1. UK interests would be better served by focusing on Iran’s war by proxy throughout the region, at the same time as addressing its nuclear program; the two are not mutually exclusive.
2. The UK must do everything within its power in the wake of Soleimani’s death to discourage and roll-back IRGC and Quds Force successes in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and beyond in recent decades. The UK already places sanctions on the IRGC and its key personnel. Fully proscribing the organization would not only send a clear message that the UK rejects Iran’s malign activities, but also tangibly impact its operational capabilities.
3. By extension, any organization with links to the IRGC, including the Badr Organization, ought to themselves be penalised through sanctions and considered for proscription.
4. In light of the strategic threat posed to both the UK and its allies, the UK should work more closely with the likes of the US to ensure a united front against Iran. This will be particularly important during efforts to secure a strengthened post-JCPOA framework.
5. The UK should continue efforts to support training and development of legitimate state military forces, but this must be strictly conditional upon them not-cooperating with Iran-linked militias.
6. The UK should support ongoing political reform efforts through engagement with legitimate political actors in the region.

April 2020