Solace - Written submission (ERA0017)

1. Solace is the representative body for more than 1500 chief executives and senior managers working in the public sector in the UK, committed to promoting public sector excellence. We provide our members with opportunities for personal and professional development and seek to influence debate around the future of public services to ensure that policy and legislation are informed by the experience and expertise of our members. Whilst the vast majority of Solace members work in local government, we also have members in senior positions in health authorities, police and fire authorities and central government.

2. We welcome the opportunity to respond to this call for evidence on issues around Electoral Law. Many of our members serve as Returning officers, those ultimately responsible for the conduct of elections and referenda in the UK.  Our members belong to Solace as individuals, not as representatives of the organisations that they work for. Therefore, speaking as the voice of Solace membership, this submission will indicate broad opinions and themes and, where more specific views and observations are offered, we have removed the name of the local authority area.

3. We wish to register the following responses which emerged on behalf of our membership. Unless stated otherwise, the views suggested below are contributions from individual Solace members, and not necessarily the official position of Solace. Where possible, these responses have been related to the terms of reference given by the Select Committee on the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013:

Individual electoral registration

3.1. Has the introduction of individual electoral registration been a positive development overall? Has it achieved its objectives, and how does it compare with the previous household registration system?

We consider the introduction of individual electoral registration (IER) to have been a positive step which properly reflects the onus which should be placed on individuals to ensure they are registered.  The previous system was anachronistic.

3.2. How well was the transition to individual electoral registration managed? How might it have been done differently?

We felt that, given the scale of the changes from household to individual registration, the risks to voter registration was well managed overall. However, there were particular challenges in the transition in areas where the population is very mobile – for example, students.

Beyond that transition period, the ‘steady state’ management of IER requires sufficient resourcing to achieve effective implementation.

3.3. What other steps are necessary to improve the electoral registration process, and to increase the accuracy and completeness of registers in particular? Has there been sufficient Government focus on completeness of registers?

There has been insufficient emphasis placed on the ability of electoral registration officers (ERO)to use data held elsewhere in the councils who appoint them to keep the register uptodate. The current proposals on canvass reform should improve the situation.

In addition, the absence of a robust approach to address the issue of "duplicate" on line registration applications is a major concern.  Electoral registration is now very much event driven, with large peaks in applications prior to major polls. "Business as usual" duplicates are manageable and in general they are checked and sorted reasonably easily. The problems occur when there is an early election or referendum when large numbers of people who were already registered make new online applications (often at the last minute) with different absent vote preferences or slightly different names – the quantity of these at the time can become unmanageable and diverts the small number of staff working to prepare for the election itself onto registration duties.

3.4. What other non-legislative measures might be necessary to encourage registration among groups that may be harder to reach? What are the main obstacles in this respect? Groups that may be harder to reach may include: students, BAME groups, attainers, frequent home movers, British citizens living abroad, people with long term health conditions, disabled people, and Commonwealth and EU Nationals, among others.

Some of the barriers to registration are physical – gated communities, concierge blocks, student halls etc can be notably hard for face to face canvassers to negotiate and there is no obligation on landlords to facilitate access.  Better communication within councils ought to make dealing with frequent movers easier as in theory at least, people should be registering for council tax when they move into an area and this information can be passed to the ERO.

Solace is aware of and welcomes the work being done by the Cabinet Office on democratic engagement, particularly in seeking to understand how those with chaotic lives including rough sleepers can be encouraged to register when in all reality being able to vote is probably very low on their list of priorities. Reaching out to such people in the places where they are likely to be – GP surgeries, job centres, benefits offices etc would increase the chances of their becoming registered.

It is possible that one reason why people do not bother to register is a lack of confidence in democracy generally so anything that councils can do to promote community engagement and to highlight the work that electoral representatives do in their areas would allow residents to see the link between being registered and making a difference locally.

Electoral fraud

3.5. Has the Act been an effective measure in its stated intention of tackling electoral fraud? How has the implementation of the Act addressed offences such as personation and duplicate voting, and do further steps need to be taken to tackle these?

It is difficult to assess how effective the Act has been in meeting its stated aim generally, partly because there is very little information about the extent to which it existed in the first place. However, it is worth noting the contents of the Electoral Commission’s 2019 report on electoral fraud which shows the total allegations of electoral fraud  since 2010 and which does indicate that the proportion of alleged offences which relate to registration has reduced since 2013.

3.6. How widespread are other voting fraud offences, such as postal vote fraud, in UK elections? What measures are needed to address these?

Solace has previously expressed the view that there is insufficient evidence of fraud to justify the proposed introduction of  ID checks and that these risk making it difficult for electors to exercise their right to vote in a context where turnout at elections is falling. The Electoral Commission report referred to above states that only 57 allegations of fraud relating to voting were made during the 2018 elections.

Annual canvass

3.7. Is the annual canvass fit for purpose? What are its main strengths and weaknesses?

Since the introduction of IER and the rolling register, the value of a full annual canvass has become questionable. Registration is now more event driven, with significant online applications (albeit many duplicates) being made once an election is announced. The canvass is hugely resource intensive and recruiting canvassers is difficult, both in rural areas where their patches cover many miles and in urban areas where access to some flatted properties is often impossible. Many authorities are using technology which has reduced the volume of paperwork generated but the ‘all out’ nature of the annual exercise drains internal resource for a number of weeks at a time when local authorities are having to make year on year reductions in their staff teams.

3.8. Are the Government’s plans to reform the annual canvass the right approach? To what extent are measures such as data matching a viable alternative to the full canvass?

Solace broadly supports the proposals for canvass reform as it would address some of the difficulties referred to above. We would urge caution about an assumption that its introduction would generate significant cashable savings though.

3.9. What has been the impact of introducing online registration? What challenges has this created for electoral administration?

Electoral registration is now very much event driven, with large peaks in applications prior to major polls. The issue of duplicates (referred to above) means that the small number of election staff available to the Returning officer must now spend more of their time later on in the electoral timetable than previously working on registration. This means they either working more (and often ludicrous hours) preparing for polling day and the count, or frankly spend less time on those aspects. The issue of duplicates is not just about wasted effort, but as a by-product of the introduction of on-line registration, it is impacting on the workload very significantly at the time of most pressure for all those administering the poll.

Electoral administration

3.10. Do you think that elections in the United Kingdom are currently well managed and regulated overall? If not, why not?

Solace believes that in the overwhelming majority of cases elections are well managed. Our members take their returning officer responsibilities extremely seriously and have utmost respect for the skill and integrity shown by electoral administrators.

3.11. Sections 14-23 of the Act made a range of changes to electoral administration. What has been the impact of these changes? Do any of them merit reconsideration or revision? Changes set out in Sections 14-23 included:

• Extending the Parliamentary election timetable from 17 to 25 days
• Enabling parish and community council elections to be held on the same day as a combined local and parliamentary election
• Providing for the publication of two additional notices of alteration to the electoral register during an election period
• Allowing the Secretary of State to reduce a returning officer’s fee for reason of poor performance, on the recommendation of the Electoral Commission
• Allowing voters queueing at polling stations at close of poll to be issued with ballot papers
• Requiring EROs to inform voters when their postal ballot paper has been rejected
• Repealing legislation to establish a coordinated online record of electors

The changes outlined above are by and large sensible.

3.12. What other measures may be necessary to ensure that electoral administration is fit for purpose and that administrators are able to fulfil their roles effectively?

The existing system of electoral law is fragmented and piecemeal. The Law Commission's report was clear and should be implemented. Non-compliance and consequential challenge to the democratic system is a real risk.

The intimidation of a candidate or campaigner should be an electoral (as well as a criminal) offence, as recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life.

Other matters

3.13. What is your view of the Government’s proposals to require people to bring personal identification when casting a vote?

Solace has previously expressed the view that there is insufficient evidence of fraud to justify the proposed introduction of ID checks and that these risk making it difficult for electors to exercise their right to vote in a context where turnout at elections is falling. The Electoral Commission report referred to above states that only 57 allegations of fraud relating to voting were made during the 2018 elections.

3.14. Is the Act (or any of its provisions) having unintended consequences? If so, what are these?

None of which we are aware.

Harry Chambers

Policy Support Officer

21 October 2019