The Local Government Technical Advisers Group (LGTAG) thank the Select Committee for the opportunity to give written evidence and are more than willing to discuss our submission further if required.
1.1 The Local Government Technical Advisers Group (LGTAG) is an Association of Technical Officers providing public services in and for Local Authorities. Our officers deal with public services like waste, recycling, street cleansing, parks, recreation, Planning, Council property (including housing) design, construction and maintenance, roads and transport, flooding and coastal protection etc. Our raison d’etre is to share best practice and advise central and local government bodies and representatives on problems and solutions relevant to these subject areas. Our membership is mainly senior staff in London and Metropolitan Boroughs, Counties and Unitary and District Councils as well as Consultants and Service providers where such services are outsourced to the private sector.
1.2 We are particularly concerned with our own Transport Infrastructure projects and indeed those of other bodies which have immediate transport and planning implications on local authorities. We should add that local government as a whole is responsible for nearly 98% of the road network providing essential links for buses, freight, pedestrians, cycles, cars etc. supporting local communities and economies.
1.3 Also, of particular relevance to this Select Committee inquiry - we recently (last September) submitted evidence to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee of Parliament on the Government Comprehensive Spending Review 2020. We identified the following priority themes for investment which should perhaps be reflected in at least funding and consequentially appraisal and delivery of major infrastructure projects:
1.4 Also, of particular relevance to our evidence;
2. Responses on issues identified by the Committee
On the detail issues included in your invitation to submit evidence we have the following comments:
2.1 The Government’s transport infrastructure priorities, including those set out in the National Infrastructure Strategy;
2.1.1 LGTAG broadly supports the objectives of the National Infrastructure Strategy (NIS) and welcomes the change in outlook on transport issues outlined in it, especially if the principles and aspirations can be achieved in practice. However, we would still remain concerned for example that the current transport programs are overly focussed on an investment programme for the National Trunk Road Network, which is contributing to an increasing disparity with local road networks. We strongly believe that investment in local transport solutions can contribute strongly to the delivery of the NIS objectives.
2.1.2 Covid-19 has had a major national and international impact, affecting virtually all aspects of life and as a consequence travel patterns have been severely disrupted and business operations have of necessity changed. LGTAG considers it to be premature to attempt to predict the consequential long-term changes to business process and also for transport. However, it is also clear that the impact to national finances is and will continue to be for some time, significant. Accordingly, delivery programs for all aspects of the NIS will need to be revisited. We recognise that because of the higher reliance upon Central Government funding, that transport will be placed under greatest pressure to accept spending reductions, however given the scale of the challenges identified in the NIS any review will need to be carefully considered.
2.1.3 Similarly, we believe the end of the transition period will impact upon trading patterns with Europe and consequently freight movements. However, we consider that it is the introduction of freeports that will likely have the greatest potential long-term impact upon freight movements. Whereas this may be a possible opportunity to rebalance freight movements and provide significant opportunities for levelling up regional economies, it is likely that transport investment will be needed to support these proposals. In order to also support the decarbonising objective and reducing pollution we would recommend that rail investment should afforded a high priority for any access to such freeports. We welcome the announcement in the NIS that a comprehensive cross-modal freight strategy is to be published in 2021, which will hopefully address these issues.
2.1.4 We welcome the inclusion of decarbonising the economy and adapting to climate change as part of the NIS. Additionally, we welcome the commitment to improving charging infrastructure (please note our recent response to the Consumer Market Authority on this subject as mention in para 1.4). We also note the recent statistics indicating significant growth in electric (185.9%) and hybrid (91.2%) car registrations in 2020, however this only represents 6.6% and 4.1% of the market share (Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders). By contrast, in Norway electric vehicles represented 54.3% of new vehicle registrations in 2020 (Road Traffic Information Council – Norway).
2.1.5 Accordingly, we consider that government needs to go further, for example: the current variation between local authority areas of public charging facilities is unacceptable and needs to be reduced by appropriate funding and regulation to ensure adequate national provision. It is probably also necessary to improve the grant system for purchasing new electric vehicles making them more competitive with conventional petrol or diesel equivalents. In time it may also be worthwhile to consider a scrappage scheme for older polluting vehicles. We consider that such a step change is required to deliver both the objective of decarbonising the economy and addressing the major pressing issue of air pollution which is having a devastating effect on health particularly for poorer inner-city residents. We are confident that car and indeed van manufacturers could readily deliver the target of manufacturing totally electric engine vehicles over the next 9 years.
2.1.6 Although not directly a transport issue, the issue of broadband is relevant and clearly, as much of the need for personal travel is communication, electronic communications can substantially reduce the need for personal travel and associated infrastructure. This can contribute to significantly reducing travel demand which has been well demonstrated during the current Covid-19 crisis. Many businesses have continued to operate with large sections of their workforces working from home utilising their home broadband connections.
2.1.7 Home working has however, highlighted the high level of variability in broadband speed. Whereas, this problem is well recognised in rural areas it is also an issue in urban areas. For example, Queens Road, Weybridge in Surrey receive a 0.12Mbps service and by contrast Dale Lane, Appleton in Warrington receives a 639MBps service, that is 5,333 times faster (U-Switch). However, it is this lower end which is of most concern as video-conferencing applications such as Zoom recommend a 1.5Mbps (up and down) service in order to function properly.
2.1.8 The government has introduced a minimum standard of 10Mbps download and 1Mbps upload, which is below the upload requirement for many video-conferencing applications. However, where a fixed connection cannot provide the required speeds operators can provide 4G modems to provide higher speeds, but data costs are generally significantly higher and signals can be less reliable. This may represent an appropriate and pragmatic response but should only be considered as a short-term solution with a commitment to upgrade fixed connections. It is probably in the area of education that this “digital divide”, when also coupled with limited computer provision, has the most significant impact. Accordingly, the government needs to address the “digital divide” issues.
2.2 The contribution transport infrastructure can make to the Government’s ‘levelling-up’ agenda and the economic growth of the UK’s towns, cities and regions outside London;
2.2.1 Apart from the issue of adequate broadband LGTAG considers other transport infrastructure to be an essential element of the “levelling-up” agenda and fundamental to increased economic growth particularly for those areas outside London. In many circumstances transport or communications are needed to help the economy, social interaction and indeed will promote levelling up. We strongly believe that investment in local transport solutions can contribute strongly to the delivery of the strategy’s objectives. There are a number of places where some road investment would be desirable (e.g., to help local regeneration or a particular environmental problem which could be addressed with a small-scale bypass). However, the investments that have most benefit are most likely to be for sustainable modes of heavy rail, trams, buses, cycles and pedestrians; there is little hard evidence that speeding up traffic, especially peak hour traffic, is likely to have benefits that society or business actually value highly.
2.2.2 Our transport networks are largely London centric and given the scale of its’ economy this is understandable. The expanding London economy has required extended transport links to other areas both for workforce and materials access. However, ever increasing London (and south-east) centric transport budgets have been at the cost of investment in the regions, effectively providing a development subsidy to London and the south east whilst neglecting the requirements of the regions leaving them with an inevitable transport deficit. We believe that this approach needs to be modified in order to help rebalancing the national economy and also offers opportunity for greater national growth through regional growth. However, to help areas outside London it probably means better communication between those areas and not to and from London.
2.2.3 Whereas many of the direct links to London are of relatively good quality other cross links have been severed, as in the case of the motorway / trunk road programme for example, or received limited investment. That is not to say all direct links have improved, for example train speeds on the East Main Coast Line (between Newcastle and London) are slower than in the 1960’s, although the numbers of trains using the route has increased significantly. The effect of severance and lack of investment on cross routes inevitably results in high levels of congestion at junctions / interchanges between the main and remaining crossing routes also often negatively impacting on regional / local connectivity. The regions are best placed to advise which key routes need to be improved to produce the greatest transport, social and economic benefits and need to be given a greater control over transport investment in each region.
2.2.4 The current proposals for HS2 have been identified by others to be a key element for the “levelling up” agenda and we consider that with the delivery of the future elements of the entire route to both the north-east and north-west that could be the case. However, in its current form economic benefits will be delivered along the route but it will be London that derives the greatest economic benefit. That is not to say we believe it should not proceed but rather consider that other projects can complement it to deliver more for the “levelling up”.
2.3 To what extent the coronavirus pandemic and its longer-term implications affects the necessity and cost-effectiveness of current and future major transport infrastructure projects;
2.3.1 The coronavirus pandemic has resulted in significant changes in people’s activities both for work and leisure and consequently travel patterns have been severely altered. As we have stated above, it is too soon to predict with any precision what the long-term impacts for transport will be. It does however seem likely that much more work and economic activity can be carried out from home particularly remote working, business meetings and on-line shopping. It may also have resulted in more walking and cycling to meet people’s needs.
2.3.2 It is however clear that public transport has been significantly adversely affected and that recovery and increased use may only return in the longer-term with consequential increased use of private car transport in the interim. Indeed, without continued support both direct financial and advisory / educational it will be unlikely to recover to pre-pandemic levels of use for some significant time. Accordingly, we recommend that local authority funding, in both revenue and capital terms for sustainable modes, should be prioritised.
2.4 How major transport projects can be delivered while ensuring the Government meets its decarbonisation 2050 net-zero targets;
2.4.1 A clearer focus and alignment of funding programmes which seek to achieve reduction in carbon emissions is required. There is considerable evidence that investment in the Strategic Road network programme at the current level is more likely result in increased emissions from extra generated traffic as well as increased traffic and congestion on the wider network. Furthermore, any possible predicted reductions in delays or any ‘modelled’ reductions in CO2 on the trunk road network are likely to be outweighed by congestion, delays, increased CO2 and pollution elsewhere.
2.4.2 We therefore advocate a broader approach, providing investment in local transport projects, including localised improvements to local roads where appropriate and public and other sustainable transport proposals. We have mentioned above the need to also provide greater support for electric vehicles, and associated infrastructure as well as rail access to ports and revenue and capital funding for sustainable modes.
2.5 Appraisal and funding of transport infrastructure
2.5.1 As mentioned in 1.4 (above), LGTAG with CIHT, TPS, RTPI (and working with officers of the LGA) are engaged with both the Treasury and the DfT in seeing how we might help develop more practical appraisal methods for Transport Infrastructure investment.
2.5.2 In very brief summary the following issues arise which we would particularly like to draw attention to this committee:
2.6 The effectiveness of the Government’s decision-making and appraisal processes for transport infrastructure projects and any changes required to the ‘Green Book’;
2.6.1 LGTAG supports changes to the Green Book announced in the NIS. As mentioned above, we firmly believe that increased transport investment needs to be provided to help address regional imbalances and thereby boost the national economy. This also needs to be accompanied by increased and meaningful devolution of decision making, allowing the Regions to prioritise transport investment in their areas including that of national agencies, rather than being a mere consultee.
2.6.2 We have previously set out our views regarding appraisal and accordingly wholly agree with the proposals to amend the Green Book. However, we wonder whether in their implementation they will go far enough to address the imbalance in the appraisal mechanism to ensure that BCR is not the dominant factor. Our experiences indicate such is the complexity of the current guidance that the Department for Transport (DfT) can invariably find issues to raise should it wish, despite overwhelming support in the Region, and both clear policy fit and value for money being demonstrated.
2.6.3 We also support relocating civil servants and hope that this will result in a meaningful presence for DfT in the regions to work and promote joint working with authorities in their areas.
2.7 Oversight, accountability and governance of transport infrastructure projects
2.7.1 LGTAG considers that DfT in conjunction with regional bodies have established possibly an unnecessarily strong governance structure for transport infrastructure projects and have addressed the issue of accountability for local authority schemes. Indeed, at times we wonder if DfT has not been overzealous particularly in pursuit of compliance with the details of elements of the assessment process and specifically in respect of modelling.
2.7.2 We do however consider that greater regional oversight is required for the work of the national agencies and particularly their alignment with regional economic investment priorities. Similarly, we do have concerns regarding larger national projects.
2.8.1 Our experience indicates that DfT has staff with skills and expertise to oversee the successful delivery of projects. However, sufficiency raises the issues of role and degree of delegation to regions without which projects will likely encounter delays, exacerbating existing frustrations. Much of the work in preparing project appraisals, particularly modelling is so complex that only a few large consultancy firms can prepare them for a client authority and LGTAG has previously identified the high overhead cost requesting simplification.
2.8.2 However, if the appraisal methodology is to remain unaltered, perhaps DfT should consider adopting a certification / approved practitioner approach to clients and or consultants submitting projects, concentrating on training / support and sampling to assist speedy project assessment. However, we continue to believe that simplification of the assessment approach would be the best option for improving speedy and cost-effective project delivery.
2.9 The relationship between the DfT and other Government departments and agencies, devolved administrations, and the private sector, in delivering major infrastructure projects.
2.9.1 It seems that the larger the organisation, whether it is public or private, the less joined up it appears to be. Furthermore, if responsibilities for different related functions are under different controlling management organisations, such problems are exacerbated. Within Local Authorities the norm is now to bring Planning and Transport under the same department head, however, with Counties and Districts and the present requirements, particularly in the South East where there is the requirement to add substantially to the housing stock, such problems are very evident.
2.9.2 As outsiders we see similar problems with say the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Department for Transport. At another level within Central Government, the Department of Health would certainly like to see less air pollution and more active travel; the DfT and Highways England appear very much to be working against this. As mentioned above LGTAG have had major issues for very many years with the Assessment, Appraisal and Funding for transport - ostensibly managed by the DfT However, we were never sure of where the reasons for the decisions by ‘government’ came from e.g., perhaps the Treasury. We sincerely hope that our present discussions with both the DfT and Treasury might resolve some long-standing issues.
2.9.3 Certainly, the larger sub central UK government organisations appear to have made progress in ensuring they deliver more of the right type of transport interventions. This appears evidenced in the progress made in London, where LGTAG is very well represented, and from our observations of what appears to be happening in Wales and Scotland.
2.9.4 For public policy considerations we believe they should rest with democratically elected representatives supported by public service orientated professional officers. This is not to say that data collection, research and management and implementation of works cannot be properly carried out by the private sector.
2.9.5 A quote from perhaps one of the best books written on Transport - Great Cities and their Traffic, gives a useful message: “‘Finally one must emphasise the importance of institutional arrangements. Probably the decisive factor determining strategic decision in many cities has been the way in which planning power has been distributed … It is therefore vital to obtain a governmental structure that is capable of arriving at rational policies and at implementing them” (Thomson 1977, pp. 322–323).
2.10 Factors influencing the cost of transport infrastructure in the UK
2.10.1 As mentioned above LGTAG has for some time raised the issue of the cost associated with scheme assessments and continues to have concerns regarding this overhead, which despite claims of a proportionate approach seems to us to be disproportionate particularly for moderate cost schemes. We accept that assessment is an essential process and needs to be robust but believe it needs to be improved. Indeed, we are aware that some smaller local authorities are no longer willing or able to justify the cost risk associated with the approval process regardless of the need for the investment.
2.10.2 The approval process both in terms of planning and land acquisition remains both costly and time-consuming for many transport projects. Projects which often have the benefit of being longstanding proposals approved in structure plans, which in themselves have been subject to public scrutiny are often subject to multiple objections often on policy grounds by the DfT. Not only is this frustrating for promoting authorities but it is also costly, adding costs both due to the delays incurred by the project and preparation costs for Public Inquiry which all too inevitably is the likely outcome of any objection. Tactical objections are often made on both the planning and compulsory purchase (CPO) processes as a means to attempt to strengthen a case for increased payments, notwithstanding that valuation is not a valid reason for objection. A further issue which arises within the CPO process is that of consideration of alternative land use which can dramatically impact valuation and landowner’s expectations.
2.10.3 We note that for National Infrastructure projects, significant improvements have been made to the processes and wonder whether the approach can also be applied to Approved Structure Plan projects.
2.10.4 The costs of utility alterations and performance of their contractors continues to be an issue which can significantly impact project budgets and programs. Accuracy of estimates and contractor’s performance can impact significantly on costs and whereas promoters normally seek to engage utility companies early and collaborate, it is the company’s priorities which prevail and the project promoter picks up the cost. Moving the utility performance to a contractual relationship may have the impact of better focussing their efforts Additionally, in the reimbursement of costs an allowance can be made for betterment however this in itself adds a cost as the specialist consultants invariably needs to be engaged to carry out the evaluation and, although worthwhile for large infrastructure projects, the reduction due to betterment is often modest in terms of overall project cost.
2.10.5 Risk is inevitable with any project and can dramatically affect the project cost and delivery and needs to be handled in a robust manner, which we discuss further below.
2.11 The reasons for continual high costs of major transport infrastructure projects, both past and present, and whether projects could potentially be delivered in a more cost-effective manner
2.11.1 We have mentioned above factors which contribute to the high costs of transport infrastructure. However, probably the most difficult issue in relation to determining potential costs of projects is that of risk. Regrettably in the eagerness to demonstrate projects are achieved at the lowest cost, risk is often handled poorly. Indeed, DfT has altered both its funding approach to risk and how it is addressed in the appraisal process. Invariably, the true cost of risk will be unknown until after the final account is paid and estimates of cost are best considered in terms of a range with an associated range of probability.
2.12 What lessons can be learned from other countries in the delivery of major transport infrastructure projects
2.12.1 Being a UK Local Government organisation we have little inside information but as transport ‘anoraks’ travelling around Europe and indeed elsewhere we do see some good and bad examples:
2.12.2 Outer Paris, like outer London in the 60s, 70s and 80s under central government control, did build too many roads which generated too much car traffic and caused many congestion and pollution problems. They have learned the lessons and Tram schemes are now appearing throughout greater Paris. Similarly, most large towns over about 100,000 population have already built fairly extensive tram schemes. They are also much better at infrastructure maintenance. France’s Motorway network is largely separately paid for and the costs of use are at least the same cost as the fuel used again. This has possibly allowed more generous payments to be made for land etc, and indeed land costs are probably considerably lower and roads are easier to route away from dense development.
2.13 Transport infrastructure capacity and skills
2.13.1 LGTAG’s experience is generally that when the economy faulters training is one of the first casualties which, when coupled with the normal employment uncertainties associated with the construction sector, inevitably creates problems in terms of skills availability, particularly in terms of recruiting the best qualified staff. Similarly, reductions in local authority funding have resulted in many experienced and qualified staff leaving; additionally, in order to reduce costs structural reorganisation often results in grouping of services with consequential loss of specialists. Accordingly, skills and capacity in all parts of the sector will continue to be a problem.
2.14 The extent to which there is enough capacity and the right skills within the UK to deliver the Government’s transport infrastructure plans, and options to help address shortages in transport infrastructure skills.
2.14.1 The publication of the NIS suggests the government is going to reprioritise sustainable transport hopefully over large road schemes. Our record on the basis of large schemes like Crossrail might suggest that we do not have the right skills or we spend too much effort gaining approval through the appraisal system and so we have less effort directed at ensuring whatever scheme is optimised before starting construction.
2.14.2 After expenditure on COVID-19 and Brexit preparations are largely complete, it is more than possible that many larger infrastructure plans, especially those that haven’t started, will need to be cut or reduced in scope.
2.14.3 We do believe there will need to be an urgent stocktake on schemes and skills in the coming year but the issues are unlikely to be clear in the short term.
3. Closing Comments
3.1.1 We apologise for the length of this submission but as representatives of the technical side of delivering or accommodating infrastructure for much of the country we hope our experiences will be of assistance to the committee in their deliberations. We are available anytime to answer questions and would be pleased to give oral evidence to the committee.
3.1.2 To conclude our main concerns are:
February 2021