Electoral Commission – Written evidence (ERA0005)

 

Summary


Introduction

  1. The Electoral Commission welcomes the opportunity to provide the Committee with written evidence on the operation of the Electoral Registration and Administration  Act 2013 and on key issues and challenges in relation to electoral registration and administration.

Individual electoral registration

Has the introduction of individual electoral registration been a positive development overall? Has it achieved its objectives, and how does it compare with the previous household registration system?

  1. The move to individual electoral registration (IER) in Great Britain in 2014 was a significant improvement in how people register to vote, reforming a system that remained largely unchanged since the Victorian period, making it more modern and secure. The previous system was based on the ‘head of the household’ completing registration forms on behalf of all other members of each household, an outdated concept not designed to enable individuals to manage their own personal registration.
  2. The previous system was vulnerable to fraud as there was no requirement to provide any evidence of an individual’s identity to register to vote and no systematic mechanism for EROs to verify the identity of applicants. There were several high-profile election petitions in the late 1990s and early 2000s that involved the fraudulent registration of electors (for example, the Hackney case in 1998 and Slough case in 2007). The requirement under IER for each individual applicant to provide “identifying information”, which is verified against DWP or locally held data, is an important measure that makes the system less vulnerable to fraud.
  3. IER increased the overall accuracy of the registers - our study of the 1 December 2015 electoral registers showed that the overall accuracy of the registers had increased by an estimated four percentage points.[1]
  4. However, it may have had a negative impact on those not highly motivated to be registered or with a low level of awareness of registration.
  5. Age and mobility continue to be the strongest variables associated with lower levels of completeness.
  6. There has been a decline in the registration level of attainers.[2] Before 2015 attainers could be registered by a parent or guardian via a household canvass form. Under IER attainers have been required to register themselves. This has seen a significant drop in the number of attainers on both the parliamentary and local government registers. This falling number of attainers supports the importance of the Government exploring more automatic approaches to registration, for example, at the point when individuals receive their National Insurance number. 
  7. IER has also introduced more resource-intensive processes, with the annual canvass now acting as an information gathering exercise. Where a new name is added to the Household Enquiry Form (HEF), the ERO is required to issue them an Invitation to Register and then follow the prescribed chasing cycle where an application is not received. There underlines the importance of making the annual canvass more targeted and efficient.

How well was the transition to individual electoral registration managed? How might it have been done differently?

  1. Overall, the findings from our study on the accuracy and completeness of the December 2015 registers indicated that the transition to IER was managed well with a notable increase in accuracy and largely stable levels of completeness. However, under-registration increased among some of those groups that were already less likely to be registered under the old system: young people and especially attainers.

What other steps are necessary to improve the electoral registration process, and to increase the accuracy and completeness of registers in particular? Has there been sufficient Government focus on completeness of registers?

  1. The Government’s plans to reform the annual canvass are an important next step, but there is more that should be done to ensure we have a joined-up and year-round registration process, making it easier for people to register to vote and for EROs to maintain accurate and complete electoral registers.
  2. Our vision of a modern electoral register is one which:
  1. We recently published the findings of feasibility studies which examined the potential for giving EROs access to data from other public service providers; integration of electoral registration into other public service transactions; and automatic or more automated forms of registration.[3]
  2. The feasibility studies found that these reforms were feasible from a technical and operational perspective and could be implemented without radically altering the structure of the electoral registration system in the UK.

 

  1. We want to encourage a wider debate on the potential benefits of further modernisation and electoral registration reform and look forward to discussing the findings of our feasibility studies with the UK’s governments and other interested groups.

What other non-legislative measures might be necessary to encourage registration among groups that may be harder to reach? What are the main obstacles in this respect?

  1. A number of non-legislative initiatives designed to encourage registration among under-registered groups have been tested in recent years. These include integrating electoral registration into the student enrolment process (e.g. Sheffield City Council working with universities in the Sheffield area), the Northern Ireland schools initiative and EROs and their staff attending British citizenship ceremonies to encourage new British citizens to apply to register to vote there and then. We will continue to pursue these in the short-term, including through the sharing of good practice.

 

  1. We undertake work to raise public awareness about the need for citizens to register in advance of electoral events. This has included mass media campaigns, as well as partnership activity with a wide range of organisations that are well placed to reach groups that are typically under-registered. We also issue guidance to EROs and have made a range of partnership resources available on our website, which include practical suggestions for how EROs can involve partners in helping to get people registered.

Annual canvass

Is the annual canvass fit for purpose? What are its main strengths and weaknesses?

  1. The annual canvass is essentially an information gathering exercise to help EROs identify where there should be additions to and deletions from the register. It continues to be a key tool in helping to maintain the accuracy and completeness of the registers.
  2. In recent decades, however, there have been major changes to key aspects of the electoral registration system which have had an impact on how the registers are maintained. These changes – including rolling registration, IER and online registration – mean that the annual canvass is no longer the only way for EROs to identify new electors or changes of address. Our analysis published in 2017 showed that the number of registration applications appears to be related to the proximity of high-profile electoral events.
  3. The current annual canvass process is characterised by inefficiency. Even though most people do not move address every year, EROs are still required by law to carry out the same steps in order to obtain a response from every address. This means that EROs are unable to focus their resources in areas of greatest need, and a disproportionate amount of resource is required to be directed at canvass activity which does not identify eligible electors who should be added to the register or necessary deletions from the register.
  4. For these reasons we do not believe that the current system is meeting the objective of the canvass as well as it should, nor do we believe the model is sustainable in the short to medium term.[4]

Are the Government’s plans to reform the annual canvass the right approach? To what extent are measures such as data matching a viable alternative to the full canvass?

  1. We welcome the UK Government’s proposals for reform of the annual canvass process. They are an important first step in modernising electoral registration. The new process should reduce the cost of the activity required for properties where there has been no change of residents; EROs will accordingly be able to focus their efforts at addresses where there has been change.[5]
  2. These changes are highly dependent on new data sharing mechanisms, which need careful implementation in good time ahead of the start of the 2020 annual canvass.
  3. The universal embedding of a more data-driven approach to managing the annual canvass offers considerable scope for reforming the system further; it presents an opportunity to build on the increasing use of data across the public and private sectors to the benefit of citizens and the delivery of efficiencies.

What has been the impact of introducing online registration? What challenges has this created for electoral administration?

  1. The introduction of online registration has been a positive improvement to the registration system. As well as making it more accessible for electors, the availability of an online process where an application can be completed in less than five minutes has also made it easier to directly encourage people to register to vote through public awareness campaigns around major polls.
  2. Analysis of online registration service data included in our 2017 report on the UK general election concluded that the numbers of people using the service had increased each year since 2014. Between 10 June 2014 and 30 June 2017 a total of 21,580,788 registration applications (representing 77.6% of all applications) were submitted online. The analysis also showed that the number of applications appeared to be related to the proximity of high-profile electoral events.[6]
  3. Online registration has been particularly popular among some of those groups who we know are less likely to be registered to vote, including young people and British citizens overseas. Over two-thirds (69%) of online applications received between 18 April 2017 and 22 May 2017 were from people aged under 34. Applications from those aged over 55 represented 8% of all applications received.
  4. Despite the undoubted convenience and accessibility of online registration, there is the ongoing challenge of duplicate registration applications. The online registration system currently allows people to submit an application to register even if they are already registered to vote. EROs have highlighted the significant administrative impact of processing duplicate applications ahead of electoral events. The UK Government should undertake further work to explore how existing systems could be improved to address the administrative impact and wasted effort by EROs and their teams which results from duplicate applications.

Electoral fraud

Has the Act been an effective measure in its stated intention of tackling electoral fraud? How has the implementation of the Act addressed offences such as personation and duplicate voting, and do further steps need to be taken to tackle these?

  1. The implementation of IER has made it much harder to register fictitious electors, whether for the purpose of committing electoral or other fraud.
  2. The dispersed and unconnected nature of the electoral registers across Great Britain means that it is not currently possible to collectively interrogate registers which are maintained by different EROs in order to identify duplicate entries. Providing a mechanism for EROs to compare information about electoral register entries across all 372 registers would help to further improve the accuracy and completeness of electoral registers and could help significantly to address the risk of some electors voting more than once at a relevant election. 
  3. Modifying the current framework so that an elector who is lawfully registered in two different electoral areas (and therefore entitled to vote in local elections for the two different local councils) must choose which area they will vote in for UK Parliamentary general elections could also reduce this risk.
  4. Polling station voting in Great Britain remains vulnerable to personation fraud because there are currently few checks available to prevent someone claiming to be an elector and voting in their name. Before introducing an ID requirement for elections in Great Britain, the Government and Parliament should consider carefully the available evidence about the impact and proportionality of different approaches on the accessibility and security of polling station voting.

How widespread are other voting fraud offences, such as postal vote fraud, in UK elections? What measures are needed to address these?

  1. There is no evidence from police data (which we collect and publish every year) to suggest that there have been widespread attempts to commit electoral fraud in recent years.[7] However, evidence from our regular post-election research with the public has shown that there is continuing concern about electoral fraud:
  1. We do not believe it is appropriate for campaigners to be directly involved in the administration of the voting process, including completing absent vote applications and postal ballot packs, because of the direct risk of electoral fraud and also because of the perceptions of voters that such activity is inappropriate. The law should be changed to address this.
  2. We would also welcome further improvements to the drafting and definition of postal voting offences, which could provide more protection for postal voters. This includes extending laws protecting the secrecy of voting to postal voters, and removing the option to request a permanent postal vote. We continue to agree with Sir Eric Pickles’ recommendation that the option to apply for a postal vote for a specified period should be subject to a three year limit, so that voters are given the opportunity to review and confirm their status as postal voters after their initial application.
  3. More generally, there is wide support and need for significant reforms to modernise election offences. Many existing electoral offences are so outdated and poorly drafted that they are not well-understood and sometimes not easily enforced.

Electoral administration

Do you think that elections in the United Kingdom are currently well managed and regulated overall? If not, why not?

  1. Recent years have seen an increase in the number of elections overall, such as the unscheduled elections in Northern Ireland and in the UK as a whole, as well as a number of complex scheduled polls, including new ones such as Combined Authority Mayoral elections.
  2. Although we believe that both we and the wider electoral community have responded well, it is important to recognise that the difficulties of delivering well run elections are increasing, especially when polls are unplanned, and as local authorities are faced with reduced resources and a growing number of skilled professionals leaving electoral work.
  3. The nature of campaigning activity at elections and referendums in the UK has changed significantly over recent years. An increasing proportion of spending by campaigners goes on online advertising, including social media companies. Yet electoral law fails to reflect these changes. We want to see legislation that ensures digital campaign materials contain information about who is responsible for producing and distributing them to voters. We first recommended that the law should be changed to require this in 2003.
  4. In summer 2018 we set out a package of recommendations for changes to the law to improve transparency and the regulation of digital campaigns, drawing on our experience of regulating funding and spending by campaigners at recent elections and referendums.
  5. More broadly, there is considerable scope to improve the legal framework governing elections. There is an urgent need for simplified and modernised electoral law, to underpin efficiency, innovation and voter confidence in electoral administration and campaign regulation.

Sections 14-23 of the Act made a range of changes to electoral administration. What has been the impact of these changes? Do any of them merit reconsideration or revision?

  1. The Commission recommended many of these changes (for example: extending the UK Parliamentary election timetable to 25 days; allowing voters queueing at polling stations at close of poll to be issued with ballot papers; and requiring EROs to inform voters when their postal ballot paper has been rejected) and consequently supported the relevant provisions in the Act. The changes set out in sections 14-23 are good examples of why law reform is important and we do not believe any of them merit reconsideration or revision.

What other measures may be necessary to ensure that electoral administration is fit for purpose and that administrators are able to fulfil their roles effectively?

  1. Electoral law is increasingly voluminous, complex and outdated: many new types of elections and referendums have been added in the last 20 years and significant new policies have been implemented.
  2. There is an urgent need for simplified and modernised electoral law, to underpin efficiency, innovation and voter confidence in electoral administration and campaign regulation.
  3. This is not just a technical or legal problem – there are real costs and impacts for voters, campaigners and election officials. The current framework also makes it much harder to innovate or introduce improvements that would make a real difference in areas that matter most.
  4. It is time for the UK’s governments to commit to the urgent need for comprehensive change, prioritising the time and resources needed to deliver meaningful improvement. We cannot afford to risk the hard-won confidence of voters and campaigners in our elections and referendums.

Other matters

What is your view of the Government’s proposals to require people to bring personal identification when casting a vote?

  1. Five English local authorities piloted voter ID at the May 2018 local elections, with ten areas piloting in 2019. The pilot schemes provide important evidence about the way in which a voter ID scheme could be delivered in Great Britain.
  2. Our statutory evaluation of the May 2019 voter ID pilots found that a large majority of people already have access to the forms of ID used in these pilots. We also found indications that some groups of people can find it harder than others to show ID. There were no significant issues in any pilot area with the administration of the election. The experience of taking part in the pilot scheme appears to have had a positive impact on people’s perception of the security of the polling station process.
  3. However, several important questions remain about how an ID requirement would work in practice, particularly at a national poll with higher levels of turnout. Before introducing the requirement for elections in Great Britain, we recommend that Government and Parliament should consider carefully the available evidence about the impact and proportionality of different approaches on the accessibility and security of polling station voting. This should include evidence from the experience of polling station voters in Northern Ireland, as well as the evidence from the local pilot schemes in both 2018 and 2019.
  4. Our evaluation of the May 2019 pilots identified three key areas for Government and Parliament to consider further:

Is the Act (or any of its provisions) having unintended consequences? If so, what are these?

  1. We are not aware of any unintended consequences of the Act.

 

 

 

 

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[1] See The Electoral Commission (2016) The December 2015 electoral registers in Great Britain: Accuracy and completeness of the registers in Great Britain and the transition to Individual Electoral Registration

[2] Attainers are people who will attain the voting age during the currency of the electoral register (1 December to 30 November the following year). 

[3] A summary of the findings of the feasibility studies can be found in our July 2019 report.

[4] Section 8 (2) of the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013 states that the objective of the annual canvass is to “assist registration officers in Great Britain to ascertain— (a) the names and addresses of persons who are not registered in a register but who are entitled to be registered; (b) those persons who are registered in a register but who are not entitled to be registered”.

[5] See the Commission’s July 2019 report on the UK Government's draft statutory instrument to reform the annual canvass.

[6] The Electoral Commission (2017) Electoral registration at the June 2017 general election.

[7] A summary of 2017 and 2918 electoral fraud data can be found on our website.

[8] The Electoral Commission (2019) The May 2019 voter identification pilot schemes.