Dr Megan Dee - Written evidence (MUL0008)

Dr Megan Dee, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, School of Law, Politics and Social Sciences, University of Stirling, July 2026

No AI was used in the preparation of this evidence.

Q.1 Is the multilateral system in crisis? If so, what are the causes of this crisis?

1. The multilateral system faces crisis when the practice of multilateralism, pursued by states through formal and informal multilateral institutions, is challenged or weakened, and/or when the idea of multilateralism as a means of advancing international cooperation or upholding international order, is undermined or threatened.  Since the late 2010s, both the practice and idea of multilateralism have been challenged, and in large part undermined, from multiple sources of crisis. These can be broadly categorised as crises of power, effectiveness and legitimacy.

2. The multilateral system today faces a crisis of power courtesy of the shift in power dynamics within the international system. Since the late 2010s/early 2020s these shifting power dynamics most notably comprise (i) the retreat of the United States from its global leadership and liberal defender roles, (ii) the resurgence of Russia and its recalcitrance within multilateral institutions, and (iii) the rise of China coupled with uncertainty over its intentions within multilateral institutions. These multipolar power dynamics are also associated with ‘multipolarization’[i]  and the growing ideological polarization between liberal democracies and authoritarian states within the international system. Such multipolarization raises critical questions about the validity, legitimacy and sustainability of a ‘liberal rules-based international’ underpinned by the multilateral governance system.[ii]

3. Today’s crisis of power in turn fuels a crisis of effectiveness for established multilateral institutions. Great power competition and contestation hinder the functionality of multilateral institutions, generating a ‘multipolar-multilateralism conundrum’[iii], or ‘multipolar governance dilemma’[iv] where multipolarity makes multilateralism increasingly necessary to mitigate geopolitical competition, risk and uncertainty, but ever harder to accomplish. This crisis of effectiveness has also been compounded by stagnation and deadlock in multilateral forums intended to negotiate, deliberate or otherwise advance collective action in solving transnational problems and delivering global public goods.[v] Critical examples of multilateral stagnation and deadlock can be found in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference,[vi] the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties,[vii] and the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conferences.[viii] Multilateralism’s crisis of effectiveness is further impacted by budgetary restraints and uncertainty for multilateral institutions – particularly recognised in the UN’s chronic budget crisis[ix] – as well as by exits or threats of withdrawal from those institutions.[x] 

4. These crises in turn fuel a crisis of legitimacy as multilateral institutions start to lose their authority in the eyes of governments and citizens. Multilateral institutions experience a ‘legitimacy surplus when they, and the rules they establish, are considered acceptable to audiences’.[xi] Multilateral institutions experience a legitimacy deficit however, when audiences believe that decision-making within the institution is stagnated or deadlocked, where consensus decisions prove ineffectual, or compliance is low, and where the perception follows that the institution is unable to deliver on its mandate.[xii]  One example of this is the 2026 NPT review conference which faced mounting pressure to deliver a consensus outcome agreement, as a ‘third straight failure’[xiii] could call into question the credibility and legitimacy of the NPT itself.[xiv]

Q.2 How is multilateral cooperation likely to evolve in the next five to ten years, and how do you assess the prospects of reform of international organisations?

5. Today’s crisis of multilateralism is a potent polycrisis of power, effectiveness and legitimacy. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that questions concerning the legitimacy and effectiveness of the multilateral system are by no means unique to 2026.[xv] In fact, the crisis of multilateralism has had a ‘remarkably long shelf-life’[xvi] with periods of global or regional transformation and uncertainty frequently coinciding with transformation and change within systems of multilateral governance. 

6. Multilateralism is also highly resilient. Multilateralism is a durable and deeply embedded idea in most states’ understanding of international cooperation and world order as well as being a practice of their foreign policy. Multilateralism is also a highly flexible practice. In the next five to ten years multilateralism can therefore be expected to respond to crisis in several distinct ways, including through decline, adaptation and evolution.

7. Multilateral decline will be felt in both relative and absolute terms.[xvii] Relative decline will occur through persistent stagnation in multilateral forums that will hinder the capacity of states to negotiate or deliberate for the delivery of global public goods. While termination of established multilateral institutions is unlikely in the next five to ten years, absolute decline may occur through reductions in membership, finance or authority of established multilateral institutions. Evidence for this is already clear in the United States’ announcement of its withdrawal from 66 international organisations in January 2026, as well as in the withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, by some states from key intergovernmental treaties.[xviii] Multilateral decline will also remain a point of concern as states reflect on the utility and cost-effectiveness of attending multilateral forums.

8. While multilateral decline can be expected, so too can we expect multilateral adaptation in the next five to ten years. International organisations continue to serve multiple critical functions, including as facilitators of intergovernmental dialogue, often providing an essential forcing function in bringing most of the world’s states together to discuss global problems. International organisations will respond to crisis by modifying their activities or working methods utilising existing mechanisms and structures. While major structural reforms of international organisations are highly unlikely – in large part due to the great power politics that will hinder any such reform decisions – international organisations will still seek to adapt their activities through established mechanisms where they have authority to act without frequent recourse to member states.[xix] The UN80 Initiative is one example of how the UN is seeking to adapt to crisis through a modernisation agenda, aimed at streamlining UN administrative processes, reviewing mandates, and enhancing coordination across UN pillars – much of which is being actioned by the UN Secretariat with major decisions then made through the UN General Assembly, where the great powers have less ability to block. Nevertheless, major reforms through the UN80 Initiative are considered unlikely as political opposition within the UNGA will remain.[xx] 

9. Multilateral evolution can also be expected in the next five to ten years. Multilateral evolution occurs when states seek to pursue new forms of multilateral coordination and cooperation, be that through the establishment of new multilateral institutions, through regional multilateral arrangements, or in the pursuit of minilateralism. Dissatisfied coalitions, typically involving leadership of a great power, have established new multilateral institutions in the past. [xxi] In the current geopolitical climate however, it is expected that states, including the great powers, will be more inclined to pursue informal multilateral coordination mechanisms or ‘dialogues’ rather than establishing new formal institutions.[xxii] In the next five to ten years we can also expect states to (i) reprioritise regional cooperation either through formal regional organisations or through ad hoc, informal regional arrangements, and/or (ii) pursue minilateralism (see Q4 response below). Such practices are to be expected as governments, faced with persistent competitiveness and uncertainty in the international system, will still seek to sustain intergovernmental dialogue, particularly with states that are likeminded or share common ties.

Q.4 Is the rise of alternative, “minilateral” groupings undermining or complementing the multilateral system?

10. Minilateralism is a form of informal governance, involving a small sub-set of the most willing and relevant states, aimed at overcoming specific transnational governance problems. [xxiii] Important to note that minilateralism is fundamentally a relational concept: one that can only be fully understood relative to established multilateral institutions and the transnational problems they are intended to tackle.[xxiv] More specifically, ‘minilateral groupings seek to advance collective action by either contributing to or bypassing the activities of established multilateral institutions’.[xxv]

11. States pursue minilateralism in distinct ways. Inside multilateralism follows where a group of states form within an established multilateral institution, explicitly and exclusively integrating their activities within that institution’s own deliberative processes. Outside minilateralism occurs when a group of states form and operate distinctly apart from established multilateral institutions.[xxvi] Minilateralism can also be understood as a fluid practice. States may therefore form a minilateral grouping inside a multilateral institution with a view to contributing to the deliberations of that institution, but then shift their activities outside of that institution when its members become dissatisfied and seek an alternative multilateral forum to pursue global public goods (inside-outside). States may also establish a minilateral grouping outside of multilateral institutions but then redirect their activities inside a multilateral institution where they seek to ‘multilateralise’ their proposed solutions or outcomes (outside-inside).[xxvii] The particular type of minilateralism that states will pursue is then conditional on how they perceive the effectiveness and legitimacy of those wider membership multilateral institutions, and the extent to which they seek to uphold, or bypass, those institutions as the main forum for tackling transnational problems. 

12. Important to note that minilateralism is not a ‘new’ phenomenon, but it has experienced a resurgence in recent years, as states seek to sustain dialogue and cooperation while navigating the complexity, uncertainty and competitiveness of today’s international system. A trend nevertheless follows that small states and middle powers typically pursue inside multilateralism, selecting geographically diverse and representative states, and integrating their activities into established multilateral institutions to add to their legitimacy. The great powers, and particularly the United States, however, typically prefer outside multilateralism, where they can control the agenda while bypassing free-riders and blocking states within multilateral institutions.[xxviii] 

13. A challenge follows, however, insofar as inside multilateral groupings tend to have limited effectiveness due to their power deficit, while outside minilateral groupings have limited legitimacy, and face a transparency and accountability deficit; being perceived as ‘cartels’ of the most powerful.[xxix] Worth noting that multilateral institutions derive much of their legitimacy from their inclusivity. That same inclusivity and large-n membership nevertheless then limit their prospects for achieving multilateral cooperation.[xxx] Minilateralism, by contrast, offers more efficient multilateral coordination and cooperation courtesy of its small-n membership. Those smaller numbers nevertheless then raise critiques of minilateralism’ s exclusivity and illegitimacy.[xxxi]

14. Minilateralism, pursued both strategically and reflectively, can nevertheless complement rather than undermine an effective multilateral system.[xxxii] Specifically, minilateralism can complement established multilateral institutions where it is:
1. Representative: Membership should, ideally, include a cross-section of states with different geographic regions, positions, responsibilities and power statuses. Membership should be exclusive insofar as numbers remain small enough and useful enough to facilitate meaningful dialogue, problem-solving and efficient decision-making, while also being inclusive of the diverse political positions within that policy space. Including ‘lynchpin’ or ‘connector’ states - those states who themselves have a wider network in their regions and political spheres, and who are active in other political groupings[xxxiii] - can also boost the representativeness of minilateral groups, ensuring greater translation and acceptability of group activities to the wider multilateral system.
2. Flexible: Minilateral groupings should be agile and responsive to transnational governance problems. They should nevertheless also be realistic about what they can contribute to solving a particular problem and ensure they remain closely linked to established multilateral institutions to avoid duplicating efforts being pursued elsewhere. It can be expected that governments will pursue multiple-minilaterals across different issue and policy spaces, working with an overlapping network of different states. Minilateral groupings should subsequently also consider their time-boundedness, with members either setting a timeframe for pursuing coordination efforts, with a flexible end point, or regular review points to consider the ongoing utility of sustaining group coordination efforts.
3. Transparent: Minilateral groupings should ensure transparency by allowing some openness about group meetings. This is not to suggest that minilateral groupings hold open meetings, but to be reflective of the need to avoid the ‘opaqueness’ of minilateralism for those states who are not in the room.[xxxiv] Transparency measures need not be onerous but can be tailored simply towards communicating (i) dates of group meetings, (ii) level of meetings, and (iii) the topic or topics under discussion. Such information can be communicated in various ways, depending on the sensitivity of meetings and the degree of formality or institutionalisation of the minilateral grouping e.g. through a dedicated website, a group statement or press release, a note verbale at multilateral conferences, or including the dates in regular national reporting to multilateral institutions. Established multilateral institutions could also bolster the connectivity of minilateral group activities to their institution by including associated minilateral group meeting dates in their own calendar of events.
4. Accountable: Minilateral groupings can moreover ensure accountability by integrating group activities into the deliberative processes of wider membership multilateral institutions. This can be achieved through the practice of submitting group working papers, making formal group statements, submitting group reports or hosting group side-events during multilateral conferences.