Written Evidence from The Howard League for Penal Reform (FSP0005)

About the Howard League for Penal Reform

1. Founded in 1866, the Howard League is the oldest penal reform charity in the world. The Howard League has about 7,500 members and 14,500 supporters, including people in prison and their families, lawyers, criminal justice professionals and academics. It is an independent charity and accepts no grant funding from government.
2. The overriding ambition of the Howard League is to move the dial on punishment away from cruelty and towards building a more humane and effective response to crime that provides justice to all and helps to reduce reoffending. It is in this context that the Howard League advocates for a very significant reduction in the use of prison, and much better conditions and opportunities for those who remain there. The incarceration of tens of thousands of people in prisons that fail to meet legal fire safety standards is of the gravest concern. The Howard League remains in legal correspondence with the government about ongoing fire safety issues.
3. This submission seeks to highlight key overarching issues that should inform any consideration of fire safety in prisons. The focus of these submissions is on publicly-run prisons in England, where the majority of prisons which require fire safety improvement works are based.[1] Notably, all privately-run prisons in England and all publicly- and privately-run prisons in Wales have automatic fire detection (“AFD”) installed, which is recognised as an “imperative” fire safety measure in prisons.[2]

Background

4. The Fire Safety Order 2005 (“the Order”) came into force in 2006. It requires those responsible for non-domestic premises to assess the risk of fire in those premises and take steps to eliminate or control that risk. In the case of prisons, responsibility is shared between the Ministry of Justice (“MoJ”), His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (“HMPPS”), private operators of prisons and others with individual control of the premises, including individual prison governors and directors, and companies with contractual obligations in relation to maintenance, repair and safety.[3]
5. In 2007, the government launched a Fire Safety Improvement programme to bring prisons up to standard.[4] The main cause of fire-related injuries in prison is due to delays in fire detection, in particular because people in cell fires cannot self-evacuate.[5] As part of the Fire Safety Improvement programme, the government accepted that AFD needs to be installed in all prison cells in England and Wales.[6] Other fire safety works, including effective smoke control and water mist suppression systems, also need to be completed in prisons across the estate; the second most serious risk of injury is from inadequate smoke control systems.[7]
6. Until last year, successive governments had committed to remedying the situation by 2027, failing which cells that were not fire safe would be taken out of use.[8] This promise was most recently reiterated to the Public Accounts Committee in January 2025.[9]
7. The government has now reneged on that commitment. It has, following legal correspondence with the Howard League, admitted to the Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate (“the CPFSI”) and – latterly – this Committee, the Public Accounts Committee[10]  and the Justice Committee[11] that the 2027 deadline will not be met and that cells will not be taken offline even where they do not comply with fire safety standards, because there is insufficient prison capacity to do so. There is now no deadline for completing all necessary fire safety improvement works, beyond doing them “as quickly as possible”.[12] As of April 2026, two-thirds of publicly-run prisons still required fire safety improvement works to be completed to comply with the law.

Extent of fire safety works and timeframe for completion

8. It has been difficult to get a clear picture of the scale of fire safety works that have yet to be completed, and the timeframe within which this work will be done, because of the lack of accurate publicly available information.
9. The government records the prioritisation of its fire safety improvement works on a spreadsheet called the Fire Safety Improvement List (“FSIL”). This document is not publicly available. It would be useful for the Committee to see and be able to ask questions about this document in order to understand the scale of the works required.
10. Otherwise, publicly available information about the progress of fire safety works is largely provided in reports to, and correspondence with, parliamentary committees. The level of detail varies and there is not always consistency in what is reported. For example, in July 2025, HMPPS told the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee that 21,000 currently occupied prison places did not meet the current fire safety standards. It was estimated that, by the end of 2027, approximately 6,000 prison places would still fall short of these essential requirements.[13] In March 2026, the prisons minister told the Chair of the Justice Committee that the number of prison places without AFD was 21,067, an increase of 67 prison places despite eight months having passed. Yesterday, the Chief Executive of HMPPS told the Committee that 19,000 prison places did not have AFD. The piecemeal nature of the information provided can make it difficult to scrutinise the government’s approach in any detail.
11. The government has recently made the decision to pursue an “AFD only” programme, prioritising the installation of AFD rather than completing full fire safety works, in some prisons.[14] The CPFSI’s understanding, set out in evidence at the inquest held in March 2026 into Clare Dupree’s death, was that this new approach would mean that all prison places would have AFD by the end of 2027. However, we understand that HMPPS is now hoping to install AFD in only c.10,000 prison places by the end of 2027, with the remaining 9,000 places to have AFD installed by the “early 2030s”. No explanation has yet been provided as to why this process is now expected to be so protracted.
12. The Howard League is also concerned about slippage in the starting and completion of agreed works on a prison-by-prison basis. For example, the Howard League was told in January 2026 that fire safety works at HMP Wandsworth had started in October 2024; however, we understand from evidence given by HMPPS to the Committee yesterday that this work has only recently commenced.
13. There have also been significant delays in completing works in prisons where there have been fire-related deaths. We understand that there have been at least nine fire-related deaths in prisons since 2011, including eight in publicly run prisons.[15] However, even fire-related deaths have not been sufficient to secure timely fire safety works in a number of those prisons:

• For example, HMP Eastwood Park, where Clare Dupree was fatally injured in a fire in December 2022, still does not have AFD in all of its cells; 177 of 395 places at the prison are without AFD. Works are scheduled to start this month (June 2026) but will not be completed until at least Winter 2028.
• At HMP Swaleside, where Christian Hinkley was fatally injured in a fire in July 2019, fire safety works have not started. Almost six years after his death, 724 of 940 places at the prison are still without AFD. In 2021, the government told the inquest into Christian Hinkley’s death that works would start in December 2022.[16] The Howard League was told in January 2026 that works would start in August 2026. However, in May 2026 we were told that this work has now been delayed until April 2028.

14. We are not aware of how information about the timeframe for completion of works is recorded and updated by the government; it is not recorded on the FSIL, which might have been expected, and the MoJ’s commercial pipeline which usually includes contract start dates and estimated contract durations – and which is supposed to be published every six months - has not been published since April 2025.[17] It would be useful for the Committee to be provided with such information in order to scrutinise purported targets and deadlines.
15. The Howard League was previously informed that the current decant of around 1,800 places to allow fire safety works is due to be increased to around 3,200 by December 2026.[18] It would be useful for the Committee to confirm that this remains the case.
16. The Howard League considers that the government should be required to publish a transparent programme of fire safety works with targets and deadlines in respect of which the Ministry of Justice regularly reports to Parliament.  It is important that this is not limited to AFD works only.

Oversight and accountability

17. The CPFSI enforces fire safety legislation in Crown premises in England, including prisons. Non-Crown bodies that fail to comply are subject to statutory enforcement and can be criminally prosecuted. However, whilst Crown bodies must comply with the provisions of the Order, they are not subject to statutory enforcement or prosecution.[19] 
18. The CPFSI can issue a range of informal and formal statutory and non-statutory notices. Only statutory notices served on non-Crown bodies are published. The Howard League considers that the CPFSI should publish all notices served on Crown and non-Crown bodies.
19. The CPFSI will send a “Crown Enforcement Notice” when it has identified that there has been a significant failure by a Crown body – such as a prison governor, the MoJ, or HMPPS – to comply with fire safety legislation. The notice outlines the issues, and requests that action is taken to ensure compliance within a specified period. If a Crown Enforcement Notice is not complied with then a ‘Step Away’ notice is issued, advising that the CPFSI would pursue a criminal prosecution if Crown immunity did not apply.
20. Eight Step Away notices have been issued since 2024, when the process was introduced, in respect of seven prisons.[20] However, we understand that only two of those prisons have active fire safety works underway.[21] Step Away notices are ultimately ineffective in terms of securing compliance with fire safety legislation because the CPFSI has no way of enforcing them. This is particularly concerning given that there is no longer a longstop date for completion of all fire safety works across the estate.
21. The CPFSI has expressed frustration publicly about its lack of enforcement powers against Crown bodies.[22]
22. The contrast between publicly- and privately-run prisons in England and Wales underlines the insufficiency of the regulatory regime as it stands. All privately-run prisons in England and Wales have AFD installed; we understand this is the case only after a series of Enforcement Notices were served in respect of several private prisons, which prompted fire safety improvement works to be delivered.
23. The Howard League considers that the CPFSI does not have sufficient powers to hold the government to account and that, for as long as Crown bodies benefit from immunity from prosecution, there can be no effective regulation of fire safety in Crown premises.

Fire safety policies and systems in prisons

24. HMPPS’s current policy on fire safety in prisons is contained in Prison Service Instruction (“PSI”) 11/2015.[23] The PSI has the stated purpose of “outlin[ing] what is required… with regards to providing a fire safety compliant environment in Prisons”. The PSI includes an annex called “Safe Systems of Work”, which is a flowchart that staff must be trained to follow in the event of a cell fire.
25. It is understood that, when developing the fire safety policy in PSI 11/2015, the MoJ/ HMPPS had regard to testing conducted by the Building Research Establishment (“BRE”) in 2005 and 2007 for the MoJ in respect of the survivability (or ‘tenability’) of cell fires. The 2005 research found that, without any form of fire-fighting intervention, a cell fire would cause injury from six minutes of the first ignition, unconsciousness within seven minutes, and death within a further minute. Separate research into the use of water mist technology for the extinguishment of prison cell fires carried out in 2007 found that the application of fixed or portable water misting systems within six minutes of ignition would provide a tenable atmosphere provided the cell door was opened after 10 minutes from ignition and then remained open for a period of at least 3 and ½ minutes. This is not reflected in the government’s current “Safe Systems of Work” annex, however, which provides for a cell door to remain closed for up to 20 minutes in certain circumstances. The Howard League is not aware of any data to support the use of a 20-minute period in this context.
26. It is therefore unsurprising that the CPFSI has recently updated its guidance on fire safety requirements for prisons and has stated that the instructions for managing cell fires in the “Safe Systems of Work” annex in PSI 11/2015 are insufficient to meet the legal obligations in the Order. [24] In particular, it is noted that HMPPS has implemented a system of work which, “whilst protecting employed prison staff from the risk of injury at cell fires, does not safeguard prisoners so far as is possible”. It details additional factors which are required to discharge the legal duty imposed by the Order, in particular that staff are instructed to commence inundation, open the door to the cell and safely remove the person in there as soon as possible.
27. The Howard League considers that the government’s policy framework (PSI 11/2015) must be updated urgently to comply with the Order.
28. The Howard League also considers that the government should commission updated independent testing on the tenability of cell fires, given the time that has lapsed since the BRE were commissioned in 2005 and 2007.

Sufficiency of mitigations

29. The Howard League is concerned about the frailty of the current mitigations implemented by HMPPS to reduce fire safety risks in non-compliant prisons.
30. In the absence of AFDs, prisons rely on a combination of battery-powered standalone domestic smoke detectors (“DSDs”) placed outside cell doors and cell bell systems. DSDs do not provide a standard of fire detection and warning that is compliant with the British Standard code of practice for fire detection, or that meet the requirements under the Order.[25]  That the CPFSI does not consider DSDs to be a sufficient mitigatory measure can be understood by the fact that they have issued Step Away Notices for prisons without AFDs, even where DSDs are installed. We understand that HMPPS is trialling integrated smoke detectors (“ISDs”) in some prisons;[26] although these may offer some improvements on standalone DSDs in terms of staff being alerted to fires more quickly, they are not an adequate alternative to AFDs and should not be regarded as such.
31. Where prisons lack AFDs, staff often rely on people in surrounding cells pressing their cell bell in the event of a fire, which may not happen for a variety of reasons. Cell bells can be silenced from the outside of the cell by anyone, as happened in the case of Thomas Ruggiero who died at HMP Swaleside in 2024.[27] The target for staff answering a cell bell is five minutes, and these targets are frequently not adhered to. Even if staff respond within five minutes of a bell being pressed, and the bell is pressed as soon as the fire is started, it only gives them up to one minute to intervene before injury occurs (i.e. on the basis of the BRE ‘tenability’ testing referred to in paragraph 25 above).
32. The Howard League considers that the government must amend its target for responding to cell bells and confirm what steps it is taking in prisons without AFD to ensure that cell bells cannot be silenced from the outside of the cell, other than by staff.
33. The prisons minister told the Justice Committee that HMPPS “has implemented a comprehensive set of mitigations to reduce fire risk and manage the use of cells that are not yet fully fire safety compliant.” Whilst the Howard League welcomes measures being taken to try to reduce the risk of cell fires in prison, including the ‘Safer Vape Pen’ programme and Arc Fault Detection Devices trial, other mitigations such as fire risk assessments and staff training, which are required under the Order, do not address the fundamental issue of delays in detection of fires in the absence of AFD.
34. The Committee took evidence from HMPPS yesterday about staff training on fire safety. It is a requirement in PSI 11/2015 that 80% of daytime staff are trained in the wearing and use of Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE), which must be worn for all cell fires. The Howard League is aware that that this threshold is not met in all prisons. It would be useful for the Committee to clarify the 80% threshold and the level of training in prisons across the estate.

Impact of a growing prison population 

35. Even with the changes introduced by the recent Sentencing Act, in the medium to longer term the prison population will continue to grow in size. Without doing more to address the fundamental issue of sentence inflation, the government will continue to lurch from capacity crisis to capacity crisis and meanwhile, every day, lives are at risk from their inaction on fire safety. The government’s own prison population projections would suggest that the window for increasing the number of cells taken offline for fire safety work is distinctly narrow.
36. The MoJ’s Prison Population Projections: 2025-2030, published in December of last year,[28] estimate that the prison population in England and Wales is projected to increase to between 98,000 and 103,600 by March 2030, with a central estimate of 100,600. While these projections do not include the impact of measures in the Sentencing Act, the government’s own Impact Assessment of that legislation admitted that:

“All reduction for prison demand from these measures is assumed to be filled by new offenders as the prison population is expected to grow in line with increasing supply. It is expected that the additional prison places being built by the government will be filled (for example, after these reforms it is expected there will be around 2,000 more people in prison by May 2029 compared to current levels). As such, it is assumed there are no prison place savings from these measures.”[29]

37. To summarise, even if all the policy measures in the recent Sentencing Act are effective, the prison system in England and Wales will face a similar capacity crisis in a few years’ time. Overcrowding and conditions in prisons will continue to deteriorate from an extremely poor current baseline. This will also have an obvious impact on the system’s ability to do remedial fire safety work in a timely and effective manner.

Annex: Fire Safety Improvement Programme List disclosed by the Ministry of Justice on 27 October 2025

Fire Safety Improvement Programme List

June 2026