Written Evidence from the Ministry of Justice (FSP0004)

 

Executive Summary

  1. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) take the safety of our staff and prisoners extremely seriously and fully recognise the seriousness of fire safety across the prison estate. We are committed to bringing the estate into compliance with fire safety standards as quickly as possible, while actively managing and mitigating risks.
  2. We have significantly increased investment to support this, with maintenance funding rising from £225m in 2024/25 to around £300m in 2025/26, and approximately £275m of further fire safety improvement funding scheduled for 2026/27. We are accelerating the rollout of in‑cell automatic fire detection (AFD), alongside interim measures such as enhanced smoke detection, strengthened staff response, and improved safety procedures to reduce risks across the estate. HMPPS is continuing to focus on reducing fire related risks in all available ways.
  3. Delivery of AFD across the estate must be carefully managed within the constraints of an operational prison system, including significant capacity pressures and the need to safely decant prisoners while works take place. While full compliance - which requires the installation of wired and automated fire detection, suppression and extraction - will take time, the combination of increased funding, targeted delivery and strong interim mitigation controls is ensuring that fire safety risks are being reduced as quickly as possible.

 


How do prisons respond to fires, and how are prisoners kept safe from fires, including fires in cells?

 

  1. Fire risk within the prison environment is unique, as a result of locked accommodation, limited immediate access, the increased risk of deliberate ignition and potential for further escalation impacting the safety of staff. 
  2. Each prison is required to have policies and strategies in place to address these risks, including:
    1. A Fire Management Strategy;
    2. An Arson Reduction Strategy;
    3. A Cell Fire Safe System of Work: the mandatory procedure that prison staff must follow when a fire is detected inside a locked cell, which includes : (a) raising the alarm, (b) donning Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE), (c) inundating the cell, and (d) entering the cell to rescue the occupant.
    4. Measures to control ignition sources, including a smoking ban and control on access to cooking equipment;
    5. Furniture and bedding must meet strict fire retardancy standards due to the high hazard classification of prisons.
    6. Volumetric control policies, limiting the amount of personal property a prisoner can keep in their cell or in storage.
    7. Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans for all individuals with mobility impairments, or other disabilities.
  3. In addition, fire safety measures implemented across the prison estate include: 
    1. Firefighting equipment available at all prisons;
    2. RPE to enable an officer to enter a smoke-filled cell and assist the occupant to get to safety.
    3. Fire safety training for staff.
    4. Prison cells are equipped with in-cell automatic fire detection equipment (AFD) or, in the absence of AFD, battery powered standalone domestic smoke detectors (DSDs) which are placed immediately outside cell doors.
    5. Each prison is required to have systems in place for managing smoke in the event of a fire.
    6. Each prison is required to have identified emergency routes and exits and provide fire safety signs and notices to ensure that individuals can identify escape routes.
  4. There are, in addition, policies to ensure that fires are investigated by the prison’s Health Safety Fire Advisor following established protocols to determine their origin, cause, and circumstances and are followed by a review of the Fire Risk Assessment (FRA).

 

What is the level of risk to fire safety in prisons in England and Wales? What are the common causes of fire in prisons, and how are risks mitigated?

 

Assessment of risk

  1. HMPPS has a comprehensive, integrated process for assessing risk, identifying issues that require remediation, and prioritising the work necessary to remediate those issues. The approach is designed to manage and respond safely to fires within cellular accommodation, recognising the unique risks of locked accommodation, limited immediate access, the likelihood of deliberate ignition and escalation risks affecting staff safety.
  2. Prisons undertake regular fire risk assessments (FRAs) - at least annually - to identify and manage fire risks, balancing safety and security. They are conducted by a suitably qualified and experienced in-house HMPPS fire risk assessor using a standard method (PAS79). Each assessor is a professionally graded member of the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE), has completed an IFE-recognised course specific to custodial premises, and engages in continuous professional development.
  3. Identified risks are recorded and assigned for action either locally or nationally if wider support or funding is needed. The HMPPS National Fire Safety Team use information from FRAs to create risk profiles for each prison, helping prioritise sites for fire safety improvement (FSI) works across the estate.
  4. Fire safety is further monitored through quarterly audits and ongoing checks. Results are reviewed at local, regional, and national levels, with clear escalation processes for unresolved issues. Regular meetings and performance reports ensure accountability and continuous improvement. All fires are investigated following established protocols to determine their origin, cause, and circumstances and insights are used to enhance fire response strategies and prevent recurrence.
  5. All operational staff receive robust annual fire safety training, with regular reviews to ensure effective practice.
  6. After reviewing the fire risk at each prison, a priority ranking is developed, which is the primary factor in ordering the programme. This is a dynamic process, with risks re-reviewed every six months. We also take into consideration availability of capacity headroom in specific regions, categories of prison, construction complexities and capacity as we plan and rollout FSI works.

 

Common causes

  1. Approximately 95% of fires set within prisons are believed to be deliberate acts. Common causes of fire setting in the prison estate are protest, frustration, bullying, debt, or attempts to exert control, alongside incidents linked to self-harm or mental distress. Fires are also used to trigger staff response.

 

Current level of risks in prisons

  1. In 2025, there were 2,830 cell fires, of which 104 were substantial requiring cell remediation works but no permanent loss to capacity. These fires led to 110 injuries and two fatalities.
  2. The main issue concerning fire risk in prisons concerns the need for prison cells to be equipped with in-cell AFD. Both HMPPS and the Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate (CPFSI) have determined that in-cell AFD is necessary to minimise the risk of harm from fires. The current number of prison places without in-cell AFD is c.19,000 out of a total of 89,795 operational places across the prison estate. HMPPS is in the process of ensuring that AFD is installed in all cells in the prison estate. The main constraint on the ability to complete those works is logistical, arising from (i) the infrastructure work required to install an in-cell AFD system, particularly in older prison buildings, (ii) the need to empty and secure areas within a prison in order to enable that infrastructure work to take place, (iii) constraints on prison capacity which place a limit on the number of cells that can be emptied at any one time for that purpose.
  3. HMPPS is conscious of the fire safety risk while the works remain ongoing and has taken a number of steps to mitigate and minimise those risks. Those are summarised below.
  4. HMPPS continues to prioritise the reduction of fire-related risks through the implementation of all available measures, supported by adherence to and accreditation against the highest national standard, BS 9997 (Fire Risk Management Systems).

 

Mitigations for cells without AFD

  1. Every cell without in-cell AFD has a standalone battery-powered DSD placed at or near the cell door, with sufficient airflow to allow smoke detection. Developed in consultation with the CPFSI, DSDs have detected over 1,200 prison fires since 2016. While not a perfect substitute for in-cell AFD, they provide substantial interim fire detection coverage across all cells during installation.
  2. HMPPS has recently pivoted to an AFD-first programme in some prisons which will accelerate in cell-detection ahead of full rollout of other FSI systems. This has been assessed to be the fastest and safest means of reducing life-safety risks, while continuing to progress wider fire safety compliance works in parallel. This approach has been discussed with the CPFSI who were supportive.
  3. Other advanced AFD works are delivering c.600 AFD protected cells dispersed across the prison estate to accommodate the highest risk fire setters.
  4. Following product development, a further programme of works is underway to roll out integrated smoke detection systems (ISDs) to replace standalone domestic smoke detectors which will enhance early warning with repeating alarms enabling faster staff response. This has been explained in more detail at paragraph 46 below.

 

Mitigations

  1. We have set out above the fire safety measures implemented across the prison estate which seek to mitigate the risks of fires in the prison estate. In addition to these measures, HMPPS has taken a number of steps to further reduce the risk of fires in prisons.
  2. HMPPS has developed a Virtual Reality (VR) fire extinguisher training solution, which is being rolled out nationally, with CPFSI being supportive of the approach.
  3. Delivered by in-house Health and Safety trainers, VR training offers a cost-effective method for ensuring that staff across the estate continue to be trained to the standard required by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
  4. HMPPS has progressed the Safer Vape Pen programme, where the Moja Safer Vape Pen was introduced across the prison estate in November 2025. As a result, since May 2025 to May 2026, contributing to a 46% overall reduction in fires across the prison estate. 
  5. In response to an increase in electrically caused fires, the trialling of Arc Fault Detection Devices (AFDDs) is also taking place. This is the development of a prison‑specific mitigation measure which is capable of detecting tampering‑related electrical arc faults. AFDDs protect electrical circuits from arcing-related fire (i.e. fires which start when an electrical arc produces enough heat to ignite surrounding materials). Early trials of standard AFDDs are underway at HMP Werrington and HMP Wetherby which are to be followed soon by a full-scale trial of AFDD at HMP Swaleside.

 

 

What is the impact of prison overcrowding on fire safety?

 

  1. Capacity constraints across the prison estate limit how quickly we can undertake FSI works as cells must be taken out of use for this work.
  2. We do not have data establishing a correlation between crowding and increased fire risk.
  3. Crowding does not make it more difficult to detect and/or extinguish fires. Our cell fire response plan across prisons has also been designed to meet the needs of the situation, regardless of whether that cell is single or double occupancy.
  4. Completing necessary fire safety works requires cells to be temporarily taken offline. This can place additional strain on the system because it further reduces available capacity which can have an impact on crowding. The process to approve commencement of fire safety works is carefully managed to ensure fire safety works are completed as fast as possible while considering the impact on the rest of the estate. Similarly, there are clear processes for crowding decisions which ensure cells are only crowded where it is safe and appropriate to do so.

 

Do prison governors have appropriate responsibilities and powers relating to fire safety in prisons? What powers should they have?

 

  1. It is our position that prison governors have appropriate responsibilities and powers to manage fire safety within their establishment. Under Article 5 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005/1541 (the FSO), HMPPS as employer has overall responsibility for ensuring compliance with the requirements of the FSO. Under HMPPS policy, the Governor at each institution acts as the Article 5 duty holder and discharges HMPPS’s responsibilities within that institution to the extent that is under their control. This primarily relates to day-to-day fire safety management within the establishment. The Governor also has access to a Health, Safety and Fire Advisor onsite. 
  2. The MoJ and HMPPS work closely with Governors to implement mitigation measures, including enhanced fire safety plans, to ensure that risks associated with non-compliant cells are understood and actively managed on a daily basis.
  3. Where fire safety issues extend beyond the control of an individual governor, particularly those requiring estate-wide or strategic approach, responsibility sits with HMPPS and ultimately the Secretary of State for Justice.

 

How effectively do inspectorates and oversight bodies hold the Government to account regarding fire safety in prisons? Do they have the powers necessary to hold the Government accountable?

 

  1. The MoJ welcomes the role of inspectorates and oversight bodies and they have a right to hold us to account. We are satisfied that there are adequate arrangements in place to hold HMPPS to account regarding fire safety.
  2. The CPFSI enforces the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in government buildings, Parliament and other Crown premises, excluding Ministry of Defence buildings which have their own Inspectorate.
  3. In terms of accountability, the Inspectorate’s powers in relation to Crown-operated prisons are limited to the issue of Enforcement Notices. CPFSI does not have the authority to prosecute in these cases. Where Enforcement Notices are not complied with, a “Step Away” letter is issued. Beyond this point, responsibility for ensuring compliance with outstanding fire safety requirements rests with the MoJ.
  4. The Crown enforcement framework provides investigation, independent regulatory judgment, compulsory improvement and public accountability while avoiding the constitutional and operational difficulties inherent in criminal prosecution of the State itself.
  5. In England and Wales, when a death occurs in prison or state detention, there must be an inquest. A coroner’s inquest is judicially independent and seeks to answer who died, and when, where, and how. Coroners cannot determine any civil or criminal liability or to apportion blame. 
  6. Where a coroner identifies matters which, if addressed, could mitigate or prevent the risk of future deaths, they must issue a Prevention of Future Death (PFD) report to those able to act. Recipients must respond within 56 days (or an extended period agreed by the coroner) setting out what action they intend to take or the reasons if no action is proposed. Reports and the responses to them must be copied to the Chief Coroner who, subject to data protection and other sensitivity considerations will publish them.
  7. Additionally, there are strong, independent scrutiny arrangements where there are deaths and serious incidents in custody to strengthen HMPPS’ accountability. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) investigate deaths of prisoners in England and Wales and produce reports with recommendations if appropriate. These reports are made available to the family, the Coroner and published at the conclusion of the inquest process.
  8. Ministers receive advice on preventing and reducing deaths in custody from the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody. Further, there are steps being taken to seek to improve the impact of the separate Ministerial Board on Deaths in Custody by transitioning to a new Ministerial Board on Deaths in Detention, chaired by Ministers and attended by officials and independent experts on deaths in detention. This new structure will play an important role in ensuring Ministers can work with experts to devise impactful interventions across Government to reduce deaths in all forms of detention, including in prisons.  
  9. Ministers are accountable to Parliament and regularly appear before Parliamentary Select Committees. Collectively, these measures help to ensure a strong accountability framework for HMPPS.

 

In light of the Government dropping its commitment to make all prison cells fire safe by the end of 2027, how should the government be prioritising fire safety works in prisons, and to what timeline?

 

  1. We want to be open and transparent about the scale of the challenge and the guiding principle the MoJ has adopted is to carry out the necessary FSI works as quickly as possible, taking out as much capacity in order to do these works as the system can safely spare. Compliance with that guiding principle is being kept under continual review which means the date by which completion of the works will occur will necessarily fluctuate given that capacity within the prison estate is a dynamic factor.  
  2. In order to ensure that the best possible use is made of the available capacity, details of all current and pending FSI projects are logged in central ‘Fire Maintenance Model’ (one for the male and youth estate, and one for the female estate). These models, maintained by the HMPPS Estates Team, log all projects necessary to bring the estate into full compliance, their duration and planned decants and the number of spaces that will be remedied over time. They enable HMPPS to plan works as efficiently as possible within capacity constraints. They are updated continuously as projects develop, are used to schedule works, adjust the planned projects as required, and to inform decision making.

 

What opportunities are there to introduce more effective fire safety equipment and technology in prisons, and what are the barriers to doing so?

 

  1. We continue to work closely with industry to explore opportunities to enhance fire safety technology within the prison environment, with targeted programmes to deliver these improvements.
  2. Recent and ongoing initiatives include the introduction of safer vape devices to inhibit fire setting and drug use, arc fault detection systems to prevent fire setting from electrical equipment, and the deployment of high-powered portable fans to extract smoke where fixed ventilation is not available.
  3. Another example of an important development is a project to implement a new technology involving Integrated Smoke Detectors (ISDs). This is a custom project developed by HMPPS in collaboration with a leading provider of life safety systems to address the particular challenges with the installation of AFD in the estate. The challenge with the installation of AFD is that it requires cells to be vacated and the installation of infrastructure within the cell. ISDs, by contrast, can be installed outside of cells and rely on Wi-Fi to work, thereby avoiding the need for hard wiring. The ISD system operates so that where one ISD is triggered, that will be relayed to all other alarms which are simultaneously triggered so that staff are visually and audibly aware of an incident and then can quickly identify which ISD was originally activated. It is hoped that ISDs will reduce substantially one of the drawbacks of DSDs, namely that they are less likely to be heard by prison staff, thus reducing response times.
  4. To carry out FSI works we also take into consideration availability of capacity headroom in specific regions, categories of prison, construction complexities and capacity as we plan and rollout fire safety work.

 

What good practice can be seen in other countries, and how could this be adopted in the England and Wales?

 

  1. We are committed to understanding practices used by international comparators to identify opportunities to strengthen our approach to fire safety.
  2. In April 2025, ten prison services across Europe provided responses to a Europris request (KMS280425) on fire response, staff training, and intervention responsibilities within closed prison environments, which we have considered and we are satisfied that our current processes for responding to and tackling cell fires are more advanced than those of the contributing organisation.
  3. Our current processes are properly reflective of good practice within prisons. In particular, our use of specialist high-pressure water misting equipment - independently tested and capable of rapidly suppressing significant cell fires - demonstrates a higher level of effectiveness compared to the conventional hoses and fire extinguishers used in other jurisdictions. Overall, our approach reflects a more progressive capability in both rapid deployment and fire extinguishment.

 

June 2026