Written evidence submitted by Dr Tom Fleming and Professor Meg Russell FBA (UCL Constitution Unit) (BBB0017)

1. Introduction

1.1.   We are academic researchers at the University College London (UCL) Constitution Unit. The Constitution Unit is a research centre that conducts timely, rigorous independent research into constitutional change and the reform of political institutions.

1.2.   Professor Russell was a specialist adviser to the ‘Wright committee’ (formally the Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons), which originally proposed the Backbench Business Committee; its proposal of backbench business was strongly influenced by one of her previous research reports.[1]

1.3.   This written evidence focuses on Backbench Business Committee debates, and does not directly address the committee’s questions about Petitions Committee debates.

1.4.   The evidence is structured as follows. We first highlight the importance of considering backbench business in the wider context of other forms of Commons business (section 2), before discussing the original goals of backbench business (section 3) and its current effectiveness (section 4). We then consider the current use of time allocated to government business (section 5), and some other sources of pressure on Commons time (section 6).

1.5.   Our key conclusions are summarised in section 7. We argue that the committee should explore ways of increasing the effectiveness of backbench business, rather than altering the time allocated to it, and should also review how effectively other parts of Commons time are used.

2. Considering the wider context

2.1.   As this inquiry’s terms of reference make clear, the allocation of time to backbench business needs to be understood in its wider context. Increasing or decreasing the time available for backbench business means – assuming no changes to sitting hours – decreasing or increasing the time for other forms of business. Any assessment of backbench business should therefore sit alongside an assessment of how effectively the House uses the time it allocates for other kinds of business.

2.2.   It should be noted that Commons business comes in multiple different forms, which vary both in how much time is allocated to them and in how that time is then scheduled. For instance, the House’s standing orders allocate 35 days to backbench business and 20 to opposition days, but ministers decide when those days should be scheduled. By contrast, the standing orders allocate 13 Fridays to private members’ bills, but the specific choice of those 13 Fridays has to be approved by the House. Some other kinds of non-government business – like urgent questions and debates relating to issues of privilege – are scheduled at the discretion of the Speaker.

2.3.   Given all this, there are several key questions to consider when asking if the current allocation of time to backbench business is appropriate. First, is that time being used effectively? Second, is it putting excessive pressure on time needed for other forms of business? Third, are there other pressures on the House’s time which should also be examined and addressed?

3. The original intention of backbench business

3.1.   Any assessment of the effectiveness of backbench business should start from asking what it is intended to achieve. This form of business, and the Backbench Business Committee, were recommended by the ‘Wright committee’ in 2009.[2] They were intended to fill a gap in the forms of business then available, which gave time to the government, opposition parties and individual members (e.g. through adjournment debates) but not to backbenchers collectively. Importantly, this form of business was intended to allow the House to express its view on propositions put forward by backbenchers on substantive motions, not just to debate them on neutral motions.

3.2.   The Wright committee gave some clear indications of the kinds of business which the Backbench Business Committee might schedule. It explicitly mentioned debates on select committee reports, making decisions on ‘House business’ such as recommendations from bodies like the Procedure Committee, and general debates on matters of concern to backbenchers (and likely also the public). In making these suggestions, the committee sought to remove matters from government control that were not really ‘government’ business, without taking time away from that essential business (e.g. debate on government bills). At the time, the government facilitated a lot of general debates, and the Wright committee’s recommendation was that backbenchers, not government, should give prioritisation to the topics. As it indicated:

This will reduce the current extent of Government control or influence over the Parliamentary agenda. But the matters “lost” to Government will be principally those in which it has no direct interest: for example, the timing and topics of general debates and discussion of select committee reports. Rather than Ministers seeking to prioritise the many demands for time that are presented by Members, this responsibility would be handed to a committee representative of the House as a whole.[3]

3.3.   The proposed amount of backbench time was commensurate with this, with the Wright committee basing its proposals on the amount of government time previously dedicated to such matters. As its report said of the Backbench Business Committee:

Without in any way compromising Government's ability to have its own initiatives discussed and scrutinised, this Committee will take clear charge of part of the agenda for at least one day a week or its equivalent for the House collectively to discuss those matters that Members feel should be prioritised. It will create new opportunities for all Members, giving them a greater sense of ownership and responsibility for what goes on in their own House. It will make debates more responsive to public concerns, as fed in to Members by their constituents. It will strengthen the position of the widely-respected select committees.[4]

3.4.   While not being prescriptive, the Wright committee speculated that backbench time might be used not only for the debate of substantive motions, general motions, and select committee reports, but also for non-government bills.[5]

3.5.   The Wright committee report discussed a range of options for the timetabling of backbench business, including a fixed day of the week, a changing day each week, or – as was ultimately implemented – a set number of days per session. The committee noted that ‘If a particular day were to be identified, and if it were to be the same day every week, the first suggestion made is likely to be Thursday’; but it dismissed this possibility, on the basis that ‘It is important that backbench business is not relegated to a backwater’.[6]

4. The effectiveness of backbench business

4.1.   The Backbench Business Committee recently assessed its first 15 years, and published a report setting out its own conclusions and recommendations. Professor Russell submitted detailed evidence to that review (with Hannah Kelly).[7] The Backbench Business Committee’s report – and the evidence informing it – should be useful for this committee’s current inquiry.

4.2.   Your call for evidence highlights two possible concerns about the current use of backbench debates: whether they are sufficiently popular, and whether they are sufficiently topical.

4.3.   On popularity, it seems clear that there is no shortage of demand from members for backbench debates, as those speaking for the Backbench Business Committee often highlight. But another pertinent consideration is whether backbench debates make sufficient use of the time allocated. There has been some concern about debates finishing early, and MPs supporting applications for debates but not then taking part. The Backbench Business Committee’s review noted that 82% of debates in 2024–26 (up to late 2025) had time limits, and more than two-thirds finished within ten minutes of the moment of interruption.[8] Even one-third of debates finishing early might be argued to be too many, but – as discussed below – timing factors seem likely to affect this.

4.4.   On topicality, there are some clear concerns. The Backbench Business Committee has itself noted (as did the Russell and Kelly evidence) that scheduling debates long into the future can limit their topicality.[9] Becoming more selective, and only scheduling debates for a few weeks ahead, could mitigate this. Indeed, the committee was originally expected to prioritise among competing bids for debates, not just marshal them into an orderly queue. Such prioritisation would require use of clear criteria, such as levels of cross-party support.[10] Unsuccessful bids could be kept on file and considered alongside new ones, rather than being immediately rejected. Alternatively, the Backbench Business Committee has proposed reviving the use of ‘topical debates’ under Standing Order No. 24A.[11] But it seems preferable for the committee to change its wider practice to pursue topicality as a matter of routine. And in any case, debates under that alternative route could not be held on substantive motions.

4.5.   Becoming more selective would require a culture shift in the Backbench Business Committee, with its members accepting the need to take hard decisions and to disappoint some applicants. One reason that they might shy away from this is that they do not represent the whole House in the way that the Wright committee intended: members were originally elected on a whole House basis, which was expected to give them a greater sense of representativeness and legitimacy. But this was replaced, on the recommendation of the government, by within-party elections in 2012. Reverting to the pre-2012 arrangements, as the Backbench Business Committee has recommended, seems desirable.[12]

4.6.   The scheduling of backbench business is a serious problem for its effectiveness and popularity. It has overwhelmingly been scheduled on Thursdays, despite the Wright committee’s original recommendation to the contrary.[13] This can depress attendance, as many MPs return to their constituencies. That can in turn discourage the use of substantive motions, and particularly those that would allow MPs to make decisions on House business like recommendations from the Procedure Committee. As the Backbench Business Committee noted in its recent report:

The timing of backbench debates, rather than the subject matter or whether there is a substantive motion, is usually the most significant contributing factor to the level of participation in debates. It is disappointing, therefore, that backbench business has largely been relegated to the ‘backwater’ of Thursday afternoons, warned against by the Wright Committee.[14]

4.7.   Backbench business could thus be revitalised – in line with the Wright committee’s original intentions – if it were more often scheduled on other days of the week. This could encourage attendance, and allow MPs to take important decisions on ‘House’ matters via backbench business. To avoid reducing the time for other business, this would require government business and potentially opposition days to more often be scheduled on Thursdays. That would be in line with the Wright committee’s proposal that Thursdays ‘be revived as a proper day for business’[15], and with the government’s view – expressed in its response to the Backbench Business Committee’s recent report – that ‘Thursday is a sitting day like any other in the week’.[16]

4.8.   A further problem regarding timing is that the government retains discretion over when backbench days take place. This brings a number of problems, which also affect opposition days given that they stem from a per-session allocation of days being scheduled by the government.

• First, there is a lack of certainty on a week-by-week basis regarding when the sessions will be held. Combined with scheduling far in advance, this contributes to the problem of members supporting bids for debates but not then taking part in them.
• Second, there is no formal obstacle to a government withholding these debates for a long period during a session in order to avoid debate on a particular matter.[17]
• Third, these allocations do not automatically increase in longer sessions, which have recently become more frequent (2010–12, 2017–19, 2019–21, 2024–26). Government may provide additional backbench days voluntarily – as it did in the last session – but this is not guaranteed. This problem also affects the Fridays allocated for consideration of private members’ bills.

4.9.   It has long been suggested that a more rational system might therefore be to move to a monthly allocation of days for backbench business (and opposition days).[18] This might also facilitate the more selective approach to debate bids that we discussed above, thus ensuring greater topicality.

5. Pressure on government business

5.1.   Governments understandably, and entirely legitimately, place high priority on passing their own business, and especially their legislative programme. Time spent on government business is also of value to other MPs, as it allows them to scrutinise that business. The whole House thus has a shared interest in adequate time being available for considering government business.

5.2.   However, it is not obvious that a shortage of time in the Commons has been a serious obstacle to recent governments passing their preferred legislation. According to figures from the House of Commons Library, the government introduced 63 bills in the 2024–26 session, of which 54 received Royal Assent, one fell due to not completing its passage, and eight were carried over.[19] The sole bill that fell had already passed all of its Commons stages.[20] Of the eight that were carried over, seven had only been introduced relatively late in the session.[21]

5.3.   Nor is it obvious that allocating more time to government business would mean any increase in the extent to which that business is scrutinised. It might simply lead to an increase in the number of bills being introduced, with no gains for the House’s ability to scrutinise them.

5.4.   Moreover, if the committee reaches the view that the House should devote more time to scrutinising government bills, it might consider whether any of this additional time could come from time already allocated to government business.

5.5.   As just one example, the committee might consider whether fewer general debates should be scheduled by the government. As noted above, the Wright committee report noted ‘the timing and topics of general debates’ as something in which the government ‘has no direct interest’, and which should therefore become the responsibility of the Backbench Business Committee.[22] And the Backbench Business Committee does now schedule a large number of such debates. But some are still scheduled in government time, with the last session seeing government-initiated general debates on various topics including rural affairs (11 November 2024), road maintenance (7 April 2025), and Ukraine (25 February 2026). These might well be worthy subjects for debate. But leaving them for the Backbench Business Committee to schedule, as originally intended by the Wright committee, could allow them to be considered alongside the other possible debate subjects suggested by backbenchers, ensuring that the eventual selection reflects MPs’ priorities.

6. Pressure on government and backbench business

6.1.   That all being said, one recent trend in Commons business – the growth of Urgent Questions (UQs) – has clearly placed pressure on both government and backbench business, and has also affected the predictability of the Commons’ agenda, which the committee highlighted as a topic raised frequently in responses to its earlier ‘call for views’.[23]

6.2.   UQs are granted at the discretion of the Speaker, and their use has grown significantly since Speaker Bercow took office in 2009. The 13 years from 1997 to 2010 saw 148 UQs; the 14 years from 2010 to 2024 saw 1098. The rate of UQs peaked in the 2017–19 session, at 0.88 UQs per sitting day. The most recent 2024–26 session saw the second-highest rate since then.[24]

6.3.   UQs play an important role in ensuring that the House can scrutinise ministers in a timely fashion about important events and policy developments, including those on which ministers do not choose to proactively update the House by making an oral statement.

6.4.   However, it is also important to note that UQs – and likewise ministerial statements – can have downsides for MPs’ ability to conduct scrutiny and have their preferred issues debated. More time spent on UQs and statements means less time for subsequent government or backbench business. For example, on Monday 17 November 2025 three UQs and a ministerial statement took up over four hours, meaning that the House didn’t turn to considering the legislation scheduled for that day until after 8pm.[25] Similarly, the Backbench Business Committee’s recent report noted that backbench business on days other than Thursdays ‘is often curtailed by multiple Government statements and Urgent Questions’, with the consequence of ‘limiting the amount of debating time available, and requiring debates to be cancelled at short notice’.[26]

6.5.   These downsides can be mitigated by the House passing motions that protect a minimum amount of time for certain items of business by allowing them to run later than the usual moment of interruption. But this too has its downsides. As the government has noted, it can require MPs – and viewing members of the public – to stay late into the evening.[27] And it gives neither group any certainty about what time the debate(s) in question will actually begin.

6.6.   The committee might therefore wish to consider the case for restraining the use of UQs and ministerial statements to ensure appropriate and predictable time is available for other business.

6.7.   This restraint might be achieved informally, via the Speaker being more selective in which UQs they grant and ministers doing likewise with their statements. That would be analogous to our suggestion that the Backbench Business Committee also filter debate proposals more selectively.

6.8.   An alternative approach – which might be more effective – would be to place some formal limit on the use of UQs or ministerial statements. The House might set a maximum number permitted per day, require higher thresholds of urgency/importance for each additional UQ/statement, and/or allocate them a specific window of time that reduces disruption to other items of business.

6.9.   The government’s response to the Backbench Business Committee’s report noted that UQs are a matter for the Speaker. However, the Speaker’s authority to accept UQs is granted to them by the House, and it is entirely legitimate for the House to consider whether and how UQs are regulated. Nonetheless, any such consideration should be careful to avoid either the perception or the reality of changing the rules to help ministers evade scrutiny. Any changed procedures would need to strike a balance between ensuring topical scrutiny and announcements, allowing adequate scrutiny of other scheduled business, and providing reasonable predictability about the timing of that business. They would also need to include failsafes to ensure ministers could update the House – or be summoned to do so – if fresh issues of very clear urgency and importance arose.

7. Summary

7.1.   Backbench business was originally proposed by the Wright committee to allow backbenchers to prioritise business for debate, and allow the House to express a view, including on matters where members could actually take a decision, such as recommendations from Procedure Committee reports. It was explicitly designed not to take time away from government business.

7.2.   The Wright committee was explicit that backbench business should not routinely be scheduled on Thursdays, and yet this is the slot that it has often been allocated. This affects MPs’ willingness to participate in debate, and their ability to reach decisions on substantive motions. At least partly as a consequence, use of such motions has reduced.

7.3.   Demand for backbench business debates among members remains high, but there is a problem with topicality, as acknowledged by the Backbench Business Committee itself. The obvious solution is for the committee to move to being more selective in identifying priority topics for debate against clear criteria, and to schedule these only for a small number of weeks ahead.

7.4.   Government control of the scheduling of backbench business, and the resulting uncertainty over this scheduling, is problematic both in itself and because of its knock-on effects for members’ ability to commit to attend. It would be better for standing orders to reduce this discretion, including by specifying a monthly allocation for this business (and for opposition days) rather than a sessional one.

7.5.   There is no evidence that backbench business is squeezing out government business, or that time for government business is unduly limited. However, the government still schedules some matters (particularly general debates) that the Wright committee intended to be scheduled in backbench business, and could potentially regain time for its other business by ceasing to do so.

7.6.   Other matters encroach on time for both government business and backbench business. This applies particularly to urgent questions, but also to government statements – both of which create timetabling uncertainties for members. There could be merit in limiting the number of slots available for these mechanisms within the sitting week, and/or for allocating a fixed time to them.