Written evidence submitted by Angie Hesham Abdo, Chinese politics expert, University of Hull (EVO 23)
About the Author
Angie Hesham Abdo is an independent researcher and policy commentator with interests in governance, public policy, democratic institutions, and the impact of technology on decision-making processes. She has contributed to policy discussions and parliamentary inquiries on a range of domestic and international issues, with a particular interest in institutional resilience, accountability, and public trust in democratic systems.
Her interest in the Procedure Committee’s inquiry into electronic voting arises from the growing role of technology in public institutions and the need to balance innovation, accessibility, and efficiency with transparency, security, and democratic legitimacy. She is particularly interested in parliamentary modernisation, legislative procedures, cybersecurity considerations in democratic processes, and the ways in which constitutional principles can be preserved as institutions adapt to technological change.
Introduction
Voting is a central function of the UK House of Commons, ensuring that Members of Parliament (MPs) can express agreement or disagreement with proposed legislation and motions. The current system relies on physical divisions in the parliamentary lobbies, where MPs must be present in person to cast their vote. This traditional method is deeply embedded in parliamentary practice and is closely linked to principles of accountability, transparency, and personal participation.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the House temporarily introduced remote electronic voting arrangements, allowing MPs to vote without physically entering the division lobbies. These arrangements were later discontinued, but they prompted renewed debate about whether digital or remote voting should play a permanent role in parliamentary procedure (UK Parliament, 2021).
This submission addresses two key questions:
1. Differences between in-person voting in division lobbies and voting elsewhere (on the Estate or remotely)
In-person voting in the House of Commons requires MPs to physically walk through the division lobbies adjacent to the Chamber within a set time after a division is called, typically around eight minutes. This process ensures that voting is tied to physical presence within the parliamentary estate and allows MPs to be counted directly by clerks and tellers (UK Parliament, “Divisions in the House of Commons”). Voting elsewhere on the Estate, such as offices or committee rooms, or remotely from outside Westminster, removes the requirement for MPs to be in a specific location, replacing physical movement with digital authentication and submission of votes.
A key difference lies in the method of verification and recording. In the division lobby system, MPs are identified by being physically observed entering a lobby and are recorded by parliamentary staff, making the process highly visible and transparent. In contrast, electronic voting systems rely on secure digital logins, devices, or authentication systems to verify identity and record votes automatically. While this increases efficiency and speed, it also introduces reliance on technological systems rather than human observation and physical presence.
Another major difference is the impact on parliamentary culture and interaction. The division lobby system encourages informal face-to-face interactions between MPs, including discussions, negotiations, and lobbying moments that can influence decision-making. Voting remotely or electronically removes this element of physical proximity and reduces opportunities for spontaneous political interaction. While this may improve efficiency and accessibility, it alters the traditional social and deliberative character of parliamentary voting.
There are also differences in time efficiency and operational impact. In-person divisions can take around 15 minutes or longer depending on turnout, as MPs must physically travel to and through the lobbies (UK Parliament procedural guidance). Electronic voting could significantly reduce this time, allowing votes to be cast almost instantly. This would potentially enable the House to conduct more business in a shorter period but may also reduce the natural pacing and structure of parliamentary debate.
A further distinction relates to accessibility and participation. The current system requires MPs to be present on the parliamentary estate, which can present challenges in cases of illness, constituency commitments, or mobility issues. Electronic or remote voting increases flexibility by allowing MPs to participate from different locations. This was one of the key reasons for introducing remote voting during the pandemic, when physical presence was restricted (House of Commons Commission, 2021).
Finally, there is a difference in system dependency and risk exposure. In-person voting is largely resilient to technological failure, as it relies on physical processes and human verification. Electronic or remote voting systems depend on digital infrastructure, secure networks, and reliable authentication systems. While these systems can be robust, they introduce dependencies that are not present in the traditional model.
Overall, the key difference is that in-person voting is a physical, observable, and socially embedded process, while electronic or remote voting is a digital, flexible, and efficiency-oriented process. Each system reflects different priorities: tradition and transparency versus accessibility and efficiency.
2. Perceptual risks of current and electronic voting systems and the principle of MPs-only voting
The current in-person voting system carries relatively low perceptual risk because it is based on physical presence and visibility. MPs must enter designated lobbies, and their participation is directly observable by parliamentary staff and fellow Members. This reinforces public and parliamentary confidence that only MPs present in the building can vote, supporting the constitutional principle of personal voting in the House of Commons (UK Parliament, procedural rules on divisions).
However, even the current system is not without perceptual concerns. Critics sometimes argue that pairing, informal arrangements, or procedural timing constraints may create perceptions of inefficiency or inconsistency. Nonetheless, because the process is physically grounded and historically established, it generally enjoys a high level of trust and legitimacy.
Electronic voting systems introduce more significant perceptual risks because they rely on digital authentication and unseen processes. Even if secure, they may be perceived as less transparent because the act of voting is not physically observable. This can create a “black box” effect, where Members and the public must trust the system rather than witness the process directly.
A major concern is the risk of cybersecurity threats, including hacking, vote manipulation, or system disruption. If electronic systems were compromised, votes could potentially be altered, intercepted, or delayed. Even the perception of such vulnerabilities can undermine confidence in parliamentary decisions, regardless of whether any actual breach occurs. This is particularly sensitive in a legislative body where legitimacy depends on trust in outcomes.
Another important risk relates to authentication and impersonation. The principle that only MPs should vote depends on ensuring that no one else can access their voting credentials. In a digital environment, this shifts reliance from physical identity (being present in the lobby) to secure login systems, passwords, or devices. If these systems are compromised, it could undermine the constitutional principle of personal voting (House of Commons Commission, 2021).
There is also the risk of system disruption or denial-of-service attacks, which could prevent MPs from voting within required timeframes. In a closely contested division, even a small number of missing or delayed votes could affect the outcome. This introduces the possibility that technical failures, rather than political decisions, could influence parliamentary results.
In terms of perception, electronic voting may also affect how parliamentary legitimacy is viewed by the public. While digital systems may be more modern and efficient, they may be seen as less tangible and less accountable than physical voting. This could weaken public confidence unless strong transparency and audit mechanisms are in place.
Importantly, the principle that only MPs should be able to vote in divisions remains central to both systems, but it is enforced differently. In the current system, it is enforced through physical presence and access control to the parliamentary estate. In electronic systems, it would depend on cybersecurity, identity verification, and system design. This shift from physical enforcement to technical enforcement is one of the most significant constitutional implications of electronic voting.
There is also a broader institutional concern that electronic voting could gradually change expectations about parliamentary participation. If remote voting becomes normalised, it may alter the balance between presence, accountability, and deliberation that currently defines parliamentary decision-making.
Way forward, recommendations, and methods of mitigating risks
1. Way forward
A phased and hybrid approach would be the most practical route forward, where in-person voting in division lobbies remains the default system while electronic or remote voting is introduced only in limited, clearly defined circumstances. This allows the House to preserve the constitutional benefits of physical voting while gradually testing digital alternatives in low-risk contexts.
Any move towards electronic voting should begin with controlled pilot schemes on the Parliamentary Estate only, rather than full remote voting from outside Westminster. This would allow MPs to vote electronically within a secure environment while still maintaining proximity to parliamentary IT infrastructure and oversight.
A clear constitutional and procedural framework should be established before any expansion of electronic voting. This should define when electronic voting is permitted (e.g. illness, emergencies, or exceptional parliamentary disruption) and ensure that it does not replace the principle of deliberation and presence in normal legislative activity.
2. Recommendations
The House should retain the division lobby system as the primary and constitutionally default method of voting, ensuring that physical presence remains the standard expectation for MPs. This preserves transparency, accountability, and the symbolic importance of parliamentary participation.
Electronic voting should be developed as a complementary contingency mechanism, not a replacement system. It should initially be limited to specific scenarios such as national emergencies, major transport disruption, or health-related restrictions, similar to arrangements used during the COVID-19 pandemic (House of Commons Commission, 2021).
Any electronic voting system must include strong identity verification measures, such as multi-factor authentication, secure parliamentary credentials, and device registration tied to individual MPs. This is essential to uphold the principle that only elected Members can cast votes.
The system should include a full audit trail and independent verification mechanism, allowing votes to be traced, checked, and independently reviewed without compromising secrecy where appropriate. This would help maintain confidence in the integrity of outcomes.
A dedicated Parliamentary Digital Voting Oversight Body (or expansion of an existing governance structure) should be created to monitor system performance, cybersecurity standards, and procedural compliance.
3. Methods of mitigating risks
A. Cybersecurity risks (hacking, manipulation, disruption)
Implement end-to-end encryption for all voting transactions to ensure that votes cannot be intercepted, altered, or replayed during transmission. In a parliamentary context, this means that each vote would be cryptographically secured from the moment it is cast by an MP until it is recorded in the final tally. Strong encryption standards would also help prevent “man-in-the-middle” attacks, where malicious actors attempt to interfere with data as it moves between devices and central systems.
Use segmented, air-gapped parliamentary networks for voting systems to significantly reduce exposure to external cyber threats. An air-gapped system is physically or logically isolated from the public internet, meaning that even if other parliamentary systems are compromised, the voting infrastructure remains protected. This approach is widely regarded as one of the strongest defences for high-security environments because it limits attack pathways.
Conduct regular penetration testing and independent cyber audits carried out by accredited external security specialists. These tests simulate real-world attacks to identify vulnerabilities in software, hardware, and network architecture before they can be exploited. Independent auditing is particularly important in a parliamentary setting, as it strengthens public trust by demonstrating that security assurances are not self-certified but externally verified.
Establish a rapid incident response team dedicated to monitoring, detecting, and responding to cyber incidents in real time. This team should have the authority to isolate affected systems, suspend electronic voting if necessary, and initiate recovery protocols without delay. Clear escalation procedures and redundancy planning would ensure that any disruption has minimal impact on parliamentary proceedings and does not compromise vote integrity.
B. Authentication and impersonation risks
Require multi-factor authentication (MFA) combining multiple independent verification methods, such as parliamentary ID cards, secure passwords, and hardware tokens or biometric verification. This layered approach significantly reduces the risk of unauthorised access because compromising one factor alone would not be sufficient to cast a vote. In a parliamentary context, MFA helps ensure that voting remains a strictly personal act tied to a verified Member.
Restrict voting access to registered parliamentary devices only, meaning votes can only be cast from approved, centrally managed hardware. This reduces the risk of MPs accidentally using compromised personal devices or unsecured networks. Device registration also allows Parliament’s IT systems to maintain tighter control over software updates, security patches, and access permissions.
Introduce session-based verification requiring re-authentication for each vote or division, rather than allowing continuous logged-in access. This ensures that even if a session is hijacked, it cannot be used indefinitely to cast multiple votes. It also aligns with the principle that each division is a distinct constitutional event requiring explicit, deliberate action from the Member at that time.
C. System failure and missed voting deadlines
Maintain a parallel fallback system using traditional division lobbies, ensuring that electronic voting never becomes the sole mechanism. If digital systems fail or are compromised, MPs can immediately revert to physical voting, preserving continuity and preventing any interruption to parliamentary decision-making.
Design systems with redundant infrastructure and offline backup capability, including mirrored servers, secondary data centres, and failover mechanisms. This ensures that even if one system component fails, another can immediately take over without data loss or disruption. Offline backup systems also allow vote data to be securely stored and reconciled after restoration.
Allow limited flexibility in voting windows during exceptional technical disruption, while maintaining strict procedural safeguards. For example, short extensions could be permitted only when system-wide issues are verified by parliamentary authorities. However, strict controls would be needed to prevent abuse or routine reliance on extended deadlines, which could undermine procedural discipline.
D. Transparency and trust risks
Provide a real-time public audit display of voting outcomes, replicating the transparency of current division lists. This would ensure that electronic votes are immediately visible to Members and the public, allowing for independent verification of outcomes. Transparency at the point of result publication is essential to maintaining confidence in digital systems.
Require independent certification of voting software and infrastructure, similar to standards applied in banking, aviation, or critical national infrastructure. Certification should cover code integrity, cybersecurity resilience, and system reliability. Independent certification reduces concerns that the system could be manipulated internally or lacks external oversight.
Publish regular transparency and performance reports, including details of system uptime, security incidents, audit findings, and stress-test results. This ongoing disclosure would help build institutional trust over time and allow Parliament to demonstrate accountability for the operation of its digital voting infrastructure.
E. Constitutional and “only MPs can vote” principle
Tie voting strictly to parliamentary-issued secure credentials that cannot be delegated or transferred, ensuring that voting rights remain personal and non-replicable. These credentials should be issued under strict identity verification processes and linked exclusively to the elected Member’s official parliamentary status.
Include identity confirmation checks immediately before vote submission is finalised, ensuring that each vote is actively authorised at the moment it is cast. This reduces the risk of unauthorised or automated voting and reinforces the principle that voting is a conscious, individual act.
Maintain a strict prohibition on proxy voting or automated voting systems, except where explicitly authorised under separate parliamentary rules (as during temporary pandemic arrangements). This safeguards the constitutional principle that decisions of the House must reflect the direct will of elected Members rather than delegated or machine-mediated participation.
F. Cultural and procedural risks
Ensure electronic voting does not reduce opportunities for in-person debate, lobbying, and scrutiny, which are central to parliamentary decision-making. Even if voting becomes more flexible, the deliberative process that precedes votes should remain rooted in physical presence and direct interaction in the Chamber and surrounding spaces.
Retain division lobbies as functional and symbolic spaces of accountability, even if electronic alternatives are introduced. The act of physically walking through lobbies serves not only a procedural function but also reinforces collective visibility and shared responsibility among Members.
Monitor changes in parliamentary behaviour following any introduction of digital voting, particularly attendance patterns, engagement in debates, and reliance on remote participation. Ongoing evaluation would help identify any gradual cultural shifts that could weaken parliamentary norms and allow corrective action if necessary.
The most sustainable way forward is not full replacement of the division lobby system, but a carefully controlled augmentation model. Electronic voting can offer clear benefits in accessibility, efficiency, and resilience, but only if introduced with strong safeguards.
Mitigating risks requires a combination of robust cybersecurity architecture, strict identity verification, system redundancy, independent oversight, and constitutional safeguards. Most importantly, any reform must preserve the principle that voting is a personal act of elected MPs, and that legitimacy in parliamentary decision-making depends not only on accurate results but also on visible, trusted procedures.
Conclusion
The comparison between in-person division of lobby voting and electronic or remote voting highlights a fundamental trade-off between tradition and modernization within parliamentary procedure. The current system is grounded in physical presence, direct accountability, and high visibility, which reinforces confidence in the legitimacy and integrity of parliamentary decision-making. Its strength lies in its simplicity and transparency, as voting is directly observable and closely tied to the physical attendance of Members. However, it can also be time-consuming, procedurally rigid, and less adaptable in situations where Members are unable to be physically present on the Parliamentary Estate due to exceptional circumstances.
Electronic and remote voting systems offer clear advantages in terms of efficiency, accessibility, and operational resilience, particularly during emergencies or disruptions that limit physical access to Westminster. They have the potential to streamline parliamentary processes and ensure continuity of legislative business under challenging conditions.
However, these benefits come with significant challenges, including cybersecurity risks, authentication vulnerabilities, system reliability concerns, and potential impacts on public and parliamentary perceptions of legitimacy. These issues are especially sensitive given the constitutional importance of ensuring that only elected MPs can cast votes in divisions, a principle that currently relies on physical presence but would depend on technical safeguards in a digital system.
Ultimately, any consideration of reform must carefully balance efficiency and accessibility against transparency, security, accountability, and institutional trust. The choice between voting systems is therefore not simply a procedural or technical matter, but one that engages with deeper constitutional questions about how parliamentary democracy should function, how legitimacy is demonstrated, and how trust in democratic outcomes is maintained over time.
Reference List
UK Parliament – Divisions
Overview of how divisions operate in both Houses of Parliament, including division lobbies, voting procedures, timing, electronic voting during the COVID-19 pandemic, and current arrangements.
UK Parliament Glossary – Divisions
Defines parliamentary divisions and explains the process of Members voting through division lobbies.
House of Commons Library – Divisions in the House of Commons
Research briefing explains the historical development and procedural operation of divisions in the House of Commons, including discussion of electronic voting proposals.
UK Parliament Glossary – Division Lobbies
Defines division lobbies and explains their role in recording parliamentary votes.
House of Commons Library – Number of Divisions in the House of Commons since 1945
Statistical overview of Commons divisions and deferred divisions, including explanation of how division lists are recorded and published.
Procedure Committee – Remote Voting Report Published by the Procedure Committee
Parliamentary committee report and recommendations concerning remote voting arrangements introduced during coronavirus restrictions.
Towards Verifiable Remote Voting with Paper Assurance (ArXiv)
Academic research discussing secure and verifiable remote voting systems and associated technological safeguards.
UK Parliament YouTube – First Remote Voting in the House of Commons (12 May 2020)
Official parliamentary recording documenting the first implementation of remote voting in the House of Commons during the COVID-19 pandemic.
May 2026