I write to draw the committee's attention to a ministerial response received on 21 April 2026, which I believe is directly relevant to the evidence I submitted on 19 March 2026 (reference NLR0007), and in particular to paragraphs 50 to 56 of that submission.
The response, from Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Security Minister, was written in reply to correspondence forwarded by my Member of Parliament, Fleur Anderson MP, following my January 2026 letter to her which included reference to my proposal for an Office of National Resilience. I am content to provide a copy of the minister's letter to the clerk should the committee consider it useful.
The minister's letter describes three government structures in response to the concerns raised: the Resilience Action Plan published July 2025; an all-hazards approach delivering against three parliamentary objectives; and the National Security Council sub-committee on Resilience, established July 2024 and chaired by the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister.
I bring this to the committee's attention for a specific reason. In paragraphs 50 to 56 of my written evidence, I described a structural tendency toward acknowledgement without action: a pattern in which the case for structural national resilience leadership is recognised in principle but addressed through incremental adjustment within existing arrangements rather than through dedicated institutional reform. I noted that this pattern had repeated across three decades and two governments.
The minister's response is courteous and professionally drafted. It does not, however, engage with the structural argument. It presents resilience as a function nested within the National Security Council architecture, overseen by a sub-committee. I want to be precise about why this matters, because it is not simply an organisational point.
In my written evidence I argued that resilience is itself a form of deterrence: a society that can absorb disruption and continue functioning is harder to coerce, destabilise or pressure, whether by hostile actors or by the leverage of great powers exploiting dependency. I stand by that argument. But resilience is also considerably more than a security instrument. It is the practical capacity of society to keep functioning when disruption occurs, whatever its source: meteorological, technological, economic, biological, or the result of deliberate action, and to embed that capability as part of everyday life. That capacity has no credible argument against it. It is not a defence posture. It is not a political position. It is common sense applied at national scale.
The consequence of locating resilience within the security architecture is that it inherits the political associations of that domain. For many people and many communities, security language triggers disengagement. The argument is heard as threat, as fear, as the concern of one part of the political spectrum rather than a universal interest. A resilience body that is clearly distinct from the security apparatus, with its own public mandate and its own direct relationship with citizens, could build the whole-of-society engagement that the minister's own second objective requires. The current structure cannot achieve that, because its framing works against it.
The minister states three objectives: continuously assess how resilient the UK is to target interventions and resources effectively; enable the whole of society to take action to increase their own resilience; and strengthen the core public sector resilience system.
The minister's second stated objective, enabling the whole of society to take action to increase their own resilience, is under considerable strain. Since my original submission, the economic environment has continued to deteriorate. The practical capacity of most citizens to prepare has, if anything, reduced. Achieving that objective requires sustained, visible, authoritative public communication from a body whose primary mandate is resilience and which is trusted across the full breadth of society. The structures described in the ministerial letter do not provide that.
I do not submit this note to make a political point about current, or past, administrations. I submit it because the committee asked whether existing arrangements are adequate. The ministerial response, read alongside my original submission, offers the committee a current, concrete illustration of the structural gap the evidence describes.
I remain available to engage with the committee in any capacity if the committee considers that useful.
30 April 2026