RAND Europe – Written evidence (NLR0139)

1. Summary

The 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) identifies a ‘new era of threat and challenge’ facing the UK, characterised by persistent hybrid activity – including cyber attacks, disinformation and espionage – alongside the renewed risk of high‑intensity state conflict. These threats are compounded by shifts in US security priorities away from Europe and towards the Indo‑Pacific, increasing the requirement for greater UK and European self‑reliance. Taken together, these threats elevate national resilience from a supporting function to a core pillar of national security policy and create an imperative for a ‘national conversation’ that is clear and transparent, as envisaged by the SDR.

In response to the worsening threat environment, NATO allies have agreed to a long‑term increase in defence‑related and resilience‑relevant spending to reach 5 per cent of GDP by 2035, while the UK government has committed to the largest sustained rise in defence expenditure since the Cold War. However, international comparisons indicate that several European allies are now moving faster in relative and absolute terms. While increased spending is necessary, this submission emphasises that resilience outcomes depend critically on how resources are allocated to translate into credible military capability, industrial readiness and societal preparedness. This comes, for example, through investments in supply chain resilience, workforce readiness and the scale-up of industrial production.

International evidence, especially from Nordic and Baltic states, shows that resilience is strongest when underpinned by a shared and clear understanding of the threat and a whole-of-society effort to prepare for potential crises. Key enablers include inclusive policy development, transparent dialogue around threats to national security, clear articulation of roles and responsibilities across government and society, and sustained strategic communication to build public trust. RAND Europe’s resilience framework offers a practical exemplar for structuring and communicating these efforts in a UK context.

Finally, the submission highlights disinformation as a growing and systemic threat to national resilience, particularly during crises and elections. Mitigating this risk requires proactive communication, clearer platform accountability, greater oversight of AI‑enabled systems, sustained investment in community‑level actors, and improved digital and media literacy underpinned by critical thinking skills and techniques.

2. Risk Assessment

Question 3. Since the 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), what changes have there been to the national resilience implications of the geopolitical environment for defence spending, development of the country’s industrial base, and military recruitment?

The SDR makes it clear that the UK is facing a ‘new era of threat and challenge’, including direct threats to national security presented by militarily capable states.[1] The Review also notes that the UK is already experiencing daily acts of aggression in a variety of hybrid forms, from cyber attacks to disinformation and espionage.[2] Finally, it hints at the implications for the UK of the United States shifting its own national security priorities, namely de-prioritising Europe and re-focusing on regional security and the Indo-Pacific – a shift that has been unfolding ever more rapidly since the SDR’s publication.[3] These emergent security challenges place increasing importance on the UK’s resilience, preparedness and ability to absorb, respond to and recover from a range of strategic shocks. It also requires the state to adapt and prepare better for future challenges. While the SDR called for a ‘national conversation’ on defence and security to build public support and a common understanding of the threat, broader national engagement has been limited.

Defence spending

In response to the worsening threat environment, NATO allies agreed at The Hague Summit in 2025 to increase spending of defence to 5% of GDP by 2035, which includes 3.5% GDP expenditure on defence and a further 1.5% on broader critical infrastructure and resilience.[4] The UK government has committed to the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War, including a 2.5% GDP commitment from April 2027.[5] However, in the context of broader NATO, the UK has been overtaken by Germany as the largest European NATO defence spender in real terms and by several other European NATO members, including Poland, the Baltics, the Netherlands and the Nordics in terms of defence spending as a percentage of GDP.[6]

Three things are increasingly clear: that a sustained increase in defence spending is essential, that such increases must be allocated effectively to achieve return on investment in terms of outcomes – namely, improved and strengthened military capabilities and a better prepared Armed Forces – and that this work must happen at a pace that addresses or over-matches the threat.

Defence industry              

While the UK has a mature industrial base pertaining to the defence sector, it is attenuated to peacetime efficiency and prepared to support wars of choice, not for potential high-intensity conflict or wars of necessity. To increase the preparedness of industry to anticipate and respond to a diverse array of emergent threats, several steps are needed:

• Defence companies and the private sector more broadly should embed resilience and preparedness for crises as natural, integral components of their business resilience planning; not ‘add-on’ activities. This includes adopting a mindset shift in terms of acknowledging and building awareness of companies’ role in national resilience and preparedness and their contributions in times of crisis. A resilience mindset must be paired with rapid innovation and adaptability – areas where Ukraine’s industrial base offers valuable lessons.
• Strong and transparent partnerships between government and industry are essential for a resilient defence and security posture, underpinned by a relationship of trust and clear communication about expectations – particularly governing industry contributions in periods of crisis. Practical collaboration opportunities such as partnership pilots, scenario-based exercises and trial crisis response schemes could help identify effective solutions. Financial markets also play a key role in national resilience by directing capital toward investing in resilience to strengthen companies’ capacity to successfully navigate disruption.
• The UK’s defence acquisition process, recently revamped with the creation of the National Armaments Directorate, needs to allow both established and emerging industries to participate fully, through a procurement process that is intentionally oriented towards speed, innovation and effectiveness. Implementing the announced procurement reforms[7] at speed and streamlining approval mechanisms for testing and iterating innovative solutions are critical.
• A more federated approach to production should also be a consideration for enhancing resilience, including relocatable or distributed manufacturing facilities across multiple regions. Not only would this help open the system to new players and diversify participation in defence production but greater diversification could help strengthen national resilience and make supply chains less vulnerable to disruption.
• Key infrastructure should be dispersed, protected, and adaptable to withstand accidents or sabotage. Beyond the defence industry, the UK’s broader industrial base faces wider challenges related to critical infrastructure and energy security. Building resilience requires addressing vulnerabilities and avoiding over-reliance on single points of failure.

While these measures should improve industrial resilience, HMG should recognise that there will be a cost to implementing these, and there are likely to be some industrial efficiency penalties as the price for increased industrial resilience. 

Military recruitment

To increase resilience and preparedness, a robust approach to recruitment, retention and mobilisation is needed. This should include the following steps:

• Updated recruitment and mobilisation laws are crucial to ensure the workforce model meets current threats and is underpinned by robust plans for both regular and reserve military personnel to be utilised to maximum effect during crisis. The upcoming Armed Forces Bill and Defence Readiness Bill could offer opportunities to improve mobilisation, training, and skills planning- for example, explicitly addressing how to recall individuals with critical skills during periods of increased competition and enabling faster use of workforce and industrial data for planning.[8]
• Improving military recruitment is also critical, with initiatives such as the Armed Forces Recruitment Service programme already starting to streamline entry processes – strengthening incentives to join the military and stay – and use better data analytics.[9] Complementary mechanisms will still be needed, however, to boost overall numbers and retain vital skills within the force. The ambition cited in the SDR to ‘increase the total number of Regular personnel when funding allows’ contrasts markedly with other European countries such as Germany and Poland which have explicit targets to increase their armed forces (Germany to grow 182,000 to 260,000 regular personnel over the next ten years[10]; Poland to grow from 216,000 to 300,000).[11]
• Facets of a more flexible military workforce model, such as those articulated in the 2023 Haythornthwaite Review, could also provide opportunities to quickly access skills, for example through a more widespread use of ‘zig-zag’ careers or other agile means of workforce management.[12]  
• Resilience and preparedness for crises should be underpinned by close cooperation between the military and civilian employers. It is important for the MOD and broader government to engage with businesses as partners, working together to plan how crisis response or mobilisation would operate in practice by clearly outlining expectations, timelines, and available support mechanisms. Further work is needed in the UK to understand how private sector can be incentivised to contribute to crisis mobilisation, with comparative tools to examine including the United States’ Defense Production Act or France’s Code de la défense.  

3. Whole of Society approach

Question 6. How can understanding of preparedness and resilience be improved, with action encouraged at all levels of society so that these priorities are both seen as relevant and achievable in practice?

A shared vision for preparedness and resilience is most effectively built on a whole-of-society approach, engaging government, the private sector, civil society and individual citizens. Whilst national cultures, geography and historical settings mean it is not possible to cut and paste a model from one society into another, we can take lessons from particularly effective cases of good practice. Considering the examples set by the Nordic and Baltic states suggests that such a vision should share the following tenets:

• Honesty and transparency: The geography of the UK offers a perceived level of protection that is not shared by some Nordic and Baltic states, where the threat is more tangible. Raising the level of understanding about the threats the UK is facing and attacks that are already taking place is an essential component to building resilience and preparedness. In other words, the UK needs to deliver on the national conversation about the threats it faces as noted in the SDR.
• Inclusive and consultative: Policy development should involve broad consultation with stakeholders at national, regional and local levels, including vulnerable and minority groups, to ensure the vision is relevant and widely owned.[13]
• Clarity and practice in roles and responsibilities: The UK may wish to consider mapping the roles of all actors in preparedness and response, and investing in enhanced communication and training to ensur that responsibilities are understood, that they are achievable and that there are mechanisms for coordination and information-sharing, particularly at the local level.[14] A supporting lessons process and feedback loop would enable continual improvement.
• Underpinned by strategic communication about the threat and how to prepare for crises: Regular, transparent communication from government is essential to build trust and maintain engagement. For example, Sweden’s approach includes distributing preparedness brochures (“In case of crisis or war”) to every household and maintaining open channels for public feedback.[15] These measures must be firmly established and supported throughout government.
• Supported by a clear understanding of resilience: one way, among many, of conceptualising resilience uses a stylised resilience cycle as an example of a common language to underpin a shared vision. As shown in Figure 1, the resilience cycle has four stages:

• Prepare: the ability to prepare for and mitigate disruptions before they materialise.
• Absorb: the ability to effectively combat and contain disruptions and their effects.
• Recover: the ability to recover from attack and restore critical functions as quickly and efficiently as possible.
• Adapt and Transform: the ability to adapt and transform the system to cope better with future threats of a similar nature.

Each stage requires distinct activities for effective implementation, as shown in Table 1.

Figure 1: Stages of the resilience cycle

Source: RAND Europe, based on Caves et al. (2021) and Nederveen et al. (2024)

Table 1: Competences and activities required within each phase of the resilience cycle

Source: Nederveen et al. (2024)

Preparedness and resilience are often most effective when made tangible, relevant and actionable for all sectors of society. International evidence highlights several strategies the UK could consider:

• Education and civic training: Resilience and preparedness could be integrated into school curricula, workplace training and public campaigns. Civic education, as used in Nordic countries, helps foster a culture of readiness and shared responsibility.[16]
• Accessible public awareness campaigns: Clear, practical messaging to explain risks and preparedness actions may help normalise preparedness. Sweden’s ‘If Crisis or War Comes’ campaign is a leading example.[17]
• Practical tools and guidance: Households and businesses could be provided with checklists, toolkits and digital resources to make preparedness actionable. The Netherlands and Finland have developed such resources, including apps and public-private partnerships.[18]
• Regular exercises and simulations: The UK might consider conducting regular, multi-level exercises involving government, private sector and communities to build familiarity and confidence in response roles.[19]
• Community engagement and local leadership: Empowering local leaders and community groups to champion resilience, tailored to local risks and contexts, could increase relevance and buy-in.[20] This strategy would leverage established community connections and build upon successful UK resilience initiatives, such as flood planning and response efforts. A locally focused approach may resonate better within the UK than the more centralised, government-driven models of ‘total defence’ found in Nordic countries, which might seem overly strict in a British context.

4. Communication and information

Question 9. What are the risks of disinformation concerning preparedness and resilience, including through digital channels and around elections, and how can these be mitigated, such as through the involvement of community organisations?

Disinformation is a direct and growing threat to national resilience. It undermines public trust and disrupts crisis response. Digital channels amplify these risks by rapidly spreading opinion, false narratives and conspiracy theories, particularly during elections, which can erode confidence in democratic processes and institutional decision‑making.[21] Its effects are cumulative; shaping behaviour, reinforcing grievances and weakening the ability of governments and communities to respond effectively to emergencies.[22]

The risks posed by disinformation manifest in several ways, including:

• Disruption of emergency response: RAND Europe research showed that exposure to false or misleading information during the COVID‑19 pandemic reduced compliance with official public health guidance, such as social distancing measures or accept vaccination, by reinforcing conspiracy beliefs and distrust in authorities.[23]
• Intersection with extremism: Disinformation ecosystems overlap with radicalisation pathways. Evidence shows that extremist groups frequently exploit digital platforms and AI-generated content to recruit and mobilise followers.[24] In addition, extremist groups have been observed to strategically move between platforms, using closed online spaces, private groups and encrypted messaging apps to spread tailored narratives.[25] This makes disinformation harder to detect and counter, and increases the risk of extremist groups spreading.
• Erosion of democratic legitimacy: In recent years, disinformation has increasingly been used to attack democratic political institutions, weakening trust in institutions and democratic processes as well as cohesion in society.[26] Coupled with the trend of declining trust in democratic governance observed in many Western democracies, disinformation can undermine the legitimacy of political decision-making, particularly in crisis situations where governments rely on legitimacy and public buy-in to act decisively.[27]

A key factor amplifying the scale and sophistication of disinformation is the rapid evolution of technology. For example, algorithmic systems and conversational AI do not just spread content; they reinforce and personalise false narratives over time, increasing their credibility and persistence.[28] In addition, bot farms, triggering and impersonation are used to artificially amplify certain narratives and distort public debate.[29] These practices undermine preparedness by overwhelming information environments and silencing scrutiny.

As national resilience depends on a public that can recognise and act on trusted information, the risks of disinformation are profound. Where disinformation degrades public trust, emergency communications become less effective and collective response breaks down.

This challenge is now inseparable from platform governance. Under frameworks such as the UK Online Safety Act and EU regulations, platforms are required to assess and mitigate systemic risks. AI-integrated systems such as conversational models create new risks through sustained, private interactions that reinforce harmful narratives over time.[30] These are national resilience risks, not just content moderation issues.

Effective strategies to mitigate the risks of disinformation include:

• Prioritising ‘prebunking’ over rebuttal: Proactively exposing common disinformation techniques is more effective than reactive fact-checking, particularly in crisis contexts. Public communications should adopt a ‘prebunking’ (preemptive rebunking) approach.[31] Evidence from Ukraine shows that advance warnings about likely false narratives reduced the credibility and impact of subsequent disinformation, especially during the early stages of conflict.[32]
• Platform accountability: Policies should require platforms to conduct and report on risk assessments that address how systems amplify, reinforce, and sustain harmful narratives, not just whether individual pieces of content are removed.[33]
• Implementing auditable oversight of AI systems: There should be requirements for transparent and auditable oversight of AI, particularly conversational models, to track escalation, persistence and potential harm.[34]
• Funding and embedding community organisations: Local, trusted community actors should be integrated into resilience and emergency planning structures, as they are often more effective than central authorities at correcting disinformation within their networks.[35] Research into Ukraine’s response to Russia’s attempts at sowing disinformation shows that civil society organisations, local media, and community-level ‘first responders’ played a critical role in identifying emerging narratives and correcting misinformation in ways perceived as more credible than central government messaging.[36]
• Promoting digital and media literacy: Improving citizens’ ability to critically assess online content helps individuals recognise disinformation, manipulated imagery and deepfakes. Evidence shows that users’ vulnerability to disinformation is closely linked to cognitive biases and the rapid amplification of misleading or sensationalist content on algorithm-driven platforms, and that improving media literacy is a necessary – though not sufficient – part of reducing this vulnerability.[37] However, increased scrutiny of digital content can also lead to scepticism toward genuine images and messages, as convincing deepfakes allow individuals to dismiss or question authentic information that contradicts their beliefs.[38] This dynamic reinforces a broader trend in which conspiracist movements leverage claims of staged videos and institutional deception to undermine trust in media and official sources. Building media literacy must therefore be coupled with efforts that foster critical thinking without eroding trust in credible information.

5. Cross-cutting issues

Question 13. What lessons concerning preparedness and resilience can the UK learn from other countries, including Nordic countries, and how can it facilitate international co-operation on these issues?

While it is not possible to ‘transplant’ one country’s approach to resilience and preparedness into another, there are nonetheless broad lessons that the UK could learn from international practice, particularly in the Nordic countries. These include:

• Total Defence/Comprehensive Security: The UK could consider adapting elements of Sweden and Finland’s ‘Total Defence’ and ‘Comprehensive Security’ models, for example by integrating more deeply civil and military preparedness, assigning roles to citizens or regular resilience and preparedness exercises across society.[39]
• Strategic communications and public trust: Open, honest and clear communication about the threats to national security, priorities, risks and how the government seeks to mitigate the risks, as practiced in many Nordic countries, may help build public trust and engagement.[40]
• Public-private partnerships: The UK might wish to strengthen public-private collaboration for critical infrastructure protection and supply chain resilience, drawing on the models used in countries such as Finland.[41]
• International collaboration: The UK could participate in joint exercises, share best practices and contribute to multinational frameworks (e.g., NATO, EU, UN) for resilience. The Netherlands’ cooperation with NATO and the EU is one potential model for leveraging international partnerships.[42]
• Continuous learning and adaptation: The UK may wish to establish mechanisms for continuous learning and adaptation, for example through regular engagement with countries where whole of society resilience is embedded more deeply.[43]

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