British Red Cross– Written evidence (NLR0056)

Summary

1. Our expertise on resilience and preparedness

As the UK’s largest voluntary and community sector emergency response organisation, the British Red Cross plays a vital role supporting communities affected by UK emergencies. We are the only voluntary organisation providing a UK-wide, 24/7 crisis response service 365 days a year.

Our crisis response teams are deployed to a wide range of emergencies on average three times a day, every day - supporting communities in rest centres, making door-to-door checks and ensuring people receive timely advice and support.

Our support extends beyond immediate relief. Through initiatives such as the Weather Together resources and Community Resilience Toolkit, we empower communities to prepare for and build long-term resilience to emergencies. We also carry out communications and engagement activity to support local and national resilience objectives.

2. Our response

The British Red Cross has a unique role as an auxiliary to government and works at operational and strategic levels as a resilience partner across Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England. As part of the wider voluntary sector we host, co-founded and co-chair the Voluntary and Community Sector Emergencies Partnership (VCSEP). Our response to this consultation covers both elements where we and the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) have a direct role in delivering resilience-building activity, but also wider issues for how national resilience strategy is led and governed. We have structured our response below to provide evidence in line with the consultation questions.

In summary, our key points are:

1. A national conversation, led by government, is required to mobilise and support society to take action to improve resilience
2. Communities must have agency in solutions
3. The VCS has insight, expertise and capacity and must be genuinely engaged as a delivery partner
4. Emergencies and disruptions disproportionately affect certain communities whose voices must be heard and supported

Submission questions

Risk Assessment

1. Since the 2025 Strategic Defence Review, what changes have there been to the national resilience implications of the geopolitical environment for defence spending, development of the country’s industrial base, and military recruitment? (Question 3)

1.1         The 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR)[1] and National Security Strategy (NSS)[2] both recognised that strengthening whole-of-resilience is strategically integral to the defence of the UK homeland. This assessment was reinforced by the UK Resilience Action Plan (RAP)[3], which set out a welcome vision for embedding resilience across society. In this context, the government’s 2025 NATO Summit commitment to spending 1.5% of GDP on security and resilience building efforts by 2035 - including civil preparedness in line with the UK’s NATO Article 3 responsibilities[4] - has the potential to be a key turning point in the UK’s national resilience strategy.

1.2         This commitment to dedicated resilience-building funding should be understood as a vital component of the government’s wider ambition to reach 5% defence-related expenditure. With this in mind, further detail on how this 1.5% will be allocated is needed and it will be essential for Parliament to maintain ongoing scrutiny to understand how this funding will help the government to achieve its stated vision for building whole-of-society resilience.

1.3         The provision of funding for bodies involved in delivering whole-of-society resilience should certainly be prioritised here.  This includes stable, long-term and outcome linked funding for Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), Regional and Local Resilience Partnerships, Emergency Preparedness Groups and voluntary and community sector (VCS) organisations, who have proven that they can deliver high impact at minimal cost during times of crisis and uncertainty[5]. The sums required for these are minor in the context of the overall 1.5% target yet offer a significant return on investment for key strategic outcomes including public awareness of risk and understanding of how to prepare, as well as building trust with communities and mobilising volunteer capacity.

Whole of Society Approach

2. How can a shared vision be developed to improve preparedness and resilience across the whole of society? (Question 5)

2.1         We welcome the SDR’s acknowledgement that a national conversation is needed to support its ambition to strengthen whole-of-society resilience.  National government has a central role to play in driving this conversation forward, and cross-government collaboration is key to ensuring this vision is holistic and achievable for individuals and communities. The government’s plans to launch a public information campaign to raise awareness of resilience and preparedness is a welcome first step in this regard.

2.2         However, centralised communications cannot solely be relied upon to deliver this outcome. The British Red Cross’s 2025 publication Water’s Edge[6], for example, shows limited awareness of official preparedness advice and low sign-up to or action from warnings and alerts - particularly in urban areas. Even where alerts are received, optimism bias and alert fatigue can lead people to ignore them. Participants frequently reported having no warning at all before being flooded, highlighting how gaps in understanding, relevance of the messages or warnings and trust shape the public’s perception of risk.

2.3         National resilience strategies across the UK, including the England-focused 2025 Resilience Action Plan[7], also acknowledge these limitations, but are not always clear about how relevant messaging and information can be delivered more holistically.

2.4         Developing a transformative vision for preparedness and resilience requires a consistent, joined‑up approach across national and local government, the VCS and the private sector. Utilising this approach to deliver clear, localised communication from trusted messengers will play a significant role in helping people to recognise and act upon the real risks around them. It is important for this localised communication to provide communities with the opportunity to articulate their own concerns and needs, including those most at risk of disproportionate impact during crises and emergencies.

2.5         It is also important that this conversation is carried out with clear and deliberate objectives. In particular, it should seek to:

• Identify a shared understanding of the outcomes that government, statutory organisations, VCS and the public need to work together to achieve for national preparedness and resilience building. This includes what households and communities need to know, have and be able to do to prepare for various emergencies and crises. Clarifying these expectations would provide a stronger grounding for coordination between central and local government, and the statutory agencies and VCS organisations who underpin community resilience.
• Build public awareness of, and confidence in, resilience and preparedness measures. Public trust and engagement are essential components of whole-of-society resilience, and the absence of either can have adverse implications[8] for the cohesion and clarity which a whole-of-society approach will rely upon.
• Advise individuals and communities on how to help others during an emergency. British Red Cross polling on flood awareness[9] finds that whilst 49% of UK adults say they know people in their neighbourhood who might not be able to evacuate in a flood without assistance, roughly the same proportion (48%) say they would not know how to support family, friends and neighbours should a flood strike. By helping people to gain the confidence and knowledge to help others in emergencies, the conversation can unlock significant resilience-building capacity across society.

How can understanding of preparedness and resilience be improved, with action encouraged at all levels of society so that these priorities are both seen as relevant and achievable in practice? (Question 6)

2.1         Understanding of preparedness and resilience will be improved where these concepts are communicated in clear, actionable, jargon-free and locally relevant terms - rather than as abstract or technical policy concepts. Insights from our operational engagement suggests that language such as ‘resilience’ and ‘adaptation’ can often be poorly understood by the public, and that communications framed at too high a level can appear remote, overwhelming or difficult to action. Relevant communications should therefore focus on clear and simple steps people can take in their homes, communities and organisations, and explain preparedness in terms of everyday concerns and practical capability rather than in institutional language. As an example, our flooding report points towards naming local geographies or locations ahead of a storm to avoid people assuming flood warnings are for other people in their area or underestimating their own risk[10].

2.2         To be seen as relevant in practice, preparedness and resilience must also be framed in ways that connect with the realities of people’s daily lives. For many communities, resilience is not understood primarily through the lens of emergency planning, but through issues such as financial insecurity, poor housing, mental health, clean streets, green spaces and community safety. Beyond conceptual understandings, these factors can create actual barriers to preparedness and resilience-building. For example, there can be a reluctance or inability to act to prevent a hypothetical future risk when a household is already struggling with real and present challenges such as socioeconomic deprivation.  Communications and engagement activity should therefore adopt a more holistic understanding of resilience, and where possible be linked with support on these wider issues that shape vulnerability to an emergency.

2.3         For example, the British Red Cross is delivering a new project where we are working with volunteers to embed wider resilience messaging through Neighbourhood Watch groups in areas concerned by crime. By engaging communities through an established concern, trusted local figures can introduce practical advice on preparation for a broader range of shocks. This approach recognises that communities already mobilised around a shared risk are better placed to absorb and act on wider resilience messaging, provided it is delivered through channels and narratives that resonate with their own experiences.

2.4         Importantly, action is most likely to be encouraged where communication and engagement are delivered with communities, not just to them. Efforts to strengthen preparedness and resilience should therefore combine a small number of simple, consistent national messages with highly localised engagement delivered through trusted VCS and grassroots organisations. This enables people to actively shape how guidance is understood and applied in practice - by sharing local knowledge, asking questions, and identifying what is feasible within their own circumstances - while ensuring guidance reflects local risks, barriers, literacy levels, languages and cultural contexts. In doing so, individuals and communities are supported to play a direct role in building their own preparedness and resilience, rather than relying solely on top‑down instruction.

2.5         The VCS is already facilitating this co-production and playing a key role in resilience building across the UK. To give an example from the British Red Cross, our community resilience hubs across the UK - piloted in partnership with Groundwork and Aviva - are run by the communities they are in and supported by local organisations to facilitate effective and accessible community action for emergency planning, response and recovery[11].   Of course, these efforts require resources, so embedding and expanding this approach will rely on VCS organisations being able to access sustainable, long-term and flexible funding to meet the demands of strengthening whole-of-society resilience at scale.

3. How can the preparedness and resilience of civil society be strengthened, such as through funding community organisations and the inclusion of people of all ages and from all backgrounds? (Question 7)

3.1         Strengthening preparedness and resilience requires a long-term and whole-system approach across society. The British Red Cross plays a part in that system as an auxiliary to government and strategic resilience partner. Our particular focus is ensuring those who are least able to help themselves in an emergency are supported. That objective can only be achieved as part of a wider system involving the communities themselves, the VCS, statutory agencies and essential businesses who provide services to those who are vulnerable.

3.2         Local communities understand the barriers and enablers that shape their ability to act on preparedness advice and information. Solutions must therefore be co-produced with them to be truly effective. VCS organisations are trusted representatives of people of all ages and from all backgrounds. Genuine partnership working across communities, with the VCS and local statutory bodies is key to success.  Barriers exist and need to be addressed (see response to Q11).

3.3         Voluntary activity is part of the solution but is not ‘free’ - VCS organisations (including coordinating / umbrella organisations such as the VCSEP) and statutory organisations (including LRFs) require capacity dedicated to strengthening resilience beyond planning for emergency response activity. Funding frameworks should enable such capacity to be sustained and long-term.

3.4         Strategic communication should aim to mobilise activity by those who are able, to improve their own resilience and reduce dependency on statutory agency support. This will enable those official organisations to work with the VCS to focus support on those individuals and communities most at risk and less able to help themselves.

Communication and Information

4. What does the public perceive to be the biggest risks, and how can communication help to provide information about these risks, including those that are already established or materialising, and support conversations about attitudes towards preparedness and resilience? (Question 8)

4.1         The British Red Cross carries out its own independent research and polling activity, using operational insights and the voice of those with lived experience to inform our policy recommendations. In our 2026 polling[12] on extreme weather and flooding, more than two-thirds (67%) of UK households reported being affected by storms or flooding since the start of 2026, with 12% experiencing a high or severe impact. Despite this, almost three-quarters (73%) said they had not signed up for flood alerts. Around a third of respondents said they did not feel confident about what actions to take to prepare themselves or their homes.

5. How should communication concerning preparedness and resilience, including the national curriculum, be targeted for particular groups, including young people aged 11-17, students, and vulnerable people? (Question 10)

5.1         The British Red Cross’s operational experience and research show that some people are more affected than others when an emergency or disaster strikes. The factors that determine how a person and their needs are likely to be impacted are many and varied, and often extend beyond, or overlap with, characteristics typically used to define ‘vulnerability’. For example, socioeconomic disadvantage is strongly correlated with heightened vulnerability to the negative impacts of emergencies owing to factors which might include a lack of storage space for stocking up on supplies for a power outage or lacking a car to reach and receive from distribution centres. Yet this is not always reflected in risk communication plans.

5.2         Because of this complexity, the term ‘vulnerable people’ sometimes risk obscuring the very different barriers people face and can overlook groups who are still disproportionately affected by crises and emergencies. Effective preparedness communication must therefore start with a more nuanced understanding of who is more likely to be affected and why, drawing on local knowledge and expertise through experience to identify specific needs and channels of communication. The VCS should play a key role in this process.

5.3         With reference to targeting preparedness and resilience communications for young people and students, Lord Harris of Haringey noted in his written evidence to the National Resilience Committee that the British Red Cross works with schools to strengthen resilience awareness amongst younger people and educators[13]. We are also working to integrate young people across our organisation as volunteers, supporters, staff and as people accessing British Red Cross services. Through insights gathered from this work – and whilst keeping in mind the complexity of defining ‘young people’ as a cohort – we would suggest that said communications should:

• Be co-produced with young people to increase the resonance of messaging and ensure they are accessible and communicated through channels that most closely align with how younger people consume information. Membership bodies and youth sector networks such as the PSHE Association, Citizenship Association, Multi‑Academy Trusts, Scouts, Guides and National Youth Agencies should also be involved in this co-production, to ensure communications are of a high-quality and to increase uptake.
• Emphasise practical, actionable skills such as crisis decision-making and basic first aid, so that young people know what they can do as well as what they should know when emergency strikes. Framing preparedness in terms of what young people can do supports agency and pro‑social behaviour, and helps avoid confusion or heightened anxiety at the point of an emergency.
• Be included in the national curriculum to ensure consistent access for young people across the board. Alternatively, resilience and preparedness concepts could be embedded into existing subjects including PHSE, citizenship, geography and science so that young people can learn practical competency in different contexts. The new compulsory Citizenship curriculum for primary schools[14], which will be launched in 2027, should be treated as a key opportunity to implement this approach.
• Be shared through trusted messengers and community connectors, including teachers, lecturers, youth workers, and community and peer leaders, to share this messaging. These individuals should be supported and upskilled and messaging would be best shared in relatable settings such as schools, universities, youth groups, sports clubs and other peer-led settings where young people meet.

Cross-cutting Issues

6. What barriers have there been to implementing improvements to preparedness and resilience, such as inaction, inappropriate structures, inadequate funding, and short-term thinking? (Question 11)

6.1         Resilience structures in the UK (lead government department model and the principle of subsidiarity positioning LRFs to deliver locally), present some challenges but can deliver if accompanied by effective governance. Such governance and associated accountability mechanisms are weak and lack visibility at national and local level. Without strengthening accountability, alongside other key enablers, any improvement in resilience will be inconsistent at best.

6.2         Wider legislation and policy development are often driven by short-term imperatives and don’t build resilience to future possible threats into policy.  Mainstreaming resilience-thinking across all areas of policy is necessary and cost-effective. For example, planning and building regulations need to address climate related threats such as flooding.

6.3         The 2025 government consultation[15] identified the need to strengthen partnership working between Category 1 emergency responders and Voluntary, Community, and Faith Sector (VCFS) organisations, as recommended by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Barriers identified included:

• Insufficient funding for joint initiatives

  Limited awareness of each other’s roles and capabilities

  Differences in engagement and partnership experience

  Resource constraints (time, personnel, financial)

6.4         The government’s conclusion to the consultation was to not strengthen any statutory requirements at this time, but reconsider as part of the Civil Contingencies Act review in 2027. Non-statutory improvements have been suggested in the meantime but remain outstanding. This could for example include strengthening guidance for joint working with the VCS into JESIP[16] doctrine.

6.5         The British Red Cross’s experience of working with others across the UK is that of a slowly improving but very inconsistent picture. Many of the areas of good practice are generated by experiences of responding to emergencies such as flooding, and hence appreciation of the value the VCS can bring. It highlights the following additional barriers:

• Ineffective data sharing processes, that can mean that non-statutory emergency responders such as the British Red Cross are not informed about households and individuals that might be most in need of their additional humanitarian support.
• A system that is built around the statutory responder agencies and focused on the response phase of an emergency, not on building resilience. JESIP[17], whilst actually very effective, is a case in point.
• Cultural inhibitors mean that the VCS is sometimes not considered as a genuine partner and core component of the resilience system.

6.6         The nature of the VCS is extremely varied. NAVCA[18] estimate that, across England alone, there are around 495,000 VCS organisations. This creates real challenges for the sector itself and for partners in coordinating activity for both building resilience and responding to emergencies. The British Red Cross often acts in an informal capacity to represent the VCS at LRF level, but it is essential that robust processes exist, including organisations such as the VCSEP[19].

7. What legislative measures should be considered to improve preparedness and resilience, such as a Defence Readiness Act and duties for organisations to incorporate resilience into their internal planning and business models? (Question 12)

7.1         The forthcoming 2027 post-implementation review of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA)[20] presents a timely opportunity to strengthen the UK’s preparedness and resilience framework and the impactful role the VCS plays within this.

7.2         By embedding a statutory duty to involve the VCS in the planning and delivery of preparedness and resilience-building activities – both locally and nationally - the review can ensure the sector’s aforementioned expertise and reach is fully integrated into ongoing work to strengthen whole-of-society resilience[21]. As stated previously this should include but not be limited to the emergency response phase, as VCS organisations should be working with statutory organisations to build resilience as well as informing responses to crises.

7.3         This duty should also incorporate learnings from the government’s analysis of responses to last year’s Strengthening Partnerships consultation[22], alongside any insights on what works well from the non-regulatory changes to partnership working that may have been implemented.

8. What lessons concerning preparedness and resilience can the UK learn from other countries, including Nordic countries, and how can it facilitate international co-operation on these issues? (Question 13)

8.1         The British Red Cross is part of an international network of Red Cross/ Red Crescent National Societies which provides a unique opportunity to gain insights into good practice around the world, including in conflict areas such as Ukraine.

8.2         Later this year, the British Red Cross will publish new work drawing on lessons from other countries to share examples of approaches that could be effective in the UK in terms of societal resilience building. This includes how governments and public bodies structure responsibilities, support community capability and engage civil society in preparedness.

8.3         The project will draw upon insights from other Red Cross Red / Crescent National Societies who operate as auxiliaries on resilience to their respective governments.

8.4         While this research will not be completed until the end of the year, we would welcome the opportunity to share preliminary findings with the Committee during the course of the inquiry to support its evidence gathering.

17 April 2026