Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh Convenor: Middle East Studies Forum, Deputy Director (International), Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation – Written evidence (AFG0031)

Dear esteemed members of the committee,

Thank you for the invitation to offer the following comments on the topic of Afghanistan and its neighbours with special attention to Iran. My assessment is based on nearly two decades of research and study on Central Asia and the Middle East. I have conducted a number of externally funded research projects during this time, the most relevant for the purpose of this assessment are the following three: a Future Fellowship with the Australian Research Council examining foreign policy making in Iran; a project on Iran’s influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and a Carnegie Corporation NY project on proxy wars in Afghanistan and Syria. As part of the Carnegie project, the research team conducted a roundtable discussion in Islamabad in 2019 and two virtual policy dialogue sessions with representation from Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. I will incorporate the most relevant lessons from these discussions in my assessment.

Two neighbouring states have significant influence in Afghanistan: Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan’s long history of involvement in Afghanistan during Soviet occupation and the post-Soviet era is well documented. Pakistan expanded its influence in Afghanistan, first as a conduit for US aid to anti-Soviet fighters (known as the Mujahideen) and a sanctuary for fighters and refugees; and second as a sponsor of the Taliban movement which hailed from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. When the Taliban managed to capture Kabul in 1996, Pakistan became one of only four states to recognise them as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Islamabad’s support for the Taliban was only rescinded following the September 11 attacks by al-Qaeda which operated under the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the nearly two decades that followed the international intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan maintained tacit links with the Taliban. This has increasingly become an open secret against the backdrop of the expressed commitment of the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan rests on its own sense of insecurity and desire to find leverage against its arch enemy: India. The anti-Soviet international response in the 1980s provided an opportunity for Pakistan to deepen its ties with the United States. This is a key pillar of Pakistan’s defence strategy. In subsequent years, following the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban gave Pakistan a unique opportunity to build close ties with Afghanistan to gain ‘strategic depth’ against India. While that strategy fell apart as the Taliban were pushed out of Kabul in 2001, Islamabad has not given up on maintaining influence in Afghanistan and preventing India from gaining a foothold in that country. This is an almost single-minded concern that governs key decision making in Islamabad. The US-Taliban peace talks and the prospects of the Taliban’s return to power, whether as part of a ‘government of national unity’ or by force, presents new opportunities for Pakistan. Islamabad is likely to consolidate its relationship with the Taliban in anticipation of a significant power shift in Afghanistan. Islamabad is keen to leverage this relationship to expand its influence in Afghanistan and strengthen its hand against India. 

Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan is likely to expand commensurate with the growing role of the Taliban. This is alienating Kabul-based elite who see Islamabad’s attitude and behaviour to be self-centred and patronising.  

Iran’s role in Afghanistan has been complex, even contradictory. After Pakistan, Iran became host to Afghan refugees during the Soviet invasion. The ascendancy of the Taliban to power in 1996 led to another wave of refugees to Iran. The Taliban’s version of Islam (thought at Deobandi schools in Pakistan) relied heavily on Wahhabism and carried a strong anti-Shia message. This was of serious concern for Iran (which is based on Shia Islam). Iran feared the establishment of a pro-Saudi/anti-Iran regime and throw its weight behind the Northern Alliance to stop the Taliban’s advance. Iran paid heavily for this when the Taliban captured Mazar-e Sharif in 1998 and killed 11 Iranian nationals at the Iranian consulate. This incident brought Iran to the brink of war with the Taliban as the Iranian army mobilised troops on the Iran-Afghan border. War was averted following UN intervention, but the Iranian leadership remained edgy about the Taliban, and sought to nurture ties with the increasingly marginalised anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance.  The 2001 international mobilization against the Taliban was an unexpected geostrategic gift to Iran. The push to remove the Taliban from power was welcomed by the Iranian leadership and provided a rare and unusual opportunity for Iran to work with the United States. Both Iran and the United States backed the Northern Alliance to launch a ground offensive against the Taliban and push south towards Kabul. Iran allowed US fighters operating in Afghanistan to cross over to Iranian airspace for search and rescue. This anti-Taliban convergence of interests facilitated Iran’s participation in the Bonn Conference (December 2001) to map the future of post-Taliban Afghanistan. The convergence of interest on Afghanistan was noted by the U.S. State Department official Richard Haass, who informed the ‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 6 December that Tehran and Washington do not see eye-to-eye on all issues, but Iran played a "constructive" diplomatic role in the Bonn talks’.[1]  This episode gave rise to cautious optimism that Iran and the United States might break out of the cycle of antagonism and acrimony. But hopes were dashed in January 2002 when President George W Bush labelled Iran a member of an ‘axis of evil’ and vowed to meet future threats emanating from US enemies. President Bush’s doctrine of preventative defence meant seeking out future threats before they affected US interests.  It was put to devastating use in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq (another member of the infamous ‘axis of evil’) and toppling of Saddam Hussein. For the Iranian leadership, US hostile action appeared imminent. This experience shut the door to any hopes of a change in Iran-US relations. In fact, it accentuated tensions and hostilities.

Iran’s policy towards post-Taliban Afghanistan has been a by-product of its relationship with the United States.[2] Concerns with the presence of US troops in neighbouring Afghanistan while the US leadership openly discussed ‘regime change’, followed by US action in Iraq, were seen as a serious security threat in Tehran. Iran’s swing to the hard-line leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who came to presidency in August 2005 was a manifestation of that fear and a show of defiance. Concerns with US plans overshadowed Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan. On the one hand, cultural and historical links facilitated close ties between Iran and Afghanistan and lubricated trade. The Iranian leadership clearly saw benefits in stability for Afghanistan. Growing diplomatic links between Tehran and Kabul rested on these foundations. On the other hand, fears of an imminent security threat from the US remained at the front and centre of decision making in Tehran. The Iranian leadership was adamant that the US should not be allowed to use Afghanistan as a launch-pad for attacks on Iran. To achieve this objective, Tehran developed links with a range of players in Afghanistan (well beyond Kabul) and fostered relationships that could be used to undermine US plans. 

The most controversial aspect of Iranian links with Afghanistan have been its ties with the Taliban. Given its anti-Shia and anti-Iran history, the Taliban were an unlikely ally for Iran. But they continued to be an effective force in bogging the US down, and by default preventing Kabul from exercising sovereignty across the country. Iran’s patronage of the Taliban was not enough to facilitate its military comeback, but it was enough to keep it active and win political favour so that the Taliban tone down their anti-Shia rhetoric. Taliban’s growing assertiveness, bolstered largely by support from Pakistan (and increasingly from Iran) made it an ever-present threat to Afghanistan’s political stability and security. In the last 2 decades, Iran has been undermining Kabul’s ability to rule, even though a stable and secure Afghanistan serves Iran’s long-term interests. Iran spoiled Afghanistan’s chance for stability and undermined its own interests because of short term concerns about US plans of regime change. In the post-Taliban period, Iranian behaviour in Afghanistan is best understood as a disrupter. 

Iranian attitudes towards the Taliban are also influenced by the rise of the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) which is affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, known as Daesh by its Arabic acronym. For the Iranian leadership, Daesh presents a new urgent threat. The anti-Shia and anti-Iran agenda of Daesh, was taken very seriously in Iran as it pushed for power in Iraq and Syria (reaching its peak in 2017). The Iranian leadership made defeating Daesh its priority and argued that if Daesh was not defeated in Iraq and Syria, the fight would take place within Iranian territories. In the same year Daesh carried out two terrorist attacks in Iran (including one at the Iranian parliament in Tehran), as if to vindicate that warning. With this background in mind, the Iranian authorities saw the emergence and expanding influence of IS-K as a serious threat in Afghanistan. Iran’s growing links with the Taliban was directly affected by this new threat assessment in Tehran.[3] From the Iranian point of view, the US was not going to eradicate IS-K (because Washington was seen to be behind the rise of this anti-Iran force), and Kabul did not have the military capacity to fight it (ironically because its forces had been depleted fighting the Taliban). Iran saw the Taliban as a viable fighting force to stem the growth of IS-K and even pushing it back. 

Iranian actions in Afghanistan have been reactive and governed by security assessments of present danger, lacking a clear long-term vision. In Iranian security assessments, the United States presents the most serious threat to the survival of the ruling regime. With the rise of Daesh and IS-K the threat environment has become more complex, but the Iran response has remained the same. Iran’s support for the Taliban have been expected to achieve three distinct objectives: 

1. Disrupt US ability to take control of the country and bog it down in costly skirmishes;
2. Modify the Taliban’s anti-Shia and anti-Iran agenda; and more recently
3. Present a serious bulwark against IS-K.

These objectives appear to have had some success, largely due to Pakistan’s strategic alignment with the Taliban and the deep desire of the United States to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The convergence of these processes appears to mitigate Iran’s security concerns. The Iranian leadership maybe heaving a sigh of relief as the US prepares to leave. Afghan Peace talks and the prospects of a Taliban come-back, however, are likely to present Iran with new challenges. While the future direction of Afghanistan is far from certain, vested interests based on tribal, religious and ethnic alignments and criminal pursuit are very likely to undermine security and stability. And Iran has no clear strategy to address the challenges emanating from Afghanistan and is likely to fall back on its immediate threat assessment and act accordingly, which often means act as spoiler.

Afghanistan’s prosperity depends on a regional approach that takes the interests of regional powers into account. Pakistan and Iran are two key regional players with immediate concerns, some of which maybe inflated but need to be addressed nonetheless. Regional powers need to be included in a collective effort to map Afghanistan’s future. Both Pakistan and Iran acknowledge that security and political stability in Afghanistan is beneficial to them, but remain suspicious of arrangements that exclude them. Iran is super vigilant and sceptical of deals in relation to Afghanistan that exclude it. Given historical and cultural ties between the two states, the large refugee population in Iran that serves Afghan economy through remittance, and Iran’s capacity to act as a spoiler, it is advantageous for the prospects of stability in Afghanistan to include Iran in a regional dialogue.

Thank you for your attention.

Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh

Convenor: Middle East Studies Forum

Deputy Director (International)

Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation

Received 1 November 2020