DHN0040

Written evidence submitted by Brunel University London- Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies and Nord University, Norway - Nord Arctic.

The Defence Committee has called for evidence on the following terms of reference:

(1)   What are the UK’s defence and security interests in the High North, and what are the current and emerging threats relating to the region?

(2)   Does the UK have clear and achievable defence and security policies for the region, including their relationship with those for adjacent regions – such as the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike concepts? 

(3)   How will the UK work with, and without, key allies and partners in the region, both within and outside NATO, including through the JEF, and how does this support or undermine the UK’s policies set out in ‘b’?

(4)   Do UK Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities for sustained operations in the region now; and are appropriate plans in place to meet the needs of the future?

(5)   To what degree can military capabilities developed for the High North be re-deployed for operations in other theatres, and vice versa?

(6)   How does the UK’s defence and security strategy for the region align with the Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda?

Contributors to this reply:

• Prof Corine Wood-Donnelly, NORD University, Norway. Coordinator for Nord Arctic, the university's cross-faculty platform for Arctic research
• Prof Matthew S. Seligmann, Brunel University of London, UK, Professor of Naval History, Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies
• Dr Kristian Gustafson, Brunel University of London, UK. Reader in Intelligence and War, Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies
• Dr Steven Wagner, Brunel University of London, UK. Senior Lecturer in Intelligence, Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies

Contributing Organisations:

• Nord Arctic is a cross-faculty platform at Nord University, Bodo, Norway, dedicated to advancing Arctic-relevant research and fostering collaboration across scientific disciplines, and networks involving government, businesses, and communities in the circumpolar Arctic and Norway’s High North. Nord Arctic is the portal to the collective research infrastructure at Nord University to promote investment in connection with Arctic challenges. Nord Arctic drives scientific excellence in research by integrating social sciences across the university, promoting research that is tailored to meet societal needs. Through this interdisciplinary approach, Nord Arctic generates impactful research that works for solving the needs of today and developing innovations for the future.

• Brunel University, Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies. The Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) was the UK’s first formally constituted research centre established to study intelligence agencies and their role in government.  We pride ourselves on consistently producing innovative, world-class and high-impact research that has contributed as much to the professional practice of UK and allied intelligence organisations as to scholarly understanding of those organisations.  Our academics bring a powerful combination of academic research on, and first hand engagement with, the intelligence profession in both government and the private sector on both sides of the Atlantic and the English Channel, and in Asia.

Executive Summary – Our Key Findings

1)      The changing technological landscape intensifies the geographic volume that must be considered in defence and security policy. Arctic geography is not only a 2-D horizontal space but is a 3-D space that also includes vertical dimensions (from ocean floor to air space, low earth orbit). This creates both opportunities for cross-border collaboration but also introduces new domains of vulnerability.

2)      China's arctic engagement is not only opportunism but is a systematic and multi-generation programme focused on trade routes, resources, influence, and security. The latter issue has led to cooperation with Russia, especially following the pause in cooperation with the Arctic Council since 2022. The response strategy must be varied and appropriately matched to instruments and technologies.

3)      The science-security-governance nexus practiced by China creates a structural gap in UK Strategy as the UK High North policy engages only with the security dimension while leaving science and governance disconnected and therefore cannot be seen as a robust strategy. It should be an ambition to increase the UK's science diplomacy and collaboration in cross-border research in the Arctic.

4)      UK policy must project both deterrence and reassurance. Presence, Persistence, and Capability are needed for deterrence; Communication, Cooperation and Patterns are needed for reassurance.

5)      The UK must ensure it has vessels that are in the Polar Classes required for operations in areas covered by the Polar Code to avoid legal barriers to physical access. Maritime and aviation assets designed or suitable for use in the High North are broadly deployable anywhere they can be based, crewed and maintained. But the reverse is not always true: generic platforms cannot always be used year-round in the High North.

Background

0.1              The High North is a rapidly shifting context both in geopolitical and environmental domains.[1]

0.2              There are clear challenges to normative order (e.g. sovereignty, territory) in the Arctic through the Trump Administration's increasingly aggressive stance on Greenland. This change weakens the legal frameworks formerly leveraged by the eight Arctic states (US, Canada, Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) to keep non-Arctic states out of decision-making and, in some cases, use of Arctic waters. While this creates a window for a greater UK role in Arctic governance, it also creates a window for China, and other non-Arctic or 'near-Arctic' actors.

0.3              The changing technological landscape intensifies the geographic volume that must be considered in defence and security policy. Arctic geography is not only a 2-D horizontal space, but is a 3-D space that also includes vertical dimensions (from ocean floor to air space, low earth orbit).[2] This creates both opportunities for cross-border collaboration, but also introduces new domains of vulnerability. Security and defence in the High North cannot be understood through conventional frameworks alone, but requires engagement with the complex, multi-dimensional nature of sovereignty, infrastructure and operations in the region, which spans legal, environmental and normative dimensions.

0.4              'Arctic exceptionalism', primarily known for the cooperative governance arrangements in the region beyond security concerns (which included Russia) has disappeared at higher, formal levels, although cooperation still remains in practical working arrangements within WG of the Arctic Council. However, some 'exceptionalism' remains in the conditions of the region. It is still remote, it is still cold with weather that is increasingly volatile, it is still dark half of the year, populations small and sparsely located, lifeline vulnerabilities are notable. In addition, the region includes Indigenous citizens who are rightsholders. This means that certain types of activities and development require free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).

(1)               What are the UK’s defence and security interests in the High North, and what are the current and emerging threats relating to the region?

1.1              Climate change is a threat multiplier, a complicating factor to historic defence needs.[3] It enables new actors to access the region and expands the number of potential security dilemma interactions, which have not been part of earlier calculations and planning for defence needs. UK defence planning should anticipate a more crowded and more contested High North. During the Cold War, the UK defence planning centred on monitoring and defending the Greenland-Iceland-UK “gap” (or GIUK gap, today often including Norway as the “GIUK-N Gap”), as the first line of defence against Soviet submarine deployments and other fleet manoeuvres.[4] The GIUK-N gap is a key line of UK defence at sea, and it is also critical to the security of our North American partners. Given the state of UK-Russian relations, that task has again become important, yet complicated by receding ice and lengthier summer seasons.

1.2              China’s accession to the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013 raised some concerns, yet it has since asserted itself as a near-arctic state.[5] Its strategy can be characterised as an extension of the belt and road initiative, focused on the Northern Sea Route. China's arctic engagement is not only opportunism but is a systematic and multi-generation programme focused on trade routes, resources, influence, and security. The latter issue has led to cooperation with 1.3              Russia, especially after the latter’s exclusion from the council since 2022. China’s strategy includes the development of dual use research vessels, critical infrastructure development and controversies and exploitation of Arctic Council observer status are all part of expressions of a unified strategy that includes military, economic, scientific and political instruments.[6] However, the UK should recognise that this is also driven by diverse institutional actors within China with different time horizons. The response strategy must be varied and appropriately matched to instruments and technologies.

1.4              State performances matter. Presence and activity by non-Arctic actors (e.g. investments, diplomatic participation, production of narrative maps) reshapes the governance architecture of the region, in part by projecting alternative narratives and interpretations of legitimacy.[7] Participation in governance arrangements and projections of responsibility also matter (e.g areas of Search and Rescue (SAR) responsibility or environmental protection).[8] In maritime spaces which are ordinarily governed by the principle of the freedom of the seas, environmental protection and safety have become a mechanism for exclusion both through UNCLOS Art 234 and through the Polar Code. The UK must ensure it has vessels that are in the Polar Classes required for operations in areas covered by the Polar Code to avoid legal barriers to physical access.

1.5              Emergency response and infrastructure present a strategic vulnerability, which can become a dimension of the threat environment in its own right.[9] With both nuclear-powered vessels operating in the High North and a high concentration of nuclear material located in the Kola Peninsula, a nuclear incident in Arctic waters is a realistic possibility, whether it emerges as an accident, or through purposeful exploitation.[10] Such an incident presents significant implications for human and food and/or water security with both immediate and long-term consequences.

1.6              Prior to 2022, a dominant mode of Russia's coercive behaviour was below military thresholds. This includes, for example, the filing of Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) warnings, which were not followed up with accompanying activity, imposing disruption and costs on commercial aviation and maritime traffic without breaching legal thresholds.[11] Another form of disruption includes Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) with hybrid threats to democratic institutions, processes and trust that have become an integral part of Russia's strategy, both in the High North and beyond.[12]

1.7              The military challenge in the High North has shifted from Norwegian Sea surface interdiction to Barents Sea bastion monitoring, and possibly toward operations.[13] This includes a broad range of capabilities, such as under-ice operations (short to medium term), long range maritime patrol, advanced acoustic and other forms of signal footprint intelligence, Arctic-ready command infrastructure. UK forces lack the cumulative intelligence, environmental situational awareness and institution-wide professional expertise that comes from continuous operations. This is not a training gap that can be closed with exercises alone, it requires sustained scientific and operational presence over years.

(2)               Does the UK have clear and achievable defence and security policies for the region, including their relationship with those for adjacent regions – such as the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike concepts?

2.1               The 2021 Integrated Review noted “the UK’s commitment to maintaining the Arctic region as one of high cooperation and low tension. It set out that we would maintain a significant contribution to Arctic science” (ref b). This is a proper aspiration but one which depends on all parties sharing the same ambition–while it is feasible with UK partners around the North Sea and North Atlantic, it is unlikely to be an ambition shared by Russia, who are likely to continue to act as spoilers of this cooperative vision. In addition, scientific collaboration with the UK's legitimate Arctic partners (e.g. Norway) is impossible without funding mechanisms to support this ambition.

2.2              The science-security-governance nexus practiced by China creates a structural gap in UK Strategy as the UK High North policy engages only with the security dimension while leaving science and governance disconnected and therefore cannot be seen as a robust strategy. It should be an ambition to increase the UK's science diplomacy in the Arctic, not merely through NERC/UK Arctic Office presence at Arctic fora[14] and minor funding for supporting work of Arctic Council (e.g. Feb 2026 AMAP geoengineering workshop, funded by UK Arctic Office) but in deliberate scientific research programmes on areas of interest to the UK at the intersection of defence, security and (social) science. The ceding of this ground by Allies will only benefit Russian and likely Chinese presence which may be inimical to UK interests that can be readily achieved through scientific cooperation.

2.3              The UK needs to consider what is required to monitor and defend the GIUK gap, especially in light of the multiple demands upon our existing capabilities, and plan for a force which is capable of meeting this mission alongside other stresses. UK defence procurement and force design need to be planned around both existing threats and future risks. These risks multiply as polar melt increases routes through the high north, and into the North Sea and north Atlantic. Other risks not considered are the dependability of allied support, access to their platforms, as well as future parliaments’ willingness or ability to spend on these issues.

(3)               How will the UK work with, and without, key allies and partners in the region, both within and outside NATO, including through the JEF, and how does this support or undermine the UK’s policies set out in ‘b’? (Looking North: the UK and the Arctic - GOV.UK)

3.1              Current Russian practice reveals an internal strategic contraction. While it works to undermine the global liberal order, it simultaneously benefits from Arctic regional governance institutions by limiting competition from non-Arctic states or by giving a certain authority over what non-Arctic states can do in the region. This creates a potential policy opportunity for exploitation: the Arctic governance institutions that constrain Russia should be the institutions the UK seeks to reinforce. This includes supporting the Svalbard Treaty, UNCLOS and SOLAS (Polar Code) implementation and Arctic Council continuity.

3.2              NATO members, including the UK should coordinate and reinforce their deterrence postures and reassurance gestures. Norway has a long history of combining deterrence with deliberate reassurance, a combination that helped to maintain low tension even during the Ukraine crisis.[15] This has occurred through many channels, but not least in ongoing cooperation in below threshold activities, such as fisheries collaboration or search and rescue cooperation. A UK strategy that focuses exclusively on deterrence and capability signalling may undermine and be counterproductive to the efforts of Nordic NATO allies and produce dangerous escalatory dynamics that Nordic countries have long worked to prevent. The UK has no reassurance component or mechanisms in its High North policy.

3.3              The UK has historically tended to over-estimate Russian military and naval strength.[16] While Russia poses a considerable challenge in the High North, a challenge that the UK cannot realistically meet single-handedly, it remains the case that working with allies, the UK is in a position to impose costs on Russian hostility in the region sufficient to act as a deterrent. Maximizing this cooperation is, thus, essential.

3.4              UK policy must project both deterrence and reassurance. If we can summarise, it is to say that Presence, Persistence, and Capability are needed for deterrence; Communication, Cooperation and Patterns are needed for reassurance.

(4)               Do UK Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities for sustained operations in the region now; and are appropriate plans in place to meet the needs of the future?

4.1              Operation FIRECREST 2026 will likely demonstrate the UKs ability to operate in the High North. It is an important display of capability. Note, however, that the vessels involved are not Polar Class, only able to operate in ice-free seas, limiting such deployments to summer months or below certain latitudes. Without armed Polar Class vessels, persistent presence in High Arctic seas will be difficult for more than half the year. Although continuous ice cover is diminishing, seasonal ice cover as well as vessel icing will continue to be navigational/operational hazards.

4.2              A key UK aviation platform for operations in the High North is the Poseidon MRA1 (the Boeing P-8A), of which the UK possesses nine. We manage this fleet in partnership with the US and with our Norwegian allies who have five.  Independently or in concert with Allies, it is deployable everywhere on Maritime duties. It is a superb platform with modern capabilities, but independently, the UK possesses insufficient numbers to provide persistent coverage if there is more than one theatre of operations.

4.3              The Astute class submarines by virtue of their uncommonly low noise profile, high underwater endurance and considerable power projection capability (cruise missiles etc) offer a high value asset for Arctic operations that can both constrain enemy deployments in the region and push forward UK and allied strike capability.

4.4              UK major surface combatants have strong Anti-Submarine-Warfare capabilities that can be used to hinder Russian submarine deployments and, thus, prevent the access into open waters of Russian missile-capable underwater platforms. As the High North is the likely route for many such Russian vessels, this represents an important asset that will be further enhanced with the commissioning of the Type 26 frigates.

4.5              The recent decommissioning of the Landing Platform Dock vessels Albion and Bulwark and the earlier sale without replacement of the LPH HMS Ocean has created a deficit in capability for rapid sealift to Arctic shores that should be addressed as soon as possible. The Multi-Role Strike Ship, replacement for these vessels as well as the Bay Class vessels of the RFA, are critical to future operations.

4.6              The UK is not prepared for sustained operations that weaken UK defence systems from within. A key example for an appropriate plan to meet this vulnerability for UK defence policy is the Nordic 'Total Defence Concept', which is the overarching security concept adopted by Norway, Sweden and Finland. The concept integrates the full machinery of the state (i.e. military to civil society, government to private sector) into a unified national defence and resilience system. This system of preparedness places emphasis on NATO Article 3 (individual states’ defence readiness and resilience) and rests on the principle that modern hybrid threats and systemic attacks that aim to disrupt and weaken our democracies and societies cannot be met with armed forces alone. National security requires every part of society to be prepared and coordinated for withstanding and deflecting anticipated attacks. This calibrated policy mix is not replicated in the UK and weakens the foundations for UK military and defence operations, which may see the operational front of the High North brought significantly closer to home and within home territory should military assets be required for domestic support or defence. 

4.7              Defence procurement and security architecture will be increasingly shaped by EU and European security mechanisms. As EU defence integration deepens, security and defence cooperation with Nordic allies will increasingly need to engage with EU frameworks and interoperability standards rather than treating NATO as the only relevant multilateral structure.[17] The UK should prepare a strategy to navigate this shift, with Nordic toolkit for this challenge (specialisation, knowledge leadership, bilateral relationship management, institutional engagement) as a template.

(5)               To what degree can military capabilities developed for the High North be re-deployed for operations in other theatres, and vice versa?

5.1              Maritime and Aviation assets designed or suitable for use in the High North are broadly deployable anywhere they can be based, crewed and maintained. But the reverse is not always true: generic platforms cannot always be used year-round in the High North. This risks two problems for military presence in the High North: dilution of available platforms for the north, and wearing out of Arctic-optimised equipment. The Armed Forces must pay attention to the issue of 'economic scarcity' - a capability can only be applied to one thing at a time whilst there are probably multiple simultaneous needs. Individual platform capability is not a sufficient substitute for platform numbers.

5.2              UK maritime assets meant for the Antarctic, such as HMS Endurance, were very liberally used around the Southern Atlantic as a generic UK asset, stressing the maintenance and sustainability of both crews and equipment not principally designed for warm-water operations. The Endurance (like its replacement, HMS Protector) is a Norwegian commercial ice-breaker purchased by the RN. These factors combined in the near disaster of 2008 where the Endurance came very close to sinking in the Southern Ocean off the coast of Argentina. According to her former commander:

1. The Endurance, then amongst the only Antarctic-capable vessel in the RN, was sent on extended cruises (18-month cruises and five years between drydock maintenance periods) which far exceeded its civilian design parameters (annual drydock maintenance).
2. The RN lacked the engineering “bench depth” to have suitable experts aboard her through these very long cruises and her maintenance was therefore poor.
3. Its equipment, designed for very cold weather operations, were unduly stressed when she was made to operate in tropical African and Caribbean seas.[18]

5.3              The near disaster of the Endurance (while she survived afloat, damage to her was so extensive she was sold for scrap) highlights points key to understanding all defence assets designed for very cold weather operations:

1. While they can be used in other environments, to do so stresses their design parameters and risks damage and deterioration.
2. Lack of platform numbers risks a commensurate shallowness in expertise.

5.4              Poseidon MRA1, while capable, is nine platforms for everywhere the RN operates. In a crisis or armed conflict, factoring maintenance and turn-around, this would provide 2-3 aircraft for persistent operations in a single operation. It is likely insufficient for two sustained operations, especially if one of those is more distant from the UK.

5.5              Dual-use scientific intelligence and FIMI capabilities are theatre-agnostic in many cases. UK investment in dual-use polar research builds institutional relationships and scientific expertise applicable to any ocean intelligence environment. Cold-weather capabilities transfer strongly to other winter or high-altitude operational environments. It is also transferable to UK Antarctic interests.

(6)               How does the UK’s defence and security strategy for the region align with the Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda?

6.1              The purchase by Norway and Canada of the UK designed Type 26 Frigate (5 and 3 hulls respectively in batch 1), means that in conjunction with the 8 vessels being built for the Royal Navy, a common platform is being created for Arctic maritime operations, especially ASW, highlighting capability and enabling consistent interoperability across navies and allies.[19] This has the potential to drive export growth by demonstrating the suitability of the platform in a critical high-pressure environment. Were the Type 31 frigate, currently being built for Britain and Poland, also to be adopted by Denmark and Sweden, as seems possible, then five partner nations would operate a common design suite across Baltic and Arctic operations further enhancing the possibilities for cooperation and highlighting the value of UK warship expertise in a competitive export environment.[20]

6.2              Commissioning of icebreakers of the appropriate Polar Class for the RN would contribute to the resurgence of UK shipbuilding and the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

26th March 2026