DHN0026
Written evidence submitted by ARX Robotics.
About ARX Robotics
ARX Robotics is a European leader in uncrewed ground systems, designed to support military forces operating in contested and demanding environments.
Our platforms are currently being used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces for evacuating casualties from the battlefield, supporting logistics resupply and are being armed with remote weapons systems. This has given us vital insight into how the UAF are able to support their operations in degraded communications environments, with fragile supply routes whilst using their manpower effectively.
We are bringing this tactical, as well as technical, experience to the work we do with NATO nations. Through our work with the UAF as well as the UK Armed Forces, several NATO nations and NATO component commands we are demonstrating the increasing value of autonomous systems in the land domain.
What are the UK’s defence and security interests in the High North, and what are the current and emerging threats relating to the region?
The UK’s interests in the High North are becoming more urgent as the region grows more contested and strategically important to Euro-Atlantic security. Activity in the North Atlantic and Arctic approaches can directly affect the UK’s ability to reinforce allies, sustain military operations and deter potential adversaries. There is also increasing concern about the vulnerability of critical national infrastructure in northern waters and territories, including energy systems, surveillance installations and subsea cables that underpin both military effectiveness and economic resilience. At the same time, rising military activity and hybrid threats mean that routine presence, resilience and the ability to operate over distance and in challenging environments are becoming more central to defence planning.
Does the UK have clear and achievable defence and security policies for the region, including their relationship with those for adjacent regions – such as the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike concepts?
UK policy rhetoric on the High North has increased in recent years. There is now stronger recognition of the importance of the North Atlantic approaches, the protection of critical national infrastructure and closer cooperation with northern allies. However, the Strategic Defence Review only referenced the “High North” four times, and in somewhat vague terms. And the Government’s strategy for its approach to the region hasn’t been updated since it was first published in 2022, despite significant shifts in the geostrategic environment. It therefore remains unclear how the overarching strategic direction will translate into a sustainable operating model on the ground today and in the future.
In practice, the government needs to look at how it can maintain a steady presence across large and environmentally demanding areas, as this is likely to be one of the main challenges. Policy discussions often focus on access and reinforcement, but the day-to-day task of securing remote sites, maintaining awareness and sustaining smaller forward elements may prove just as important to credible deterrence. There are also open questions about how logistics will be managed once forces are deployed. Supply routes in the region are likely to be long, exposed and affected by weather and terrain. Future planning may therefore need to place greater emphasis on endurance, resilience and the protection of routine movement.
Do UK Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities for sustained operations in the region now; and are appropriate plans in place to meet the needs of the future?
UK Armed Forces have the experience and core capabilities needed to deploy to the High North, but the challenge is sustaining operations there over time and at a relevant scale. Distances are long, infrastructure is limited and routine movement can be slow and exposed. Maintaining a steady presence, including securing remote sites, monitoring key routes and supporting dispersed units, will place increasing pressure on manpower and logistics.
There is growing interest across NATO in how uncrewed and autonomous systems might support day-to-day land tasks. These systems are not yet widely integrated into force structures, but they are increasingly seen to deploy far wider sensor networks, offset targetable assets from manned positions and support logistics activity in challenging conditions. Developing our understanding of power management whilst using uncrewed and autonomous systems is a key to its successful integration, especially in the High North. At ARX, we have identified, and adapted to, issues with battery life and power systems in extreme cold weather conditions. The Armed Forces need to be equipped with suitably adapted systems for sustained operations.
For the UK, the issue is whether capability development is moving quickly enough to support sustained, distributed operations in the future. As the High North becomes more contested, equipment that extends endurance, maintains awareness and protects personnel without increasing force sizes, and technically develops as our adversary capabilities do, will become more relevant.
To what degree can military capabilities developed for the High North be re-deployed for operations in other theatres, and vice versa?
We expect significant overlap between the demands of operating in the High North and those already seen on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in Ukraine. Both environments require forces to operate across large areas with limited infrastructure, under persistent observation and with pressure on logistics and manpower.
In Ukraine, uncrewed ground platforms are being used to support tasks such as monitoring terrain, protecting infrastructure, extracting casualties and moving supplies where routine movement by personnel carries risk. Many of the same lessons are relevant to northern operations. Forces will need to maintain awareness over wide areas, sustain high bandwidth communication networks, secure remote installations and sustain smaller units at distance. Capabilities designed to function in degraded communications environments and to support routine tasks without increasing exposure can therefore have clear application beyond the theatre in which they were first fielded.
This also means that capability development does not need to start from first principles for the High North. Experience gained on the eastern flank, including through operational use and rapid adaptation, can inform how allied forces think about persistence, logistics resilience and infrastructure protection in demanding environments. In this sense, systems shaped by current conflict conditions will offer practical insight into how future northern operations could be supported. The value lies in the technology itself and the relationship with industry going forward, but also in the operational lessons that come from fielding and refining it in real-world conditions.
How does the UK’s defence and security strategy for the region align with the Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda?
Capabilities developed to support operations in the High North are not only relevant to Arctic or northern European conditions. The underlying operational challenges (e.g. sustaining dispersed units, protecting critical infrastructure and managing vulnerable logistics) are increasingly common across a wide range of theatres.
For example, systems used to monitor remote radar or communications sites in northern Norway or Finland will also be relevant for protecting pipeline networks in the Gulf, where forces are required to maintain awareness across large areas with limited personnel and in environments where routine movement may be exposed. Similarly, approaches that reduce risk during resupply, such as using uncrewed ground systems to move equipment short distances, carry stores between positions or check routes before personnel move, are not unique to cold-weather operations. Comparable pressures exist for NATO forces deployed in eastern Poland or the Baltic States, for units operating across dispersed island chains in the Indo-Pacific, and for expeditionary forces working with limited infrastructure in regions such as the Sahel.
Experience from Ukraine has already demonstrated how the same need to extend endurance and reduce the exposure of manned platforms is likely to shape future deterrence missions and stabilisation tasks in other parts of the world, including areas where terrain, distance or threat conditions create similar operational constraints. We need to incorporate these lessons into the evolution of the UK Armed Forces.
Therefore, capability development influenced by the demands of the High North should be understood as contributing to a wider shift in how land forces operate. For the UK, engagement in this area can therefore support both regional deterrence and longer-term export potential by helping to develop solutions to operational problems that are becoming more common globally.
Conclusion and recommendations
As the High North becomes more strategically contested, the key challenge for the UK will be sustaining credible presence over time rather than simply deploying forces into the region. Operating across large distances, protecting dispersed infrastructure and maintaining resilient logistics will increasingly shape what effective deterrence looks like in practice.
Lessons from the current conflict in Ukraine are likely to have growing relevance for northern operations, particularly the impact of congested and contested electromagnetic environments on routine land activity. At the same time, the scale of northern operating areas, including very long land borders such as that between Finland and Russia, highlights the practical difficulty of maintaining situational awareness and persistent surveillance using manpower alone. The High North should therefore be seen as an environment that brings into sharper focus wider trends in how modern land forces must adapt to operate in dispersed and contested conditions.
There would be value in increasing the scale and frequency of exercises that test how dispersed units can maintain presence, protect infrastructure and manage logistics in demanding northern conditions, including how forces operate when communications and positioning systems are degraded and how emerging technologies can support wide-area surveillance. Greater emphasis may also be needed on logistics resilience and routine force protection in capability planning. Closer cooperation with northern allies, alongside engagement with European defence technology firms already working in this space, could help accelerate concept development, improve interoperability and ensure that emerging capabilities are shaped by real operational pressures.
24th March 2025