DHN0021
Written evidence submitted by Arctic Research and Development Limited.
This submission is made by Ben Saunders, Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of Arctic Research and Development Ltd (ARD), a UK/US defence and deep-technology company headquartered in the Cotswolds, with a Delaware-incorporated US entity (ARDC).
I have more than 25 years' experience operating in polar environments. I hold the world record for the longest human-powered polar journey on foot, and have covered approximately 8,000 kilometres on skis in the Arctic and Antarctica, including solo expeditions to both the North and South Poles. During a 108-day Antarctic expedition in 2013–14, supported by Intel, I transmitted an unprecedented volume of data from the field using the Iridium satellite network — an early demonstration of the communications challenges and opportunities that now underpin ARD's product development. I have briefed research institutions, military organisations, and multinational corporations on the realities of operating in extreme cold environments.
ARD builds autonomous systems, communications infrastructure, and software designed specifically for Arctic and sub-Arctic operations. The company's products include: Icelink (ruggedised satellite communications optimised for high-latitude operations); Auka OS (situational awareness and autonomy software); Arctic Node Array (a LoRa-based mesh sensor buoy network for persistent maritime surveillance); Power-LT (extreme cold-weather energy storage); Coldpack (an Iridium-enabled integration layer for legacy hardware); and Iceguard (autonomous maritime surveillance, developed with a partner). ARD's first paying customer is UK Commando Force (MOD), with whom we conducted a live operational trial of Icelink in Norway. We are also engaged with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) through the Defence Innovation Unit (DIU), and with Danish and Norwegian defence procurement bodies.
I write with a perspective that combines direct physical experience of the operating environment with active commercial delivery of capability into it. That combination informs the evidence below.
This submission addresses questions (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) from the Committee's call for evidence.
The strategic significance of the High North is accelerating faster than the pace at which most defence institutions can respond. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review noted that the Arctic Ocean is likely to be ice-free each summer by 2040. That is not a distant projection; it is within the planning horizon of decisions being made today.
The threats are well-documented in broad terms but deserve sharper operational framing. Russia has spent the past decade militarising the Arctic at scale: hardening and expanding Northern Fleet infrastructure, deploying new classes of submarine, and asserting control over the Northern Sea Route with a combination of icebreakers, coastal defence systems, and air power. The Northern Fleet's submarine force poses a direct threat to Atlantic sea lines of communication, UK SSBN operating areas, and critical undersea energy and data infrastructure, including the Langeled pipeline, which provides a substantial proportion of UK peak gas demand. These are not theoretical risks; they represent potential vectors for coercion in a way that a land border does not.
China's role in the region is less kinetic but no less consequential. China's Polar Silk Road initiative is designed to exploit opening Arctic shipping lanes and secure access to natural resource extraction, with Russia as its enabling partner. China has invested heavily in polar research, infrastructure and icebreaker capability. The convergence of Russian military ambition and Chinese economic ambition in the same increasingly accessible space creates a compounding strategic challenge.
The hardware asymmetry in the region is stark. Russia operates the world's largest icebreaker fleet – some 57 vessels including eight nuclear-powered icebreakers, with more under construction – giving it unmatched physical access to Arctic waters year-round. The US Navy has no operational icebreakers. The US Coast Guard operates three, of which the primary heavy icebreaker, USCGC Polar Star, was commissioned in 1976 and has just marked its fiftieth year of service. NATO's combined icebreaker fleet, while larger than commonly assumed, cannot match Russia's capacity for sustained high-latitude operations; above 80ºN, vast areas of the Arctic remain effectively inaccessible to Western vessels for much of the year.
This asymmetry is not a problem that can (or should) be solved by matching Russia hull for hull. It points instead to a different strategic imperative: knowledge, and moving from domain awareness to domain understanding. From knowing that Russian vessels are operating in a given area, to understanding their patterns, intent, and capability in granular, persistent detail. That is fundamentally a data and ISR challenge. And it is one that technology can address at a fraction of the cost of an icebreaker programme.
What is often missing from policy analysis of the High North is honest operational context. The Arctic is not simply an empty space that is becoming less empty. It is an extraordinarily demanding physical environment. Sea ice, even in retreat, remains dynamic and unpredictable. Temperatures are severe and variable. The Arctic night runs for months at a stretch. Communications break down at high latitudes and in bad weather. Logistics chains are long, brittle, and expensive. Any force that has not trained and equipped specifically for these conditions will be severely degraded, regardless of how capable it is in temperate theatres.
I have personal, first-hand experience of all of the above, not least from North Pole expeditions from 2001-2004 that relied on Russian infrastructure and logistical support, and entailed time spent in Norilsk, Novosibirsk, Khatanga, Cape Chelyuskin, and Sredny and Golomjannyj. The operational significance of these environmental factors is systematically underestimated in strategy documents that are, by necessity, written from desks rather than sea ice.
The UK's core security interests in the region are: protection of Atlantic sea lines of communication; defence of critical undersea infrastructure; maintenance of SSBN freedom of manoeuvre; early warning of Russian maritime activity; and the credibility of NATO's northern flank, which now – with Finland and Sweden as members – extends significantly deeper into the Arctic. There is also a nascent but growing interest in sovereign access to Arctic resources and the commercial opportunities presented by new shipping routes, including in the context of Greenland.
The UK has the right instincts on the High North but has not yet translated them into a coherent capability plan.
The Royal Navy's Atlantic Bastion concept – a networked architecture of autonomous systems, sensors, and warships designed to secure the North Atlantic – is directionally correct. The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) provides a credible multilateral framework. UK Commando Force has genuine Arctic capability and hard-won expertise from decades of training in northern Norway. NATO's emerging Arctic Sentry mission, in which the UK has confirmed a leading role, creates a framework for persistent allied presence.
But strategy and doctrine are not the same as capability. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review, notable for many things, did not include specific recommendations on the Arctic or High North. This is a significant omission given the pace of change in the region. The absence of an explicit Arctic Capability Plan – one that maps identified operational requirements against sovereign industrial supply – means that the UK's posture in the region remains dependent on inadequate or borrowed materiel, allied goodwill, and improvisation.
Several specific gaps stand out:
• There is no dedicated MOD programme for Arctic communications. UK forces operating at high latitudes rely on commercial SATCOM systems not optimised for polar orbits, or on legacy HF radio. Neither provides the bandwidth, reliability, or security needed for sustained operations.
• There is no persistent maritime surveillance architecture for the High North equivalent to that which exists in the Baltic or the North Sea. The UK and its allies are operationally blind across large swathes of Arctic Ocean for extended periods.
• Cold-weather power and energy logistics remain a known and unresolved problem. Standard battery systems fail rapidly at Arctic temperatures. Forward-deployed units face a fundamental tension between operational endurance and resupply exposure.
These are not capability aspirations for 2040. They are capability gaps that exist today, in a theatre where the UK has an active and growing operational commitment.
Recommendation: The MOD should commission and publish an Arctic Capability Plan within the current parliamentary session, mapping specific operational requirements against existing programmes and sovereign industrial capacity. This should be updated annually and form part of the Defence Investment Plan.
The UK's alliance architecture for the High North is broadly sound. NATO's northern flank is strengthened materially by Finnish and Swedish membership. The JEF provides a nimble, high-readiness framework with the right membership – Nordic and Baltic partners who take Arctic operations seriously and have invested in the relevant capabilities. Bilateral relationships with Norway, in particular, are deep and operationally credible.
ARD has direct experience of how these alliances function at the working level. Our Icelink trials with 30 Commando in Norway were conducted alongside allied personnel. The capability gaps we identified – in communications, persistent surveillance, and cold-weather logistics – were consistently echoed by allied partners. The problems are shared; the solutions, to date, have not been.
The USMC connection is worth emphasising. Following demonstrations of Icelink at MARFOREUR/AF in Stuttgart, the USMC has expressed substantive interest in the system as a communications solution for its Arctic operations. The US is investing heavily in Arctic capability; UK-developed technology is genuinely competitive in that market. This is both a defence export opportunity and a proof-point for interoperability.
There is a structural challenge, however, in how allied capability development is coordinated. NATO doctrine and JEF coordination frameworks are strong on intent but weak on specifying shared technical standards for Arctic-specific systems. The result is that allies tend to develop and procure capability independently, producing interoperability friction at the point of joint operations. A common architecture for Arctic communications, data, and sensing – developed through JEF or NATO frameworks – would deliver significant operational and economic value.
On operating without key allies: the UK should be honest with itself that its ability to operate independently in the High North at a meaningful scale is currently limited. This is not a critique; it is a statement of fact that should inform investment priorities. The UK's sovereign capability in the region needs to grow, both for operational resilience and because allied credibility ultimately rests on the ability to contribute rather than merely to participate.
Recommendation: The UK should use its JEF leadership role to drive the development of common technical standards for Arctic-specific communications and surveillance systems, with a view to enabling interoperable capability development across JEF member states.
This is the area where I can speak with most authority, and where the Committee's scrutiny is most urgently needed.
The fundamental challenge of sustained operations in the Arctic is not political or doctrinal. It is physical. The environment imposes constraints on human performance, equipment reliability, logistics, and communications that have no equivalent in temperate theatres. Forces that have not trained and equipped specifically for these conditions will degrade rapidly. Forces that rely on systems not designed for the Arctic will find those systems fail at the moment they are most needed.
ARD's products were developed specifically to address identified capability gaps, based on operational experience and direct engagement with defence customers. The following gaps are, in the company's assessment, the most urgent:
Conventional geostationary satellite communications systems operate poorly at latitudes above approximately 70 degrees North, where the low elevation angle of geostationary satellites causes signal attenuation and multipath interference – and provide no coverage at all in the highest latitudes. HF radio provides coverage but with severely limited bandwidth and unreliable connectivity in high-sea-state conditions. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations offer a partial solution but require purpose-built terminals optimised for high-latitude orbital geometry.
This is not a gap that the Skynet programme will close. Skynet – including the forthcoming Skynet 6 architecture – is a geostationary system, and physically incapable of providing coverage in polar regions. Whatever the merits of Skynet 6 as a strategic communications programme, it does not and cannot address the Arctic communications problem. Bridging this gap requires either LEO-based terminals optimised for high-latitude orbital geometry, or investment in Highly Inclined Elliptical Orbit (HIEO) satellite infrastructure – a complement to GEO specifically designed for polar coverage. Neither is currently in the UK's programme of record.
The UK has no current programme of record for Arctic-optimised tactical communications. This is a significant gap that leaves forward-deployed units with degraded connectivity at the moments when secure communications matter most.
The Arctic maritime domain is, for practical purposes, unmonitored across vast areas for extended periods. Satellite revisit times are improving but remain insufficient for real-time maritime tracking. Crewed patrol aircraft and vessels provide episodic coverage at high cost.
The consequence is strategic blindness. The UK and its allies cannot currently maintain persistent awareness of Russian submarine activity, surface vessel movements, or the broader maritime picture across the Arctic Ocean. This creates unacceptable operational and strategic risk.
ARD's Arctic Node Array – a network of LoRa-based mesh sensor buoys – is designed to provide persistent, low-cost maritime surveillance in environments where crewed systems cannot operate continuously. The Iceguard autonomous surveillance system provides an additional layer of capability for coastal and littoral monitoring. Both address the same fundamental problem: the need for persistent eyes in a domain where humans cannot permanently be present.
The UK should invest in a persistent Arctic ISR architecture as a strategic priority. This does not require manned presence; it requires an autonomous and semi-autonomous sensor network that can provide continuous coverage at acceptable cost.
Standard lithium-ion battery systems experience dramatic capacity reduction at low temperatures, typically losing 30-50% of rated capacity at -20º C. and becoming effectively unusable at -40º C. This is not a niche engineering problem; it is a fundamental operational constraint for every system that relies on battery power in the Arctic, from communications terminals to autonomous vehicles to soldier-worn equipment.
The MOD should include Arctic-rated power and energy systems within its cold-weather operating requirements, and should consider whether current operational testing and acceptance criteria for battery-dependent systems adequately reflect Arctic performance requirements.
Sustained manned operations in the Arctic are expensive, operationally demanding, and carry significant welfare and safety risks. The case for autonomous systems – platforms that can persist, monitor, and operate where humans cannot be continuously present – is both compelling and growing. This applies across domains: maritime surveillance, communications relay, logistics support, and environmental monitoring.
The UK's investment in autonomy for the High North lags behind its investment in autonomy for other theatres. The Royal Navy's Atlantic Bastion concept acknowledges the role of autonomous systems but does not specify a programme of record for Arctic-specific autonomous capability. This gap needs to close.
• Establish an Arctic Technology Accelerator within the MOD – a dedicated fast-track procurement pathway for Arctic-specific capabilities, modelled on the Defence Innovation Unit in the United States. The traditional procurement cycle is too slow for the pace of change in the region.
• Revise operational testing and acceptance criteria to include Arctic performance baselines for all relevant systems. Equipment that passes temperate-climate tests may fail catastrophically in Arctic conditions.
• Invest in a persistent autonomous Arctic ISR architecture as a programme of record, not as an experimental project. The technology exists; the strategic will and funding have not been committed.
• Engage the UK defence deeptech sector as a primary delivery partner for Arctic capability. Small, specialist companies with genuine domain expertise can deliver faster, cheaper, and at higher specification than traditional prime contractors for these requirements.
The High North represents a significant and growing export market for UK defence technology. Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, and the United States are all investing in Arctic capability. Allied demand for specialist systems – communications, surveillance, autonomy, cold-weather logistics – is real and increasing. UK deeptech companies with genuine Arctic expertise are well-positioned to capture this market.
The UK has a narrow but real window of advantage. British polar science, military Arctic training, and now defence technology are recognised internationally as among the best in the world. But this advantage is not permanent. The US, Norway, and Canada are investing heavily. If the UK does not move quickly to commercialise its expertise and back its domestic Arctic technology sector, that advantage will erode.
The Foreign Secretary's January 2026 statement that the High North is an ever more critical frontier for NATO, and that Britain is stepping up on Arctic security, is the right message. It requires capability and industrial backing to be credible.
The defence exports opportunity is also a domestic industrial opportunity. Arctic-capable technology – communications, autonomy, cold-weather power – has applications across the defence sector and in adjacent civil markets: energy, shipping, scientific research, emergency response. Supporting the UK's Arctic technology sector is consistent with the broader industrial strategy objective of building sovereign capability in dual-use deep technology.
Recommendation: The UK's defence exports strategy should explicitly identify Arctic-capable technology as a priority sector. UKEF, DSTL, and the relevant trade bodies should map the supply chain and identify the domestic companies – including small and medium-sized enterprises – best positioned to compete internationally in this space.
The UK has the intent, the alliances, and the foundational military expertise to be a credible and consequential actor in the High North. What it currently lacks is the persistent, sovereign capability to back that intent with operational reality.
This is a fixable problem. The technology exists, and in many cases it has been developed by UK companies, for UK customers, working in UK-funded operational environments. The demand signal from allied defence customers is clear.
What is needed is a decision: to treat the High North as a serious operational theatre requiring dedicated investment, rather than as a regional nuance on the margins of Euro-Atlantic strategy. The 2025 SDR's silence on the Arctic was a missed opportunity. The Defence Investment Plan and the forthcoming capability command paper should correct that omission.
The window is open. The ice is melting. The question is whether the UK will be present and capable in the Arctic when it matters – or whether it will arrive late, underprepared, and dependent on allies who made different choices.
24th March 2026