DHN0018

Written evidence submitted by the Council on Geostrategy.

The Council on Geostrategy is an independent non-profit organisation situated in Westminster. It focuses on shaping British strategic ambition in an international environment increasingly defined by geopolitical competition and the environmental crisis, so that the United Kingdom (UK) is best able to succeed and prosper in the 21st century.

William Freer is a Research Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy, with a focus on naval strategy, international relations, and defence-industrial policy. Charlotte Kleberg is an Adjunct Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy. She holds various project and board advisory roles in the Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro-Ro) shipping sector through Wallenius Lines, Wallenius Marine, and United European Car Carriers, and her areas of expertise include maritime security and naval strategy, with a particular interest in strengthening civil-military cooperation. Matthew Palmer is a former British Army officer and an Adjunct Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy. His experience includes working at the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) Headquarters, and his areas of interest include sub-threshold warfare and joint operations.

British defence and security interests in the High North

1. It is worth noting that the ‘High North’ is not well-defined in British strategic and policy documents, often being used synonymously with the Arctic Circle.[1] However, the Arctic Circle is not defined based on geostrategic factors: it is located at roughly 66° North because this represents the southernmost latitude in the Northern Hemisphere where the sun remains above the horizon for 24 hours in summer months. This is relatively unhelpful for defence planners. A clear definition based on geostrategic features would make greater sense – for example, the areas north of the southernmost tip of Greenland (roughly 60° North). This would unambiguously include Iceland, the Norwegian Sea, and the Gulf of Bothnia within the High North definition.

2. Arguably, the High North represents the primary security interest for the UK, given this is where the most likely axis of attack from which a peer threat against the home islands would emerge. Russian forces in the High North have come a long way since the post-Cold War slump in readiness and legacy equipment. The Northern Fleet is composed of an increasingly modern mix of at least 11 large surface combatants (i.e., destroyers and frigates) and 25 submarines, as well as a number of specialist platforms.[2] Together, these can potentially carry a total offensive capacity of over 800 missiles, although not all would be able to sail simultaneously. In addition to the Northern Fleet, the Kola Peninsula and wider Russian Arctic regions are home to a significant number of air and land forces specialised to operate in the region. Russia is investing heavily in its basing infrastructure in the High North, despite the burden of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

3. The High North is one of the most likely areas where a potential flashpoint between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russia could emerge, given the importance of the ‘bastion’ (well-defended areas of the Barents Sea) to the Kremlin and points of contention over Svalbard (a Norwegian territory), as well as being the origin of much Russian maritime sub-threshold activity that extends into the waters of the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean.

4. The High North will be of growing economic interest to a number of regional and extra-regional actors due to the consequences of climate change. Mineral extraction and shipping lanes in the High North will become increasingly feasible. The opening of the Northeast Passage will be of double benefit to Russia. Firstly, it can threaten British and allied shipping companies which may one day operate in the region. Secondly, the route undermines the ability of NATO to close Russia off from international shipping via the Baltic and Black Sea chokepoints – long a powerful deterrent factor.

Does Britain have clear and achievable defence and security policies for the region?

5. The last couple of years have seen significant movement in the UK’s defence and security policies directed towards the High North, having been an area that was a much lower priority in the post-Cold War and so-called ‘War on Terror’ years. However, efforts to develop a clear approach to the region have been somewhat siloed. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (RAF) have developed clear policies built on close coordination. There are also questions over the level of ambition towards radical transformation of the British Armed Forces and the risks these entail. Underfunded, overly transformative, and regularly changing plans are one of the primary reasons that the British Armed Forces are struggling to meet commitments today.

6. The addition of Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike, alongside Atlantic Bastion, to the Royal Navy’s plans puts in place a much more rounded posture, well-suited to the worsening High North security picture.[3] In essence, the UK and its allies must be able to blunt (and also be resilient against) any potential Russian attacks, while simultaneously possessing the ability to threaten Russian sites in the region. A detailed overview of the capabilities required to make these plans a reality cannot be conducted here, nor can a detailed overview of the potential upsides and risks of the transformation towards a ‘New Hybrid Navy’. Key gaps remain in the availability of existing assets, munitions stocks, missile defences, hardened shelters at air stations, and long-range strike weapons, among other line items.

7. A missing link in existing plans is the land domain (i.e., the British Army). The High North is a littoral environment, featuring numerous islands and fjords. The ability to project and sustain land forces in the High North should play an important part in Atlantic Shield, Strike, and Bastion. The ability to hold and use (e.g., expanding sensor or strike weapon coverage) key sites, or dislodge Russian forces, will bolster the UK’s position. The decline of Britain’s amphibious force undermines the ability to do this at the scale needed; as useful as ‘raiding’ by commando forces can be, they are not a substitute for the ability to seize, hold, and reinforce key terrain. Further to this, there is ample evidence of close coordination between the UK’s air and naval forces with the air and naval forces of its Nordic partners, but a far lower level of cooperation between British air and naval forces with the land forces of Nordic allies.

8. For example, the Commando Force, primarily consisting of the Royal Marines, is currently limited in its ability to conduct amphibious operations due to the retirement of the Albion class amphibious warfare ships. There is no confirmed procurement of the successor Multi-Role Strike Ship, which is not expected to enter service until the mid-2030s.

a.     The Commando Force is also predominantly a light infantry force, with short-ranged weaponry. To improve the utility of the Commando Force, it is worth considering the merits of equipping an element – e.g., 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery – with long-ranged missiles, able to strike both land and sea targets. This would complement the raiding doctrine adopted by the Commando Force and offer more options for the UK and its allies in the High North.[4]

b.     While the Commando Force does train for cold weather warfare, the British Army is not currently focused on High North operations (although 3 Ranger has a Northern European focus and exercises with Nordic counterparts). However, the Army’s enduring commitment to Operation CABRIT in Estonia provides useful training in cold weather conditions.

c.      16 Air Assault Brigade is the British Army’s primary rapid-reaction and response force. If the High North is an expected area of operations, especially in a likely crisis scenario, greater cold weather warfare training alongside Nordic allies should be considered for the force.

9. Ultimately, the UK’s military approach to the High North should be a more concerted effort – even a national defence priority – cohered around the Shield/Strike/Bastion concepts. Currently, the strategy for the High North is the focus of a single branch (the Royal Navy), alongside deep involvement with another branch (the RAF), and extremely limited involvement from the third (the British Army). A greater level of top-down political direction to direct the branches of the military is needed.

How will the UK work with, and without, key allies and partners in the region, and how does this support or undermine British strategy?

10. NATO remains the bedrock of the UK’s defence posture in the region, and retains regional defence plans for Scandinavia and the High North.

11. The JEF is another key and growing ‘minilateral’ defence framework in the region, and deserves significant attention and resource allocation from Britain. Its key strengths are its flexible, opt-in nature; the like-mindedness of its members; and its regional focus (although it was initially conceived for more global operations). However, the JEF is not a ‘mini-NATO’; it is, at heart, a 2* military joint headquarters, primarily run by British personnel, with no permanently assigned forces.[5]

12. The JEF has significant potential, but needs greater investment and reform to meet that potential. The UK and fellow JEF members should consider several key reforms, most notably:

1. Establishing JEF Headquarters as a permanent independent entity. Currently, running the JEF is delegated to Britain’s Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), which has other taskings separate from the JEF. If the JEF is to evolve and become more formalised, it must be its own separate entity, ideally with greater manning from the other JEF nations alongside British personnel.

2. Most JEF activity is either time-bound or reactive (e.g., the Joint Response Options). Giving the JEF a long-term, permanent campaign to operate will enhance the utility of the organisation and provide a backdrop for iterative training, reform, and development.

3. Noting the expansion of alternative Baltic minilaterals, the JEF should focus more of its attention on the High North, although this may be difficult to organise given that many of the member states are primarily focused on Baltic security.

4. The relationship between NATO and JEF should be formalised, especially on division of responsibilities and how to respond in a crisis and transition-to-war scenario. The UK should encourage JEF involvement in NATO planning, and vice versa.

5. The JEF’s strength is its flexibility and the relatively compact number of like-minded partners. Expansion should not be seen as universally good for the organisation. Possible exceptions might be made for Canada, Poland, or even the Republic of Ireland (the JEF is still officially separate from NATO), but this must be deliberated with great care.

6. Likewise, the JEF is a military organisation first and foremost. While there is much that can be done on defence-industrial and diplomatic coherence through the JEF, policymakers and officials should not lose sight of the organisation fundamentally being a 2* headquarters.[6]

13. There has been some coordination of defence plans with Nordic and JEF allies, but there is evidence that this has only gone so far. Amid Russian sub-threshold activities, monitoring and protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) has become a key focus area for the Nordic states, having expanded their defence plans in recent years. Following Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, Nordic defence planning has been increasingly integrated, and many previous barriers relating to information sharing, planning, and logistics have been removed.

14. While Finland maintains its territorial defence model, albeit nested within NATO structures, Norway emphasises surveillance, fleet recapitalisation, and resilient reinforcement routes; and Sweden is focusing heavily on Baltic/Arctic interoperability and its total defence model. Deeper collaboration on joint procurement, surveillance, and integrated air and missile defences can be observed across the board between Nordic countries to enhance interoperability and situational awareness.[7] Britain is engaged, but not as deeply.

15. The UK depends on close collaboration with regional partners to ensure the layered defences as outlined by Atlantic Shield, Strike, and Bastion protect key interests and enable power projection. Yet, it is clear that gaps in British-Nordic coordination exist. For example, the Atlantic triad sits well behind the geographic areas the Nordic countries are focused on, especially the Bear Gap, and the British Army, for example, is overly focused on the assumption of reinforcing the Baltic states.[8] There is a significant opportunity to enhance collaboration to safeguard CUI, ensure smooth cross-border transport and military mobility, and reform defence plans to build greater synergies. This includes expanding joint efforts like the strategic-level cooperation with Norway, enhanced exercises, and joint capability development.

Do the British Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities for sustained operations in the region now and in the future?

16. Logistics in the High North is an incredibly challenging prospect, as weather and geography are extremely harsh on both people and equipment. Key issues include rough seas, cold weather, iceflow, and the lack of existing civilian/dual-use infrastructure. Many of the UK’s forces have spent the best part of the last three decades optimised for operations in desert/high temperature conditions, although a significant portion have cycled through European NATO commitments and exercises. The need to scale up High North-appropriate supplies and training will require attention. The United States (US)/NATO naval strategy change in the 1980s (e.g., the OCEAN VENTURE exercise in 1981), which saw a sudden and sustained increase in High North exercises, is worth reviewing, as are the challenges these faced.

17. The main logistics challenges can be divided into four categories: resupplying land forces; keeping ships at sea; keeping planes in the air; and doing so under contested conditions:

1. Resupplying land forces: Britain’s ability to sustain operations is significantly constrained by inadequate strategic sealift capacity, currently relying on an ageing, four-vessel Ro-Ro fleet. Even when new initiatives, such as the Fleet Solid Support and Strategic Sealift Future Programme, come to fruition in the 2030s, total capacity will still fall short of surge demand.[9] To sustain operations, the UK should deepen its engagement with commercial partners and regional allies. As shipping capacity vanishes rapidly during a crisis, establishing peacetime contracts with shipowners is essential to guarantee access to vital vessels and logistics networks, as traditional requisitioning – i.e., Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) – no longer ensures access to usable ships, crews, or expertise.

Effective sustainment requires an efficient end-to-end supply chain, involving commercial partners for terminals, processing centres, and inland distribution. Critical regional ports remain vulnerable to attacks; greater resilience and redundancy is needed. Britain has under-explored flexible access models to guarantee reliability beyond its small dedicated fleet. Rectifying this should include exploration of a NATO-level or regional assured-access programme. By pooling allied resources for sealift support during conflicts, including vital icebreaking capabilities, forces can ensure sustained operational success.

2. Keeping ships at sea: The ability to remain on station in the High North would be crucial in the event of conflict. Days would be lost returning to port for resupplying and reloading. Refuelling, rearming, and resupplying while at sea was previously one of the UK’s strengths thanks to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), but this is a capability which has been allowed to wither to concerning levels in recent years. The move towards a Hybrid Navy could place even more pressure on at-sea logistics in the effort to maintain an disaggregated and more numerous spread of platforms.

3. Keeping planes in the air: The RAF possesses a number of capabilities vital to dominating the High North, such as airborne early warning and maritime patrol/anti-submarine aircraft, as well as combat aircraft. However, due to having only three E-7 Wedgetail and nine P-8 Poseidon aircraft, keeping these planes on station – especially over long distances – will prove challenging. This is worsened by the fact that the RAF’s current fleet of Voyager tankers cannot refuel either platform, as they are not fitted with a boom refuelling capability.[10]

d.     Contested logistics: High North logistics in peacetime are difficult enough; in wartime, they are even more so. Russian forces would go to great effort to degrade and disrupt NATO logistics, sinking ships and damaging or destroying scarce infrastructure. For three decades, NATO has operated under the assumption of uncontested logistics. This is a significant gap, and one which has shown limited signs of action. Greater emphasis on defending the means and sites of logistics, including far greater civil-military cooperation, is needed. Indeed, this should be the norm. This challenge is not limited to the High North but, given the critical lack of redundancy in place in the region, it is doubly important.[11]

18. Given the challenges of logistics in the region compared to other NATO regions, where existing infrastructure is more extensive and conditions less harsh, it is worth considering that more survivable platforms and weapons have a premium over expendable ones in the High North.

19. An additional element vital for sustainment is the defence-industrial capacity to provide sufficient munitions for the UK and its allies to stay in the fight. Alongside this, the ability for Britain to replace potential losses through its reserve force is a similarly crucial element of sustainment. Both of these points, however, are well known wider challenges – not specific to just the High North.

To what degree can military capabilities developed for the High North be redeployed for operations in other theatres, and vice versa?

20. To an extent, in extremis, most military capabilities can be deployed to other theatres. However, there is utility in specialisation. If the UK seeks to turn the High North into an area it is able to secure and dominate militarily, then it should develop capabilities meant specifically for that theatre.

21. Cold weather warfare can have a significant deleterious effect on equipment, including drones. Electric batteries, mechanical parts, and sensors will all experience reduced effectiveness in extreme cold weather.

22. The British Army’s military vehicles are currently not optimised for High North operations – e.g., the open-topped Jackal or the multitude of ‘protected mobility’ vehicles.

23. As well as equipment, training should be considered as a critical underappreciated element. If personnel are expected to operate in the High North, then they must be trained appropriately to do so. There are obvious trade-offs in time, money, and equipment between training for different environments.

How does the UK’s defence and security strategy for the region align with His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda?

24. The defence strategy for the High North presents a number of growth and export opportunities that align with HM Government’s economic agenda. The more emphasis that Britain places on prioritising the region, the more likely it is that regional allies such as Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland – who between them have a combined defence budget of over £70 billion – will want to have a greater degree of interoperability with the UK’s forces. This will help boost the chances of British firms in competitions with those countries – as already seen with the Type 26 class frigate winning the Norwegian competition. Given growing American interests in the High North as part of its new prioritisation of hemispheric/homeland defence, there are also possibilities for more defence-industrial opportunities with Washington, although the US is quite strong on giving preference to American firms.

25. There are, however, two major caveats to this positive aspect:

1. Given the UK’s focus on operations beyond the High North over past decades, in many cases northern allies have their own equipment, better tailored to operating conditions in the region. This significantly reduces the likelihood that they would buy British equipment. However, this does not mean that there are no growth opportunities for the UK. The British Armed Forces can onshore production of Scandinavian defence firms if equipment is deemed suitable to capability needs as the UK rebuilds its High North capabilities.

2. There are only a handful of allies who operate in the High North. As the British Armed Forces look to re-equip with High North-capable equipment, most export customers are not interested in dedicated capabilities and the extra costs they incur. The UK has far greater export opportunities in equipment designed for temperate and warm climates than it does for sub-zero ones.

24th March 2026