DHN0017
Written evidence submitted by Babcock International Group.
Babcock is a UK-headquartered FTSE 100 defence company that provides engineering and support services across the nuclear, marine, land, aviation and mission system sectors. As the second largest supplier to the Ministry of Defence, we specialise in managing complex assets and engineering systems – from submarines and warships to nuclear infrastructure and land vehicles.
Executive Summary
The High North is central to UK security, serving as the nation’s northern buffer and the primary approach route for air, maritime and hybrid threats. As geopolitical competition intensifies, increased incursions near UK waters, and growing capability to target subsea infrastructure have sharply reduced warning times and heightened vulnerability. These developments are occurring alongside the rising risk of grey‑zone disruption, where hostile activity against subsea cables, pipelines and trade routes could impose economic damage on a scale comparable to the COVID‑19 pandemic.
Despite this deteriorating threat environment, UK policy delivery has not kept pace with the urgency of the challenge. While key naval concepts such as Atlantic Bastion, Shield and Strike articulate a credible approach to High North security, many remain uncontracted, and the UK’s escort fleet has shrunk to just thirteen frigates and destroyers. This shrinking mass limits the UK’s ability to meet simultaneous commitments in the High North, the Baltic and now, increasingly, the Middle East, and risks undermining the credibility of UK leadership within NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF).
Meeting the operational demands of the High North requires far greater escort availability, amphibious capability, maritime patrol aircraft and submarine mass than the UK currently possesses, at a time when personnel shortages further constrain output. In this context, Babcock is helping to mitigate risk through advanced sustainment solutions, digital engineering, cold‑weather training, and platform‑hardening expertise. These capabilities are essential to supporting persistent operations in a region defined by extreme conditions and increasing threat complexity.
At the same time, the High North presents significant opportunities for the UK’s defence export strategy, particularly as Nordic states undertake major fleet modernisation programmes. Babcock’s partnerships – including with Saab on Sweden’s future Luleå‑class frigates – demonstrate strong confidence in UK naval design and highlight the potential for deeper industrial collaboration. Yet delays in UK procurement and industrial policy risk constraining the sector’s ability to scale, threatening both export success and the UK’s long‑term strategic influence in the region.
a. What are the UK’s defence and security interests in the High North, and what are the current and emerging threats relating to the region?
The High North is a central geographic pillar of UK security. Strategically, it functions as the country’s northern buffer, the point from which threats, including Russian aircraft, submarines, and long-range strike capabilities, approach UK territory via air and sea. This centrality is reinforced by the enduring significance of the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) Gap, which remains an indispensable NATO maritime choke point essential for the defence of the North Atlantic. NATO’s concern about increased militarisation aligns with longstanding realities, reducing detection and response time and placing critical national infrastructure within range of modern long-range strike systems.
The threat is not limited to overt military action. Reports in recent years have also highlighted increased incursions into UK waters and activity by intelligence gathering vessels near subsea infrastructure. Such developments speak directly to the concerns raised in the inquiry about growing threats and malign behaviour. The economic vulnerability inherent in the UK’s dependence on subsea infrastructure – digital cables, energy pipelines, and maritime transport routes – presents an avenue for grey zone disruption. Around 95% of UK goods by volume move by sea, and subsea cables underpin tens of billions of pounds of economic activity annually. Babcock modelling indicates that a co-ordinated campaign targeting subsea infrastructure could cause economic disruption on a scale comparable to COVID19, potentially totalling hundreds of billions of pounds. Combined with incidents of pipeline and cable sabotage in the Baltic, this risk underscores why resilience in the High North must be treated as a national priority.
Furthermore, the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea are fundamental to the survivability of the UK’s Continuous At‑Sea Deterrent (CASD), as secure submarine operations depend on maintaining control of the undersea battlespace and ensuring the integrity of the GIUK Gap. Protecting this corridor is essential not only to safeguarding the deterrent but also to enabling reinforcement routes and preserving wider strategic stability.
It is equally important that the UK continues to uphold its responsibilities in maintaining the rules‑based international order. This includes supporting freedom of navigation and contributing to the governance frameworks that underpin stability in the Arctic, even though the Arctic Council’s mandate does not extend to hard security. These commitments reinforce the UK’s role as a responsible actor, help deter coercive behaviour, and support the safe, lawful use of an increasingly accessible region.
b. Does the UK have clear and achievable defence and security policies for the region, including their relationship with those for adjacent regions – such as the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike concepts?
While UK defence policy – namely the Integrated Review (2021, 2023), the Defence Arctic Strategy (2022) and the Strategic Defence Review (2025) – and Ministerial discourse seemingly recognise the growing strategic importance of the High North, there is a widening gap between the UK’s stated ambition, expressed through concepts such as Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike, and its ability to deliver them at scale and pace. While the concepts themselves are strategically coherent, the challenge lies in delivery, with key elements still uncontracted or delayed within the procurement pipeline. A significant “say–do gap” has emerged between policy announcements and the placement of contracts necessary to realise them. While industry stands ready to deploy autonomy demonstrators and maritime surveillance capabilities on accelerated timelines, key tenders and prime contracts remain outstanding.
UK industry remains well placed to support the Government’s ambitions, with established capability and capacity in areas such as warship production, maritime surveillance and autonomous systems. Babcock’s Type 31 production line in Rosyth, for example, provides a strong foundation from which output could be adapted or increased over time. However, the long‑term investment needed to expand facilities, grow the workforce and strengthen supply‑chain resilience depends on clear, timely and predictable procurement decisions. Prolonged uncertainty makes forward planning more difficult and may limit the UK’s ability to take full advantage of both domestic and export opportunities as they arise.
c. How will the UK work with, and without, key allies and partners in the region, both within and outside NATO, including through the JEF, and how does this support or undermine the UK’s policies set out in ‘b’?
The UK’s alliances underpin Britain’s strategy (and the ability to fulfil it) in the High North. The UK’s positioning in NATO and the JEF play a central role in how it can play a part in the High North. The UK’s leadership role within NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk, responsible for the North Atlantic and the defence of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, reflects the UK’s strategic importance. Baltic states themselves are increasing defence spending significantly and undertaking largescale fortification programmes, reflecting the seriousness of regional threat perceptions. Without the sufficient numbers of escorts, submarines and aircraft, the UK’s ability to underpin its leadership position risks being constrained or even diluted.
Despite these challenges, significant opportunities exist to deepen co-operation in ways that would enhance the UK’s effectiveness and deepen its relationship with key allies. Joint pre‑positioning of equipment and munitions in Norway and Finland, fuller implementation of existing agreements such as the Lunna House framework, and shared logistics arrangements would reduce duplication and improve responsiveness. Greater interoperability of autonomous systems for persistent surveillance could enable a distributed, resilient, low-cost sensing layer across the High North. Industrial partnerships with Nordic nations – many of whom possess unique Arctic expertise – would further strengthen capability development and ensure that the UK’s approach is consistent with allied needs.
Ultimately, UK operations in the High North remain heavily dependent on alliances. While the UK retains niche unilateral strengths, sustained activity relies on NATO and bilateral partners for basing, logistics, intelligence and integration. Persistent capability gaps including limited maritime mass, constrained Arctic sustainment, and reliance on allied infrastructure - combined with uncertainties concerning ITAR restrictions - reinforce the need for deeper allied integration, shared readiness and stronger industrial resilience. Operating without partners, while not a viable option, would reduce the UK’s reach, resilience and situational awareness, making certain objectives set out in UK defence policy harder to achieve.
d. Do UK Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities for sustained operations in the region now; and are appropriate plans in place to meet the needs of the future?
Analysis indicates that the UK lacks the necessary mass in escorts, amphibious lift, maritime patrol aircraft, and submarines to conduct sustained operations in the region while meeting global commitments. Planned fleet expansion through the Type 26, Type 31, and future naval programmes will not resolve these gaps until the mid‑2030s.
Carrier Strike operations require a substantial escort screen, which is difficult to generate reliably under current force levels. Personnel shortages further constrain operational output with several Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels remaining in reduced readiness, and both UK aircraft carriers unable to be fully crewed simultaneously. This combination of platform shortages and personnel deficits limits operational agility and the UK’s ability to maintain persistent High North presence.
Operations in the High North will also be shaped by severe environmental and geographic constraints that collectively impose significant strain on UK forces. Long supply lines from the UK to Norway and across the GIUK Gap necessitate dispersed logistics, while extreme cold degrades equipment, increases maintenance demands and reduces personnel endurance. Limited port, airfield and storage infrastructure in northern Norway and Iceland further restricts mobility and sustainment. These challenges are compounded by a contested logistics environment, where Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and air bridges remain vulnerable to submarine activity and long‑range strike threats. Maritime operations are constrained by the need for under‑ice capable, cold‑weather‑hardened vessels and by limited afloat support due to RFA capacity pressures. Land forces rely heavily on pre‑positioned stocks and require specialised Arctic‑capable vehicles and shelters, while air operations depend on tanker support and dispersed basing due to the scarcity of hardened High North airfields. Communications, too, will be difficult to maintain, with existing satellite coverage – including the Skynet constellation, which Babcock operates – not optimised for Arctic latitudes.
e. To what degree can military capabilities developed for the High North be re-deployed for operations in other theatres, and vice versa?
Capabilities designed for the High North are, in many cases, highly redeployable across theatres. Modular and flexible platforms, such as Type 31, enable rapid reconfiguration for diverse operational demands. Surface combatants, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, Royal Marines, and digital systems retain high manoeuvrability across environments. Equipment hardened for Arctic extremes generally performs well in other regions.
The central underlying constraint is mass. Redeploying scarce escorts or submarines to the High North inevitably creates gaps in presence elsewhere, as has recently been evident in the UK’s response to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. For this reason, investing in resilient, flexible and modular capabilities, supported by predictable industrial programmes, is essential to ensuring that redeployability does not undermine commitments in other operational theatres.
f. How does the UK’s defence and security strategy for the region align with the Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda?
Currently the UK’s defence and security strategy for the High North does not align with the Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda. There is limited economic presence and so a lack of opportunity development in the Arctic region. There is strong international competition exacerbated by European funding models like the EU’s SAFE. Defence industrial policy should therefore prioritise Arctic-relevant capabilities, including subsea protection, autonomous systems, and resilient infrastructure for logistics and power; all of which can meet the requirements brought forward in the defence and security strategy whilst concurrently providing capability to export.
The High North presents substantial opportunities for the UK’s defence export strategy, particularly given the historic scale of modernisation programmes in countries like Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Recent procurements, such as Norway’s decision to acquire several Type 26‑class frigates, demonstrate confidence in UK design and industrial competence, which Babcock is hoping to build on with other Nordic partners through the Arrowhead-derived design. With European defence exports rising significantly and UK defence exports reaching £20bn in 2025, the High North represents a natural region for targeted expansion.
Babcock is actively expanding its engagement across the Nordic region, where we are pursuing major opportunities across land and maritime. Just last year, Babcock formed a new partnership with Patria, a Finnish company, to offer a customised, UK‑built version of the Patria 6×6 armoured vehicle to the British Army, combining Patria’s design leadership with Babcock’s large‑scale UK manufacturing and through‑life support capabilities. That is further bolstered by the UK’s accession to the Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS) programme in September 2025. We are also working closely with Danish and Swedish naval shipbuilding stakeholders to align our capabilities with their future fleet requirements, building on our proven track record in delivering adaptable, export ready warship designs. This co-operation has been further strengthened by Saab’s recent public endorsement of Babcock’s Arrowhead derived warship design, with Saab backing our Arrowhead 120 proposal for Sweden’s forthcoming Luleå class surface combatant programme. This partnership demonstrates both the strong confidence placed in UK naval design excellence and the significant potential for deepened industrial collaboration with key High North partners. However, policy delays and uncertainty pose barriers to realising these opportunities.
The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) 2025 positions defence as an engine for growth, with commitments to rapid innovation, resilient supply chains, and export support – linked to a sustained increase in UK defence spending. For High North relevant capabilities including undersea surveillance and autonomous systems, the DIS’ focus on novel technology fielding and export reform creates a clear path to scale domestic manufacturing and grow exports with Nordic, Baltic, and transatlantic partners.
A more integrated, ‘Whole of Government’ approach to exports, supported by prompt procurement decisions and a predictable industrial pipeline, would better enable the UK to capitalise on regional opportunities such as those within the High North.
Conclusion
The High North is emerging as one of the world’s most strategically consequential regions. The UK’s interests, whether be it security, economic, or geopolitical, require a credible and sustainable presence supported by modern platforms, resilient infrastructure, and a strong industrial base. While the UK’s strategic intent is sound, the gap between ambition and deliverable capability is widening and the connective tissue between intent and delivery is missing.
Babcock’s engineering expertise, sustainment experience, digital innovation and international partnerships place us in a strong position to support the UK in addressing the challenges it faces in the High North region and beyond.
23rd March 2026