Written evidence submitted by Transport for the West Midlands (RSS0072)

Road Safety Strategy

Theme 4: Ensuring Infrastructure is Safe

How should evidence on the relationship between speed limits and safety influence new guidance? Does the Strategy strike the correct balance between a nationally-set direction and local decision-making regarding speed?

Below is an independently produced business case used to identify current benefits and challenges relating to the implementation of average speed enforcement in the West Midlands Combined Authority Region.

The summary points of this are:

• The estimated annual casualty prevention from the ASE scheme is 1 fatal, 13 serious, 76 slight collisions;
• The annual societal cost savings based on the estimated casualty prevention benefits are £15m (2025 prices);
• The scheme offers a Benefit Cost Ratio of 2.4 to 3.6 (High Value for Money);
• Annual operational costs to deliver the scheme are £3m;
• Projected income generation to cover costs of the scheme and reinvest in road safety achieved through eligible offenders undertaking a National Driver Offender Rehabilitation Course (speed awareness) within the region is £785,000 resulting in a projected annual operating deficit of approx. £2.2m;
• Societal savings significantly exceed the operating deficit;
• Approx. £2m generated from fixed penalty notices that go directly to HM Treasury’s Consolidated Fund, therefore not reinvested into the region;
• Operating at a deficit with limited or no opportunity for reinvestment to improve road safety is consistent in 21 of 28 responses from police forces surveyed in the UK.

Regional stakeholders have written to Government multiple times to request support in maximising the societal benefits of speed enforcement whilst ensuring the sustainable financial security of the scheme, including the retention of fixed penalty notices to reinvest back into the region’s road safety activities.

In addition, 35 regional and national road safety stakeholders wrote to Government presenting this evidence that clearly demonstrates that the model for effective speed enforcement systems in the UK is in urgent need of review to better understand the road safety challenge and to enable partnerships to address issues that are constraining sustainability. The current system is broken and we need the Government’s help.

We believe that unless there is a comprehensive review of the existing speed management system, police and highway authorities will have no option but to limit or cease enforcement activities, impacting significantly on the UK’s ability to meet the new casualty reduction targets.

The logos of Transport for West Midlands, the independent consultant, regional partners and surveyed police forces have been removed from the Business Case.

Average Speed Enforcement
Full Business Case (FBC)

                                Nov                                                                         May 2025

Table of contents

Executive summary

1              Introduction

1.1              Scene Setting

1.2              The Current Operation

2              Strategic Case

2.1              Detailed National Context

2.2              Summary Review

2.3              Summary Review Findings

2.4              Case study 1 – Safety Cameras in Scotland

2.5              Case study 2 – Safety Cameras in Wales

2.6              Summary Review – Primary Qualitative Data

2.7              Conclusions

2.8              Final Thoughts

2.9              Local and Regional Context

2.10              Overview of Speed-related Road Casualties

2.11              Problem Identification

2.12              Spending Objectives

2.13              Constraints and Interfaces

2.14              Options Development

2.15              Conclusion

3              Economic Case

3.1              Introduction

3.2              Critical Success Factors

3.3              Long Listed Option Development

3.4              Long Listed Option Assessment

3.5              “Current Option” for this Economic Appraisal

3.6              Quantitative Assessment – “Existing scheme” (2022/23 locations)

3.7              Quantitative/Qualitative Assessment Appraisal Summary Table

3.8              Monetised Analysis of Collision Benefits (“Current Option”)

3.9              Monetised Analysis of Costs (“Current Option”)

3.10              Benefit-Cost Ratio (“Current Option”)

3.11              Whole Life Carbon Commentary

3.12              Distributional Impact Analysis of Collisions

3.13              Place Based Analysis

3.14              Other Enforcement Modes

3.15              Summary

3.16              Economic Case Update Notes 08/05/2025

4              Commercial case

4.1              Capabilities

4.2              Commercial relationship

4.3              External factors

4.4              Commercial – long list

5              Financial Case

5.1              Overview (Baseline Position)

5.2              Cost Model Overview

5.3              Cost Model Input Assumptions

5.4              Cost Model Projection Scenarios

5.5              “49,000 disposals” Cost Model Projection

5.6              “60,000 disposals” Cost Model Projection

5.7              Other Enforcement Modes

5.8              Summary

5.9              Financial Case Update Notes 08/05/2025

6              Management Case

6.1              High-Level Objectives

6.2              High-Level Risks

6.3              Governance Structure for the ASE Camera Enforcement Programme

6.4              Risk Management Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme:

6.5              Resource Management Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme

6.6              Benefits Realisation and Evaluation Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme

6.7              Stakeholder and Communications Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme

6.8              Performance Metrics Plan for ASE Programme

Appendix A: Supplementary documents on request

Appendix B: List of literature reviewed

Appendix C: Stakeholder matrix

Appendix D: Schedule 5 and Schedule 1

Executive summary

The West Midlands region continues to face a significant challenge in reducing the number of road casualties, with an average of 1,048 people killed or seriously injured (KSI) annually between 2015 and 2017, at a societal cost exceeding £300 million. By 2022, KSI casualties had fallen to 993, showing progress, but further intervention is required to meet the ambitious target of halving KSI casualties by 2030 and moving towards the region’s mission of Vision Zero.

Despite national efforts, road safety progress has plateaued, with fatality rates remaining stable over the last decade. The West Midlands reflects this trend, with particular concerns about high-risk groups, including pedestrians and younger drivers. In response, the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA), West Midlands Police (WMP), and local partners have strengthened enforcement efforts through the Average Speed Enforcement (ASE) Programme.

The ASE Programme Headlines:

• Prevents an estimated 0.9 fatal, 13.1 serious, and 76 slight collisions per year.
• Delivers annual societal cost savings of £15 million per year (2025 prices).
• Has a benefit-cost ratio range of 2.9 to 4.5 for a fifteen-year appraisal which is a High – or potentially Very High – value for money investment.
• Has a benefit-cost ratio range of 2.4 to 3.6 even if renewing for a single year (2025/26) appraisal which is a High value for money investment.
• Has annual operational costs of £3m. This value comprises:
• £2.2m of WMP back-office costs for the ASE Programme disposals; and
• £786k of local authority operating costs, of which:
• £300k is offset for the local authorities by a contribution from WMP towards the Jenoptik contract costs, so the WMP total costs are £2.5m;
• £64k of operating costs which could be capitalised between Coventry and Solihull, relating to expansion which comes into effect in 2025/26 and 2026/27; and
• A remaining £422k revenue costs for LAs which cover the remaining Jenoptik contract costs (£55k) plus other operational and maintenance costs incurred by the LAs associated with the ASE scheme (e.g. energy, signing maintenance, cleansing, vegetation, structural assessment, and Section 50 licences).
• Will include £385k supply and commissioning capital funding for Solihull in 2025/26 towards the new A41 Warwick Road scheme.
• Has an expected annual net income of £785k. This forecast is based on:
• A 60,000 projection for the total number disposals, but only 26% of those disposals are expected to lead to a driver attending a speed awareness course; and
• A net income to the scheme per course attendee of £50.
• Operates with financial challenges at a deficit.
• The back-office cost per disposal is £37, and the other (LA) operating cost per disposal is £13, leading to a total scheme running cost per disposal of £50.
• In contrast, the expected income per disposal is £13, due to a minority of disposals generating income.
• This leads to an operational surplus/deficit per disposal of -£37, and a total operational surplus deficit per annum of -£2.2m.

Strategic Justification

The insights gathered from interviews with police forces, combined with existing literature, provide a holistic understanding of how legislation, enforcement, and driver perception work together to shape compliance with traffic laws, particularly speed limits. Compliance is not a one-dimensional outcome driven solely by enforcement, but rather a product of a complex interplay between deterrence mechanisms, public perception, and strategic enforcement.

The literature review including drawing on evidence from successful schemes in Scotland and Wales. The A9 ASE scheme in Scotland resulted in a 43% reduction in fatal and serious collisions, while the A470 scheme in Wales achieved a cost saving of £2 million in a three-year period. These case studies provide a strong rationale for expanding the ASE network in the West Midlands.

The ASE Programme has demonstrated strong effectiveness in improving compliance and reducing casualties. From the outcomes of the study into the performance of the scheme network (based on sites which were online during 2022/23), the scheme prevents an estimated 0.9 fatal, 13.1 serious, and 76 slight collisions per year, delivering annual societal cost savings of £15 million per year in 2025 prices.

However, despite its success, affordability and capacity constraints must be considered, as the WMP back office is already at full processing capacity, and the scheme operates at a financial deficit. Only a minority proportion of all speeding activations generated by the ASE Programme are disposed and only a minority of disposals result in the driver attending a speed awareness course which generates income back into the ASE Programme. These figures suggest that both the road safety benefits, and revenue generated from the speed awareness courses are operating well below the potential.

Economic Justification

The Economic Case evaluates the impact and value for money of the ASE Programme, which will have expanded from 27 locations (55 sites) in 2022/23 up to 35 locations (71 sites) in 2025/26, and 36 locations (73 sites) in 2026/27 (with the A41 Warwick Road scheme expected to be online from 2026/27 onwards).

The analysis of the existing scheme demonstrated its effectiveness in reducing collisions, meanwhile the impact on traffic speeds was found to be minimal, with only a slight reduction in higher-end speeding behaviour and (effectively) a neutral impact on average speeds.

A 15-year appraisal of the scheme estimates the Present Value of Benefits between £116.0m and £180.8m compared to a Present Value of Costs of £40.5m, resulting in a Net Present Value between £75.5m and £140.2m (all presented in 2023 prices and 2023 values). This corresponds to a Benefit-Cost Ratio range of 2.9 to 4.5, indicating High to Very High Value for Money.

The Benefit-Cost Ratio for a 2025/26 single year appraisal ranges from 2.4 to 3.6. This places it in the High value for money category. 

Whilst the ASE Programme operates at a deficit, the societal cost savings substantially outweigh the deficit in value for money terms. It demonstrates clear safety benefits, but future expansion must be carefully balanced with financial and operational feasibility to ensure continued effectiveness.

Financial Implications

The Financial Case documents the inputs, assumptions, and forecast projections for the cost model which is based on a single year working agreement commencing from April 2025 until March 2026, alongside indicative costs projected for a further two financial years (2026/27 and 2027/28) since the impact of expansion during next year has a consequence for the assumptions to be included in future year contract, operating and maintenance costs. 

Scenario testing is considered for the impact of different disposal volumes between 49,000 – as the minimum service level agreement volume – and 60,000 per annum – as the latest projection based on increasing back -office costs and capacity – in relation to income and the operating deficit.

The income to the scheme is generated via speed awareness course fees. However, only around 26% of disposals result in the driver attending a course – most disposals go to FPNs, court or cancellations which do not generate income. With 60,000 disposals, the projected income for 2025/26 is just below £0.8m, however, WMP back-office costs (for that ASE Programme specific activity) are approximated to be circa £2.2m. The expected enforcement income per disposal is estimated to be circa £13, whilst the expected scheme operating cost per disposal is estimated to be circa £50. Therefore, an average disposal has an enforcement operating deficit, which means that expanding the level of enforcement within the ASE Programme is expected to widen the operational deficit.

Beyond the enforcement costs, local authorities have contract costs with Jenoptik (existing supplier) plus operating and maintenance costs at the ASE Programme sites. For 2025/26, WMP have offered a contribution of £0.3m towards the Jenoptik contract costs.

However, increases in Jenoptik contract costs from 2024/25 into 2025/26 are largely driven through expansion (Coventry and Solihull) but warranties and maintenance form any new technology through confirmed expansion plans could be capitalised. £64k of operating (Jenoptik contract) costs which could be capitalised between Coventry and Solihull, relating to expansion which comes into effect in 2025/26 and 2026/27, leaving £422k of revenue operating costs between the local authorities consisting of the remaining Jenoptik contract costs, plus their other maintenance costs.

The other capital funding is £385k supply and commissioning costs for Solihull in 2025/26 towards the new A41 Warwick Road scheme.

Future of Enforcement in the West Midlands

The ASE Programme is a cornerstone of the Refreshed Regional Road Safety Strategy. Moving forward, governance measures – as detailed in Schedule 1 – will ensure effective programme management, decision-making, and financial oversight. Additionally, the criteria for expanding the ASE network, as outlined in Schedule 5, will guide future enforcement site selection based on robust evidence and operational viability.

By refining enforcement strategies, securing sustainable funding, and leveraging technological advancements, the West Midlands can accelerate progress toward Vision Zero, making roads safer for all users.

1          Introduction

1.1        Scene Setting

Safer roads in the West Midlands are a necessary requirement for all residents, businesses and visitors transiting through the region. During the period of 2015-2017, there was an average of 1,048 people killed or seriously injured on our roads, with the societal cost of these incidents in the region totalling £320m. While the number of killed or seriously injured (KSI) casualties reduced in 2022 to 993, the societal costs increased to £333m (based on estimated ‘real costs’ for lost output, medical and ambulance, police, insurance, admin and damage to property).

Using devolved powers; the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA), the seven constituent authorities and partners such as the West Midlands Police and the Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner are collaborating through a Regional Road Safety Partnership. This partnership has jointly agreed a collective Vision Zero goal by 2040 and an interim target to achieve a 50% reduction in the number of KSI casualties across the region by 2030.

The perspective nationally, is one of a wider trend of stagnation in road safety performance on United Kingdom (UK) roads. The number of fatalities from the previous ten years has plateaued, having previously shown year-on-year reductions (see figure 1 below). This is context for this regional problem, further compounding the challenge for the Partnership.

Figure 1: UK road fatalities 2007 to 2020

Further to the above, presented below is a qualitative snapshot of ‘now’, depicted in a relative RAG (red, amber, green) status format, of the current position of KSIs per region in the UK. The West Midlands, along with London, Northwest, Southeast and Wales are witnessing a decline in their safety performance.

Table 1: UK KSI performance by region 2021 to 2024

Whilst the above presents a basic view of performance against safety, this strategic case builds context and an understanding of the Force Areas actual operations (section 2.3), lending perspective on this initial presentation offered by this relative RAG status. Discussed further in this document, will be the understanding that not every Force Area can claim success by design.

The evidence points to the need for a broader approach and wider thinking to support the partnership’s ambitions to achieve ‘Vision Zero’. This ‘Full Business Case’ (FBC) embodies an evidence-based approach and endorses the use of elements from safe system principles. The safe system approach recognises a shared responsibility of all stakeholders, including road users, planners, policymakers, vehicle manufacturers and enforcement authorities. As such, the approach advocates moving away from attempting to improve safety exclusively through engineering design solutions within the silo of scheme delivery.

Figure 2: Safe system goal and strategy

Applying the safe system approach requires the following thinking:

• Data-driven decision-making focussing efforts initially on truly understanding demand of road offenders within the West Midlands area, providing a robust evidence base on which to explore solutions.
• Preventing collisions and mitigating consequences: it is not possible to avoid all collisions, focus must additionally be given to how collision severity can be reduced.
• Looking beyond just safe roads and speeds: assess the role of all pillars in the safe system, recognising the partnership does not have direct or full control over all aspects of the system.
• Continuous evaluation and improvement: regular evaluation and monitoring of road safety initiatives are essential to assess their effectiveness and identify areas for improvement.

1.2        The Current Operation

In 2023/24 West Midlands Police (WMP) processed around 86,500 disposals for speed enforcement via the back-office.

Of that total, circa 35,000 disposals (approximately 40% of the total back-office activity) related to this Local Authority (LA) average speed enforcement (ASE) scheme, out of circa 136,600 activations from the ASE cameras, leading to an activation-to-disposal rate of circa 26%.

Of the remaining back-office capacity, around 32% of disposals related to the WMP mobile (i.e. vans) enforcement scheme. The other 28% related to Highways Agency Digital Enforcement cameras (HADECS) and temporary speed restriction enforcement on the motorway network which are not in the scope of this work.

Each disposal has one of four outcomes – the driver attends a National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme (NDORS) speed awareness course, the driver is issued with a fixed penalty notice (FPN), the driver attends court, or the disposal is cancelled. (Cancellations can be due to multiple reasons, including activations which would not be pursued further such as emergency vehicles travelling on blue lights).

In 2023/24, circa 8,000 drivers attended NDORS courses, 4,600 FPNs were issued and 1,200 drivers attended court because of the ASE scheme. Those NDORS course fees generated circa £360,200 income for the ASE scheme (down on 2021/22 which generated circa £489,400 income from 10,900 course attendances). However, money generated from FPNs, and court fines go back to HM Treasury – this requirement is currently rooted in the general principles of public finance management in the UK.

Within the gift of the West Midlands partnership there were 57 average speed enforcement (ASE) sites in the 2022/23 financial year, which is due to rise to 71 sites by the end of 2024/25 financial year with the expansion of new sites in Coventry (expected March 2025) and Solihull (multiple schemes were completed during 2023 and 2024).

The WMP ‘vans’ enforcement scheme capacity has also recently increased from 4 to 8 mobile enforcement units.

The ASE enforcement aims to positively influence driver behaviour and ensure that motorists comply with the set limits on roads resulting in a safer environment for all road users. As above, the enforcement is carried out by WMP, with the installation and maintenance of enforcement technology carried out by the constituent authorities who own the assets. The responsibility for installing ASE systems lies with the individual constituent authorities. These systems have been deployed using capital investment. WMP enforce speed violations and provide back-office support to the constituent local authorities. However, as above, neither WMP, nor the constituent authorities have access to the annually generated revenue through fixed penalty speeding fines.

The delivery of the ASE enforcement programme has previously been complicated by three separate service level agreements (SLAs) between constituent authorities and WMP (one for the four Black Country authorities, one shared between Birmingham City Council and Solihull Metropolitan Borough, and one for Coventry). This impacts on the number of speeding offence activations within each authority area and differences in the way revenue generated from Speed Awareness Courses is shared. This is fundamentally to compensate the WMP back-office costs and the cost to constituent authorities to maintain ASE camera system assets. The ASE system has to be supported financially by each organisation as the revenue generated and shared from the Speed Awareness Courses does not currently cover the costs to either WMP or any of the constituent authorities.

The previous SLAs only covered a minority proportion of all speeding activations being disposed – for example 35,000 disposals out of 136,600 activations (26%) in 2023/24. These figures suggest that both the road safety benefits, and revenue generated from the speed awareness courses are operating well below the potential. Further context and analysis on this point will be forthcoming in this document.

During 2021/2022, the back-office cost of delivering the ASE scheme across the region was circa £955,000, against an income of £489,400 from NDORS courses. LAs were then provided with a share of circa £116,500 in line with their existing SLAs. However, this resulted in an overall circa -£423,800 deficit to the scheme.

The back-office costs have since increased to an estimated figure of circa of £1,543,200 in 2024/25 (this approximates an “allocation” to the ASE scheme out of the total WMP speed enforcement budget). However, the NDORS course fee has been fixed throughout that period and so the level of income per disposal has remained constant, whilst operating costs have increased. Therefore, the ‘operating deficit per disposal’ is effectively increasing year-on-year, i.e. increasing the level enforcement increases the scheme deficit.

Building on the Strategic Outline business case this FBC sets out to present options for a programme which are: financially viable for all, capable of delivering quantifiable road safety benefits, reduce the societal cost and explores income generation for reinvestment in safety.

As presented above, this FBC takes the ‘safe system’ approach and considers protecting all roads users including those who are most vulnerable, such as pedestrians and cyclists but also vehicle drivers and passengers between 20-29 years of age. Additionally, being a demand led approach this will become an effective tool for partners across the region to ensure we have actionable insight and are working collaboratively towards the ‘2030’ casualty reduction target.

2          Strategic Case

2.1        Detailed National Context

As discussed in the introduction, the national picture for safety is one that is stagnant. This shows an extended plateau in performance notwithstanding the considerable amount spent annually on road safety which is estimated to be c.£0.5b. A recent project (2023) completed for the DfT looking at the entire road network within England, endeavoured to find potential ‘safety enhancements’ which could be implemented based on the findings from the most in-depth evidence-based study to date in the UK (via the use of the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS)). Whilst some of the study focused on the strategic network, there was analysis on local roads to draw inference upon. Using Road Accident In-Depth Studies (RAIDS) coding system for collision types one of the core outputs is presented below which depict collision types by vehicle category. Red indicates a higher prevalence. Connected to each collision type is a scenario which is made up of several ‘causal factors’.

Table 2: KSI collision types (RAIDS coding system)

Linked to the collision types are the most common ‘causal factors’, these are presented below:

• Speeding is a factor in a significant proportion of fatal collisions involving cars

• High-risk road users are a key cause of fatal collisions

(high-risk road users are defined as individuals who exhibit exceptionally dangerous behaviours, such as speeding, not wearing a seatbelt, or driving under the influence of drugs / alcohol)

• Fatalities following vehicle loss of control are primarily due to impact with roadside hazards

• Vehicles stopping in live roads often stimulate fatal events

• Impacts with vehicles involved in previous collisions (secondary collisions) and ex-vehicle pedestrians have catastrophic outcomes

• Fatigue, inattention, distraction, and failure to anticipate hazards are all prevalent factors

• GV collisions have high energies causing injury severity

As evidenced above – speeding is confirmed in this study as a growing and prevailing factor which negatively influence KSIs in England. [i]

2.2        Summary Review

As part of this FBC, the undertaking of a desk-based review of the effectiveness of average speed enforcement schemes and high-speed violation enforcement using spot speed cameras in the UK has been undertaken. This included an understanding of the road safety benefits and cost-effectiveness.

The review questioned 26 forces in England, 8 divisions in Scotland and 4 forces in Wales.

The following question was posed:

“Regarding the management of average speed capability and high speed violation enforcement using spot speeds - we'd fundamentally like to understand how ‘XYX’ Police Force’ measure the benefits from the point of view of ‘cost’ and ‘public value’ - ideally in the context of a wider economic benefit achieved from safety improvements”.

2.3        Summary Review Findings

For the majority of the forces there was a preference not to respond in writing but to discuss via a Teams call or telephone call. Additionally, there was also a request by a number of forces not to transcribe word for word what was discussed. In the interest of non-disclosure the results have been summarised below in table format with a further two extensive case studies provided via forces who were more forthcoming in the divulgence of their operations. The study was conducted in the following way, where forces where happy with transparency their ‘Force Area’ name has been captured on the left-hand side of the table (below). Table headers summarise whether the back office makes a gain or a loss, whether there is an understanding of the wider societal economic benefits and finally if there is any reinvestment in safety from the operational gains.

Table 3: KSI summary review synopsis by Police Force Area

**Where an FA badge above remains generic, there was a request not to disclose (naming) force details but agreement sought to partake in this study.

2.4        Case study 1 – Safety Cameras in Scotland

Organisation and Funding

Safety Cameras in Scotland are funded through grants provided by the Scottish Government. The Scottish Safety Camera Programme (“Programme”), managed by Transport Scotland, oversees the allocation of these funds. The revenue generated from fines and fixed penalties is retained by the Scottish Government, but this is offset by a reduction in the block grant received from the UK Government. Transport Scotland is responsible for the overall management and performance of the Scottish Safety Camera Programme. Police Scotland is responsible for operation of the safety cameras through three regional Safety Camera Units (North, East and West) These units manage the administration and deployment of speed (mobile and fixed cameras) and red-light cameras throughout Scotland. The Safety Camera Units are also responsible for back office processing the paperwork for the detections of speed/red light violations.

The Scottish Safety Camera Programme aims to reduce the number of casualties on Scotland’s roads. “It does this by ensuring safety cameras are deployed as a visible and effective way in which to encourage good driver behaviours and compliance with the speed limit. This helps contribute to the road safety vision contained in Scotland’s Road Safety Framework to 2030”. (Reference 3)

Deployment of Safety Cameras

The deployment of mobile and fixed safety cameras in Scotland is undertaken utilising a site selection process. The aim of the Programme is to locate safety cameras in locations where they will have the most significant impact on road safety.

Summary of the process for deployment of safety cameras.

• Local Authorities, Police Scotland, Transport Scotland or the Public can suggest potential new camera sites.
• Safety Camera Scotland conducts a yearly selection process.
• Data on potential sites is considered based on mapping of all injury collisions.
• Stakeholder engagement is undertaken, and speed-related causation must be demonstrated to be a factor in the collisions.
• Other safety interventions must be considered.
• Speed surveys are undertaken at potential sites and assessed against speed criteria
• Should it be deemed that an intervention is required at the site an enforcement strategy is determined based on the data collected.
• If a site is deemed eligible for a safety camera the relevant Safety Camera Unit operates the location providing enforcement and deployment of mobile units.
• Site effectiveness is regularly reviewed. 
• Some of the sites with the lowest number of detections are the most successful as this shows that the public are adhering to speed limits. This requires a comparison against the initial speed survey to compare speed violation numbers.

A9 Average Speed Camera mini-case study

Average speed Cameras were installed on the A9 between Dunblane and Inverness and have been operational since October 2014. Vehicles are detected through Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) and their average speed is calculated by measuring the time taken to travel between defined points of a known distance.

“The system is visible along the A9 from just north of Keir Roundabout (Dunblane) to just south of Raigmore Interchange (Inverness). While this is approximately 136 miles (220 kms) the system will not operate over the entire length.

North of Perth there are seven distinct average speed camera system zones all of which are single carriageway sections. The cameras are generally five to seven km apart. South of Perth, there are 12 camera locations on the northbound carriageway and 11 on the southbound carriageway spaced every 5 to 7 km apart”. (Reference 5)

As a way of illustrating possible cost savings as a result of safety camera deployment the collision data for the single carriageway sections of the A9 within the Perth and Kinross local authority have been isolated. The tables below show collision counts by severity for the 3 years prior (2011 – 2013) and 3 years after (2015 – 2017) the installation of the average speed cameras. RAS4001 has then been used to associate costs to each of these collision severities and a total cumulative cost is shown.

While it should be noted that the average speed cameras were only one element of the investment in improving safety along the A9 at that time, these other improvements included improved consistency of signage and lining, improved geometry and safety barriers. During the period identified the safety improvements lead to a reduction in collisions. This reduction in collisions within the investigated period, based on the cost provided by RAS 4001, resulted in a saving of approximately £3.7million over a 3-year period.

Table 4: Collison Severity 2011-2013 with RAS4001 Costs (A9 study)

Table 5: Collison Severity 2015-2017 with RAS4001 Costs (A9 study)

Links and Source information:

1. Police Scotland Safety Camera Website

https://www.safetycameras.gov.scot/about/

2. Police Safety Unit Website

https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/what-we-do/safety-camera-unit/

3. Scottish Safety Camera Programme - Annual Progress Report 2022/23

https://www.transport.gov.scot/media/2panjkng/scottish-safety-camera-programme-annual-progress-report-202223.pdf

4. Scottish Safety Camera Programme – Handbook of Rules and Guidance March 2022

https://www.transport.gov.scot/media/51339/scottish-safety-camera-programme-handbook.pdf

5. A9 Road – Safety Cameras

http://a9road.info/safety-statistics/safety-cameras/

6. DfT Statistics – RAS4001: Cost of prevention of road accident and casualties.

https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/reported-road-accidents-vehicles-and-casualties-tables-for-great-britain

7. Performance data for A9 and the average speed cameras published

a.              https://www.transport.gov.scot/news/performance-data-for-a9-and-the-average-speed-cameras-published/

8. Police Research Group – Cost benefit analysis of traffic light & speed cameras

https://www.iapsonline.com/sites/default/files/Cost%20benefit%20analysis%20of%20traffic%20light%20and%20speed%20cameras.pdf

2.5        Case study 2 – Safety Cameras in Wales

Organisation and Funding

Safety Cameras in Wales are funded through grants provided by the Welsh Government, Police budgets, revenue from enforcement activities and partnership contributions. The Welsh Safety Camera Programme is managed by ‘GoSafe’ which is a partnership between the Welsh Government, Police forces plus other stakeholders. Transport for Wales oversees the allocation of the funds. The revenue generated from fines and fixed penalties is retained by the Welsh Government, but this is offset by a reduction in the block grant received from the UK Government. Transport for Wales is responsible for the overall management and performance of the Welsh Safety Camera Programme. Police Wales is responsible for the operation of the safety cameras through three regional Safety Camera Units (North, South, and West Wales). These units manage the administration and deployment of speed (mobile and fixed cameras) and red-light cameras throughout Wales. The Safety Camera Units are also responsible for back-office processing, handling the paperwork for the detections of speed/red light violations.

The Welsh Safety Camera Programme aims to reduce the number of casualties on Wales' roads. “It does this by ensuring safety cameras are deployed as a visible and effective way to encourage good driver behaviours and compliance with the speed limit. This helps contribute to the road safety vision contained in ‘Wales' Road Safety Framework to 2030’.

Deployment of Safety Cameras

The deployment of mobile and fixed safety cameras in Wales is undertaken utilising a site selection process. The aim of the Programme is to locate safety cameras in places where they will have the most significant impact on road safety.

The selection and placement of safety cameras across Wales follows a structured approach designed to maximise their impact on road safety. This process ensures that cameras are strategically placed where they can effectively reduce collisions and promote safer driving behaviours. The steps involved are as follows:

1. Identification of potential sites: Potential locations for new safety cameras are identified through recommendations from various sources, including local councils, Police Wales, Transport for Wales and suggestions from the public.
2. Annual Review and prioritisation: Each year, Safety Camera Wales undertakes a comprehensive review of proposed sites. This involves mapping out all reported collisions and conducting a preliminary assessment to determine where safety cameras could be most beneficial.
3. Engagement with stakeholders: In collaboration with relevant stakeholders, including local communities and road safety groups, the proposed sites are further evaluated. This step is crucial in ensuring that the root cause analysis meets public opinion and the threats to safety—such as speeding—are effectively addressed.
4. Exploration of Alternative measures: Before finalising camera placement, other potential safety measures (e.g., road redesigns, improved signage) are considered. If these interventions are not deemed sufficient, camera enforcement is pursued.
5. Detailed speed assessments: At locations where cameras are likely to be deployed, detailed speed monitoring is carried out. The data collected from these surveys help determine the specific enforcement strategy needed.
6. Deployment strategy: Based on the gathered data and stakeholder feedback, a tailored enforcement strategy is developed for each site. This strategy includes decisions about the type and number of cameras, as well as whether mobile or fixed units will be deployed.
7. Operational oversight: Once deployed, the relevant Safety Camera Unit is responsible for the continuous operation and maintenance of the cameras. This includes regular updates to ensure the technology remains effective.
8. Ongoing performance evaluation: The effectiveness of each camera site is continuously monitored, with regular reports generated to assess whether the cameras are achieving the desired safety outcomes. Sites that demonstrate significant compliance (indicated by lower detection rates) are considered successful.
9. Community impact and feedback: Finally, feedback from local communities is gathered to evaluate the broader impact of camera deployments. This ensures that the safety measures contribute positively to public perceptions of road safety.

A470 Average Speed Camera Mini-Case Study

Average speed cameras were installed on the A470 (Merthyr Tydfil and Brecon) and have been operational since October 2016. Vehicles are detected through Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), and their average speed is calculated by measuring the time taken to travel between defined points of a known distance.

“The system is visible along the A470, north of the Cyfarthfa Retail Park (Merthyr Tydfil) to just south of the Brecon roundabout. While this is approximately 40 miles (65 km), the system does not operate over the entire length. North of Merthyr Tydfil, there are several distinct average speed camera system zones, all of which are single carriageway sections. The cameras are generally five to seven km apart. South of Brecon, there are additional camera locations on both the northbound and southbound carriageways.

To illustrate possible cost savings because of safety camera deployment, the collision data for the single carriageway sections of the A470 within the Powys local authority area have been isolated. The tables below show collision counts by severity for the 3 years prior and 3 years after the installation of the average speed cameras. RAS4001 has then been used to associate costs to each of these collision severities, and a total cumulative cost is shown.

While it should be noted that the average speed cameras were only one element of the investment in improving safety along the A470 at that time, these other improvements included improved consistency of signage and lining, improved geometry and safety barriers. During the period identified, the safety improvements led to a reduction in collisions. This reduction in collisions within the investigated period, based on the cost provided by RAS 4001, resulted in a saving of circa £2million over a 3-year period.

Table 6: 2011-2013 Collision Data with RAS4001 Costs (A470 study)

Table 7: 2017-2019 Collision Data with RAS4001 Costs: (A470 study)

1       Welsh Causality Reduction Partnership:

2       GoSafe | Wales Road Casualty Reduction Partnership

3       DfT Statistics – RAS4001: Cost of prevention of road accidents and casualties:
RAS4001: Road Accidents and Casualties Statistics - GOV.UK

4       Welsh Government Road Safety Strategy and Resources:
Road safety strategy | GOV.WALES

5       Welsh Government Air Quality & Speed Enforcement
50mph Speed Limits to Reduce Pollution​(GOV.WALES

2.6        Summary Review – Primary Qualitative Data

Further to the quantified analysis provided in the table 3, there was significant input from all parties interviewed (Force Areas) which has been paraphrased and presented in the narrative below. This input is supported by secondary research and theory where appropriate. Many of the emerging ideas relate to the Safe Systems Principles presented in the introduction.

Insights from Police Forces on Traffic Legislation and Enforcement

In a series of interviews conducted with officers and enforcement specialists across various UK police forces, the following themes emerged regarding the influence of legislation and enforcement in the compliance of traffic laws, particularly speed limits.

Legislation as a Foundation for Compliance: One of the primary themes expressed by officers was the crucial role that traffic legislation plays in framing how enforcement is executed and perceived. Officers noted that the foundation of compliance is built upon a clear legislative framework, which not only dictates what is legal but also shapes enforcement strategies. A senior officer commented, “Legislation sets the groundwork — without clear and enforceable laws, enforcement would lack the teeth to influence driver behaviour.” This view was widely shared, as officers emphasised that compliance often begins with road users’ understanding of traffic codes, which act as a guide to safe driving behaviour.

The Impact of Enforcement on Perceived Risk: The enforcement of traffic laws, particularly through speed cameras and police presence was described by multiple officers as central to shaping the subjective risk of detection among drivers. One traffic enforcement expert stated, “There’s a defiant cohort of drivers that don’t think they’ll get caught, but when we increase enforcement visibility, we see a tangible improvement in compliance.” Police forces pointed to the critical role of both visible and hidden enforcement strategies. Officers across different regions confirmed that drivers are more likely to comply with traffic laws when they perceive an immediate risk of being caught. This mirrors the concept of general deterrence, with one officer explaining, “When drivers know we’re out there, even if they don’t see us directly, it changes their behaviour.”

Figure 3: The compliance model

Subjective Risk and Public Perception - A common sentiment raised during the interviews was how subjective risk is influenced by both enforcement strategies and public perceptions. Officers noted that technology plays a significant role in shaping these perceptions, citing tools like navigation apps (e.g., Waze, Google Maps) and online communities where drivers share information about camera locations. An officer shared, “Drivers are smart—they know where we are, and apps help them avoid us. That’s why mixing visible enforcement with hidden measures helps maintain a sense of uncertainty.” This use of both overt and covert enforcement creates a broader perception of surveillance, leading to increased overall compliance.

The Role of Surveillance in Deterrence - Interviewees consistently pointed out that deterrence is a core mechanism driving compliance. Many officers referenced the two-tier deterrence model of general and specific deterrence. One officer noted, “Specific deterrence affects those who’ve been caught before—once ticketed, they tend to follow the rules for a while. But general deterrence, the idea that anyone could get caught at any time, is what really keeps people in line.” This highlights the dual approach to deterrence in traffic enforcement: preventing repeat offenses among violators while maintaining general compliance among the broader driving population.

Challenges in Enforcement and Perceived Fairness - While the deterrent effect of enforcement was recognised as essential, some officers raised concerns about the perceived fairness of certain speed limits and enforcement practices. One officer reflected, “There are areas where the speed limits don’t make sense to the public. If drivers see a limit as unfair, they’ll be more likely to break it, even if they think they might get caught.” This issue of fairness adds a layer of complexity to enforcement, as it can impact the willingness of drivers to comply with traffic laws, independent of the perceived risk of detection.

Sanctions and Their Effectiveness - Sanctions, such as fines and penalty points, were discussed as a necessary but an imperfect tool for achieving compliance. Officers recognised that while negative sanctions can deter behaviour, their long-term effectiveness in curbing repeat offenses is limited. One officer stated, “We’ve found that fines work to an extent, but without a lasting impression, we see the same drivers breaking the rules again.” This insight calls attention to the need for complementary measures such as public education campaigns and alternative sanctions, like speed awareness courses.

The Importance of Maintaining Uncertainty - Another key takeaway from the interviews was the importance of maintaining a sense of uncertainty about enforcement presence. Officers described how repeated and unpredictable surveillance could expand the perception of risk across a wider geographic area. One officer explained, “If drivers only expect enforcement in certain areas, they’ll follow the rules just in those places. But if they believe we could be anywhere, they’re more likely to stick to the rules everywhere.” This was particularly evident in discussions of mobile enforcement and the use of cameras, where unpredictability in placement and timing was shown to increase compliance.

2.7        Conclusions

The insights gathered from interviews with police forces, combined with existing literature, provide a holistic understanding of how legislation, enforcement, and driver perception work together to shape compliance with traffic laws, particularly speed limits. It is clear that compliance is not a one-dimensional outcome driven solely by enforcement, but rather a product of a complex interplay between deterrence mechanisms, public perception, and strategic enforcement.

Deterrence: A Dual Approach

The concept of deterrence—both general and specific—remains a cornerstone of effective traffic law enforcement. General deterrence, which focuses on creating a widespread perception that violations will be detected and punished, plays a critical role in influencing the behaviour of road users who have not yet been penalised. The interviews confirmed that visible enforcement acts as a strong deterrent, with drivers adjusting their behaviour when they perceive an increased likelihood of detection. However, the model of subjective risk of detection—where drivers' perceptions of enforcement activities extend beyond visible police presence—is perhaps even more critical. Drivers do not need to see enforcement personnel in action to adjust their behaviour; it is the possibility of surveillance that modifies driving habits, a point supported by both interviews and the work of Mäkinen et al. (2003).[ii]

On the other hand, specific deterrence—targeted at individuals who have been caught and penalised—also plays a role in reducing recidivism. However, as highlighted by officers and the literature (e.g., Andenaes, 1974)[iii], its impact can be limited, particularly when drivers perceive penalties as unfair or inconsistent. This underscores the need for enforcement strategies that are seen as equitable and reasonable, where the rules themselves are respected and not just the enforcement.

The Role of Technology and Modern Tools in Enforcement

One of the most significant findings from both the interviews and literature is the evolving role of technology in shaping compliance. Apps like Waze and Google Maps, which allow drivers to avoid enforcement zones, highlight the challenges faced by police forces in maintaining deterrence. However, interviewees emphasised that unpredictability in enforcement—through mobile units or hidden cameras—counteracts these technologies, ensuring that the subjective risk of detection remains high even in areas where drivers expect to evade detection. The balance between visible and hidden enforcement appears to be a key strategy moving forward, allowing forces to maintain control over wide areas, as also noted by Brehmer (1966) [iv] and Homel (1988) [v].

Perception of Fairness and the Human Element

Another critical aspect that emerged from the interviews was the role of perceived fairness. Several officers noted that when speed limits or enforcement measures are seen as unjust, drivers are less likely to comply, even in the face of potential punishment. This aligns with Nilsson's (2004) [vi] work, which shows that compliance is more robust when road users believe that laws and enforcement measures are sensible. Therefore, public perception and education must play an integral role in enforcement strategies. It is not enough to simply catch violators—drivers need to understand the why behind speed limits and traffic regulations to foster long-term compliance. This represents a shift from a purely punitive approach to one that incorporates education and community engagement, as highlighted by officers and reflected in various traffic safety initiatives worldwide.

Sanctions and Their Long-Term Effectiveness

While sanctions, including fines and penalty point systems, are integral to enforcing compliance, the interviews revealed that their long-term impact may be limited. Several officers indicated that repeat offenses are common even after drivers are penalised, raising questions about the sustainability of sanctions as a deterrent. This is supported by the research of Vaa & Glad (2012) [vii], who noted that while demerit points can reduce violations in the short-term, the long-term effects on driver behaviour remain inconclusive. Moving forward, the police forces suggested that enforcement should be supplemented with educational initiatives and alternative sanctions, such as speed awareness courses, which provide drivers with a deeper understanding of the consequences of speeding beyond the immediate fear of punishment.

Uncertainty in Enforcement as a Key Strategy

The theme of maintaining uncertainty in enforcement emerged as a dominant factor in both the interviews and supporting literature. Officers reiterated that unpredictable enforcement—whether through rotating mobile units, hidden cameras, or irregular patrols—creates a sense of ever-present surveillance that is critical for deterrence. This is particularly important in combating modern tools, like driver navigation apps, that allow motorists to anticipate enforcement zones. By ensuring that enforcement remains unpredictable, police forces can sustain a level of compliance that extends beyond known enforcement areas. This strategy is supported by Makinen et al. (2003), who emphasized that the uncertainty of detection is just as important, if not more so, than the frequency of enforcement activities.

2.8        Final Thoughts

In conclusion, the primary goal of traffic enforcement is to improve road safety by reducing crashes and injuries. Effective enforcement hinges not on maximizing the issuance of infringement notices but on increasing public perception of the likelihood of being caught. Compliance is rooted in a combination of legislative clarity, strategic enforcement, and perceived fairness. Enforcement should be seen as more than a punitive measure—it should form part of a broader strategy that educates road users and promotes safer driving behaviours.

Deterrence mechanisms, both general and specific, play a central role. General deterrence arises from the perception that traffic laws are enforced and that violations will lead to consequences, while specific deterrence focuses on individuals who have been caught, with the aim of discouraging future offenses. The visibility of enforcement activities, combined with public education and community engagement, enhances the effectiveness of these mechanisms.

However, the model of enforcement is not without its limitations. Both interviews and secondary research suggest that more attention is needed on the long-term effectiveness of sanctions and the role of recidivism in traffic violations. Although enforcement has proven effective in the short-term, repeat offenses suggest a need for further research to understand how to reduce non-compliance over time.

Additionally, modern technology poses new challenges and opportunities for both drivers and law enforcement. While tools like speed cameras have proven to be effective deterrents, there remains a need for innovative solutions to adapt to evolving technologies and driver behaviours.

Ultimately, the belief that proper enforcement can improve compliance is widely shared by both law enforcement and the public. While intensified and targeted enforcement campaigns often lead to temporary improvements, a more sustained and comprehensive approach is necessary. Accurate and reliable measures of compliance and enforcement impact are needed to better understand the full scope of non-compliance, allowing for more strategic allocation of resources and improved road safety outcomes.

2.9        Local and Regional Context

The Regional Road Safety Partnership consists of 17 member organisations, including WMCA and Transport for West Midlands (TfWM), seven constituent local authorities, West Midlands Police and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

The partnership works collectively to improve road safety for all road users in part by applying a robust evidence-base to identify those locations where compliance with the speed limit is low and which results in significant risk to road users.

It is the responsibility of local highway authorities to set speed limits in their area. West Midlands Police has powers to enforce posted speed limits. However, enforcement resources are limited and need to be targeted at strategic locations.

The Mayor of the West Midlands has concurrent powers with the seven constituent authorities for road safety under Section 39 (2) and (3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 by virtue of Part 2 of the West Midlands Combined Authority (Functions and Amendment) Order 2017, for purposes of promoting road safety. These powers apply to the WMCA area.

In conjunction with the partnership, the Regional Road Safety Strategy 2019-2028 was launched. This has provided direction to address road safety for all road users across the West Midlands Metropolitan region. To enhance the casualty reduction target to a 50% reduction in KSIs by 2030, formally adopt Vision Zero, and to better align to local authority strategic polices, a Refreshed Regional Road Safety Strategy 2023-2030 was launched in September 2023. The regional strategic approach recognises excessive speed as one of the four main causes of road traffic crashes and commits to implement the use of intelligent enforcement and public engagement to improve awareness and compliance with posted speed limits.

The management of speed is also a core component of all local authority road safety strategies.

•               Action 1 of the recently launched Regional Road Safety Action Plan 2024-2030 commits to a more effective regional operational agreement for average speed enforcement.
•               Action 3 will result in a new Speed Management Policy for the region looking at road design and appropriate speed limits, the road hierarchy, enforcement types and raising awareness of the purpose of speed limits and enforcement.

This aims to make use of average speed cameras to help control the speed of vehicles along a section of road rather than single point enforcement with spot cameras. Trials of average speed cameras were undertaken to ensure effectiveness and provide a standardised approach. To date, 59 locations with 139 ASE cameras exist but there is scope to extend the scheme using an evidence-based approach, targeting areas where compliance with posted speed limits is low or where inappropriate and excessive speed is a contributory factor in people being killed or seriously injured.

2.10    Overview of Speed-related Road Casualties

Between 2015-2022, excessive and inappropriate vehicle speed was a key factor in contributing to these figures. 20–29-year-old drivers, riders and vehicle occupants (passengers) where inappropriate or excessive speed was the number one contributory factor were disproportionately represented in KSI casualty statistics (see Figure 3). In this age category, 90% of driver or rider KSIs and 65% of passenger KSIs were male.

30–39-year-old and 40–49-year-old driver or rider KSIs where inappropriate or excessive speed was the number one contributory factor during this same period were significantly higher than all other age categories.

Figure 4: KSIs where Inappropriate/Excessive Speed is the Number 1 Contributory Factor in the WMCA Area 2015-2022

2.11    Problem Identification

In 2016, Birmingham City Council and Solihull Council agreed a pilot scheme with West Midlands Police (WMP) and Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) to initiate digital ASE camera systems aimed at increasing compliance with speed limits at designated locations, and in turn reducing the number of people killed or seriously injured on the road network within the West Midlands Combined Authority area. The scheme was expanded in 2019 with ASE locations extended into Coventry, Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton.

Local authorities agreed to procure, install and maintain enforcement technology equipment (known as the asset). WMP agreed to take on the role of enforcing speed violations and supervise and be responsible for the Back Office Equipment and make such arrangements necessary to enable the Back Office Equipment to be linked to interface with the WMP Back Office Systems for processing in connection with the enforcement of any speed violations captured by the equipment. Three separate working agreements were signed to cover operations across the region; one covering the four Black Country local authorities, a joint agreement including Birmingham City Council and Solihull Council, and a single agreement with Coventry City Council.

Through an analysis of the current scheme, while quantifiable benefits to road safety have been identified, the scheme is far from self-financing resulting in a significant deficit that burdens all parties. This also affects any plans to expand the scheme further. There is currently a desire for a single regional agreement from 1st April 2024 to 31st March 2025. This approach has been agreed in principle with some amendments to be made to the previous Working Agreements. However, it is expected that a multi-year Working Agreement may then be developed for April 2026 and beyond.

2.12    Spending Objectives

The SMART spending objectives for a scheme are shaped by the policy context and the identified problems that the intervention is seeking to address, and therefore establish the basis for the development of the intervention. Ultimately, they are used to evaluate the success of the scheme and are therefore set with respect to the HM Treasury’s Five-Case Model guidance.

As described above, the Refreshed Regional Road Safety Strategy aims “to have halved the number of killed or seriously injured” by 2030 as a waypoint towards Vision Zero, “a long-term mission where nobody is killed or seriously injured on our roads”. Whilst the current scheme can contribute towards this, it is expected that a multi-year Joint Working Agreement will be developed and approved for April 2025 and beyond that can seek to maximise the desired road safety benefits within a financially supported framework.

DfT guidance recommends a hierarchy of objectives to be established:

• Strategic ambitions (Impacts): informed by the policy context, the over-arching priorities which the intervention contributes to.
• Scheme (Intermediate) objectives (Outcomes): which the intervention needs to deliver for the impacts to be realised.
• Operational objectives (Outputs): desirable outputs to achieve the intermediate objectives.

The strategic impact sought through intervention is Vision Zero where nobody is killed or seriously injured on TfWM’s roads.

The need for intervention above set out how problems with current ASE scheme are acting as a barrier to this impact being realised. The scheme objectives have therefore been tailored to target those specific weaknesses whilst maintaining a clear logical causal link to the longer-term impacts being pursued.

The scheme objectives are to:

• Contribute towards the Refreshed Regional Road Safety Strategy aim “to have halved the number of people killed or seriously injured” by 2030; and
• Preserve or enhance a sustainable financial support framework for the enforcement scheme across the multi-year Joint Working Agreement timeframe.

To align the objectives with SMART principles, success criteria have been defined for each option. These criteria are the direct first-order outcomes of the intervention and must be satisfied for the intervention to make a direct contribution to the objectives and impacts. They are quantifiable and specific, can be modelled (forecast) for a set of options to enable comparison, and can also be measured to evaluate the performance of the implemented option.

Figure 5: KSI CSC (first order outcomes)

2.13    Constraints and Interfaces

The number of ‘committed’ ASE locations going forward (see also the Economic Dimension and Financial Dimension) is assumed to consist of:

• 27 locations (55 sites) as referenced in the “TfWM - Effectiveness of Speed Camera Enforcement - Phase 1 DRAFT” report (October 2024) which was based on the 2022/23 network of locations.
• 5 additional locations in Solihull – A34 Stratford Road (opened 2023) and four ‘village’ schemes (opened 2024).
• 3 additional locations in Coventry – B4107, B4118 and B4109 – which are planned to be installed in March 2024 (noted “switch on” may be the start of Financial Year (FY) 2025/26).
• 1 additional location in Solihull – A41 Warwick Road – which is planned to be delivered during FY 2025/26 and has allocated capital and revenue funding.

The outturn assumption is that the ASE scheme will consist of 35 locations (71 sites) in FY 2025/26 and 36 locations (73 sites) in FY 2026/27, assuming that the A41 Warwick Road scheme is considered to be online from FY 2026/27 onwards.

The ASE scheme could continue to operate its current form, however, there are constraints in respect of whether the existing locations are the most appropriate for ASE, and the ongoing financial support framework for the scheme to continue operating.

A performance review of the impacts on collisions and travel times at the average speed scheme locations which were online in 2022/23 was undertaken by Agilysis. Additionally, compliance monitoring data for the locations appears to indicate that some of the locations have a low number of activations. There may be different reasons for this which the performance review may highlight – it is possible that a low activation rate is due to the success of the scheme, however, there are also conditions which can be sub-optimal for average speed as a mode of enforcement. 

Therefore, there may be scope for adjusting – i.e. switching existing locations for new ones – and/or extending the average speed scheme using an evidence-based approach, targeting areas where compliance with posted speed limits is low and where inappropriate and excessive speed is a contributory factor in people being killed or seriously injured. This approach uses targeted location selection for the areas with the greatest need – this would naturally be expected to generate higher collision benefits in forecast analysis.

An adjusted version of this approach would be targeting areas where compliance with posted speed limits is low, but not necessarily where inappropriate and excessive speed is a contributory factor in people being killed or seriously injured. The refinement is predicated on prevention through a proactive approach at locations which have the characteristics for KSIs to occur but may have a low incident rate in the KSI data for recent years. This type of proactive approach fits with the strategic ambition of the scheme, however, it would be expected to generate lower collision benefits than a reactive approach in forecast analysis, given that the reactive approach demonstrates a higher opportunity based on the observed KSI data.

In summary, average speed enforcement tends to be most effective for longer sections of road where drivers may travel at a “free flow” speed for a sustained period. It is likely to be less effective if there are busy junctions (since the slowing and/or delay could negate non-compliance elsewhere in the ‘average’ calculation) and where there are other impedances which can lead to drivers to changing their speed within the scheme (for example, other safety measures such as traffic calming).

Alternative, and potentially complementary, methods of enforcement include:

• Spot speed – fixed location cameras which measure the speed at a specific location on a link. These cameras tend to be most effective for links where compliance with posted speed limits is low, but ASE may not be effective for one or more of the reasons provided above.
• Mobile (vans) – the operational model allows dynamic location choices for enforcement across the network whereas spot speed cameras ‘fix’ enforcement at a set of known locations. It is possible that knowledge of mobile enforcement can influence indirect compliance given the perceived ‘unknown’ to drivers, whereas spot speed can target compliance at specific locations.
• Red light – cameras located at junctions to target non-compliance with automated traffic control signals. It is possible, not necessarily the case, that excessive speed may be a primary or even secondary factor (notwithstanding the driver’s behaviour at other points). 

However, regardless of the design and coverage of an enforcement system, it is important to consider that there will still be constraints.

• The ability to process activations generated by the enforcement system is ultimately constrained by the back-office capacity. Whilst it may be possible to identify expansion locations, the efficacy of the system relies on its perception as a contributing factor towards both direct and indirect compliance, including the benefits from education for those activations which are disposed to NDORS courses. 
• Enforcement in isolation can contribute towards, but does not guarantee, total compliance and collision prevention. Cases where excessive speed (or non-compliance with traffic signals) is a recorded contributory factor to KSIs may also have other contributory factors; for example, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, anti-social behaviour, or a stolen vehicle.

2.14    Options Development

Based on the problem identification, constraints, and interfaces described above, a set of four broad options were developed.

• Option 1 – Do not continue the scheme
• This provided the “Do Nothing” option. It is assumed that all average speed assets are deactivated, and no enforcement related to average speed is undertaken.
• Option 2 – Demand led / deployment policy with existing sites
• This provided the “business-as-usual” option.
• Option 3 – Demand led / deployment policy with alternative sites
• This provided a version of an enhanced average speed enforcement option.
• Option 4 – Demand led / deployment with the full complement of all modes of enforcement (average, spot, mobile, red light)
• This provided a version of a “Do Maximum” option.

2.15    Conclusion

The strategic case presents primary and secondary data, a national and local perspective and case studies. All the above create a compelling argument that a solution must and can be sought to support ‘The Partnership’ in their mission for Vision Zero, within the West Midlands Combined Authority region.

3          Economic Case

3.1        Introduction

This Economic Dimension seeks to identify and assess the impacts of the average speed enforcement scheme in terms of contributing towards its critical success factors and spending objectives, alongside establishing its value for money.

• For the avoidance of doubt, references to ‘the ASE scheme’ or ‘ASE locations/sites’ herein refers to the local authority scheme as described in the ‘Overview’ (section 5.1) and does not refer to any other average speed enforcement activities or programmes such as on the motorway network.

For the context of this full business case, there is an existing average scheme ‘on the ground’ and so the analysis of costs and benefits for the “as is” situation has been developed based on monitoring data. The number of average speed enforcement (ASE) locations (or ‘sites’, if considered as bi-directional in most cases).

The number of ‘committed’ ASE locations is assumed to consist of:

• 27 locations (55 sites) as referenced in the “TfWM - Effectiveness of Speed Camera Enforcement - Phase 1 DRAFT” report (October 2024) which was based on the 2022/23 network of locations.
• 5 additional locations in Solihull – A34 Stratford Road (opened 2023) and four ‘village’ schemes (opened 2024).
• 3 additional locations in Coventry – B4107, B4118 and B4109 – which are planned to be installed in March 2024 (noted “switch on” may be the start of FY 2025/26).
• 1 additional location in Solihull – A41 Warwick Road – which is planned to be delivered during FY 2025/26 and has allocated capital and revenue funding.

The outturn assumption is that the ASE scheme will consist of 35 locations (71 sites) in FY 2025/26 and 36 locations (73 sites) in FY 2026/27, assuming that the A41 Warwick Road scheme is considered to be online from FY 2026/27 onwards.

3.2        Critical Success Factors

The critical success factors were set out alongside their relationship with the spending objectives in Table 8 of the Strategic Dimension (Section 2.12).

Spending objective analysis is established in HMT Business Case Guidance for Projects and into the DfT’s Transport Analysis Guidance. It is intended to help business case authors to “systematically connect the economic and strategic dimensions of the business case, allowing a more structured and consistent presentation of evidence across the two dimensions”

“Whilst reporting a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) or value for money (VfM) category rating provides a useful summary of the overall social value of a proposal, it does not provide decision-makers with sufficient information to judge whether the sources of that value are directly in support of the strategic dimension.”​

“An important aspect of spending objective analysis is understanding the composition of the benefits and costs which inform the BCR or VfM rating, and how they link to the objectives of the appraised scheme”.

The Refreshed Regional Road Safety Strategy sets out the objective “By 2030 we aim to have halved the number of people killed or seriously injured.” TAG guidance recommends the default approach is that options which do not achieve spending objectives should be ruled out of progressing from the long list stage.

Therefore, whilst the BCR is a part of the multi-dimensional analysis which supports options assessment, it needs to be taken in context with the spending objective analysis outcomes.

In other words, the extent to which an option resolves the problem is not described by a BCR, and the more effective option at solving the problem may not have the highest BCR. This is in line with the HMT Business Case Guidance for Projects and into the DfT’s Transport Analysis Guidance. 

In summary:

• Strategic fit: the average speed enforcement scheme is seeking to maximise road safety benefits as this will provide the greatest contribution towards the 2030 strategy target, and beyond.
• Value for money: the average speed enforcement scheme should provide value for money, however, the option which provides the most optimal strategic fit (within affordability and achievability constraints) may not be the same option which provides the most ‘optimal’ value for money solution.
• Capacity: the West Midlands Police back office is operating at its current capacity to process disposals. Whilst the back-office capacity is planned to be increased, expanding the average speed enforcement scheme would also increase the demand on the back office, and so there is a risk of “diluting” the effectiveness of the existing scheme if expansion is not considered in parallel with the back-office capacity constraints.
• Affordability: the average speed enforcement scheme needs to be financial affordable in the context of revenue and capital funding needs.
• In the context of revenue funding, the primary constraints are identified in the Strategic Dimension, which include the ongoing operating for West Midlands Police to undertake enforcement and the site maintenance costs to local authorities. The current average speed scheme operates at a deficit as the expected revenue per disposal is lower than the pro-rata costs per disposal.
• In the context of expanding the average speed scheme, this will rely on capital funding to fund the supply and commission of new assets, in addition to increasing the overall operating costs and increasing the demand on the West Midlands Police back office which is already operating at its current capacity.
• Achievability: the expected increase in back-office capacity was referenced above but this takes time to implement (e.g. staff training) and it is not indefinite, i.e. expanding the existing enforcement locations does not necessarily increase the overall level enforcement undertaken through to disposals unless it is also aligned with future growth in the back office capacity that would need to be provided by West Midlands Police.   

3.3        Long Listed Option Development

The option development process was detailed in the Strategic Dimension. Four options were taken into consideration in the Economic Dimension at the Strategic Outline Business Case (SOBC) stage.

• Option 1 – Do not continue the scheme
• This provided the “Do Nothing” option. It is assumed that all average speed assets are deactivated, and no enforcement related to average speed is undertaken.
• Option 2 – Demand led / deployment policy with existing sites
• This provided the “business-as-usual” option.
• Option 3 – Demand led / deployment policy with alternative sites
• This provided a version of an enhanced average speed enforcement option.
• Option 4 – Demand led / deployment with the full complement of all modes of enforcement (average, spot, mobile, red light)
• This provided a version of a “Do Maximum” option.

3.4        Long Listed Option Assessment

The long list option assessment was developed at the Strategic Outline Business Case (SOBC) stage. Options 2, 3, and 4 are all expected to generate safety benefits.

The literature reviews, including section 2.4, indicate that average speed is effective at improving compliance with speed limits, which consequently reduces the number, and severity, of road traffic collisions. 

The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) published a “speed cameras factsheet”[viii] which reports outputs from an RAC study which showed that, on average, permanent average speed cameras see a reduction in injury collisions, particularly those of a higher severity, including:

• Fatal and serious injury collisions fell by 25-46%; and
• Personal injury collisions fell by 9-22%.

Additionally, in relation to Option 4, the factsheet quotes the outcomes from another review, which found that “the number of people killed and seriously injured fell by 50% at fixed sites and by 35% at mobile sites”.

Naturally, Option 4, and to a lesser extent Option 3, could have a multitude of permutations.

However, this will, at some stage, present a trade-off between a benefit analysis and a value for money analysis. The effectiveness of cameras data above indicates that expanding the scheme, and/or replacing sub-optimal locations with more appropriate ones can accumulate additional collision benefits at each of the new locations. But locations have different background collision rates and so their collision saving benefits will differ, and hence their benefit cost ratio (BCR) can differ. In other words, a proposed location which would provide further KSI savings may have a lower BCR than the scheme average, and so including it in the scheme would reduce the overall scheme BCR compared to if it was not included. 

Option 1

Based on the evidence presented that average speed enforcement generates collision benefits, it would be assumed that Option 1 would lead to collision disbenefits, since the enforcement scheme is deactivated.

On this basis, Option 1 does not achieve the spending objectives and so it was discounted at the SOBC stage and not considered for further economic assessment.

Option 2

Since these sites are already in place, the collision benefits are already being generated by these sites, i.e. the collision prevention benefits currently being generated need to be estimated from monitoring data.

The performance analysis project undertaken by Agilysis into the ongoing average speed enforcement scheme provides the primary evidence base for the quantitative assessment of the existing scheme which is analysed in the next section.

Option 3

At SOBC stage, Option 3 was effectively a concept – a specific benefit and cost is naturally subject to the number and location of sites to be changed, which may be informed by the ongoing average speed scheme performance analysis project.

However, it is assumed that any alternative sites are chosen because they have a higher collision rate – and hence a higher level of collision benefits – than their replacement sites.

If there were no such choices this becomes Option 2 by default because the existing sites remain in place.

Therefore, it follows that any form of Option 3 can generate higher collision benefits than Option 2, by the implication that any alternative site has a higher prevention opportunity than the one it replaced. However, it is dependent on additional funding to facilitate the deployment of assets and new locations. Further, this option would also lead to additional pressures on the back-office capacity for effective enforcement with higher volumes of activations being generated.

The impact on the BCR for this option would be dependent on the additional estimated reduction in KSIs at the new sites (on top of what is ‘lost’ from removing the existing sites) compared to the redeployment costs.

Option 4

Likewise, at SOBC stage, Option 4 was effectively a concept – a specific benefit and cost would be subject to a final composition – including number and location of different modes – which comprise the revised system; this may also be informed by the ongoing average speed scheme performance analysis project.

However, like Option 3, it is assumed that any additional modes/sites are chosen because they have been identified as having a high opportunity for prevention and so these options would generate higher collision benefits. 

If there were no such choices this becomes Option 2 by default because the existing sites remain in place.

The narrative is therefore similar for Option 3 – the BCR for Option 4 relative to Option 2 depends on if the estimated reduction in KSIs translates into a higher collision prevention value, compared to the multi-modal deployment costs, based on similar analysis of value of prevention versus additional deployment costs.

Comparing the benefits for this option versus Option 3, the primary opportunity for additional collision benefits is through the potential – if required – to replace average speed with a more efficient mode. For example, if there are clusters of KSIs near signalised junctions, these may be candidates for red light enforcement, but this might require a trade-off to be analysed (assuming the total operational budget is fixed) based on the prevention benefits opportunity and cost implications for enforcement with different permutations of modes/sites.

However, it is dependent on additional capital and revenue funding to facilitate the installation and commission of new enforcement modes and their additional operating costs (on top of the existing average speed scheme assets). Further, this option would also lead to substantial additional pressures on the back-office capacity for effective enforcement with higher volumes of activations being generated, at the risk of diluting the effectiveness of the existing average speed scheme.

3.5        “Current Option” for this Economic Appraisal

As referenced in the Financial Dimension, this full business case is based on a single year working agreement commencing from April 2025 until March 2026, alongside indicative costs projected for a further two financial years (FY 2026/27 to FY 2027/28) since aspects of these will be impacted by the assumptions included in the FY 2025/26 costs. The option described in the cost model has been developed based on the principle of only including ‘firm and funded’ commitments in the assumptions. This is pertinent since the costs are being forecast over a very short time horizon.

Therefore, the “current option” to be assessed in this economic appraisal is necessarily based on that consistent version of the average speed enforcement scheme, which was described above in Section 3.1. The locations are also illustrated in the image below. This is effectively aligned with “Option 2” using the notation in the long list of options that was described above.

In the SOBC, the potential for expanding the average speed scheme into wider modes of enforcement was considered. The presentation of “Option 2” in this economic appraisal does not preclude opportunities for expansion in the future, but they are not ‘firm and funded’ commitments that can be included in assumptions for the immediate future which is the premise of the cost model development (i.e. over a very short time horizon) and this corresponding economic appraisal.

Figure 6: “Current Option” for Economic Appraisal

3.6        Quantitative Assessment – “Existing scheme” (2022/23 locations)

The following key outputs (with their associated confidence and/or caveats) are noted from the “TfWM - Effectiveness of Speed Camera Enforcement - Phase 1 DRAFT” report (October 2024) which are pertinent to this economic assessment. 

Note that this analysis is based on 27 locations (55 sites) which were online in FY 2022/23 since they needed to have been open for at least a year in to provide some data for inclusion in the analysis.

Collision Impacts

Whilst noting the commentary around the statistical significance tests, it is observed that for the control site, the annualised values for PICs and FSCs are broadly similar before and after (the differences are 1 and 2 collisions respectively with the rounded values provided).

On that basis, it is possible that the differences between before and after values at the average speed sites may be attributed to the enforcement following the premise that there is no apparent change between before and after values at the control sites.

Under this assumption, this corresponds to an annual prevention of 90 PICs, including 14 FSCs, attributed the average speed scheme; in relative terms, the average speed scheme reduces the number of PICs by 35%, and the number of FSCs by 33%.

To increase confidence in this assumption, the outcomes from the average speed enforcement scheme performance review have been checked against independent data sources.

• The value for reduction in the number of FSCs (33%) is within the middle of the range quoted from the RoSPA study (25-46%) above.
• The value for reduction in the number of PICs (35%) is slightly higher than the RoSPA study range (up to 22%) however these average speed sites are in urban areas where there is higher frequency of slight collisions (which would increase the overall number of PICs) compared to the comparative rate for average speed schemes on rural, higher speed links.
• The proportion of FSCs out of all PICs is 15.6% (14/90); the default rate for 30/40mph other S2 roads in the DfT TAG Databook [v2.0FC “COBALT 4”] is 15.5%.

In summary, it is estimated that the existing average speed enforcement scheme prevented:

• 0.9 fatal collisions per annum;
• 13.1 serious collisions per annum;
• 76.0 slight collisions per annum.

Whilst it is not part of the spending objectives, the prevention of PICs can also reduce the number of damage-only collisions. The estimated number of damage-only collisions per PIC is 17.7 for urban areas using the DfT TAG Databook [v2.0FC “COBALT 1”]. Using this relationship, it would be estimated that the existing average speed enforcement scheme prevented 1,593 damage-only collisions per annum.

Travel Time Impacts

If it is assumed that the control site changes account for “background” changes in traffic speeds, the difference in average speeds attributed to average speed before and after enforcement would be -0.21mph; the corresponding value for 85th percentile speeds would be -0.90mph.

There will naturally be some underlying variation by different times the day and seasonality, however, when traffic flows are highest, the traffic will generally be slower anyway due to congestion. For times of the day with highly congested conditions the average speed enforcement may also be superfluous to the background traffic speeds.

But at this aggregate level, whilst noting the commentary around the statistical significance tests, the initial indication is that average speed enforcement may have a marginal to neutral impact on average travel speeds in these enforcement areas, but it may have a slightly higher impact on 85th percentile speeds, i.e. the presence of average speed enforcement appears to impact on a smaller number of higher speeds in the upper tail of the distribution.

In summary, the control site analysis and evidence suggest that the impact on traffic speeds is highly minimal to neutral, with only a slight reduction in higher-end speeding behaviour. The average speed scheme does not change (reduce) speed limits and so there are no direct impacts on journey times – in relation to it as a function of driving speed – for drivers who are already in compliance with the speed limit.

3.7        Quantitative/Qualitative Assessment Appraisal Summary Table

Collisions and travel times were anticipated to be potential key drivers of impacts for the average speed enforcement scheme – the quantitative evidence basis for those impacts in the context of the existing scheme are presented above.

Due to the large number of marginal or neutral impacts for a scheme of this nature – especially considering it is “renewal” since nearly all sites are already on the ground – a version of the DfT Appraisal Summary Table (AST) has been produced below. This presents the outcomes of those quantitative assessments, along with supplementary evidence and qualitative assessments, for each of the sub-impacts in the AST.

A detailed consideration of the monetised and distributional impacts is considered in the next section, alongside a more detailed consideration of the carbon impacts.

3.8        Monetised Analysis of Collision Benefits (“Current Option”)

Based on the outcomes of the quantitative and qualitative analysis summarised in the table above, collision prevention is the key driver of benefits, whilst various impacts which relate to changes in average speed would be marginal at an overall level based on the control site data comparison.

Additionally, whilst any average speed reductions would lead to journey time disbenefits, there is some counterbalance with journey time benefits due to reducing the number of collisions and their associated traffic impacts which, whilst infrequent, can be significant when they occur (e.g. road closures).

The quantified assessment – based on 27 locations (55 sites) sites that were operational in 2022/23 – estimated that the existing average scheme prevented:

• 0.9 fatal collisions per annum;
• 13.1 serious collisions per annum;
• 76.0 slight collisions per annum.

Using the relationship for damage-only prevention to PIC prevention from the TAG Databook, it would also be estimated that the 1,593 damage-only collisions per annum.

In 2025 prices and 2025 values, the annual value of prevention for a fatal collision is circa £3.1m, and the value of prevention for a serious collision is circa £0.350m.

In total, this estimated number of collisions prevented corresponds to a monetised value of prevention of circa £10.2m in 2025 prices and 2025 values, based on the values prevention in the TAG Databook v2.0FC (November 2024) using the collision-related costs for “built up” areas.

An adjusted value based on including estimated damage-only collision prevention is circa £14.8m in 2025 prices and 2025 values.

Table 8: Estimated Total Values of Prevention (2022/23 locations)

£000s, 2025 prices, 2025 values

From herein, the monetised values for the cost-benefit analysis are presented in a 2023 price base and a 2023 value year.

• This means that the cost-benefit analysis aligns with the 2025 forthcoming change to DfT guidance by presenting cost-benefit analysis using a standard 2023 price base year and 2023 value year instead of 2010 respectively in both instances (where 2010 had been the longstanding recommendation in DfT guidance until this point).  
• It should be noted that choice of price base year and the value year does not change the benefit-cost ratio, it is simply a presentational unit for the present values. Naturally, any present values (costs and benefits) reported here in 2023 prices and values will appear considerably higher than any corresponding or counter-part values in previous versions of this report which had a unit of 2010 prices and values.

This value of prevention (circa £10.2m) corresponds to an annual present value of collision benefits of circa £9.0m in 2023 prices and 2023 values, using a price base adjustment factor (0.949) using the GDP deflator and a discount factor (1.071) based on the standard discount rate (3.5%). 

The adjusted value based on including estimated damage-only collision prevention is circa £13.2m in 2023 prices and 2023 values.

These values of prevention include:

• Lost output: calculated as a measure of the loss of productive capacity of an individual because of an injury in a road collision.
• Human costs: such as the pain and distress felt by the collision victims or their relatives, as well as the intrinsic loss of enjoyment of life in the case of fatalities - these are valued based on estimates of people's "willingness to pay" for small reductions in the risk of exposure to such effects.
• Medical and ambulance: the estimated costs associated with a casualty’s use of the ambulance service, hospital accident and emergency department costs, hospital in-patient costs and blood transfusion services.
• Police costs: related to the cost of time spent attending and reporting collisions by police officers - estimates are made of the number and rank of officers involved in any collision, and the number of hours’ involvement for each person.
• Damage to property: including both damages to vehicles and other third-party property.
• Insurance and administrative costs: estimated by calculating the average handling cost per claim.

3.9        Monetised Analysis of Costs (“Current Option”)

The breakdown of the existing scheme costs is described in the Financial Dimension.

In summary, the primary inputs are:

• The number of average speed enforcement (ASE) locations (or ‘sites’, if considered as bi-directional in most cases).
• For the avoidance of doubt, references to ‘the ASE scheme’ or ‘ASE locations/sites’ herein refers to the local authority scheme as described in the ‘Overview’ (section 5.1) and does not refer to any other average speed enforcement activities or programmes such as on the motorway network.
• The capital costs for any additional ASE locations (i.e. expanding the ASE scheme).
• The contract costs for Jenoptik (existing supplier) who provide, operate and maintain the existing network of average speed camera locations.
• Other operational and maintenance costs incurred by the LAs associated with the ASE scheme (e.g. energy, signing maintenance, cleansing, vegetation, structural assessment, and Section 50 licences).
• The WMP “back office” costs to undertake enforcement.
• The disposal rate – and outcomes – of average speed enforcement activations.

Additionally, any costs up to the end of financial year 2024/25, including the capital costs for the existing average speed scheme sites, are sunk.

The financial dimension cost estimates have been converted to present value costs, in 2023 market prices and values.

• The values in the table above account for both expansion (where applicable) and inflation. The real cost inflation was calculated for each line item based on the difference between the inflation series embedded into the data above and GDP deflator inflation (via the TAG Databook), using the following assumptions:
• Jenoptik contract: bespoke inflation as per the provided values (after accounting for the assumed increases for additional sites), and CPI inflation via the TAG Databook series beyond 2027/28.
• Local authority maintenance costs using CPI inflation (after accounting for the assumed increases for additional sites).
• WMP back-office costs using wage inflation via the TAG Databook series.
• Income per course attendee is assumed to be constant in real terms.
• The number of ASE sites is assumed to be constant beyond 2027/28. The level of enforcement is also held constant for projections beyond 2027/28.
• Adjustment for risk or optimism bias used the following assumptions:
• Operating cost risk @25%, via the same assumption as the Financial Dimension.
• Capital cost optimism bias @42%, based on the TAG Unit A1.2 value for technology and/or IT projects at FBC (“Stage 3”).
• There is no risk allowance applied to the NDORS course rate per attendee. A variance on the income relative to the number of course attendees would be served via a sensitivity test on that assumption (number of attendees), rather than a contingency value applied to the actual course cost which has been held constant in real terms anyway.
• Adjustment from 2024/25 prices to 2023 prices is undertaken using a factor of 0.967, based on the GDP deflator.
• Discounting to 2023 values is undertaken using discount factors which have been calculated using the rates from the TAG Databook, starting at 3.5% for the first 30 years.
• Conversion to market prices is undertaken using the adjustment factor of 1.190 from the TAG Databook.

The Financial Dimension presents two projections of the costs. These include variations on scheme income based on the projected number of average speed scheme disposals but that is counter-balanced by higher assumed back-office costs to process additional disposals.

The cost-benefit analysis is presented herein is based on “60,000 disposals” from the Financial Dimension, but the broad outcomes in terms of cost-benefit analysis are similar regardless of that choice of projection. This is due to the relative scale of the scheme income compared to operating costs, and that the back-office contribution to the total operating is assumed to increase to process more average speed scheme disposals.

The next section analyses the costs (and collision benefits) across an appraisal period.

Table 9: Present Value Cost Estimates for 2025/26 to 2027/28

2023 market prices, 2023 values

* A Negative sign denotes income in this Present Value Cost table

3.10    Benefit-Cost Ratio (“Current Option”)

A benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for the “current option” (as described in section 3.5) has been calculated based on the monetised analysis of collision benefits presented in Section 3.6 and the analysis of costs presented in Section 3.7.

The BCR has been calculated for both:

• A single year, since this full business case based on a single year working agreement commencing from April 2025 until March 2026; and
• Using a fifteen-year appraisal period between 2025/26 through to 2039/40, which would be a more conventional level of appraisal period whilst aligning with TAG Unit A1.1 guidance which notes that for “projects [which] may involve assets that have a limited life … or be addressing a transport problem with a short time horizon … a shorter appraisal period is more appropriate.”

This scheme is addressing an immediate transport problem in the context of the 2030 target in the Refreshed Regional Road Safety Strategy, and the asset lifecycle for cameras is typically around 10-15 years. There is also greater uncertainty about projecting the quantitative into long-term forecast horizons given the potential impact of future traffic growth and technology on both road conditions and safety considerations. 

Present Value of Benefits

From Section 3.6, the present value of collision benefits with the site locations as per the Performance Review analysis was circa £9.0m in 2023 prices and 2023 values based on the prevention of PICs. An adjusted value based on including estimated damage-only collision prevention was circa £13.1m in 2023 prices and 2023 values.

As per Section 3.5, additional sites have been – or will shortly be – online which are not accounted for in the Performance Review analysis. Therefore, the collision benefits are also presented based on the observed values of prevention, and an extrapolated prevention in line with the increase in the number of sites.

In summary, this means that the collision benefits are presented as a 2x2 combination, whereby the top left square is computed directly from the outcomes of the performance review, but the other three squares require one, or more, degrees of extrapolation, i.e.

• Prevention of PICs, and adding in prevention of damage-only collisions; and
• Performance review analysis for existing sites in 2022/23 vs. estimated prevention outcomes for the recently – or soon to be – expansion sites.
• The estimated prevention for sites completed post the Agilysis monitoring data uses a conservative assumption that collisions on those schemes where excessive speed was a factor may be prevented.
• It is noted that the causes of collisions are often multi-faceted, including several of these data points. Average speed enforcement may not necessarily prevent all collisions where excessive speed was a factor (e.g. if another factor related to crime), but, conversely, it may also help to mitigate in combination with other factors (e.g. excessive speed for weather conditions). This assumption is conservative in the sense that it doesn’t necessarily consider how the average speed enforcement may, more generally, support safety on the routes, even if the incidents aren’t specifically tagged as an excessive speed factor.

Table 10: Present Value Benefits (2025/26 single year)

2023 market prices and values

Table 11: Present Value Benefits (15-year appraisal)

2023 market prices and values

Present Value of Costs

Following the outcomes presented in section 3.7, the present value of costs in 2023 market prices and 2023 values is £3.7m for a 2025/26 appraisal year, and £40.5m for a 15-year appraisal. 

Net Present Value

The Net Present Value (NPV) is calculated as the Present Value of Benefits (PVB) minus the Present Value of Costs (PVC).

Based on the values presented in the 2x2 grids above:

• The NPV for a 2025/26 single year appraisal ranges from £5.3m to £9.7m in 2023 market prices and 2023 values.
• The NPV for a 15-year appraisal ranges from £75.7m to £140.2m in 2023 market prices and 2023 values.

Benefit Cost Ratio

The Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) is calculated as the Present Value of Benefits (PVB) divided by the Present Value of Costs (PVC).

Based on the values presented in the 2x2 grids above:

• The BCR for a 2025/26 single year appraisal ranges from 2.4 to 3.6. This places it in the “high” value for money category. 
• The BCR for a 15-year appraisal ranges from 2.9 to 4.5. This places it in the “high” to “very high” value for money categories. 

It is important to note the key uncertainties around the BCR.

• The collision prevention for existing sites has been calculated based on quantitative outcomes from the Performance Review. The collision prevention for expanded sites, is therefore based on additional estimates of prevention outcomes and so subject to greater uncertainty. However, the extrapolation only serves to scale the outcome – prevention for existing sites (even if taking expansion costs) is strongly positive in benefit-cost terms.
• The quantitative assessment indicated that collision benefits would be the major driver of benefits – other impacts, such as those related to changes in average speeds are highly marginal, if not neutral, overall, based on the quantitative outcomes from the Performance Review.
• The scheme costs are subject to the assumptions documented in the Financial Dimension. Further, the maintenance costs are subject to greater uncertainty – including potential replacement of equipment – over a longer forecasting horizon.

However, based on the evidence developed for this economic appraisal, it is likely that the “current option” offers High value for money (a BCR in the range 2.0 to 4.0), and possible that the “current option” offers Very High value for money (a BCR greater than 4.0).

These value for money indications are driven by the “current option” effectively being a ‘renewal’ scheme at this stage – the capital costs for supply and installation of the existing sites (except for one) are sunk, whilst the quantitative outcomes from the Performance Review indicate that they provide clear benefits for the prevention of PICs and KSCs.

3.11    Whole Life Carbon Commentary

Whole life carbon consists of embodied, operational and user carbon components.

As referenced previously, this full business case based on a single year working agreement commencing from April 2025 until March 2026. However, all but one of the schemes is online at the start of FY 2025/26 and so their supply and installation embodied carbon is sunk. Additionally, for assessment over a single year the carbon associated with replacement or renewal of assets is anticipated to be minimal.

Therefore, a qualitative narrative and consideration of the carbon impacts has been provided below.

Embodied carbon

For existing sites, the embodied carbon is sunk.

For the single new site, embodied carbon may be associated with:

• New cameras:
• Construction carbon.
• New street furniture (i.e. poles):
• However, the first choice is to use existing street furniture; new poles would have carbon construction impacts but only required if no suitable existing assets to use.
• Installation:
• Carbon impacts from the Jenoptik team to drive to site and being on site to set up, commission and test the cameras.

For all sites, operational carbon impacts may be associated with:

• Cameras maintenance from Jenoptik:
• Carbon impacts from the Jenoptik team to drive to site for maintenance activities.
• Site maintenance from LAs:
• There may be some additional activities but LAs would still be responsible for highway maintenance at these locations (regardless of the scheme)

For all sites, user carbon impacts may be associated with:

• “Normal” traffic conditions:
• The control site analysis indicates that, on average, the average impact on mean speeds is marginal with average speed enforcement (some variation by site within this).
• From a tactical perspective, there may be a marginal benefit in terms of fuel efficiency due if average speed enforcement smooths the flow of traffic.
• Reduction in the number of road closures / incidents due to a reduction in the number of serious and fatal collisions:
• Each incident is unique (location, time of day, etc) so this cannot be readily quantified but there are likely to be carbon efficiency savings from reducing the number of road closures, as an indirect benefit of drivers being idle and/or driving in highly congested conditions during incidents.
• This also reduces the number of road traffic collisions to be attended by WMP and ambulance services. But it is assumed that the carbon impact would be neutral because those resources would be deployed onto other activities (and it would be spurious to claim a forecast of what those specific activities may be in the context of emergency service responders and if they are higher/lower carbon impact).

3.12    Distributional Impact Analysis of Collisions

Given the significant impact of the scheme in relation to collision prevention, a distributional impact analysis using the TfWM collision data (2018-2022) has been undertaken.

The observed data has been broken down into age, sex and road user type (i.e. to identify pedestrians). It has also been calculated for ‘all casualties’ and ‘casualties where excessive speed was a listed factor’ – the “variance” describes how similar the proportions are between the ‘all casualty’ and ‘excessive speed was a factor’ values.

The distribution by age analysis indicates that 20–29-year-olds, and to a slightly lesser extent 16-19-year-olds, are disproportionately likely to be casualties where excessive speed was a factor compared to the ‘all casualties’ baseline.

The distribution by gender analysis indicates that males disproportionately likely to be casualties where excessive speed was a factor compared to the ‘all casualties’ baseline.

The combined distribution by age and sex indicates that this cross-section is specifically 20-29-year-old males. “Young males” are identified as a vulnerable social group in TAG A4.2, and this data indicates that preventing PICs and KSIs associated with excessive speed as a factor should be positively beneficial to that social group. The population heatmap (males aged 16-29-years-old) below indicates that the largest resident areas for this group are generally in the urban areas, particularly in and around central Birmingham and Coventry.

The other two vulnerable social groups identified in TAG A4.2 are “children” and “older people. These two – and all other – social groups can benefit from a reduction in PICs and KSIs associated with the average speed scheme, but this distributional impact data does not indicate a greater or lesser impact from prevention specifically associated with excessive speed as a factor.

Table 12: Distribution of Casualties by Age

* Excludes records with "unknown" data for age of casualty

Table 13: Distribution of Casualties by Gender

* Excludes records with "blank" data for sex of casualty

Table 14: Distribution of Casualties by Age and Gender

* Excludes records with "unknown" data for age of casualty and/or “blank” data for sex of casualty

Figure 7: Population: Males aged 16-29-years-old

3.13    Place Based Analysis

Place-based analysis has been undertaken by consideration of the distribution of casualty locations across the seven local authorities.

Broadly speaking, there is no significant “variance” in the place-based distribution of ‘all casualties’ and those where ‘excessive speed was a factor’.

Note: this analysis is conducted with the 2018-2022 dataset that was used to undertake the distributional analysis above, so the values may not be precisely the same as any similar values referred to in the JWA or other places.

The indices of multiple deprivation (IMD) heatmap below indicates many of these casualties are occurring in places that in the most deprived areas of the country. There are notable areas of red and orange – which correspond to the ‘most deprived’ deciles – including inner Birmingham and westwards towards West Bromwich, central to north Coventry, Dudley, Walsall and Wolverhampton.

There are some areas which are towards the ‘least deprived’ end of the decile range, including parts of Solihull district (including around Solihull itself) and north of Birmingham around Sutton Coldfield.

Table 15: Distribution of Casualty Locations by Local Authority

Figure 8: Indices of Multiple Deprivation (deciles)

3.14    Other Enforcement Modes

As stated in Section 3.5, the cost and economic appraisal analysis model projections presented above are based on the existing average speed enforcement locations plus “expansion” locations which are considered to be “firm and funded” assumptions. 

In the SOBC, the potential for expanding the average speed scheme into wider modes of enforcement was considered. Whilst they do not meet the criteria of “firm and funded” for this business case, it is possible that that they could be reconsidered as part of future expansion plans along the lines of “Option 4” from the long list (above), a “Do Maximum” option with the (potential for a) full complement of all modes of enforcement – average speed, spot speed, mobile (vans), and red light.

Naturally, such an option could have a multitude of permutations. The constraints and interfaces referenced when average speed can most effective but also conditions where it may be less relevant and other modes of enforcement may be more effective. If the idea of this option was taken forward, a detailed design of the system would need to be developed to provide a specified scheme for costing and appraisal as part of a future expansion business case.

Indicative qualitative analysis of the benefits for the concepts of those options, including the potential cost and benefit impacts, are retained with their respective references below. 

Qualitative Analysis of Benefits – “Alternative sites” (SOBC “Option 3”)

Whilst Option 3 was a concept – a specific benefit and cost is naturally subject to the number and location of sites to be changed – it would be assumed that any alternative sites are chosen because they have a higher collision rate – and hence a higher level of collision benefits – than their replacement sites. If there were no such choices this becomes Option 2 by default because the existing sites remain in place.

Therefore, it follows that any form of Option 3 generates higher collision benefits than Option 2, by the implication that any alternative site has a higher prevention opportunity than the one it replaced.

However, this does not mean than Option 3 would have a higher BCR than Option 2. This is dependent on the specific design of an Option 3, but it would incur additional costs to relocate the sites which may or may not be higher than the additional safety benefits which the new location provides (on top of those at the existing location). Other considerations would also include finding new locations which ‘fit’ with the available equipment provision of the replacement site, unless there were additional capital costs to relocate a site plus an uplift for additional equipment needs.

Qualitative Analysis of Benefits – “Expanded, all modes, scheme” (SOBC “Option 4”)

Likewise, Option 4 was a concept, and a specific benefit and cost is subject to a final composition – including number and location of different modes – which comprise the revised system. Similar to Option 3, it is assumed that any additional modes/sites are chosen because they have been identified as having a high opportunity for prevention and so these options would generate higher collision benefits.

• The Performance Review outcomes demonstrate the effectiveness – in terms of collision prevention – of this existing average speed scheme.
• Wider evidence for the effectiveness of speed enforcement was presented in Section 3.4 above.

In the context of red-light enforcement, outcomes from a meta-analysis presented by the College of Policing indicates that red-light camera programmes led to reductions in total injury crashes of 20%[ix].

However, new sites will incur additional capital costs. Therefore, it is possible that a BCR for Option 4 could be lower than Option 2 because Option 2 (as presented in Section 3.8) is effectively a “renewal” scheme whereas Option 4 would be expected to generate additional collision benefits at the new locations on top of upfront capital costs to undertake that expansion.

In other words, it is likely that a version of Option 4 will provide the highest collision benefits, and hence the greatest strategic fit, but it is also possible that it would have a lower BCR than Option 2 since that is light on capital costs in the context of largely “renewing” the existing scheme.

However, the BCR (and value for money) is only one component of the critical success factors as per Section 3.2 – an Option 4 cannot be ‘indefinite’ because it must also be affordable (additional capital and operating costs for each location) and set in the context of an achievable operating model for the scheme (such as alignment with the back-office capacity to be effective).

Therefore, it follows that any form of Option 3 generates higher collision benefits than Option 2, by the implication that any alternative site has a higher prevention opportunity than the one it replaced.

However, this does not mean than Option 3 would have a higher BCR than Option 2. This is dependent on the specific design of an Option 3, but it would incur additional costs to relocate the sites which may or may not be higher than the additional safety benefits which the new location provides (on top of those at the existing location). Other considerations would also include finding new locations which ‘fit’ with the available equipment provision of the replacement site, unless there were additional capital costs to relocate a site plus an uplift for additional equipment needs.

Qualitative Analysis of Benefits – “Expanded, all modes, scheme” (SOBC “Option 4”)

Likewise, Option 4 was a concept, and a specific benefit and cost is subject to a final composition – including number and location of different modes – which comprise the revised system. Similar to Option 3, it is assumed that any additional modes/sites are chosen because they have been identified as having a high opportunity for prevention and so these options would generate higher collision benefits.

• The Performance Review outcomes demonstrate the effectiveness – in terms of collision prevention – of this existing average speed scheme.
• Wider evidence for the effectiveness of speed enforcement was presented in Section 3.4 above.

In the context of red-light enforcement, outcomes from a meta-analysis presented by the College of Policing indicates that red-light camera programmes led to reductions in total injury crashes of 20%[x].

However, new sites will incur additional capital costs. Therefore, it is possible that a BCR for Option 4 could be lower than Option 2 because Option 2 (as presented in Section 3.8) is effectively a “renewal” scheme whereas Option 4 would be expected to generate additional collision benefits at the new locations on top of upfront capital costs to undertake that expansion.

In other words, it is likely that a version of Option 4 will provide the highest collision benefits, and hence the greatest strategic fit, but it is also possible that it would have a lower BCR than Option 2 since that is light on capital costs in the context of largely “renewing” the existing scheme.

However, the BCR (and value for money) is only one component of the critical success factors as per Section 3.2 – an Option 4 cannot be ‘indefinite’ because it must also be affordable (additional capital and operating costs for each location) and set in the context of an achievable operating model for the scheme (such as alignment with the back-office capacity to be effective).

3.15    Summary

The Economic Case evaluates the impact and value for money of the Average Speed Enforcement (ASE) scheme, which will have expanded from 27 locations (55 sites) in FY 2022/23 up to 35 locations (71 sites) in FY 2025/26, and 36 locations (73 sites) in FY 2026/27 (with the A41 Warwick Road scheme is considered to be online from FY 2026/27 onwards).

The assessment, based on existing monitoring data, aims to determine the scheme’s effectiveness in reducing road collisions and supporting the Refreshed Regional Road Safety Strategy, which targets a 50% reduction in people being killed or seriously injured. While the scheme aligns strategically with these goals, its affordability and capacity constraints must be considered, as the West Midlands Police back office is already at full processing capacity, and the scheme operates at a financial deficit.

Four options were originally long listed assessed: deactivating ASE (which was discounted due to the negative safety impact), maintaining existing sites, replacing underperforming sites with higher-risk locations, and expanding enforcement to include other methods such as spot speed, mobile, and red-light cameras.

The analysis of the existing scheme demonstrated its effectiveness in reducing collisions, with an estimated annual prevention of 0.9 fatal, 13.1 serious, and 76 slight collisions, as well as 1,593 damage-only collisions for the 2022/23 network of sites (which has since, and is currently, being expanded). The impact on traffic speeds was found to be minimal, with only a slight reduction in higher-end speeding behaviour.

A 15-year appraisal of the scheme estimates the Present Value of Benefits (PVB) between £116.0m and £180.8m, compared to a Present Value of Costs (PVC) of £34.6m, resulting in a Net Present Value (NPV) between £75.5m and £140.2m. This corresponds to a Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) range of 2.9 to 4.5, indicating High to Very High Value for Money.

While further enforcement expansion could enhance safety benefits, it would require additional investment and could reduce the overall BCR due to capital and operational costs. The current ASE scheme demonstrates clear safety benefits, but future expansion must be carefully balanced with financial and operational feasibility to ensure continued effectiveness.

These value for money indications are driven by the “current option” effectively being a ‘renewal’ scheme at this stage – the capital costs for supply and installation of the existing sites (except for one) are sunk, whilst the quantitative outcomes from the Performance Review indicate that they provide clear benefits for the prevention of PICs and KSCs.

3.16    Economic Case Update Notes 08/05/2025

Section 5.9 summarises updates that have been applied in the cost model between the previous draft of the FBC v5.1 and this updated draft of the FBC v5.2.

Due to this, the economic case was also updated to account for incorporate changes in the costs.

The BCR reduced slightly in the latest version since the back-office costs increase more so than the NDORS course net income.

4          Commercial case

4.1        Capabilities

The required capabilities and services for enforcement largely fit into six key areas.

Figure 9: Capabilities and Services for Enforcement

Enforcement Technology and Infrastructure:

• Includes ASE Cameras, Spot Speed Cameras, Mobile Enforcement Units (Vans), and Red Light Cameras.
• These are the physical tools used to enforce traffic laws and ensure compliance.

Operational Support and Back-Office Capacity:

• Covers Processing and Adjudication, Data Integration, and Financial Management.
• These are administrative and technical processes needed to support enforcement operations.

Strategic Deployment and Optimisation:

• Focuses on Performance Monitoring, Evidence-Based Adjustment, and Complementary Enforcement Methods.
• This ensures enforcement strategies are efficient, adaptable, and data-driven.

Stakeholder Collaboration:

• Involves cooperation with Local Authorities, West Midlands Police (WMP), and other key stakeholders.
• Collaboration is crucial for coordinated enforcement efforts.

Public Engagement and Awareness:

• Encompasses Education Campaigns and Deterrence Strategies.
• Aims to raise public awareness about traffic enforcement and encourage compliance through educational efforts.

Financial and Contractual Management:

• Includes Multi-Year Agreements and Risk Management.
• Focuses on long-term planning, budgeting, and managing risks related to enforcement operations.

4.2        Commercial relationship

Local authorities (LAs) have maintained a generally positive relationship with its current service supplier Jenoptik, which has largely met operational service standards. However, challenges have arisen due to Jenoptik's difficulty in maintaining consistent and clear communication with LAs. This has led to confusion over basic aspects such as the status of infrastructure and the operational state of enforcement sites.

As the Road Safety Partnership plans for a more dynamic deployment policy, a new, more flexible relationship between LAs and service suppliers will be necessary. This evolving approach requires better coordination and understanding between all parties involved to ensure smooth operation and effective service delivery.

In light of these challenges, if the project progresses to the Full Business Case (FBC) stage, a remediation plan will need to be put in place. It is important to note that Jenoptik remains under contract with all LAs, and addressing these communication gaps will be crucial for future success.

Additional Points for Consideration:

1. Capacity for Scalability: As the Road Safety Partnership moves toward a more dynamic deployment policy, there will be an increased need for the supplier to demonstrate scalability in operations. Jenoptik, or any future supplier, should have the capacity to scale up services as demand for more widespread or flexible enforcement increases.
2. Technological Integration: The success of future enforcement systems may depend on the integration of newer technologies, such as smart data analytics or real-time monitoring systems. Ensuring that both suppliers and Local Authorities can integrate these technologies will be essential to enhancing operational efficiency and data-driven decision-making.
3. Training and Support: Local Authorities will require ongoing training and support to manage more dynamic deployments. This could involve technical workshops or more comprehensive documentation provided by the supplier to address the complexities of newer technologies or operational practices.
4. Contractual Flexibility: Given the evolving nature of the program, future contracts with suppliers like Jenoptik should be flexible enough to allow for changes in deployment policy. Contracts may need to include clauses that facilitate the modification of services, should the scope of enforcement expand or change rapidly.
5. Performance Metrics and Reporting: To prevent the issues that arose with Jenoptik's communication, clear performance metrics and reporting requirements should be established and enforced. Regular updates on infrastructure status, site operations, and service delivery should be provided by the supplier, with a system in place to hold them accountable for missed targets.
6. Stakeholder Engagement: More regular and structured communication channels should be developed between the Road Safety Partnership and Jenoptik, or another supplier. This could involve quarterly meetings or dedicated points of contact to ensure that any confusion or issues can be addressed before they escalate.
7. Risk Management: As the deployment policy becomes more dynamic, the potential risks (e.g., operational delays, technology failures, or political/regulatory changes) may increase. A robust risk management strategy should be developed, ensuring that both Road Safety Partners and Jenoptik can quickly respond to unforeseen challenges.

4.3        External factors

A strategic market review indicates inflationary pressures on equipment costs, a shortage of technical resources, and volatile financial markets.

These conditions are likely to persist, potentially resulting in procurement prices that are not lower than those currently paid to Jenoptik.

It is not understood how long these conditions will prevail; they are likely to persist, meaning that if the project went to market the prices obtained in a procurement may not be less than those paid to Jenoptik presently.               

In addition to the inflationary pressures, resource shortages, and volatile financial markets mentioned in the text, several other external factors could impact the procurement process and overall project execution. Here are some additional external factors that should be considered:

Global Supply Chain Disruptions

• Impact: The ongoing global supply chain issues, which have been exacerbated by events such as the COVID-19 pandemic (legacy) and geopolitical tensions may affect the availability of necessary equipment and materials, causing delays or increased costs. Such impacts are being experienced by other projects currently which is limiting choice in the market for appropriate suppliers.
• Mitigation: Building flexibility into procurement timelines and securing alternative suppliers or local sourcing strategies may help mitigate this risk.

Technological Advancements

• Impact: Rapid advancements in technology may quickly render current equipment or solutions obsolete, meaning procurement decisions made today could have shorter lifecycles than expected – this is unlikely given the stringent measures required for Home Office Type Approval.
• Mitigation: Incorporating future-proofing strategies and ensuring flexibility to upgrade or adapt new technologies in the contracts can address this.

Regulatory and Policy Changes

• Impact: Changes in local or national legislation or industry regulations (e.g., environmental standards, safety requirements, data privacy laws) could influence project costs, compliance needs, or the types of equipment that can be procured.
• Mitigation: Ensuring close monitoring of regulatory developments and maintaining relationships with regulatory bodies will help anticipate potential compliance challenges.

Exchange Rate Fluctuations

• Impact: If equipment or services are procured from international suppliers, exchange rate volatility could significantly affect procurement costs, particularly for large purchases.
• Mitigation: Hedging strategies or focusing on local suppliers may help manage the risk posed by exchange rate fluctuations.

Environmental and Sustainability Considerations

• Impact: There is increasing pressure from governments and stakeholders to meet sustainability targets. Suppliers that offer environmentally friendly products or adhere to sustainable practices might be more expensive but could provide long-term benefits.
• Mitigation: Incorporating sustainability criteria into procurement processes and evaluating the lifecycle cost (including environmental impact) may help meet future regulations and corporate responsibility goals.

Labour Market Fluctuations

• Impact: The availability of skilled labour, especially in technical roles, is critical. If there is a labour shortage in key areas, such as IT or engineering, suppliers may charge more for their services, or project timelines may be extended. This is becoming more evident as witnessed on other similar projects.
• Mitigation: Offering training programs or partnering with educational institutions to develop the talent pipeline could help address labour shortages.

Political Instability and Geopolitical Risks

• Impact: Political instability in regions where key suppliers are based can cause delays, increased costs, or even loss of access to certain suppliers. Geopolitical risks such as trade wars, sanctions, or military conflicts could also have significant impacts.
• Mitigation: Diversifying the supplier base geographically can reduce reliance on any one region and spread the risk.

Public Perception and Community Engagement

• Impact: Public opposition to projects (e.g., enforcement systems or infrastructure) could delay implementation or require adjustments in approach. Community or stakeholder expectations around the project’s impact on the local population should be considered.
• Mitigation: Early public engagement, clear communication, and transparency can help garner public support and prevent costly opposition or delays.

Insurance and Risk Management

• Impact: In volatile financial markets, insurance premiums and the cost of risk management strategies may increase. Unforeseen disruptions such as cyberattacks could also affect the project.
• Mitigation: Ensuring comprehensive risk assessments and up-to-date insurance coverage can help manage these external risks.

Global Health Crises

• Impact: Pandemics or other global health issues may reoccur and affect supply chains, labour availability, and project timelines. New health regulations or workplace safety measures could lead to increased operational costs.
• Mitigation: Building in contingency planning for health-related disruptions and ensuring that operations can shift to remote or flexible models will be important.

By considering these additional factors, TfWM can develop a more resilient procurement strategy that accounts for various potential risks and external pressures. This holistic approach will help manage uncertainty and ensure project success in the long-term.

4.4        Commercial – long list 

Figure 10: Commercial model long list

Next steps for FBC

Evaluation: Assess each option against criteria like cost, risk, strategic alignment, and delivery capacity.

Consultation: Engage stakeholders to refine the options and gather input on feasibility.

***Points to note - Interactions with financial case include:

• WMP contribution – offer of a commitment to cover Jenoptik contract costs for 2024/25 but the budget process is year-on-year.
• Maintenance costs – Jenoptik (or other supplier contracts) are multi-year contracts.

5          Financial Case

5.1        Overview (Baseline Position)

The Regional Road Safety Partnership consists of 17 member organisations, including West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) and Transport for West Midlands (TfWM), seven constituent local authorities (LAs), West Midlands Police (WMP) and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

LAs agree to procure, install and maintain enforcement technology equipment. The contract costs for Jenoptik (existing supplier) are estimated at circa £313,000* for 2024/25 but there are additional sites for Coventry and Solihull which have – or will be – coming online in the current financial year and will, therefore, uplift the future year Jenoptik contract costs. (*See section 5.3 below: Birmingham have currently agreed to a “pay-as-you-go” contract with Jenoptik – this figure is based on an allocation of £60,000 for ongoing work.)

LAs also cover the maintenance costs for the average speed locations, which cover the cost of energy, signing maintenance, cleansing, vegetation, structural assessment, and Section 50 licences. These costs are estimated at circa £363,000** for 2024/25 across the scheme, notwithstanding the planned expansions referred to with the Jenoptik contract data. (**See section 5.3 below: the Black Country value of circa £80k for installation costs over the 10-year life cycle is excluded from this figure – that is assumed to be capitalised costs rather than day-to-day revenue costs for operating and maintenance of the scheme).

WMP undertake the speed enforcement and provide operational back-office support functions, including disposals, annual reporting and data sharing. The total budget for 2024/25 across all enforcement modes (including vans and motorway) is circa £3.8m – with an approximation of 40% of activity to average speed enforcement this would be circa £1.5m. 

Each disposal results in one of four outcomes:

• The driver attends a National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme (NDORS) course.
• The driver is issued with a fixed penalty notice (FPN).
• The driver goes to court.
• The disposal is cancelled.

The outturn income that comes back into the average speed enforcement scheme per NDORS course attendee is £45. This value has been constant over several years.  

Disposals which result in a prosecution (FPN or court) do not provide any income back into the average speed enforcement scheme. FPNs range from £50 to £300, typically £100 for speeding offences, whilst the average court fine for motoring offences was £311[xi] in 2023. Also, disposals which are cancelled do not generate any income for the average speed enforcement scheme. 

Using the 2021/22 and 2023/24 monitoring data, the average speed scheme disposal rates are 26% to NDORS courses, 14% to FPNs, 5% to court and 55% were cancelled. This split provides an average income per disposal of circa £12, against an average WMP cost per disposal of £35; i.e. an average disposal has an operating deficit based on the expected income.

• Based on these assumptions, close to 100% of disposals would have to go to NDORS courses to avoid an operating deficit, notwithstanding cost increases in future years such as wage rises. In other words, the “cancellation rate” is not determining the operating deficit (although it does contribute to the scale of the deficit).
• Only disposals to NDORS courses are income positive for the enforcement scheme, whilst most disposals (FPNs, court or cancellations) provide no income the enforcement scheme.
• Additionally, the operating deficit may increase in future years because NDORS course costs do not have a set increase, whereas the back-office costs may continue to rise with future wage rises.

In summary, the average speed enforcement scheme currently has an operating deficit. The enforcement process itself operates with a deficit based on the ratio of the average cost per disposal and the average income per disposal, and then there are further costs in terms of Jenoptik contract costs and local authority maintenance costs on top of the enforcement process.

5.2        Cost Model Overview

A cost model has been developed for this full business case based on a single year working agreement commencing from April 2025 until March 2026, alongside indicative costs projected for a further two financial years (FY 2026/27 to FY 2027/28) since aspects of these will be impacted by the assumptions included in the FY 2025/26 costs.

The cost model has been developed based on the principle of only including ‘firm and funded’ commitments in the assumptions. This is pertinent since the costs are being forecast over a very short time horizon.

The primary inputs to the cost model are:

• The number of average speed enforcement (ASE) locations (or ‘sites’, if considered as bi-directional in most cases).
• For the avoidance of doubt, references to ‘the ASE scheme’ or ‘ASE locations/sites’ herein refers to the local authority scheme as described in the ‘Overview’ (section 5.1) and does not refer to any other average speed enforcement activities or programmes such as on the motorway network.
• The capital costs for any additional ASE locations (i.e. expanding the ASE scheme).
• The contract costs for Jenoptik (existing supplier) who provide, operate and maintain the existing network of average speed camera locations.
• Other operational and maintenance costs incurred by the LAs associated with the ASE scheme (e.g. energy, signing maintenance, cleansing, vegetation, structural assessment, and Section 50 licences).
• The WMP “back office” costs to undertake enforcement.
• The disposal rate – and outcomes – of average speed enforcement activations.

5.3        Cost Model Input Assumptions

Average Speed Scheme Locations / Sites

The number of ‘committed’ ASE locations is assumed to consist of:

• 27 locations (55 sites) as referenced in the “TfWM - Effectiveness of Speed Camera Enforcement - Phase 1 DRAFT” report (October 2024) which was based on the 2022/23 network of locations.
• 5 additional locations in Solihull – A34 Stratford Road (opened 2023) and four ‘village’ schemes (opened 2024).
• 3 additional locations in Coventry – B4107, B4118 and B4109 – which are planned to be installed in March 2024 (noted “switch on” may be the start of FY 2025/26).
• 1 additional location in Solihull – A41 Warwick Road – which is planned to be delivered during FY 2025/26 and has allocated capital and revenue funding.

The outturn assumption is that the ASE scheme will consist of 35 locations (71 sites) in FY 2025/26 and 36 locations (73 sites) in FY 2026/27, assuming that the A41 Warwick Road scheme is considered to be online from FY 2026/27 onwards.

Average Speed Enforcement Scheme Capital Costs

Linked to the assumptions above regarding the number of ASE locations, the capital costs for expansion included in this cost model are only included for “firm and funded” proposals.

• Birmingham: the data provided states that there is an existing £600k budget for speed enforcement and potential for further funding on top of this. However, expansion plans are currently at a sifting and prioritisation stage, which is being undertaken within the £600k budget. Therefore, whilst there is a budget of overarching "funding", there are no "firm" proposals to be included in this short-term cost model.
• Black Country: the data provided indicates ambitions for further expansion including some potential sites, however, there are no “firm and funded” proposals to be included in this short-term cost model.
• Coventry: the additional three schemes in Coventry (B4107, B4118 and B4109) are planned to be installed in March 2025 (noted "switch on" may be the start of FY 2025/26) and so it is assumed that the capital cost of these schemes is sunk in FY 2024/25.
• Solihull: the A41 Warwick Road (Solihull) is planned to be delivered during FY2025/26. The capital cost estimate provided for that scheme is £385,000.

Table 16: Capital (Expansion) Cost Assumptions

Jenoptik Contract Costs

Consistent with the assumptions above regarding the number of ASE locations, the Jenoptik contract cost assumptions are detailed below. 

• Birmingham: have a "pay-as-you-go" contract for maintenance with Jenoptik. The current allocation was stated to be £60,000 and so this has been assumed as the level for the immediate term.
• Black Country: the latest provided estimate for FY 2025/26 in January 2025 is "circa £75k". Previous data also included an annual uplift estimate.
• Coventry: an original estimate of £120,000 for FY2025/26 was produced in September 2024 based on four additional locations in March 2025, so this has been ‘discounted’ to an estimate of £114,175, based on an additional three locations coming forward.
• Solihull: the estimates provided account for the ‘village’ schemes being online in FY2025/26 and the A41 Warwick Road scheme being online in FY 2026/27.

Table 17: Jenoptik Contract Cost Assumptions

However, warranties and maintenance from new technology associated with confirmed expansion plans could be capitalised. The costs for Coventry and Solihull in Table 17 both account for increases due to several new locations coming online in 2025/26, and a further location for Solihull in 2026/27. (It isn’t shown in Table 17 but, for reference, the Solihull figure for 2024/25 is circa £59.6k and the Coventry figure for 2024/25 is circa £96.7k).

Table 18 below shows the Jenoptik contract cost assumptions that could be capitalised, whilst the remainder of the costs as revenue are shown in Table 19.

Table 18: Jenoptik Contract Cost Assumptions – Capitalise

Table 19: Jenoptik Contract Cost Assumptions – Revenue

WMP will make a financial year contribution of £300,000 per annum towards Jenoptik contract costs for the next three years starting from 2025/26.

Table 20: Jenoptik Contract Cost Contribution Assumptions

Other Local Authority Operating and Maintenance Costs

Consistent with the assumptions above regarding the number of ASE locations, the other local authority ‘operating and maintenance’ (O&M) costs are detailed below. 

• Birmingham: an original value for "operational costs" of £78,997 was provided in the FY 2021/22 data pack – no more recent information has been available, so this has been uplifted in line with CPI inflation.
• Black Country: the latest provided estimate in January 2025 is £111,500 for various itemised operational costs. This value has been uplifted for future years in line with CPI inflation.
• It also includes circa £80k pa for “LA installation costs (life cycle)” costs – for this cost model it is assumed these are capitalised costs and not revenue expenditure to include in this part of the cost model.
• Coventry: the latest available estimate is £110,000 based on an additional three locations in FY 2025/26. This value has been uplifted for future years in line with CPI inflation.
• Solihull: the latest available estimates are £110,000 for FY 2025/26 and £130,000 for FY 2026/27 based on committed expansion plans.

Table 21: LA ‘Other O&M’ Cost Assumptions

Projected Number of Average Speed Scheme Disposals

The monitoring data for activations and disposals is reproduced below.

Table 22: Activations and Dispsoals Monitoring Data

Using simple extrapolation, an end of year projection for the number of ASE scheme disposals in FY 2024/25 is 44,961 (the final value was not available at the time of writing). This is notably higher than the FY 2023/24 end of year total.

However, the new Joint Working Agreement (JWA) will be based on a “minimum level of enforcement” of 49,000 disposals per year (based on a minimum 7,000 per LA, assuming that level of activations is available).

The total WMP budgeted costs for speed enforcement are also increasing between FY 2024/25 and FY 2025/26, with the combined Central Ticket Office (CTO) and Camera Enforcement Unit (CEU) budget increasing from £2.1m to £2.9m (excluding the £300k contribution to LAs in the FY 2025/26 figure for the comparison).

Assuming an ongoing disposal capacity uplift in relation to the CTO and CEU budget increase (which is described further below), and with an allowance for wage inflation, a projection for the expected number of disposals for FY2025/26 is 60,000.

Therefore, the follow section provides two projections for the scheme income. The first is based on the 49,000 ‘baseline’ for the JWA levels of enforcement, which is close to the projected number of disposals to be processed during FY 2024/25 (noting, as referred to previously, the outturn value wasn’t available at the time of writing). The second is based on the projection of 60,000 based on the budget-to-capacity relationship assumed increase. 

Outcomes of Average Speed Enforcement Scheme Disposals

Each disposal results in one of four outcomes:

• The driver attends a National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme (NDORS) course.
• The driver is issued with a fixed penalty notice (FPN).
• The driver goes to court.
• The disposal is cancelled.

The monitoring data for average speed disposal outcomes is reproduced below.

Table 23: Average Speed Scheme Disposal Outcomes Monitoring Data

The pattern is very similar between both years. Therefore, it is assumed that the average disposal proportion to speed awareness courses is 26% for the ASE scheme enforcement.

Income from Average Speed Scheme Disposals

The outturn net income that comes back into the average speed enforcement scheme per NDORS course attendee is assumed to be £50 from FY 2025/26, following an increase in the course fee at the end of FY 2024/25. This updated £50 value is assumed to be to be held constant in future years, given that the previous value of £45 was constant for several years.

Disposals which result in a prosecution (FPN or court) do not provide any income back into the average speed enforcement scheme. FPNs range from £50 to £300, typically £100 for speeding offences, whilst the average court fine for motoring offences was £311in 2023. Also, disposals which are cancelled do not generate any income for the average speed enforcement scheme. 

Based on the assumed outcomes of average speed scheme disposals (table above) and the assumed income rates for average speed scheme disposals, the expected income per average speed scheme disposal is £11.77.

WMP Back Office Costs

The total WMP budgeted costs for speed enforcement in FY2024/25 is £3,263,400, including the Central Ticket Office (CTO), Camera Enforcement Unit (CEU) and Safer Roads for West Midlands (Training) costs.

The total WMP budgeted costs for speed enforcement in FY2025/26 is £6,328,600, including the CTO, CEU, Safer Roads for West Midlands (Training) costs and a £300,000 Jenoptik contract contribution to the LAs.

Based on feedback from WMP, the back-office processing time for disposals can vary between the enforcement schemes since some take more effort than others – for example, average speed can take longer to process than mobile, but motorway (HADECS) can also take longer to process.

The estimated proportion of speed enforcement activity for back-office costs to be attributed to the ASE scheme provided by WMP is 40% of the total FY2025/26 budget value stated above, i.e. £2,531,440.

The back-office disposal capacity is assumed to increase in line with the uplift in the CTO and CEU budget cost increases, after accounting for wage inflation. As referred to above, assuming an ongoing disposal capacity uplift in relation to the CTO and CEU budget increase, and with an allowance for wage inflation, the projection for the expected number of disposals for FY2025/26 is 60,000.

Operating Cost Risk

An operating cost risk value of 25% has been applied, to take into account the current landscape around technology and enforcement.

5.4        Cost Model Projection Scenarios

The cost model assumptions described above have been used to project two scenarios:

•  
• A “JWA baseline” estimate with 49,000 average speed disposals in FY 2025/26.
• This is the ‘minimum level of enforcement’ based on 7,000 disposals per LA.
• A projection based on 60,000 average speed disposals in FY 2025/26.
• This is based on scaling the number of disposals in the monitoring data with the real back-office cost increases to provide a relationship for assumed capacity increases. 

The outputs in the summary tables include:

• Operating costs:
• WMP back-office costs:
• The estimated allocation for the average speed enforcement scheme based on the number of disposals.
• WMP contribution to Jenoptik contracts:
• As per the assumptions (£300k).
• LA operating costs that could be capitalised:
• Increases in Jenoptik contract costs from 2024/25 into 2025/26 for Coventry and Solihull driven through expansion.
• LA revenue costs:
• The remaining Jenoptik contract costs (related to existing sites) and other LA maintenance costs.
• Capital costs:
• Supply and commissioning capital costs for Solihull in 2025/26 towards the new A41 Warwick Road scheme.

5.5        “49,000 disposals” Cost Model Projection

5.6        “60,000 disposals” Cost Model Projection

5.7        Other Enforcement Modes

As stated in Section 5.2, the cost model projections presented above are based on the existing average speed enforcement locations plus “expansion” locations which are considered to be “firm and funded” assumptions. 

In the SOBC, the potential for expanding the average speed scheme into wider modes of enforcement was considered. Whilst they do not meet the criteria of “firm and funded” for this business case, it is possible that that they could be reconsidered as part of future expansion plans. It was previously referred to as “Option 4”, a “Do Maximum” option with the (potential for a) full complement of all modes of enforcement – average speed, spot speed, mobile (vans), and red light.

Naturally, this option could have a multitude of permutations. The constraints and interfaces referenced when average speed can most effective but also conditions where it may be less relevant and other modes of enforcement may be more effective. If the idea of this option was taken forward, a detailed design of the system would need to be developed to provide a specified scheme for costing and appraisal as part of a future expansion business case.

Indicative costings had been sought to describe the potential financial impacts of these enforcement approaches, and those references are retained below. 

Benchmark cost estimates for red light enforcement are ~ £93,600 based on a value for supply and installation of a new site uplifted by 50% to incorporate allowance for design and project management fees, and ~£5,000 per annum for maintenance, in 2024/25 prices. These are the midpoint values from a range of values, given that the size and complexity of junctions will vary.

Benchmark cost estimates for spot speed enforcement have also been obtained.

•               It is assumed that one installation would cover the regional network. The benchmark costs are ~ £128,000 for supply and installation and ~£17,500 per annum for maintenance.
•               For each outstation, the benchmark costs are ~ £37,000 for supply and installation and ~£7,00 per annum for maintenance.

These spot speed benchmark values do not account for design and project management costs, but this set up requires a network-level consideration because there is an economy of scale to increasing the number of outstations subject to an initial set up of an installation, and if/how the demand for this may overlap with other enforcement modes. For example, the WMP mobile enforcement is established (and expanding) which may be suitable, if not already, for covering locations that may consider spot speed.

It should also be noted that in this context of adding other enforcement modes, there is a risk of “diluting” the existing scheme. Whilst there are plans to expand, the back-office is currently assumed to be operating at full capacity and so increasing enforcement locations/sites may not increase the income if the number of disposals is the same. Specifically in the context of red-light enforcement, disposals would operate entirely as a deficit because the NDORS courses would not apply to red light violations, i.e. it would not be revenue generating.

However, the new locations may produce safety benefits due to the perception of enforcement, which may be reinforced with targeting capacity for activations generated at the new locations.

5.8        Summary

This Financial Dimension documents the inputs, assumptions, and forecast projections for the cost model which has been developed for this full business case of the average speed enforcement scheme.

The cost model is based on a single year working agreement commencing from April 2025 until March 2026, alongside indicative costs projected for a further two financial years (FY 2026/27 to FY 2027/28) since aspects of these will be impacted by the assumptions included in the FY 2025/26 costs.

The cost model has been developed based on the principle of only including ‘firm and funded’ commitments in the assumptions. This is pertinent since the costs are being forecast over a very short time horizon.

The cost model assumptions described above have been used to project four scenarios:

• A “JWA baseline” estimate with 49,000 average speed disposals in FY 2025/26.
• This is the ‘minimum level of enforcement’ based on 7,000 disposals per LA.
• A projection based on 60,000 average speed disposals in FY 2025/26.
• This is based on scaling the number of disposals in the monitoring data with the real back-office cost increases to provide a relationship for assumed capacity increases. 

The primary inputs and ‘levers’ to the cost model are:

• The number of average speed enforcement (ASE) locations (or ‘sites’, if considered as bi-directional in most cases).
• For the avoidance of doubt, references to ‘the ASE scheme’ or ‘ASE locations/sites’ herein refers to the local authority scheme as described in the ‘Overview’ (section 5.1) and does not refer to any other average speed enforcement activities or programmes such as on the motorway network.
• The capital costs for any additional ASE locations (i.e. expanding the ASE scheme).
• The contract costs for Jenoptik (existing supplier) who provide, operate and maintain the existing network of average speed camera locations.
• Other operational and maintenance costs incurred by the LAs associated with the ASE scheme (e.g. energy, signing maintenance, cleansing, vegetation, structural assessment, and Section 50 licences).
• The WMP “back office” costs to undertake enforcement.
• The disposal rate – and outcomes – of average speed enforcement activations.

The income to the scheme is generated via NDORS course fees. However, most disposals go to FPNs, court or cancellations which do not generate income. Therefore, the back-office cost per disposal is higher than the average income per disposal and so an average disposal has an operating deficit, which means that expanding the level of enforcement within the scheme widens the operational deficit.

5.9        Financial Case Update Notes 08/05/2025

The following updates have been applied in the cost model between the previous draft of the FBC v5.1 and this updated draft of the FBC v5.2:

• Updated WMP back-office costs for FY2024/25, and new WMP back-office costs for FY2025/26 were provided and have been incorporated.
• The NDORS course net income for WMP has been updated to £50 for FY2025/26.
• The disposal deficit is now reported for “scheme total” costs, with the breakdown for the “back office” and “other operating costs” also provided separately.
• Some presentational changes have been applied to the reporting tables.

The economic case has also been updated to account for incorporate changes in the costs. The BCR reduced slightly in the latest version since the back-office costs increase more so than the NDORS course net income.

6          Management Case

6.1        High-Level Objectives

The governance of the Average Speed Enforcement (ASE) Programme must ensure the effective delivery, financial sustainability, and continuous improvement of enforcement strategies across the West Midlands. The Joint Working Agreement Management Board (JWAMB) is responsible for overseeing compliance, performance, and strategic decision-making to achieve the region’s Vision Zero goal.

6.2        High-Level Risks

Figure 11: High level risks

6.3        Governance Structure for the ASE Camera Enforcement Programme

Joint Working Agreement Management Board (JWAMB)

The JWAMB shall provide oversight, ensure financial accountability, and drive strategic improvements. It shall comprise:

• Chair: Head of Roads Policing, West Midlands Police.
• Deputy Chair: Deputy Head of Roads Policing, West Midlands Police.
• Board Members:
• A representative attending from the West Midlands Police Camera Enforcement Unit.
• The Roads Policing Data Analyst for West Midlands Police.
• The Policy Officer Lead for Road Safety on behalf of the Police and Crime Commissioner for West Midlands.
• A representative attending on behalf of each of the Local Authorities party to the Joint Working Agreement.
• The WMCA Regional Road Safety Manager.
• The WMCA Road Safety Commissioner.
• Additional persons may be invited at the Chair’s discretion (e.g., legal representatives, finance officers) but will not have voting rights.

JWAMB Decision-Making & Accountability

• All decisions require a quorum of eight members, with representation from key stakeholder groups.
• Dispute resolution mechanisms shall ensure escalation to the Chief Officer, PCC, and relevant legal advisors when necessary.
• Failure to comply with governance measures may result in operational restrictions or reassignment of responsibilities.
• Expansion of speed enforcement assets shall be considered in accordance with the criteria set out in Schedule 5, ensuring all new enforcement locations meet robust evidence-based requirements and operational feasibility assessments.

JWAMB Project Management Approach

• Quarterly Performance Reviews: JWAMB will assess enforcement effectiveness, compliance, and financial sustainability.
• Structured Decision-Making: Defined approval processes for changes to ASE infrastructure and enforcement scope.
• Stakeholder Consultation: Local Authorities and enforcement partners must be engaged in major governance changes.
• Financial Planning: Cost-sharing models will be agreed upon to address funding gaps and ensure fair distribution of resources.

6.4        Risk Management Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme:

• Operational Risks: Ensure adequate resourcing and contingency plans.
• Financial Risks: Implement a transparent cost-sharing framework among stakeholders.
• Legal & Compliance Risks: Regular audits to ensure alignment with national road safety laws and data protection regulations.
• Public Engagement Risks: Establish clear communication channels to address community concerns and maintain trust.

6.5        Resource Management Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme

• Funding Strategy: Identify sustainable revenue sources to maintain and expand ASE enforcement.
• Staffing Plan: Allocate resources for enforcement, back-office processing, and performance monitoring.
• Technology Investment: Ensure regular updates to enforcement equipment and data processing systems.

6.6        Benefits Realisation and Evaluation Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme

• Key Performance Indicators (KPIs):
• Reduction in KSI incidents within enforced zones.
• Increase in compliance rates and enforcement efficiency.
• Financial sustainability of the ASE programme.
• Annual Review: Formal assessment of the programme’s impact, with recommendations for improvements.
• Public Reporting: Transparent publication of enforcement data and outcomes.

6.7        Stakeholder and Communications Plan for ASE Enforcement Programme

• Community Engagement: Proactive communication strategies to inform the public about ASE benefits and enforcement policies.
• Transparency Measures: Regular updates on governance decisions, funding allocations, and enforcement effectiveness.
• Stakeholder Meetings: Scheduled consultations with Local Authorities, Police, PCC, and community representatives.

6.8        Performance Metrics Plan for ASE Programme

• Financial Metrics:
• Revenue generated vs. operational costs.
• Percentage of costs covered by partner contributions.
• Enforcement Metrics:
• Number of activations, disposals, and compliance improvements.
• Effectiveness of enforcement interventions in high-risk areas.
• Public Perception Metrics:
• Community feedback and complaint resolution effectiveness.
• Level of public support for ASE expansion initiatives.

Appendix A: Supplementary documents on request