DHN0008

Written evidence submitted by Dr Anna Katila.

About

This evidence submission has been written by a postdoctoral researcher in International Politics at City St George’s, University of London. It stems from ongoing research that examines the truth and reconciliation process concerning the Indigenous Sámi in Finland, which has led to wider consideration of the impact of the geopolitical context and military activity on the Arctic Indigenous people in Europe. This evidence seeks to highlight the impact of military exercises in the High North on the local Indigenous populations, arguing for the establishment of sustainable and respectful cooperation practices.

Context

The geopolitical tensions in the High North, encompassing the Arctic region, have increased after a post-Cold War period of increased cooperation and low tensions. The UK has easy access to the high seas at the centre of the US and Russian security and trade aspirations, including in the Barents Sea. The relative proximity of the US and Russia across the Arctic has informed the security considerations at least since the beginning of the Cold War. The US Pituffik Space Base, formerly Thule Air Space, established in Greenland in 1951 provided NATO important access to and surveillance capacity in the High North. Russia covers around a half of the total Arctic coastline and has a concentration of military power, including submarines, aviation and advanced air defence systems in the Kola Peninsula (Åtland 2011; Limon and Gürdal Limon 2024). For decades, the Arctic Council facilitated cooperation between Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US in questions of climate, biodiversity, emergency response and arctic peoples. In 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, the Council’s work paused, but it has resumed in a considerably reduced scope and with operational constraints (Balton and Haig 2026).

What are the current and emerging threats?

There are three topic areas where threats have emerged and appear likely to have future impact: increased military activity, access to natural resources, and trade benefits from new shipping routes.

1)      The current threats in the High North include increased tensions between the so-called great powers. In the recent years, Russia has modernized and expanded its military concertation in the Kola Peninsula (Bermudez et al. 2020). The NATO has long been concerned of the Russian military presence and activity in the High North, and the US Whitehouse interest in acquiring Greenland speaks of a desire to balance access to and influence over the Arctic. The NATO has also strengthened its capabilities, for example, by opening new Combined Air Operations Centre in Bodø, Norway, in 2025. There is a threat that increasing investment in defence and security in the Arctic will lead to the increased perception of threat and further tensions. If not carefully considered, this could in the future lead to an arms race and an increased risk of military confrontation. The UK should work towards avoiding the circumstances enabling the cycles of increasing perception of threat to which the response is to again increase military preparedness.

2)      The climate change in the Arctic proceeds quickly and the impact of the shrinking ice coverage remains uncertain. It is expected to enable access to vast natural resources, including oil and rare earth elements. Russia has plans to develop the usage of its Arctic natural resources, which can support its defence industry (Arctic Council Secretariat 2021; Ditrych 2025). Safe access and extraction may be too expensive to make commercial sense in some Arctic locations, such as Greenland. Nevertheless, the existence of the vast natural resources, make the region vulnerable to competition over opportunities, which may have an effect on the security situation.

3)      The shrinking ice coverage is expected to enable the increased uses of shipping routes, which might cause new tensions. Greenland and Canada benefit from an unimpeded access to the Northwest Shipping Route that connects the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean. The route shortens the journey from East Asia to Western Europe by approximately 4,350 miles but is currently navigable only for a short time yearly due to the ice conditions (Schwartz and Baskaran 2026). The access to this route may have been a factor in the recent White House policy over the acquisition of Greenland. In 2024, Russia used the sea route from Kara Gates Strait to the Bering Strait to ship 38 million tonnes of cargo but seeks to increase the volume to 70–100 million tonnes by 2030 (Putin 2025). Having branded itself as a “near Arctic state” in 2018, China has shown interest in a “Polar Silk Road”, consisting of the Arctic shipping routes (Lim 2018). The future of increased sea traffic and concentration of competing trade and security interests may shape new emerging threats in the region.

How will the UK work with key allies and partners in the region, both within and outside NATO, including through the JEF?

The UK has already increased its activity in the High North in response to the current treats, actively participating in capacity building through the NATO military exercises, such as Nordic Response 2024, and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). As the UK is the framework or lead nation of the JEF alliance, it should evaluate and consider the impact of its peacetime military activity in the High North. It is well-placed to develop good practice for managing the impact of the military exercises on the local residents.

1.1. The populations of the High North

In Europe, the 75,000-100,000 Indigenous Sámi live in northern Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia with and alongside the Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Russian majority populations. The population of Greenland is around 90% Indigenous Inuit. In Norway and Sweden reindeer husbandry is a protected profession, which means that any harm or damage to reindeer husbandry has negative effect on the Indigenous livelihoods. Since the Indigenous cultures and traditions are tied to the surrounding nature, damage to the environment can have far-reaching consequences for the Indigenous people’s ability to practice their culture.

1.2. The impact of military activity in the High North

In recent years, military exercises have caused harm to local and Indigenous livelihoods and nature in the High North. The NATO’s Nordic Response 2024 exercise took place in the traditional lands of the Sámi in Norway and Finland. It brought 20,000 NATO soldiers to the Norwegian and Finnish Arctic for 10 days in March 2024. In Finland, the participation to the Nordic Response reflects a recent, rapid growth of military activity in the Arctic.

1.2.1.        Example 1: Nordic Response 2024 in Norway

To support Norway’s role in the Nordic Response 2024, the environmental protection officers of the Norwegian armed forces’ operational headquarters worked to minimise the environmental damage and facilitated complaints and compensation claims (Hadland Bøthun 2024). This can include discussing the areas of the military activity with the local reindeer herders. Nevertheless, it is common that military vehicles do not remain within the agreed areas and that a helicopter may fly to a wrong direction, causing noise disturbance and damage to fences and trees. This disturbance and damage have resulted in reindeer herds being mixed up, the animals being dispersed and injury or death of reindeer. Disturbed nature can also mean that a herding area remains unusable for a long period of time due to the loss of vegetation suitable for feeding. Other complaints have concerned environmental pollution and waste left behind. In Norway, damage-reporting and compensation procedures are reasonably well established. After the Nordic Response 2024, local residents submitted around 200 damage reports, some of which led to compensation payments. The relationship management and compensation costs add to the budget of military exercises. Having processes in place for managing the impact on the local residents is crucial for ensuring the sustainability of military cooperation in the High North.

1.2.2.        Example 2: Nordic Response 2024 and other recent military activity in Finland

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission concerning the historical and ongoing discrimination of the Indigenous Sámi People in Finland commissioned a special report to understand the effects of the militarisation of the Sámi homeland, Sápmi, on the Sámi culture, livelihoods and rights. Published in 2025, it was the first attempt in Finland to map and identify the impact of the military activity in the Arctic on the Sámi. Based on the information included in this report, in 2024, noise and disturbance, broken fences, and tracks on the ground caused dispersion of reindeer, reindeer following wrong tracks, movement to the wrong feeding areas, where there is no food or it should be saved for the next season, death and injury caused by panic and exhaustion, and sustained damage to herding areas (Junka-Aikio 2025, 84–87). The report conveys the importance of communication regarding the military activities and damage. There appeared to be few or no attempts by the Finnish Defence Forces or Ministry of Defence to minimise damage beforehand or to establish effective complaints processes after. The current practices of organising military exercises also appear to be in contradiction to the Finnish national legislation which bans the use of land within the recognised reindeer herding area in ways that cause significant harm to reindeer husbandry (Poronhoitolaki 1990).

Unlike Norway, Finland still lacks well-established procedures for managing community relations and compensation. While there are individual cases of granted compensation, reindeer herders view the current compensation provisions insufficient. The practices of addressing the impact on the local residents are developing.

1.3. The Sámi voices in security and defence

The Sámi are reported to feel that voicing concerns over the military activities is unwelcome and an area where they have little say even when the activities cause damage to their traditional lands and livelihoods (Junka-Aikio 2025, 27). In Finland, the Sámi Parliament representatives and officials have observed that the Finnish state overlooked and ignored its legal responsibility to hear and negotiate in the defence and security questions that directly affect the Sámi people (Junka-Aikio 2025, 60). The lack of information-sharing, which would allow the Sámi Parliament to submit their statement and help minimise impact within the communities, considerably contributes to the issue. This may be partially caused by the lack of established procedures in the ministries in this new area of engagement (Junka-Aikio 2025, 64–65).

The Norwegian Sámi Parliament published only in 2025 its first statement on the expectations for Norway’s security politics. The Sámi Parliament expressed support for the increase in military preparedness but reminded that the related activities should respect the Sámi rights, following the Norwegian constitution and principles outlined in the international law (Sametinget 2025).

1.4. The future of military exercises in the High North

Military exercises and increased military activity in the High North has had an impact on the local populations, many of whom are Indigenous. Increased activity in the future will mean also more severe damage to the nature and local residents’ livelihoods. While no compensation will repair the damage to the nature, the effects of military exercises should be minimised where possible through careful planning and relevant communication practices. The Arctic nature is vulnerable, especially due to the climate change, and the UK peacetime military activity should consider the impact on the nature and local populations’ livelihoods.

The Indigenous rights

The UK voted in favour of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN general Assembly in 2007. The declaration protects the Indigenous people’s right to participate in decision-making in matters that affect them. Even though Finland and Norway are committed to the declaration and the Finnish and Norwegian constitutions provide protections to the Sámi, the Sámi communities struggle to have their voices heard in security and defence decision-making. The UN declaration requires states to consult and cooperate with the indigenous peoples to obtain their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). These FPIC principles seek to establish conditions for fair negotiations, since there is a power asymmetry between the state representatives and those of the indigenous people. The principles of FPIC should be followed in consultations over minimising the impact of military activity in the High North and in planning for damage reporting and compensation processes.

Recommendations for the military activity in the High North

The UK should outline operating expectations that protect the Indigenous rights in the NATO and JEF activities. When leading military activities, the UK should take its responsibility for the local populations, livelihoods and the Arctic nature seriously and proactively work with partners to identify and mitigate harm. Sustainable practices in peacetime military cooperation are productive for long-term relationships.

Supporting implementation of transparent accountability and communication mechanisms with the local people could lead to increased learning about the conditions and operating in the High North. The Indigenous populations and reindeer herders hold unique knowledge of the operating environment and adaptation to it.

The UK defence policies should support the delivery of the NATO and JEF cooperation and activities in the High North so that they respect the internationally and nationally recognised indigenous rights. The UK as a NATO partner should ensure that planned training and capacity building activities follow practices that minimise the harm to local populations.

Reference list

Arctic Council Secretariat, ‘The Economy of the North’, May 20, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11374/2611.

Balton, David and Stirling Haig. “Revitalizing the Arctic Council.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 24, 2026 https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/revitalizing-arctic-council.

Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr., Heather A. Conley, and Matthew Melino, “The Ice Curtain: Modernization on the Kola Peninsula.” Center for Strategic & International Studies Briefs. March 23, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-modernization-kola-peninsula.

Ditrych, Ondrej. 2025. “The Northern Frosts: The EU should contain and unpower Russia in the Arctic.” European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 30, 2025.

Lim, Kong Soon. “China's Arctic Policy and the Polar Silk Road Vision. October 23, 2018. In Heininen, L. & Exner-Pirot, H. (Eds.) Arctic Yearbook 2018, pp. 420-432. (Akureyri, Northern Research Forum). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3603710. 

Junka-Aikio, Laura. 2025. Saamenmaan militarisaation vaikutukset alkuperäiskansan kulttuuriin, elinkeinoihin ja oikeuksien toteutumiseen Suomessa: Erillisselvitys saamelaisten totuus- ja sovintokomissiolle (Valtionneuvosto). https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-383-718-8.

Limon, Onur, and Elif Gürdal Limon. 2024. “The Impact of the Ukraine War on Russian Military Capabilities in the Arctic.” Polar Geography 47 (3): 157–78. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2024.2399003.

Poronhoitolaki. 1990. https://www.finlex.fi/eli?uri=http://data.finlex.fi/eli/sd/1990/848/ajantasa/2025-06-27/fin.

Putin, Vladimir. The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue international forum. March 27, 2025. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76554. 

Saami Council. N.D. ”Suunnitelmat rautatiestä Jäämerelle ovat yhä uhka saamelaiselle poronhoidolle”. https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/suunnitelmat-rautatiest-jmerelle-ovat-yh-uhka-saamelaiselle-poronhoidolle. 

Sametinget. 2025. Sametingets forventninger til Norges sikkerhetspolitikk. 25/17507. https://innsyn.onacos.no/sametinget/postliste/norsk/. 

Schwartz, Meredith and Gracelin Baskaran, “Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. January 8, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/greenland-rare-earths-and-arctic-security. 

Sunniva Hadland Bøthun. ”Færre skademeldingar enn venta under militærøving: – Det pleier å vere mykje meir”. In Norwegian Broadcasting Company/ NRK. March, 16, 2024. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/nordic-response-2024_-faerre-skademeldingar-enn-venta-1.16808350

Åtland, Kristian. 2011. “Russia’s Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?” Contemporary Security Policy 32 (2): 267–85. doi:10.1080/13523260.2011.590354.

9th March 2026