Written evidence submitted by Mrs Catherine McLaughlin [CLR 085]

Summary of Personal Experience as a Leaseholder

Since the freehold of our building was acquired by Assethold Limited and management was undertaken by Eagerstates Limited, our experience as leaseholders has deteriorated significantly. We have faced substantial and escalating service charges, repeated disputes over the legitimacy and necessity of works, aggressive enforcement action, and prolonged legal proceedings simply to exercise basic statutory rights.

Service charges increased sharply following the change in freeholder and managing agent, often accompanied by minimal explanation and inadequate supporting documentation. Contractors appeared with little notice, undertook disruptive or questionable works, and leaseholders were later invoiced thousands of pounds for works that were poorly evidenced or, in some cases, not carried out at all. Requests for clarity, breakdowns, or justification were routinely ignored.

When leaseholders began challenging these charges, communication from the managing agent effectively ceased except for demands, threats, and escalation. We were forced into repeated First-tier Tribunal (FTT) applications to contest service charges and management practices. Even where tribunal decisions were favourable, enforcement proved ineffective, requiring further time, expense, and stress to pursue matters through the County Court.

Attempts to exercise the Right to Manage (RTM) were repeatedly obstructed through technical and procedural challenges, including failures by the managing agent to properly register interests, later relying on those failures to argue that statutory notices were invalid. These tactics exploited the complexity of leasehold law and undermined rights that Parliament intended to be accessible to ordinary leaseholders.

Despite service charge disputes being active and unresolved, the managing agent pursued aggressive debt recovery, resulting in a County Court Judgment (CCJ) against us. This temporarily destroyed our credit rating, restricted our financial options, and caused significant personal distress. The managing agent also made claims directly to our mortgage lender based on disputed charges, escalating the situation to threats of possession of our home.

The financial impact has been severe. Since Assethold and Eagerstates assumed control, we have been unable to save money. Thousands of pounds have been spent on disputed charges, legal advice, tribunal applications, and associated costs. Even selling the property is effectively constrained, as we would be dependent on a management pack provided by the same agent whose conduct we are disputing, creating a form of financial hostage-taking.

Eagerstates was expelled from The Property Ombudsman, yet was able to continue operating almost immediately by joining another redress scheme. This experience has demonstrated not only individual misconduct but systemic regulatory failure.

Strengthening Leaseholders’ Rights and Bringing the Feudal Leasehold System to an End

The draft Bill signals an intention to reform leasehold, but it does not yet achieve the Government’s stated aim of bringing the feudal leasehold system to an end. The core problem lies not solely in ownership structures or ground rents, but in the imbalance of power and lack of enforcement faced by leaseholders.

In practice, leaseholders remain exposed to excessive charges, procedural obstruction, and retaliatory behaviour with limited protection. Statutory rights exist in theory, but are difficult, costly, and time-consuming to enforce. Freeholders and managing agents are able to exploit delay, complexity, and asymmetry of resources to wear down leaseholders.

Our experience demonstrates that reform must go beyond economic adjustments and address how rights are exercised in reality. Without effective enforcement mechanisms, clearer duties on managing agents, and meaningful sanctions for abuse, the feudal characteristics of leasehold will persist regardless of changes to valuation or ground rent rules.

Forfeiture and Enforcement Imbalance

The proposal to end forfeiture is welcome, but forfeiture is only one aspect of a broader enforcement imbalance between leaseholders and landlords. In practice, managing agents and freeholders already rely on alternative mechanisms that can be just as coercive.

In our case, disputed service charges were escalated to the County Court, resulting in a CCJ despite ongoing tribunal proceedings. This had severe consequences for our credit and financial security. The managing agent also contacted our mortgage lender directly, relying on disputed sums to trigger further pressure and threats of possession.

Unless the Bill also restricts the use of CCJs, lender notifications, and debt escalation where charges are actively disputed, the underlying imbalance will remain. Ending forfeiture alone does not prevent leaseholders from being coerced into payment through other legal and financial levers.

Reform should ensure that where charges are genuinely disputed, enforcement action is automatically paused until disputes are resolved, and that leaseholders are not penalised for exercising their legal rights.

Major Works and Service Charges

The draft Bill does not adequately address the lived experience of leaseholders facing major works and service charges. Our experience shows that the greatest financial harm arises not from ground rent but from unregulated service charges and opaque major works.

Leaseholders are frequently presented with large invoices for works that were not properly consulted on, not competitively tendered, or not adequately evidenced. Contractors may be appointed with conflicts of interest or minimal transparency, yet leaseholders bear the financial risk.

Challenging such charges requires time, legal knowledge, and financial resources that many leaseholders simply do not have. Even successful challenges through the FTT do not guarantee compliance or redress, as the tribunal lacks robust enforcement powers.

Without stronger controls on service charges, clearer consultation requirements, and meaningful sanctions for overcharging or non-compliance, leaseholders will continue to be exposed to unaffordable and unjustified costs.

Enfranchisement and the Right to Manage

Our attempts to exercise the Right to Manage highlight how easily statutory rights can be frustrated. Procedural complexity allows freeholders and managing agents to challenge notices on technical grounds, often relying on information asymmetries or failures they themselves have created.

In our case, failures by the managing agent to properly register interests were later used to argue that RTM notices were invalid. This kind of tactical obstruction undermines the purpose of RTM legislation and places an unreasonable burden on leaseholders.

Enfranchisement and RTM remain prohibitively expensive and complex. Legal costs, valuation disputes, and procedural traps deter leaseholders from pursuing rights that should be accessible. The failure to implement the remaining Law Commission recommendations perpetuates this imbalance.

Reform should simplify procedures, cap recoverable costs, remove development value where appropriate, and penalise bad-faith obstruction. Without these changes, enfranchisement and RTM will remain theoretical options rather than practical remedies.

Regulation of Managing Agents

Our experience demonstrates the urgent need for statutory regulation of managing agents. The current system of voluntary redress schemes is ineffective. The fact that a managing agent can be expelled from one scheme and immediately join another illustrates the absence of meaningful accountability.

Managing agents exercise significant power over leaseholders’ homes, finances, and security, yet are subject to minimal oversight. There is no licensing regime, no consistent standards, and limited consequences for misconduct.

Statutory regulation should include licensing, enforceable standards, investigatory powers, and meaningful sanctions, including removal from the sector. Without this, other reforms risk being undermined by poor or abusive management practices.

Conclusion

Our experience shows that the harms of leasehold are not abstract or historical; they are ongoing and deeply personal. Excessive service charges, ineffective tribunals, procedural obstruction, aggressive enforcement, and weak regulation combine to create a system in which leaseholders are structurally disadvantaged.

The draft Bill represents progress, but without stronger enforcement, regulation of managing agents, and protection against retaliatory enforcement, it will not deliver the Government’s stated aim of ending the feudal leasehold system in practice.

Reform must focus not only on changing rules, but on ensuring those rules can be enforced fairly, affordably, and without fear.

February 2026