Written evidence from the Certification Office (RAG0099)

Thank you for your invitation to provide some input into your Committee’s current Inquiry and to open a channel for future engagement between your Committee and regulators.

As a newly appointed regulator, I warmly welcome such dialogue and engagement with your Committee’s Inquiry.

Therefore, further to your call for evidence, I welcome this opportunity to reply. Below, I address each question in turn, as follows:

1. What is the role of regulators in supporting and promoting economic growth? How does this translate into actions?

A regulator’s primary role is to regulate. However, a secondary role is to ensure the delivery of its regulatory function is transparent, simplified, accessible and effective. Therefore, meeting these requirements (statutory or otherwise) is without doubt paramount. However, since 2015, some UK regulators (Ofcom, Ofgem and

Ofwat) have had a tertiary duty to promote economic growth when exercising their functions under the Deregulation Act 2015. Accordingly, since then most regulators have sought to support and promote economic growth by removing burdens which hinder their respective regulatory stakeholders. These expectations broadly apply to all traditional regulators operating within economic sectors where their decisions may shape market activity.

Notwithstanding this, the Certification Officer is not subject to a growth duty, and for good reason. As the Government has made clear, my role is fundamentally different from that of traditional regulators: I am an independent, quasi-judicial officeholder whose core functions are to oversee compliance with statutory requirements fairly and impartially. Imposing an obligation to promote economic growth would risk compromising my neutrality. Unlike traditional regulators, I operate in a domain where the relationship between regulatory intervention and economic growth is contested and politically salient. A duty to promote growth would therefore provide no coherent guidance to my decision-making, and would risk undermining my neutrality by requiring the adoption of implicit economic or ideological positions that Parliament has not resolved.

That said, I share the principle that regulation should not create unnecessary barriers. While I cannot and should not pursue economic outcomes as an objective, I can contribute indirectly by ensuring our processes are efficient and proportionate. For example, replacing archaic paper-based systems with digital solutions, to reduce burdens on regulated bodies.

In short, I remain robustly independent while engaging constructively with emerging thinking on regulatory efficiency. Where ideas align with my statutory remit and enhance transparency, accountability or service quality, I will adopt them. This way, I support growth not by mandate, but by removing avoidable burdens and maintaining confidence in fair, impartial regulation of trade unions and employers’ associations.

2. What barriers, if any, are regulators putting in the way of economic growth? How will Government and the public know if regulators are supporting growth, rather than impeding it?

For many traditional regulators, barriers to growth have historically stemmed from complexity and uncertainty. The approach taken by the 2015 legacy legislation, the Enterprise Act 2016 and the recent (2024) Smarter Regulation has helped reduce this by clarifying expectations and extending the growth duty to most major regulators, meaning that the state of flux created by the legacy legislation has been removed. In fact, the Economic Growth (Regulatory Functions) Order 2017 excludes the Certification Officer. Nevertheless, in my limited experience as a regulator, it is archaic processes (ie paper systems) rather than digital schemes, which is a commonplace example of a barrier to growth.

The Certification Officer is not a typical regulator and is not subject to a growth duty, for reasons already outlined. That said, I share the principle that regulation should not create unnecessary burdens. Where improvements, such as digitisation, align with my statutory remit, I pursue them. Similarly, periodic reviews, such as quinquennial assessments by sponsoring departments, can help benchmark regulators against good practice and encourage continuous improvement. These steps demonstrate that, while promoting growth is not my objective, I remove avoidable barriers and maintain confidence in fair, effective regulation.

3. How are regulators expected to balance the growth duty with their other objectives? Does the Government make clear what should be prioritised, and how can this be achieved?

Presently, Governments have approached the economic growth duty as a “have regard to” obligation which operates alongside, and does not displace, a regulator's primary duties. Government guidance does not establish a hierarchy between growth and other objectives, nor does it prescribe how conflicts should be resolved. Instead, regulators are expected to exercise judgement on a case-by-case basis, with the clear understanding that core statutory functions must continue to be delivered.

The Certification Officer is not subject to a growth duty, and therefore is not required to undertake such a balancing exercise. As a result, there is no established framework for how a growth duty would interact with the Certification Officer’s statutory role, which is quasi-judicial in nature and focused on ensuring

compliance with complex legal requirements governing trade unions and employers’ associations.

If a growth duty were ever to be applied to the Certification Officer, clarity from government would be necessary. In particular, it is not clear what conception of “economic growth” would be relevant in the context of trade unions and employers’ associations; how the economic effects of decisions relating to trade union governance or enforcement would be assessed; or how any growth considerations would be reconciled with the Certification Officer’s duty to act impartially and in accordance with statute.

Without such clarity, it is difficult to see how a growth duty could provide meaningful or coherent guidance in this regulatory context..

4. Can changing the growth duty alone have a significant impact on regulators’ decision-making, or is there a need for broader changes to regulators’ duties, objectives and strategic guidance?

A broader change is needed; in order to align regulators’ paramount duties with their secondary/tertiary/subsidiary strategic duties. In my view, cultural and legislative change(s) are required.

5. Is it possible to make regulatory processes quicker and cheaper while maintaining the same level of protection to the public and the environment? Will there have to be trade-offs between these goals, and if so, how should the Government and Parliament clarify how these trade-offs should be made?

It is possible to make regulatory processes quicker and more cost-effective. Currently, AI and digitisation lends itself to those opportunities. However, Government and Parliament ought to be reminded when/if considering such changes, that regulators must command public confidence; otherwise their regulatory missions are undermined. Therefore, Government and/or Parliament ought to undertake equality impact assessments when considering any such changes as well as seek to reaffirm that regulators’ independence is paramount in ensuring Public confidence.

6. How is a stronger growth duty likely to affect how regulators view risk and where the burden of risk falls? To

what extent should consumers, businesses and the public be prepared to accept greater risk as a result of changing regulatory protections, and how should a less risk-averse approach be implemented by regulators?

The current Growth Duty in UK regulation ensures that regulators actively engage with promoting economic growth when exercising their functions. Whilst the Growth Duty aims to foster a regulatory environment where innovation and efficiency is advanced, it has had, in my view, little impact on changing risk assessments and burdens. In my sector, it is not appropriate nor conducive to better employment relations to expect the Public and /or other stakeholders to accept greater risks. Reducing burdens on stakeholders should embolden the Public’s confidence in regulating trade unions/employer associations.

While broader discussions such as these about regulatory risk appetite may be relevant for regulators with direct influence over economic activity, applying such concepts to the Certification Officer would raise distinct issues. For example, a less risk-averse approach might be perceived as altering the lance between the rights of individual members of trade unions and the rights of trade unions themselves, which would go beyond the Certification Officer’s neutral quasi-judicial role. For that reason, changes to how risk is allocated in respect of the environment regulated by the Certification Officer are most appropriately addressed by Parliament/Government, rather than through changes in regulatory approach by the Certification Officer.

7. What impacts will targets for reducing the administrative burden on business and increasing the speed of approvals have on regulators? What pressures or perverse incentives might these targets bring into regulatory systems?

Targets to reduce administrative burdens or to increase the speed of regulatory decisions can influence how regulators prioritise work and allocate resources. In some regulatory contexts, such targets may support efficiency and early resolution of issues. However, the Certification Officer does not operate an approvals regime, and is not responsible for approving business activity. My functions are primarily reactive and quasi-judicial, involving the determination or complaints and the enforcement of statutory requirements governing trade unions and employers’ associations. In this

context, the use of targets raises particular challenges, including uncertainty about what outcomes such target s are intended to achieve. For example, a target to resolve complaints more quickly could be framed as reducing burdens on trade unions, but it could equally be framed as a weakening of regulatory scrutiny or an altering of the balance of protections afforded to members of trade unions. It is not clear, at present, how such outcomes would be assessed against an objective of economic growth. More generally, targets focussed on speed or administrative reduction risk creating perverse incentives, including pressure to prioritise easily resolvable cases. Should targets be considered, careful thought would be needed as to how they interact with my statutory duties, and the need to maintain confidence in the integrity of my decision-making. These are unnecessary, if quinquennial reviews are undertaken to benchmark regulators’ activity.

8. Do regulators have the resources they need to be able to adequately support growth and innovation in general, and through specific measures such as proposed “fast lanes”? If increased resources are needed, should they come from increases in regulatory fees and charges or through additional public funding?

All regulators should be adequately funded in order to ensure they meet their statutory obligations in their respective regulatory frameworks/functions. In my view, ‘fast lanes’ (March 2025) is a new label for what should be an existing, ongoing improvements process.

The Certification Officer is not subject to the economic growth duty and I do not operate any regulatory “fast lanes” or approvals processes designed to enable economic growth. As previously stated, my functions are primarily compliance-based and quasi-judicial, focused on the determination of complaints and the enforcement of statutory requirements relating to trade unions and employers’ associations. As such, the relevance of growth-oriented resourcing models varies significantly from that of regulators whose role is to facilitate or authorise business activity.

Questions of resourcing nevertheless remain important for the effective discharge of my statutory functions. In recent years, my office was funded through a levy on trade unions and employers’

associations. Following the Employment Rights Act 2025, my office is once again funded entirely by the public purse.

In that context, if additional expectations were to be placed on the Certification Officer, whether framed in terms of supporting growth, accelerating processes, or otherwise, careful consideration would be needed as to how such activity should be resourced. For a regulator with quasi-judicial responsibilities, reliance on fees or charges levied on regulated bodies may risk undermining confidence in independence and impartiality. Public funding may therefore be a more appropriate mechanism where additional capacity is required, particularly where new expectations arise from changes in government policy rather than from the needs of regulated entities themselves.

9. Will changes to regulatory processes, such as proposed paid-for “fast lanes”, have the planned effect? Are companies prepared to pay more for expedited services? Is it clear how potential disadvantages, such as for smaller companies who are less able to afford increased fees, could be managed?

No comment.

10. Can regulators work together where needed, and do they act to avoid duplication or inconsistency in how they regulate? Are there barriers which prevent regulators from working together?

Regulators do work together and they should always act to avoid any duplication or inconsistency. Government departmental chairs (including regulators) foras ensure that such potential duplication and/or inconsistency are addressed.

11. How are changes in regulatory structures likely to affect how regulators deliver their functions and impact on growth? Do regulators and the Government understand both the benefits from and the downsides to reorganisations? Are changes being planned and delivered in a way that minimises instability or unpredictability, and ensures regulation remains effective?

No changes should be made unless a clear benefit is being effected. Any uncertainty undermines the effectiveness of any regulatory regime.

12. What are regulators doing in practice to encourage innovation and support economic growth? Are regulatory sandboxes working as expected, and if so, should their use be expanded?

As Certification Officer, I do not have a role in encouraging innovation within trade unions or employers’ associations, nor in promoting economic growth through their activities. Those organisations are independent, self-governing bodies, and Parliament has deliberately left decisions about how they organise their internal affairs to their own members, subject only to compliance with statutory requirements.

My function is therefore not to shape behaviour or outcomes, but to ensure that minimum legal standards of governance, transparency and accountability are met, and to determine complaints where those standards are alleged to have been breached. Within that framework, trade unions and employers’ associations are free to innovate, adapt and develop as they see fit, without regulatory direction or encouragement.

In this context, my contribution is to provide a stable and predictable legal environment in which autonomy can be exercised, rather than to promote particular models of innovation or economic performance. That approach reflects the constitutional balance established by Parliament, and distinguishes my role from that of regulators whose purpose is explicitly to facilitate innovation or growth in regulated markets.

‘Regulatory sandboxes’ as controlled environments will doubtless provide experiences, examples and outcomes from which all regulators can learn.

13. Are regulators using data, digital technology and artificial intelligence to improve their efficiency and productivity? What potential benefits and drawbacks would result from their increased use?

What is emerging in my own regulatory context is that applicants are utilising AI in order to bring their complaints. As the newly

appointed Certification Officer, I am intent on embracing digital technology to enhance the existing effective efficiency and hight productivity in my Office.

14. Is the new Regulatory Innovation Office working as planned to improve regulation and taking the necessary whole of Government view?

No comment.

15. How do UK regulatory systems compare to others internationally? Who should the UK look to for good practice in regulatory design and operation? Are there any advantages to UK regulatory systems?

Australia and the USA have comparable growth duty frameworks. These are noted in the City UK (2024) analysis across 21 variant jurisdictions (cf. Annex 2 of its report).

In summary, the responses above reflect the distinct statutory position of the Certification Officer. Policy tools designed to promote economic growth, innovation or speed are, at present, largely framed for regulators that facilitate or authorise economic activity. By contrast, the Certification Officer’s role is quasi-judicial and compliance-based, and is grounded in respect for the autonomy of trade unions and employers’ associations. Its function is not to promote particular economic outcomes, but to enforce minimum legal standards and determine complaints impartially within a framework set by Parliament.

Within that framework, I am, nevertheless taking practical steps to reduce unnecessary administrative burdens and improve regulatory clarity. This includes the digitisation of the annual returns process and the development of a bespoke case-management system, both aimed at reducing complexity, increasing transparency and providing greater certainty for regulated bodies and complainants. These improvements support accessibility and efficiency irrespective of any economic growth duty. For my role, effective regulation rests on legal clarity, independence and procedural fairness. Where additional objectives or expectations are

contemplated, they should be accompanied by explicit policy direction, and appropriate resourcing.

I trust this assists your Committee’s Inquiry.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be able to assist your and/or your Committee further with regard to this matter.

21 January 2026

9