Written submission from Hleb Buziuk (LMI0001)

 

Competition and market functioning in the UK live music industry
Written evidence submitted by Hleb Buziuk

Executive Summary

  1. This written evidence responds to the Business and Trade Committee’s call for evidence on “Competition and market functioning in the UK live music industry”. It addresses market structure and competition, barriers to entry and expansion, harms to competition and consumers, and the role of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).
     
  2. Evidence indicates high concentration at the top of the UK live music market. Analysis by the Association of Independent Festivals (AIF) suggests that Live Nation and its affiliates control around two thirds of tickets for 2025 arena, stadium and large outdoor concerts.[4] This sits alongside significant vertical integration between promotion, venue ownership and primary ticketing.
     
  3. At grassroots level, the market appears fragmented but fragile. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee has reported a net loss of 125 grassroots music venues (GMVs) in 2023, reducing the network to 835 venues.[1] Music Venues Trust (MVT) data show that more than a third of GMVs are loss‑making and that margins are extremely thin.[3] This points to barriers to survival and growth for smaller operators.
     
  4. Relationships between artists, promoters, venues and ticketing platforms can reinforce these patterns. Major promoters and ticketing companies can offer multi‑territory tour deals and marketing support that smaller firms cannot match. Artists and their agents often prefer these integrated packages, which can concentrate business in fewer hands and make it harder for independent promoters, venues and ticketing platforms to secure headline shows.
     
  5. Consumers have experienced opaque and confusing ticketing practices. The CMA’s investigation into Ticketmaster’s sale of Oasis reunion tour tickets found that fans were not given clear information about different pricing tiers and that “platinum” tickets were sold at large mark‑ups without clear added benefits. Ticketmaster has now given undertakings to improve pricing transparency and labelling.[6][7][8]
     
  6. The CMA has taken important consumer enforcement action in ticketing and in the secondary market, but has not yet conducted a full market study or market investigation into primary live music promotion and ticketing, despite growing concern about concentration and exclusivity.[1][2][4] This submission therefore recommends: a CMA market study into live music promotion, venues and ticketing; closer scrutiny of long‑term exclusive contracts where firms have significant market power; stronger sector‑wide requirements for upfront “all‑in” pricing and clear information on ticket types; and complementary government measures to support independent venues and promoters.

About the Submitter

  1. I am an independent policy researcher and human‑rights advocate specialising in competition policy, consumer protection and cultural sectors. I have no financial or contractual relationship with any promoter, venue operator or ticketing company addressed in this submission.
     
  2. This evidence is based entirely on publicly available material from UK Parliament, the CMA, trade bodies, independent research institutes and reputable news outlets. Key sources are listed in the References.
     
  3. The submission reflects a public interest perspective focused on fair competition, consumer outcomes and the long‑term health of the UK’s live music ecosystem.

Context and Background

  1. The Business and Trade Committee is examining characteristics of the UK live music industry that may adversely affect competition and market functioning, including the role of the CMA. The Committee is seeking written submissions on market structure, barriers to entry, harms to competition and consumers, and what more regulators should do. Written evidence is invited by 18 December 2025.
     
  2. Live music is a significant cultural and economic sector. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee has estimated that in 2022 there were around 37 million attendances at live music events, generating several billion pounds in gross value added.[1] Analysis by Economics Observatory describes the UK live music sector as a “cultural and economic powerhouse” with superstar tours and sold‑out arenas, but also points to rising costs, administrative burdens, declining earnings and grassroots venues closing.[2]
     
  3. This evidence adopts a competition and consumer‑focused lens. It recognises that not all problems in live music are competition problems: macroeconomic conditions, post‑pandemic recovery and cost pressures also play major roles. However, market structure and firm behaviour can exacerbate or mitigate those underlying pressures, and are the primary concern of this submission.

Evidence against the Committee’s Terms of Reference

4. Market structure and competition

Concentration in promotion, venues and ticketing

  1. At the top end of the live music market, promotion and festival ownership are highly concentrated. AIF’s 2025 festival ownership analysis finds that Live Nation owns three of the four UK festivals with capacity above 80,000 and has significant holdings across a wider portfolio of events.[4]
     
  2. AIF’s evidence to Parliament further reports that, based on a database of around 23 million tickets for 2025 arena, stadium and large outdoor concerts, Live Nation and its affiliates are responsible for roughly 66 per cent of those tickets.[4] This suggests a dominant position in large‑scale promotion and events.
     
  3. Ticketing is similarly concentrated. While precise current market share figures are not published, Ticketmaster remains the primary ticketing partner for many large arenas, stadiums and major venues and is integrated with Live Nation as its parent company.[2][4][6]
     
  4. At grassroots level, the market is more fragmented. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee has documented that 835 GMVs remained in operation at the end of 2023, after a net loss of 125 venues in that year.[1] MVT’s data show that more than a third of these venues are loss‑making and that margins across the segment are very low.[3] These findings indicate a large number of small operators with constrained viability rather than a concentrated structure.

Vertical integration and relationships between actors

  1. Live Nation group combines promotion, venue operation and primary ticketing (through Ticketmaster). Other major groups also combine promotion and venue interests. This vertical integration can produce efficiencies and investment in infrastructure, but it also creates scope to leverage market power across stages of the supply chain.
     
  2. In vertically integrated models, promoters may have incentives to route tours preferentially through their own venues and ticketing systems. Where the integrated group holds a large share of major artists or headline tours, this can make it difficult for rival promoters, venues and ticketing firms to compete on equal terms, even if there is no explicit contractual restriction.
     
  3. Relationships between artists, agents and promoters play an important role. Major integrated promoters can offer artists and their representatives multi‑territory tour packages, marketing support and access to large venues. Smaller promoters and venues typically cannot match this bundle of services. As a result, artists may feel that working with integrated groups is the safest or most lucrative option, even if this concentrates business in fewer hands. In turn, this can reinforce the position of integrated promoters and ticketing platforms, making it harder for competitors to win high‑profile tours.

Differences between segments and regions

  1. Evidence suggests a “two tier” structure. Economics Observatory notes that while superstar stadium tours are thriving, smaller venues and festivals face rising costs and high closure risk.[2] Independent festivals have reported multiple cancellations in recent years and have pointed to consolidation among larger festival operators.[2][4]
     
  2. At grassroots level, competition issues manifest less as dominance by a single firm and more as a struggle to cover costs. When small venues close, local consumers lose options for live music and independent promoters lose access to stages, gradually reducing competitive pressure on larger operators and reducing the diversity of live music provision.
     
  3. Regional disparities are evident in venue distribution and financial resilience. MVT data indicate particularly acute financial stress in smaller towns, where a higher proportion of GMVs are loss‑making.[3] In contrast, major cities such as London, Manchester and Glasgow host multiple large venues with relationships to different promoters, though large‑scale events remain dominated by a small number of companies. Detailed regional data on market shares are limited, and this is an area where further work by regulators or government would be valuable.
     
  4. Overall, competition conditions are not uniform. At large scale, high concentration and vertical integration appear to limit effective rivalry. At smaller scale, there are many operators but limited financial sustainability, which can reduce competitive pressure over time as venues and promoters exit the market.

5. Barriers to entry and expansion

Barriers facing new or smaller promoters and venues

  1. New and smaller promoters face significant financial and risk barriers. Securing a major artist typically requires substantial upfront guarantees, marketing spend and capacity to absorb losses if events underperform. Large integrated groups have access to capital, cross‑subsidy across their portfolios and long‑standing relationships with agents, which are not available to small entrants.
     
  2. Independent promoters and venues also face relationship and information barriers. The live music business is relationship‑driven. Agents and managers often prefer to work with established promoters who can offer multi‑city or multi‑year deals. This makes it difficult for new entrants to secure artists capable of filling larger venues, even if they are efficient and innovative.
     
  3. Grassroots venues face additional structural barriers. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee report identified rising business rates, energy costs and rents as key pressures on GMVs, alongside post‑pandemic debt.[1] MVT’s data show that many GMVs operate on extremely low margins and that cost inflation since 2022 has eroded profitability.[3] These pressures reduce capacity to invest and grow, which in turn constrains their competitive position relative to larger, better‑capitalised venues.

Exclusive deals and lack of fair access

  1. Long‑term exclusive contracts between venues and ticketing providers are common at larger scales. Many arenas and major theatres sign multi‑year exclusive agreements with a single ticketing company, often Ticketmaster.[2][5] This has two principal effects:
    a. Competing ticketing platforms are effectively excluded from a large portion of high‑value inventory.
    b. Consumers purchasing tickets for those venues cannot choose between ticketing providers on the basis of price or service.
     
  2. Exclusive or preferential relationships between promoters and venues can also limit access. Examples include promoters with first refusal on certain venue dates or long‑standing arrangements that, while not always contractually exclusive, function as de facto exclusivity in practice. This can hinder independent promoters from booking attractive dates or prime locations.
     
  3. In festival markets, non‑compete clauses and radius clauses can limit artists’ ability to perform for competing festivals in the same season or region. While some protection of an event’s commercial investment is understandable, widespread use of such clauses can restrict independent festivals’ access to headline talent and reduce consumer choice.
     
  4. Where these exclusive arrangements are entered into by firms with significant market power, they can act as barriers to entry and expansion. New ticketing platforms cannot gain scale without access to major venues. New promoters cannot grow beyond small venues if access to larger stages and popular artists is constrained.

Use of market power by vertically integrated groups

  1. Evidence of explicit abuse of dominance, such as retaliation against venues using rival suppliers, is limited in the UK public domain. However, the combination of high market share, vertical integration and exclusivity creates conditions in which such behaviour could arise and may discourage smaller firms from challenging incumbents.
     
  2. Academic and policy commentary on ticketing systems in the UK has raised concerns about the effects of long‑term exclusive contracts, vertical integration and opaque pricing on competition and consumer outcomes.[2][5] Even without clear evidence of specific abuses, the structural barriers described above appear sufficient to warrant closer examination by the CMA through a market study.

6. Competition harms and the role of the CMA

Harms to competition and consumers

  1. Consumers have faced high and unpredictable ticket prices for major events. Economics Observatory notes that buying tickets for large tours such as the Oasis reunion or Taylor Swift’s Eras tour has been characterised by queues, sudden price changes and confusion about availability.[2][5]
     
  2. The CMA’s investigation into Ticketmaster’s sale of Oasis reunion tickets found that fans were not properly informed about the existence of different pricing tiers or about the benefits of “platinum” tickets. Higher‑priced tickets were released while lower‑priced tickets were still being advertised, and labels such as “platinum” were used for seats that did not differ meaningfully from standard tickets.[6][7][8]
     
  3. Following this investigation, Ticketmaster has agreed to:
    a. Give advance notice if tiered pricing will be used.
    b. Provide clearer information about price ranges while customers are queuing.
    c. Stop using labels that suggest premium benefits where none exist.
    d. Report regularly to the CMA on its compliance.[6][8]
     
  4. These undertakings are welcome, but they also demonstrate that, in a market with limited effective rivalry at the top end, a dominant ticketing platform can operate with opaque and confusing practices until regulatory intervention occurs.
     
  5. Secondary ticketing has been a further source of consumer harm. Earlier CMA enforcement against resale platforms such as Viagogo addressed misleading information on ticket validity and seller identity. Despite those steps, high mark‑ups and risks of fraud persist in the resale market.[2] The persistence of touting at scale suggests that the primary market is not fully meeting demand or providing sufficient authorised resale options, and that consumers lack effective competitive alternatives once initial allocations are sold.
     
  6. Reduced viability and closure of grassroots venues harm both competition and consumers. When GMVs close, local audiences lose choice and access, and new artists lose platforms for development. MVT emphasises that GMVs effectively subsidise the wider industry by absorbing early‑stage risk and providing “research and development” for future headline acts, but without corresponding financial support.[1][3] Over time, this can narrow the pool of artists able to progress to larger stages and reduce competitive pressure on larger promoters and venues.

Is the CMA doing enough to keep competition fair?

  1. The CMA has used its consumer protection powers in relation to primary ticketing and secondary ticketing. The Oasis case shows a willingness to secure undertakings on pricing transparency and to threaten litigation where voluntary compliance is not forthcoming.[6][8]
     
  2. However, the CMA has not recently undertaken a full market study or market investigation into the structure of the live music promotion and ticketing sector. The last major competition assessment relating to Live Nation and Ticketmaster in the UK was the merger review conducted by the Competition Commission in 2010. Market conditions and the scale of integrated operations have evolved substantially since then.
     
  3. Trade bodies representing independent festivals and venues have explicitly called for a CMA investigation into Live Nation’s position in the UK live music market.[4] These calls, combined with evidence of high concentration and exclusivity, suggest that a structural review is overdue.
     
  4. It is recognised that the CMA must prioritise among many sectors and that competition cases require strong evidence. Nonetheless, given the economic and cultural importance of live music, and the scale of consumer detriment evidenced in recent ticketing controversies, there is a strong case for the CMA to allocate resources to a market study, drawing on evidence collected by this Committee.

Recommendations

  1. In light of the evidence above, the following recommendations are offered for the Committee’s consideration.

Recommendation 1: CMA market study into live music promotion and ticketing

  1. The Committee may wish to recommend that the CMA initiate a market study into the live music sector, covering:
    a. Primary promotion of large‑scale concerts and festivals.
    b. Venue ownership and control.
    c. Primary ticketing services.
     
  2. Such a study should examine concentration, vertical integration, exclusive contracts and barriers to entry, and assess whether the market is delivering fair outcomes for consumers and smaller businesses. Depending on the findings, the CMA could consider a market investigation reference and remedies, including behavioural commitments or structural measures if warranted.

Recommendation 2: Scrutiny and limits on long‑term exclusivity

  1. The Committee may wish to encourage the CMA to scrutinise long‑term exclusive venue contracts and similar arrangements where they involve firms with significant market power. The CMA could:
    a. Treat widespread long‑term exclusivity as a potential feature of an adverse effect on competition in any market reference.
    b. Develop guidance on when exclusivity risks foreclosing competition in live music and ticketing.
     
  2. Government could also consider whether sector‑specific guidance or codes of practice are needed, for example by encouraging reasonable limits on the duration and scope of exclusivity in contracts involving core infrastructure such as major arenas.

Recommendation 3: Strengthen transparency and “all‑in” pricing

  1. Building on the Oasis case, the Committee may wish to recommend that:
    a. The CMA use its new powers under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act to enforce against drip pricing and opaque ticket labelling across the sector.
    b. Ticket sellers be required to display total prices, including compulsory fees, upfront, and to provide clear information about any tiered or dynamic pricing before customers join queues.[6][8]
     
  2. The Committee could also encourage the CMA to monitor the implementation of Ticketmaster’s undertakings and to extend similar expectations to all major ticketing platforms to ensure a level playing field.

Recommendation 4: Support for independent venues and promoters

  1. While not a matter for the CMA alone, the viability of independent venues and promoters is integral to long‑term competition. The Committee may wish to:
    a. Endorse relevant recommendations from the Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s report on grassroots music venues, including measures on business rates and targeted support.[1]
    b. Encourage government and industry to explore mechanisms such as a modest levy on large arena shows to fund support for GMVs, as proposed by stakeholders including MVT.[1][3]
     
  2. These measures would help ensure that smaller operators remain in the market to provide competitive pressure and a pipeline of new artists and events.

Recommendation 5: Ongoing Parliamentary oversight

  1. The Committee could commit to revisiting this issue after the CMA has responded to any recommendation for a market study, and after key undertakings in ticketing have been implemented. Joint working or information sharing with the Culture, Media and Sport Committee may help maintain a coherent approach across competition and cultural policy.

Committee may wish to ask…

  1. To the CMA:
    a. What evidence would be needed for the CMA to launch a market study into live music promotion and ticketing, and does the CMA consider that threshold may already be met?
    b. How does the CMA prioritise work on sectors such as live music, which are culturally significant but may not be the largest in terms of consumer expenditure?
    c. Does the CMA consider long‑term exclusive venue contracts between dominant ticketing firms and major venues to be a potential competition concern in the UK?
     
  2. To large vertically integrated groups (for example, Live Nation/Ticketmaster and other major promoters):
    a. What proportion of their UK concerts and festivals are promoted by their own entities compared with independent partners?
    b. How many UK venues do they own or operate, and how many of those are subject to exclusive ticketing contracts?
    c. What safeguards do they have to ensure that their vertical integration does not disadvantage independent promoters, venues or ticketing firms?
     
  3. To independent venues, promoters and festivals:
    a. In what ways do exclusive venue or artist contracts limit their ability to compete?
    b. Are there examples where they have lost opportunities because of existing relationships between artists, agents, large promoters or ticketing firms?
    c. What forms of regulatory or policy intervention would most effectively lower barriers to entry and expansion for them?

Risks and Further Work

  1. Data gaps. Publicly available data on current market shares in promotion and ticketing are limited. Much of the available evidence comes from trade bodies and individual analyses. A CMA market study would be well placed to obtain comprehensive data directly from firms and to verify or refine existing estimates.
     
  2. Causality. Some of the harms described, such as venue closures, are driven by cost pressures and wider economic conditions as well as competition issues. Further work is needed to disentangle these factors and to assess how market structure interacts with other pressures to shape outcomes.
     
  3. Regional analysis. Evidence on regional differences in competition is currently patchy. It would be useful for the CMA or government to commission detailed mapping of live music provision by region, including the distribution of venue ownership, promoter presence and ticketing partnerships.
     
  4. Behavioural evidence. There is limited public evidence of direct abuses of dominance in the UK. Further work (perhaps through confidential submissions to the CMA or this Committee) could gather experiences from venues, promoters and artists who may be reluctant to speak publicly. This would help assess whether structural concerns translate into specific anti‑competitive conduct.

References

[1] House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Grassroots music venues, Seventh Report of Session 2023-24, HC 527, 11 May 2024. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmcumeds/527/report.html

[2] Meyrick, C., “Live music in the UK: what’s the state of the industry?”, Economics Observatory, 7 November 2024. Available at: https://www.economicsobservatory.com/live-music-in-the-uk-whats-the-state-of-the-industry

[3] Savage, M., “Over a third of UK grassroots music venues are loss‑making, charity finds”, The Guardian, 24 January 2024, reporting Music Venues Trust annual data. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/music/2024/jan/24/over-a-third-of-uk-grassroots-music-venues-are-loss-making-charity-finds

[4] Association of Independent Festivals, “AIF calls for Competition and Markets Authority to investigate Live Nation”, 8 July 2025. Available at: https://www.aiforg.com/blog-database/aif-calls-for-investigation-live-nation

[5] Waterson, M., “How could the system for live event ticketing be improved?”, Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE), University of Warwick, 23 September 2024; and summary by Economics Observatory. Available at: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/23-09-24-how_could_the_system_for_live_event_ticketing_be_improved/ and https://www.economicsobservatory.com/how-could-the-system-for-live-event-ticketing-be-improved

[6] Competition and Markets Authority, “CMA secures changes from Ticketmaster following Oasis tickets investigation”, 25 September 2025. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-secures-changes-from-ticketmaster-following-oasis-tickets-investigation

[7] Reuters, “UK secures commitments from Ticketmaster after Oasis tour issue”, 25 September 2025. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/uk-secures-commitments-ticketmaster-after-oasis-tour-issue-2025-09-25/

[8] Taylor Wessing, “Roll with it: Ticketmaster gives CMA undertakings on ticket pricing transparency”, 22 October 2025; and RPC, “CMA secures undertakings from Ticketmaster on dynamic pricing following Oasis investigation”, 18 November 2025. Available at: https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2025/10/rd-roll-with-it-ticketmaster-gives-cma-undertakings-on-ticket-pricing-transparency and https://www.rpclegal.com/snapshots/consumer/autumn-2025/cma-secures-undertakings-from-ticketmaster-on-dynamic-pricing-following-oasis-investigation/