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Written evidence submitted by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) (RTS4512)
Introduction
The TUC is the voice of Britain at work. We represent more than 5.5 million working people in 47 unions across the economy. We campaign for more and better jobs and a better working life for everyone, and we support trade unions to grow and thrive.
The TUC shares the government’s aims of a compassionate, fair and managed approach to migration. The Skilled Workers Visa scheme, introduced in the aftermath of Brexit, has consistently failed to meet its intended objectives. While the policy was designed to facilitate the entry and retention of essential workers to address skill shortages across the UK, its rigid criteria and income thresholds have instead exacerbated labour gaps in critical sectors.
We remain concerned that the proposals to reform the route to settlement will worsen this instability. This policy is very likely to negatively impact migrants in the UK, delay integration, exacerbate labour shortages, facilitate exploitation and abuse, and importantly, hinder the ability of migrant workers to advance conditions across the labour market.
What evidence is there on the effect that pathways to settlement have on immigration and rates of settlement?
As migrant workers will need to apply for additional visa renewals, there is a greater chance that people will be pushed out of status (their permission to be in the UK) due to the cost. As a result of extending the qualifying period for settlement, migrant workers who have made vital contributions to UK communities and the economy will be trapped in exploitation for longer due to difficulties in changing to a new sponsoring employer, rendering them second class citizens in the UK for longer.
Anecdotal information provided by affiliated unions points to early evidence that many workers in key sectors are deciding to leave the UK due to the proposed changes. This risks exacerbating the skills and labour shortage that the UK is already facing. Additionally, in a survey conducted by the Royal College of Nursing, 60% of nurses without indefinite leave to remain (ILR) reported that the proposed changes are “very likely” to influence their decision to remain in the UK.[1]
What is the likely impact of longer routes to settlement on businesses and employers, including international recruitment of higher-skilled workers?
TUC-affiliated trade unions have highlighted recruitment crises in a number of key sectors that are essential for state infrastructure and our communities. A non-exhaustive list includes:
Doubling the length of the route to settlement will exacerbate recruitment crises by presenting a less attractive offer to migrant workers. If the route to settlement is extended to 10 years, the UK will have some of the longest routes to settlement among high-income countries, though comparable to Japan and Switzerland. This will result in the UK being less able to attract and retain workers. Failing to staff crucial sectors properly will result in unsustainable workloads for remaining workers, leading to stress, sickness absence and turnover, further degrading key institutions.
Migrants with permanent residency have greater leverage in the labour market compared to those on employer-tied work visas due to their ability to change employer more easily, leading to better pay and working conditions. Research on refugees also indicates that holding permanent or more secure immigration status is linked to better labour market integration.[11] Furthermore, the 10-year route to settlement means that workers will be reliant on their employer for a longer period of time due to their need for visa sponsorship. This increases the risks to workers of abuse and exploitation, while undermining their ability to push for better conditions because the employers know they cannot simply change employment.[12]
The Low Pay Commission found that “the surest way for [underpaid workers] to increase their pay and escape underpayment is to move jobs; workers staying in the same job are much more likely to remain ‘stuck’ in underpayment.”[13] As such, changing employer is linked to the ability to secure full or, indeed, higher pay.[14] Sponsorship erects barriers to switching employers due to the need to find an employer willing and able to hire a worker on a sponsored visa. In 2024, Jobbatical, found that only around 105,000 UK businesses held a sponsor licence,[15] despite the Government estimating that, in 2024, there were around 5.5 million private sector businesses in the UK.[16] This points to fewer than 2% of private sector businesses holding sponsorship licences. Keeping migrant workers on restrictive visas without the freedom offered by leave to remain means that they are less able to fully participate in the labour market and are limited to a small pool of employers.
Workers on sponsored visas are also more fearful of joining or engaging in trade unions.[17] This creates downwards pressures across sectors as a whole, as sponsorship impedes workers’ ability to campaign for better pay and conditions or fight back against poor treatment. Extending the period required to achieve settlement would further entrench these barriers, prolonging dependence on sponsoring employers and limiting opportunities for workers to move jobs and improve pay and conditions.
What is the likely impact of longer routes and stricter requirements for settlement on migrant households already in the UK? This could include:
The exorbitant costs of visa renewal applications already cause significant hardship. Currently, visa fees are set significantly higher than the administrative cost.[18] A migrant on a three-year Skilled Worker visa currently with no dependants pays around £9,900 in fees before qualifying for settlement. Under the new rules, this would rise to £16,900[19]mainly because the Immigration Health Surcharge must now be paid for ten years instead of five, assuming the visa is renewed three times[20] Proposed during a time of severe financial strain, this change would place an even greater burden on working families who are already struggling to make ends meet. Many households rely on borrowing to cover the cost of their visa fees. A survey conducted by IPPR, Praxis and Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit highlighted a clear link between the 10-year route and household financial hardship. Nearly half of respondents of respondents said that they find it hard to pay for essential costs (such as food, rent and childcare costs)[21]
Beyond the economic hardship and mental health issues that will emerge from the extension of the route,[22] the high costs will lead to some workers losing their immigration status due to an inability to pay for visa renewal fees. Having built ties (including families) in the UK over an extended period, many migrants who longer hold a valid visa will remain in the UK and could end up working irregularly. This is well recognised as a central factor in creating a risk of exploitation,[23] as exploitative employers know that undocumented workers can’t speak out for fear of immigration consequences. Moreover, because most law-abiding employers cannot hire them due to Right to Work checks, many undocumented workers are compelled to take jobs with very low pay, poor working conditions, inadequate treatment, and minimal oversight.[24] This proposed policy will leave many migrant workers who arrived in the UK in good faith to contribute to our communities at a serious risk of exploitation and abuse.
Retrospective application of the 10-year route to settlement will also impact migrant households who made plans and budgeted according to a legitimate expectation that they could acquire leave to remain within the original five years. One UNISON member said that they felt ‘devastated’ by the announcement to extend the route to settlement and its possible retrospective effect. Another said that they had made a decision with their family to turn down a job offer from Canada as they had already made a commitment to the UK. This directly affects individuals who have made significant contributions to society and complied with the terms that were set out for them when they came to the UK.[25]
What potential effect could changes to eligibility for settlement have on integration?
As highlighted above, the financial strain produced by additional visa costs as well as the dampening effect on trade union engagement means that workers will be less able to participate in social life and integrate into their communities.
The Migration Observatory recognise that permanent status may incentivise migrants to invest more heavily into language learning and developing community ties.[26] Longer paths to permanent status will delay access to citizenship and therefore delay access to the full roster of rights available to British citizens. Acquiring citizenship impacts naturalised immigrants’ sense of belonging, trust in institutions and their contribution to the public purse via formal participation in the labour market. As highlighted by University College London, the ‘most credible academic studies show that citizenship accelerates the economic, social and political integration of immigrants.’[27] Grants of citizenship were recognised as substantially improving migrants’ sense of belonging as well as their trust in institutions.[28] Moreover, acquiring citizenship was linked to migrants becoming more politically active, including gaining political knowledge, and engaging in formal politics.[29] Doubling the length of time to ILR may act to undermine opportunities for integration by delaying incentives to meaningful participation and belonging.
How should “long-term contribution” to the UK be defined and quantified, when considering pathways to settlement? This could include how the following elements should be defined and weighted:
The criteria for “long-term contribution” outlined by the Home Secretary on 29 September include:
The TUC strongly opposes these proposals for several reasons:
Undervaluing vital contributions: The TUC rejects the premise that an additional measure of “long-term contribution” is necessary. Migrant workers already contribute substantially to the UK, economically, socially, and culturally, by working, paying taxes, and being integral members of our communities.
A significant proportion of those now affected by ILR policy changes previously played key roles during the pandemic, providing essential services to communities. Many who arrived later to support recovery continue to work in similarly critical areas of the economy. Indeed, the extension of the qualifying period to 15 years for those on the Skilled Worker route on a role below RQF level 6 will target precisely this cohort of workers, for instance, those who’ve contributed to looking after our communities on the Health and Care Work visa. Given the known risk of exploitation on this route,[30] many workers will be trapped in exploitative roles for longer.
Earlier forecasts predicting that following Brexit, lower net migration would shrink the labour force and reduce GDP have proven inaccurate. Instead, a surge in non-EU migration has helped to offset workforce shortages, particularly in health and social care, while supporting growth in high-productivity service sectors and compensating for the decline in EU-origin workers. The rapid increase in migrants entering through routes beyond the main Skilled Worker visa, such as the Graduate visa and dependants of work and study visa holders, appears to have softened the negative economic impacts of the end of free movement post-Brexit.[31]
Impact on low earners: Linking the time to settlement to total taxable income equates contribution with salary, ignoring the fact that many essential roles, such as in care, health, and hospitality, are low paid yet vital to the UK economy and society. These proposals will have a disproportionately harsh impact on low earners and carers, who will forced to make repeated expensive applications and suffer through a longer period of instability before they’re entitled to ILR. These changes would move the goalposts, changing rules that informed their decisions made in good faith to move to the UK to contribute to our communities.
Harmful benefit restrictions: Most migrant workers without settled status already have no recourse to public funds.[32] The TUC has previously called for access to public funds for migrant workers, particularly when employment ends through no fault of the worker.[33] Denying this support risks pushing entire households into poverty. Particularly with the No Recourse to Public Funds condition that prevents non-EU citizens on work, study, or family visas from accessing most benefits, including Universal Credit or Child Benefit means that migrant workers pay much more in terms of taxes than they receive. The ramifications of making settlement subject to the No Recourse to Public Funds condition will have a particularly devastating effect on migrant households, who will need to go for longer without access to an essential safety net. Migrant households already face additional costs on top of the taxes they already pay. The Immigration Health Surcharge (£1,035 per year in most cases) is paid as a part of the visa application and grant the visa holder access to free health services in the UK. Linking non-receipt of benefits to the length of time to settlement ignores that migrants pay much more in taxes than they receive in benefits.[34]
Most people on temporary visas cannot access benefits, with refugees being a notable exception. Extending the route to settlement would mean some migrants remain excluded from benefits for a longer period. Penalising the few migrants who are eligible for receiving support from our social safety net, further entrenches the risks of poverty.
Lack of ESOL funding: Language skills are essential for workers to understand employment rights, engage in safety training, and challenge exploitation. However, the TUC is concerned that using English-language proficiency as a criterion for reducing the time to settlement unfairly penalises workers, particularly when public funding for ESOL provision has been withdrawn. The TUC has previously raised concerns that cuts to ESOL provision shifted the financial burden of language training onto low-paid, vulnerable workers, with many employers refusing to step in.[35] This not only undermines workplace cohesion but also creates a two-tier system that disproportionately harms working migrants. Conditioning faster settlement on language skills whilst failing to reinstate funding for ESOL is therefore both unfair and counterproductive to the purported aim of integration.
What exemptions should there be to the new rules?
The TUC opposes the extension of the ILR route to 10-years in its entirety.
We note that members in affiliated trade unions have expressed the need to ensure that workers’ contributions in vital sectors are recognised. For instance, UNISON has recommended that any expedited route to settlement which requires workers to prove their contribution should recognise the already exceptional contribution made by those working in public services – particularly those in health and social care. Similarly, NEU has called for teaching to be recognised as a priority profession within any future “earned settlement” or fast-track ILR framework. The Government should consult with trade unions to ensure that the contributions of workers in key sectors are recognised and that vital sectors are safeguarded and sustainably staffed.
In the Immigration White Paper, the Government recognised a need for shorter routes for survivors of domestic abuse, who will continue to qualify for settlement after five years, and for victims of domestic abuse. We note that workers who have faced labour exploitation should be considered in a similar manner. It is impossible for survivors to recover and rebuild their lives while living with the insecurity that comes with not having leave to remain. Moreover, many will have complex support needs, for instance, arising out of the trauma of their experience, and therefore it would be inappropriate and unduly harsh to expect them to meet the ‘contribution’ conditions required for the reduced period of time until settlement.
The separate proposal in the Immigration White Paper for the development of sector workforce strategies is potentially positive. In social care the TUC and affiliates have long called for the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to develop a long-term comprehensive care workforce strategy.[36] However, as DHSC have confirmed, the details remains to be confirmed, including how comprehensive a social care workforce strategy would be, whether it would be owned and led by DHSC, and how sector stakeholders – including the TUC and unions – will be able to contribute to its development and oversight. Particularly in light of any changes to the existing or future workforce that would arise from the implementation of the suggested extension of the qualifying period for ILR, the TUC and other unions should have opportunities to robustly engage in the development of sector workforce strategies.
Dec 2025
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[1] Gregory, A., (2025). "Up to 50,000 nurses could quit UK over immigration plans, survey suggests." The Guardian.
[2] Sandford, D., (2025). ‘Prison officers feel they’re dicing with death every day’. BBC.
[3] Syal. R., (2025) "Prison system was days from collapse three times under Sunak, review finds." The Guardian.
[4] UNISON (2025). "Briefing: Westminster Hall Debate on Keeping the ILR pathway for existing Skilled Worker Visa Holders." UNISON.
[5] Gregory, A., (2025). "Up to 50,000 nurses could quit UK over immigration plans, survey suggests." The Guardian.
[6] Gregory, A., (2025). "Up to 50,000 nurses could quit UK over immigration plans, survey suggests." The Guardian.
[7] RMT (2025). "RMT demonstration against work visa rule changes affecting rail staff". RMT.
[8] RMT (2025). "Apprentices Charter". RMT.
[9] French, S., (2024). "Austerity has triggered DWP staffing crisis, research finds." PCS.
[10] National Education Union (2025). "Education at a glance 2025: OECD data confirms teacher retention crisis.” NEU.
[11] Bertrand, A.L.(2019). "Refugees’ trajectories in Switzerland: Impact of residence permits on labour market integration." Quetelet Journal.
[12] Labour Exploitation Advisory Group (2024). “So I decided to carry on…”: The continuum of exploitation in practice”. Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX); Sehic, A., (2025). “Proposals to double settlement requirements will increase exploitation, MPs tell Home Office“. Work Rights Centre.
[13] Low Pay Commission (2023). “Compliance and enforcement of the National Minimum Wage“. Gov.uk ; Low Pay Commission (2023). “Lack of job mobility traps low-paid workers in underpayment“. Gov.uk.
[14] Low Pay Commission (2023). “Compliance and enforcement of the National Minimum Wage“. Gov.uk.
[15] Faragher, J. (2024). “Sponsor licence numbers up 44% year on year”. Personnel Today.
[16] Department for Business and Trade (2024). “Official Statistics: Business population estimates for the UK and regions 2024: statistical release”. Gov.uk.
[17] Theodoropoulos, P. (2018). “Barriers to migrant worker unionization: Examining the impact of structural and subjective barriers to migrant worker unionization in the UK”. Journal of Labor and Society.; Marino, S., et Al. ( 2015). “Trade unions, immigration and immigrants in Europe revisited: Unions’ attitudes and actions under new conditions”. Comparative Migration Studies.
[18] Migration Observatory (2024). “Q&A: Immigration fees in the UK”. University of Oxford.
[19] https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/changes-to-settlement-what-do-they-mean/
[20] Migration Observatory (2025). “Changes to settlement: what do they mean?” University of Oxford.
[21] Praxis, IPPR & GMAIU (2023). “A Punishing Process: Experiences of People on the 10-year Route to Settlement. Praxis.
[22] IPPR (2023). “Revealed: the ‘devastating’ impact of 10-year process endured by thousands on course to settle in UK”. IPPR.
[23] Labour Exploitation Advisory Group (2024). “So I decided to carry on…”: The continuum of exploitation in practice”. Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX).
[24] id.
[25] UNISON (2025). "Briefing: Westminster Hall Debate on Keeping the ILR pathway for existing Skilled Worker Visa Holders." UNISON.
[26] Migration Observatory (2025). “Changes to settlement: what do they mean?” University of Oxford.
[27] UCL Policy Lab (2023). ”Brief Credible Evidence on the Impact of Citizenship Acquisition”. UCL.
[28] Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Pietrantuono, G. (2015). “Naturalization fosters the long-term political integration of immigrants.“ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[29] Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Pietrantuono, G. (2017). “Catalyst or Crown: Does Naturalization Promote the Long-Term Social Integration of Immigrants?” American Political Science Review.
[30] Murray, J. (2025). “Less than 4% of exploited care workers helped by UK government scheme”. The Guardian.
[31] Portes, J., (2025). “Unintended Consequences? The Changing Composition of Immigration to the UK after Brexit”. National Institute Economic Review.
[32] McKinney, C. et al. (2025). “No recourse to public funds” House of Commons Library.
[33] TUC (2023). “An inspection of the immigration system as it relates to the social care sector - TUC response”. TUC.
[34] Migration Observatory (2024). “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK”. University of Oxford.
[35] TUC (2008). “English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and Community Cohesion”. TUC.
[36] See: Hunt, A. & Pound, N. (2023). “A strategy for the care workforce”. TUC.