ABOUT

1. This submission has been prepared by Dr Gillian McKay, a researcher in peace studies and the protection of civilians in armed conflict at Leeds Beckett University. Her PhD research, supervised in the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Leeds, examined the UK government's operational approach to preventing mass atrocities. She has also worked as a practitioner and consultant in multiple contexts across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding sectors.

SUMMARY

2. This submission draws on case study research examining FCDO programmes in Kenya and insights from area-based monitoring of FCDO programmes in Myanmar. Three considerations emerge around the need to: (1) preserve flexible programming frameworks that enable adaptive management; (2) strengthen multi-level partnerships that privilege local ownership; and (3) institutionalise lessons learned for strategic and operational coherence. These considerations are particularly relevant for SDG16 and atrocity prevention work, highlighting how UK aid and assistance can help to mitigate upstream and imminent risks before crises escalate.

INTRODUCTION

3. IDC Chair Sarah Champion recently observed that while “[p]revention and early intervention should be core to all FCDO work […] they are often seen as a ‘nice to have’.”[1] This is problematic given not only the proliferation of violent conflict and mass atrocities but also growing resource constraints. Few dispute that prevention is more cost-effective than responding to crises once they escalate.[2] In keeping with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s view that budget cuts also offer an opportunity to review allocations and strengthen frameworks,[3] this submission highlights three ways in which the FCDO can help to mitigate conflict and atrocity risks despite reduced funds: flexible programming, multi-level partnerships, and lessons learned.

FLEXIBLE PROGRAMMING

4. Flexibility empowers local partners to respond to evolving dynamics in real-time, which is critical for addressing both upstream and imminent risks. The Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the Northern and Coastal Regions of Kenya (REINVENT) programme offers a key example.[4] One programme annual review echoed the views of one official who praised REINVENT’s ability to respond to emerging risks despite losing up to 50% of its budget as implementation was ongoing.[5] It adopted a 'problem-driven iterative adaptation' approach, meaning the objective to foster police accountability and professionalism was sufficiently flexible to respond to new risks.

5. For example, when COVID-19 lockdowns were announced in 2020, Kenyan police used excessive force to manage crowds returning to mainland Kenya from Mombasa Island. Over subsequent weeks and months, the UK worked with the Kenyan interior ministry and police to build a shared understanding of COVID-19 as a public health crisis, shape future police responses, and mitigate police-civilian tensions. One official explained that this would not have been possible without “a programme that could quickly adapt [...] our log frame and theory of change is designed in a way that enables flexibility and adaptation.”[6] This flexibility was key in preparing for the 2022 general election, helping to build the inhibitory capacity of Kenyan institutions against pervasive drivers and emergent risks. The space to balance long-term institutional reforms with short-term security responses was seen as critical. Another programme, discussed more below, came to a similar conclusion: that “[f]lexible programme design is necessary to promptly respond to last minute requests and funding gaps.”[7]

6. Such adaptive implementation should also be backed by iterative monitoring, particularly in contexts vulnerable to access restrictions. Area-based third-party monitoring of the FCDO’s humanitarian programming in Myanmar demonstrates the value of this approach[8] and aligns with Humanitarian Reset calls for more integrated programming.[9] In navigating data-scarcity, the approach triangulates data across multiple sources, helps to determine whether aid is reaching intended communities, probes why gaps exist, enables adaptations and capacity building, and informs scenario planning and future funding allocations. The case reinforces that flexible programming requires both adaptable frameworks and monitoring systems that can verify implementation and identify risks in real-time. The scalability of this model offers a pathway for accountability and adaptive management in complex crises.

MULTI-LEVEL PARTNERSHIPS

7. In combining the UK’s diplomatic and development leverage in Kenya, political engagement complemented the provision of technical development assistance. REINVENT activities converged with the Kenya Elections Support Programme (KESP), designed to facilitate a “credible, peaceful and inclusive” vote in 2022.[10]  Moreover, officials felt that the FCO-DfID merger had "really helped bring to bear the strengths of the UK in Kenya", especially on governance and security.[11] Externally, the High Commissioner hosted a regular informal “dialogue space” with her US counterpart, bringing together senior leaders from civil society, religious groups, and the private sector to communicate risks and identify “opportunities for pressing particular messages, either using official channels or privately.”[12] The UK also co-convened a governance group, bringing together Heads of Missions, with Denmark, engaged with other donor, gender, and elections groups on a range of issues, and met with Google and Meta to discuss online election-related risks. These relationships contributed to what one practitioner perceived to be a vital sense that "the world [was] watching".[13]

8. On a national level, REINVENT engaged with the Kenyan police, interior ministry, and First Lady, including to address the risk of sexual and gender-based violence. The FCDO also supported the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) to track and mitigate online harms. KESP provided technical assistance to build capacities in the judiciary and core electoral management body. A consortium of four (I)NGOs was established through KESP to increase civic participation and monitoring of elections and increase public trust in electoral institutions. However, there was a perception among organisations working at a community level of little appetite, even apathy, among donors to fund atrocity prevention: “if you ask anyone, ‘did you see the UK playing a role in supporting peaceful elections in Kenya?’ most likely everybody will tell you they didn't do anything.”[14] This may have been due to low operational profiles for security reasons, but it also points to critical gaps in operationalisation.

9. The Myanmar case also demonstrates the importance of partner feedback loops and respect for the operational realities of local actors. In restricted access environments, trusted intermediaries can play a crucial role, particularly for adaptive management. Iterative monitoring acknowledges challenges while still enabling the FCDO to verify activities, assess interim impact, and identify opportunities to make adjustments or build certain capacities. This balance of maintaining robust oversight while protecting local stakeholders is vital for sustaining meaningful partnerships in complex crises, and reinforces an important need for local actors to be viewed as active partners, not just passive aid recipients. It also maximises accountability while minimising costs where traditional monitoring is prohibitively expensive or dangerous.

LESSONS LEARNED

10. Through KESP, the prevention of mass atrocities was considered to be “an underlying theme” of the UK's “overarching objective to promote democracy”.[15] By factoring atrocity risks into programme design and implementation, the UK was able to not only pursue its objective to promote democracy but also mitigate the risk of mass atrocity. Despite no explicit labelling as such, the Kenya case underscores the importance of institutionalising lessons learned. The ‘election-cycle approach’ adopted in KESP means that lessons have been continuously learned as officials reflect on the last election and look forward to the next. The need for enhanced institutional capacity to oversee credible elections was one such lesson that directly influenced KESP design and enabled officials to proactively contribute to the mitigation of key atrocity risks.

11. The iterative nature of area-based monitoring in Myanmar demonstrates the value of similar principles of continuous learning and adaptation. The monitoring objectives evolved over time to meet the shifting needs and priorities of the FCDO. While core commitments remained constant, each monitoring cycle built on lessons learned from the previous, allowing for methodological refinements, targeted data collection, and adaptation to operational landscapes. This created institutional memory about what works in highly restricted operating environments; knowledge that can inform the FCDO’s approach in other fragile, conflict-affected, and post-conflict contexts.

12. The approaches in both Myanmar and Kenya illustrate how institutionalised learning mechanisms enable more proactive and coherent programming. They share key features: regular cycles of reflection and adjustment, capturing lessons in real-time as opposed to retrospectively, and building organisational knowledge that transcends individual staff rotations. The Kenya case shows that this works for predictable events like elections. The Myanmar case shows it has significant value even in unpredictable complex crises. Together, they demonstrate that systems for continuous learning – rather than infrequent evaluations – are important for adaptive management and the effective use of constrained resources. Institutional learning prevents the repetition of past failures and enables an approach which is more proactive and less costly than the reactive status quo. Moreover, building institutional capacity through iterative mechanisms fosters sustainable change that can help to reduce aid dependency.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

13. The NCIC claimed the 2022 presidential vote was one of “the most peaceful elections Kenya has ever had”[16] demonstrating that support can help to successfully mitigate atrocity risks when key elements align. This success was built on years of sustained engagement, learning from past successes and failures, and programme design that balanced long-term institutional capacity building with short-term crisis response.

14. To address the scale and complexity of the challenges ahead, the future of UK aid must be proactive, flexible, strategic, and coherent. Three considerations stand out:

(i)     Preserve flexible programming frameworks that enable adaptive management and timely response to evolving dynamics while maintaining an overarching focus on long-term objectives and mitigating the need for wholesale redesign.

(ii)  Strengthen multi-level partnerships that privilege local ownership, ensuring the UK’s convening powers are leveraged and inclusive communication strategies developed to bridge local-global divides and warning-response gaps.

(iii) Institutionalise lessons learned for strategic and operational coherence, preventing the repetition of past failures and enabling a proactive approach supported by an accountable senior leadership and robust decision-making.