Future of UK aid and development assistance - written evidence

The author:

Dr Irene Morlino is a Visiting Fellow in the Department of International Relations at LSE. She is also a Visiting Professor in International Conflict Management at Escola Superior d’Administració i Direcció d'Empreses (ESADE) in Barcelona. Her research focuses on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in contexts of conflict and crises, as well as European foreign, security, and defence policy. Her book Humanitarian Aid and the European Union: An Analysis of its Effectiveness in the Field is forthcoming. She is also working on the relationship between host countries and recipient populations, as well as on the EU crisis response in the West Bank (articles forthcoming).

Dr Morlino has received the LSE International Relations Department’s “Dominique Jacquin-Berdal PhD Prize for outstanding thesis”. She has been a Visiting Scholar at the Minda de Gunzburg Centre for European Studies (CES) at Harvard University and a visiting PhD fellow at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). She has also worked with international organisations, including the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in Rome, and International IDEA at the United Nations in New York. She teaches International Conflict Management at ESADE, and she has taught EU security and defence policy and International Politics, among other courses, at LSE. She holds a PhD in International Relations from LSE, a Master’s in European Affairs from SciencesPo Paris, and a Bachelor’s in Political Science from LUISS Guido Carli in Rome.

 

  1. Introduction

This submission responds to the Committee’s call for evidence on the Future of UK aid and development assistance, focusing on the question “How can the UK’s approach to development be sufficiently flexible to respond to what its development partners need the most?”.

 

Drawing on my forthcoming book Humanitarian Aid and the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of its Effectiveness in the Field, and on research examining the effectiveness of European Union humanitarian aid (DG ECHO) between 2015 and 2020, based on a triangulation of data from 71 interviews with EU, UN, NGO, and FCDO practitioners, official documents, and comparative case studies in Myanmar, Lebanon, Mozambique, and Mali, this evidence identifies key lessons for the UK. It shows that aid adaptability depends less on financial scale than on local ownership, funding flexibility, and collegiality among actors.

 

The empirical findings demonstrate that to be flexible, the UK approach should therefore prioritise locally owned resilience programmes, integrated humanitarian-development funding, and stronger organisational culture, coordination and collegiality among aid actors.

 

Flexibility is not only a managerial quality but a political and relational one. The UK’s development strategy will best serve its partners when it shares power, funding, and knowledge, investing in relationships of trust that allow programmes to adapt to their specific contexts. A system that empowers local decision-makers and integrates humanitarian and development goals will enable increased flexibility in the UK’s development approach and be more responsive to what partners need most: ownership and genuine partnership.

 

  1. Why do current models limit flexibility?

 

Traditional development cooperation has been organised around two rigid pillars: short-term humanitarian relief and long-term development aid. Each operates with distinct mandates, funding streams, and accountability frameworks. This fragmentation hinders flexibility.

 

Evidence from EU humanitarian programming shows that separate budgets and planning cycles produce parallel systems, one designed for emergency response and the other for structural development. As crises become increasingly protracted, this divide creates inefficiencies and ineffectiveness: humanitarian projects often extend far beyond their intended timeframe, while development initiatives struggle to adapt to volatile contexts (see OCHA, 2021, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016a, 2016b,2015)

 

In Myanmar and Lebanon, EU-funded programmes were delayed or scaled back due to inflexible procedures and insufficient coordination between humanitarian and development actors (Chaaban et al., 2020; European Court of Auditors, 2018; ADE, 2021; Bailey and Harvey, 2017). In Mozambique and Mali, overlapping responsibilities and duplicated reporting requirements slowed down implementation (Esteves et al., 2022; OCHA, 2020; Morinière et al., 2017; RIASCO, 2017). A flexible approach requires shared planning and financing mechanisms that can address immediate and long-term needs simultaneously. Flexibility, therefore, is not only a question of administrative agility but also of will to share agenda-setting power with partner governments, civil society, and communities.

 

 

  1. Lesson 1: a shift from reactive to proactive humanitarian aid, with increased local ownership

 

The first step towards flexibility is a shift from reactive aid delivery to proactive, partnership-based programming that invests in prevention, preparedness, and resilience, involving local authorities and civil society. The research across four countries demonstrates that aid is most effective where national authorities and civil society are directly involved in programme design and implementation. In Mali and Mozambique, where local authorities and community organisations helped shape disaster-risk reduction projects, EU assistance was both better targeted and more sustainable. Aid programmes are most flexible when they are locally owned. Flexibility grows when governments and local communities can adjust priorities as crises evolve, something possible only when they have a stake in planning and management (Interviews with EU, NGOs, UN).

 

For the UK, this means re-centring the partnership principle in practice. Concretely:

  1. Embed resilience and preparedness into country strategies by funding early-warning systems, contingency planning, and local responder training alongside service delivery.

 

  1. Provide predictable, multi-year funding for locally designed projects that bridge emergency and development phases.

 

  1. Channel resources through local organisations wherever feasible, ensuring that monitoring frameworks prioritise participation and adaptation, not just the speed of disbursement.

Evidence from Mozambique demonstrates that this approach yields multiple benefits, including greater government acceptance, higher beneficiary trust, and more timely responses to crises. The Mozambican government actively participated in needs assessments, contributed to project formulation, and implemented strategies to address humanitarian needs, most notably the National Strategy for Basic Social Protection (2016–2024). This general approach yielded various benefits, including guiding the interventions of all social protection partners (WFP, 2016). A proactive, locally owned model transforms aid from crisis management into a genuine partnership.

  1. Lesson 2: Integrate humanitarian and development funding

Flexibility also depends on breaking down the institutional and financial barriers between humanitarian and development assistance. The EU experience across the four case studies shows that while the “humanitarian–development nexus” (i.e., integrating short-term emergency with long-term development aid) improved coordination, it remained limited by separate funding lines and accountability systems (Interviews with EU, NGOs, UN).

 

A flexible model requires a shared funding pot that allows resources to flow seamlessly across the relief, recovery, and development spectrum. In practice, this means designing integrated financial mechanisms that fund both immediate and long-term objectives within a single framework.

 

Within the UK system, this could involve the FCDO establishing a Joint Humanitarian and Development Fund, which would be accessible to both emergency teams and long-term country programmes. Such a common fund would:

 

  1. Allow for the flexible allocation of funds based on evolving needs, rather than rigid budget categories.

 

  1. Encourage joint programming between humanitarian and development actors, to reduce duplication and transaction costs.

 

  1. Support a continuum of action, from rapid response to resilience building, without bureaucratic interruptions.

 

 

For the UK, integrating humanitarian and development budgets would mean increasing funding flexibility, aligning resources with the multidimensional nature of today’s crises. It would also embody the Committee’s own objective: doing more with less through efficiency and complementarity.

 

  1. Lesson 3: foster coordination and collegiality among aid actors

 

The third condition for flexibility is effective coordination and communication among all actors, including donors, implementing partners, and host authorities, at both the formal and informal levels.

 

Research from EU-funded programmes highlights that coordination quality is not determined solely by formal structures, but also by relational trust and informal information exchange. Where collaboration was strong, such as DG ECHO’s “humanitarian breakfasts” in Myanmar, programmes were delivered more swiftly, duplication was avoided, and local ownership increased (Interviews with EU, NGOs and UN). In Lebanon and Mozambique, by contrast, limited communication among agencies resulted in overlapping projects and an inefficient use of funds. For instance, in Lebanon where the UK’s DfID was very much involved together with DG ECHO, but there were not any informal initiatives bringing actors together, both the Norwegian Refugee Council and UNHCR were implementing similar protection programmes leading to a waste of funds and efforts (Interviews with EU, UN, NGOs; BouChabke & Haddad, 2021; WFP, 2020; Karroum et al., 2018; Mansour, 2018; Bailey and Harvey, 2017; Morinière et al., 2017; Parker, 2017; Pelly and Juillard, 2017; Boston Consulting Group, 2017; ADE and URD, 2016; WFP, 2016).

 

For the UK, flexibility can be enhanced by institutionalising mechanisms that encourage collegiality, joint learning, and horizontal communication. Specific measures could include:

 

  1. Establishing field-level informal coordination events that bring together FCDO staff, local authorities, NGOs, and private sector actors in regular informal meetings focused on problem-solving.

 

  1. Creating joint evaluation and learning frameworks shared across humanitarian and development teams, allowing lessons to circulate quickly.

 

  1. Investing in relationship management and cross-posting of staff between humanitarian and development divisions to build trust and institutional memory.

 

 

Where relationships develop beyond formal arrangements, information flows more efficiently, enabling timely adjustments to programming as contexts evolve.

 

 

 

6. Conclusion: Implications for the UK

 

Applying these lessons would allow the UK to build a development system capable of adapting to complex, rapidly changing environments while responding more effectively to the priorities of its partners. Flexibility in development assistance is not achieved through new bureaucratic procedures, but through a transformation in the donor–partner relationship. Evidence from EU humanitarian aid suggests that programmes are most effective when donors act as partners and enablers, rather than as managers only.

 

Three overarching shifts are needed:

 

  1. Adopt a holistic, “resilience-first” approach that integrates humanitarian preparedness with long-term development goals, thereby strengthening local ownership. Programmes co-designed and implemented with national and local authorities and civil society are more trusted, context-appropriate, and sustainable.

 

  1. Develop integrated funding instruments that can flexibly move across emergency and development phases, allowing seamless responses to crises that no longer fit into separate categories. This would ensure a comprehensive response from the outset.

 

  1. Invest in coordination and learning mechanisms that prioritise relationships and problem-solving over compliance, fostering the collegial communication that serves as the social glue of flexibility.

 

Taken together, these shifts would make the UK’s aid architecture more adaptive, credible, and effective, ensuring that limited resources are directed where they are needed the most.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Articles

 

Bailey, S., & Harvey, P. (2017). The DFID/ECHO approach to cash assistance for refugees in Lebanon: Documenting the process (Working Paper 525). Overseas Development Institute. https://odi.org/en/publications/the-dfidecho-approach-to-cash-assistance-for-refugees-in-lebanon-documenting-the-process/

BouChabke, S., & Haddad, G. (2021). Ineffectiveness, poor coordination, and corruption in humanitarian aid: The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Voluntas, 32(4), 894-909.

Chaaban, J., Ghattas, H., Salti, S., Moussa, W., Irani, A., Jamaluddine, Z., & Al Mokdad, R. (2020). Multi-purpose cash assistance in Lebanon. CAMEALEON, American University of Beirut. https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/multi-purpose-cash-assistance-lebanon-impact-evaluation-well-being-syrian-refugees-20

Esteves, S., Naranjo Sandalio, R., Furci, V., Dubuis, M., González Monsalve, C., María Rosales, R., Fillet, J., & Mule, E. (2022). Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Sahel and in the food assistance and nutrition sectors (2016-2020). ICF.

Karroum, N., Bitar, Y., Halabi, L., & Hassan, N. (2018). Lebanon case study – SOHS 2018. ALNAP, Groupe URD, Beyond, Reform and Development. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/lebanon-case-study-–-sohs-2018

Mansour, K. (2018). Coordination in Lebanon: The consequences of excluding Syrian actors. Chatham House.

Morinière, L. C., Cuervo Alonso, B., Chisvo, M., Fürstos, M., Mwalwanda, A., Nhamithambo, B., & Rakotoarimanana, G. (2017). Evaluation of the ECHO assistance in the Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, 2012-2016. Publications Office of the European Union.

Morlino, I. (forthcoming). Humanitarian Aid and the European Union: An Analysis of Its Effectiveness in the Field. Routledge.

Parker, B. (2017, February 20). Unconventional cash project challenges aid status quo in Lebanon. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2017/02/20/unconventional-cash-project-challenges-aid-status-quo-lebanon

Pelly, I., & Juillard, H. (2020). Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organizational System of E-Cards (LOUISE): Learning review. Key Aid Consulting.

 

 

Official Documents

ADE. (2021a). Evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian response to the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh, 2017-2019: Final evaluation report. Volume 1 – Main report. Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations – DG ECHO.

ADE & URD. (2016). Evaluation of the ECHO response to the Syrian crisis 2012-2014: Executive summary. ADE European Court of Auditors. (2018). EU assistance to Myanmar/Burma (Special Report No. 4). https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/myanmar-4-2018/en/

Boston Consulting Group. (2017). Food - restricted voucher or unrestricted cash? How to best support Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon? World Food Program and Boston Consulting Group.

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2021). Myanmar humanitarian fund annual report 2020. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2020

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2020). Myanmar humanitarian fund annual report 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2019

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2019). Mozambique humanitarian response plan 2019. https://fts.unocha.org/plans/761/summary

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018). Global humanitarian overview. http://interactive.unocha.org/publication/globalhumanitarianoverview/

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2017). RIASCO humanitarian outlook for Southern Africa, November 2017 to April 2018. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/southern-eastern-africa/document/riasco-humanitarian-outlook-southern-africa-november

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2016a). Humanitarian needs overview: Myanmar. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-2016-humanitarian-needs-overview

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2016b). Myanmar humanitarian fund annual report 2016. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2016

OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2015c). Myanmar humanitarian fund annual report 2015. https://www.unocha.org/myanmar/humanitarian-financing/emergency-response-fund-erf

RIASCO. (2017). Response plan for the El Niño-induced drought in Southern Africa, May 2016 - April 2017. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RIASCO%20Action%20Plan%20Draft%20Document%20PDF%20version.pdf

WFP. (2020). European Union funds climate resilience and food security in Gaza and Tete provinces with €3 million. https://www.wfp.org/news/european-union-funds-climate-resilience-and-food-security-gaza-and-tete-provinces-eu3-million

WFP. (2016). Country Programme – Mozambique (2012-2015): Standard project report. https://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/project_docs/200286.pdf

 

 

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