ADBRS0010

Written evidence submitted by Refugee Legal Support.

 

Evidence

 

Background:

This evidence is based on a survey (in English/Dari/Pashto) conducted by the charity Refugee Legal Support in consultation with Prof Canning (Lancaster University) and Prof de Jong (University of York), and disseminated by various Afghan resettlement stakeholders between the 23rd of Sept - 5 Oct 2025. Participation in the survey was voluntary and open to anyone over the age of 18 and affected by the Afghan data breach. The survey did not ask for personal information and all responses have been anonymised. 

 

The survey received 350 valid responses. Of the total number of respondents, 155 respondents are currently based in the UK, 152 in Afghanistan and 33 in third countries outside Europe; 10 were in European countries or ticked ‘prefer not to say’. The below graph provides an overview of respondents’ professions and locations (please note that some respondents have had more than one relevant profession.)

Of the survey responses received, 231 respondents reported receiving direct communication from the Ministry of Defence that their data had been breached; (referred to hereafter as ‘Affected Afghans’).

Information security and risk management

Q: What is the impact of the data breach and its handling on trust for Affected Afghans?

1.      Personal risks and/or threats to family member(s): Of the 231 Affected Afghans, 200 (87%) reported personal risks and/or threats to family members.

2.      Type of risks and threats: Affected Afghans reported a range of threats and risks, ranging from extreme violence, including killings, to threats, such as house searches.

The survey also invited Affected Afghan respondents to provide more detailed information on the risks and threats. A few examples are presented below:

“I have suffered serious harm as a result of the Afghan data breach. My personal car was taken, and our home has been searched multiple times. My father was brutally beaten to the point that his toenails were forcibly removed, and my parents remain under constant and serious threat. My family and I continue to face intimidation, repeated house searches, and ongoing danger to our safety”.

Respondent ID 117, 333/444 Triple Special Forces, currently residing in the UK.

“ A couple of weeks after publication I was recognised by the Taliban and badly beaten up.”
Respondent ID 43, Afghan National Army and ANSF, currently residing in Afghanistan.

It [data breach] has intensified the threats against my family and made them a target, exposing them to being killed without excuse by the terrorist group (Taliban) that rules Afghanistan.

Respondent ID 78, occupation undisclosed, currently residing in Afghanistan.

Following the recent data leak, the Taliban searched my family home and continue to threaten my relatives. One of my family members is still under their pressure, and they question my family about me every day.

Respondent ID 88, Interpreter 333/444 Triple Special Forces, currently residing in the UK.

3.      Quality of Security Advice: A minority of the Affected Afghan respondents (38%) affected by the data breach found the Security Advice provided by the MoD helpful (n=87 out of total n=231).

4.      Based on the quantitative and qualitative survey results, there was a profound mismatch between the MoD’s security advice, which focussed on e.g. restricting one’s use of social media accounts and advising the use of Virtual Private Networks, and the severity of reported risks and threats, which included direct threats, violence, and displacement.

5.      The survey’s open-ended responses indicated that the security advice was considered overly general and inappropriate for the local context of Afghanistan. Affected Afghan Respondents also indicated that the security advice failed to provide any concrete support for those at risk:

It lacked clear guidance on how to stay safe, how our concerns would be addressed, and what concrete support was available. More detailed, timely, and tailored advice would have been helpful to reduce the risks we faced.
Respondent ID 24, Afghan National Security Forces, currently residing in Afghanistan.

The security advice I received from the Ministry of Defence following the data breach is applicable to me here in the UK, and I have taken steps to follow it. However, it is not practical or fully applicable for my family members who are still in Afghanistan. The situation there is beyond their control, and due to the local environment and security risks, they are unable to implement many of the recommended measures.
Respondent ID 56, Contractor, currently residing in the UK.

When our personal information is already accessible to the Taliban, the security advice provided cannot be effective. The risks remain severe regardless of the guidance offered.
Respondent ID 21, 333/444 Triple Special Forces, current location undisclosed.

I was expecting clear steps or assistance to prevent misuse of my personal information, but the advice was limited to basic online safety tips.
Respondent ID 171, 333/444 Triple Special Forces, currently residing in Afghanistan.

 

6.      Impact on physical and mental health: 89% (207 out of 231) Affected Afghans informed by the MoD that their data was compromised, reported impacts on their own physical and/or mental health and the same number (207) reported negative impacts on their family’s physical and/or mental health.

 

Open-ended responses to the survey revealed physical and psychological symptoms of stress, anxiety, depression, loss of concentration and memory, and sleeplessness.

The data breach has had a serious impact on my mental health. I have been under constant stress, anxiety, and fear for my safety and my family’s safety. It has also affected my ability to rest properly and maintain peace of mind. The pressure and uncertainty have taken a toll on both my mental and physical well-being.
Respondent ID 27, ANSF and NDS, currently residing in the UK.

The Afghan data breach has significantly affected my physical and mental health. I live under constant fear for my life and the safety of my family due to repeated raids, threats from the Taliban and local intelligence groups, and the risk of forced marriage for my daughter. The ongoing stress, anxiety, and fear for my family’s well-being have severely impacted my emotional and physical well-being.
Respondent ID 30, 333/444 Triple Special Forces, currently residing in Afghanistan.

The data breach has seriously impacted both my physical and mental health. Since learning that my personal information was compromised, I have been living in constant fear and stress. I suffer from anxiety, sleepless nights, and extreme worry for the safety of myself and my family. The threat to my life and the risk of Taliban targeting have affected my well-being and daily functioning.
Respondent ID 229, Afghan National Army, currently residing in Afghanistan.

 

7.      Compounded impacts and harms: The survey’s open-ended responses provided deep insight into the compounded impacts and harms experienced by Affected Afghan respondents, who had been informed by the MoD that their data had likely been compromised.

To draw from a testimonial which reflects others, Respondent ID 39 highlighted:

I am writing to share how the Afghan data breach has deeply affected me and my family—emotionally, psychologically, and in terms of our safety.

I recently relocated to the United Kingdom and am physically safe here. But mentally, I live in constant fear and guilt. The breach has become a daily source of anxiety and emotional torment. My family—who remain in Afghanistan—are terrified. They ask me every day: Are we in danger? Did you share our names, phone numbers, addresses, or photos in your emails to the UK? Could the Taliban find us because of this?

I try to reassure them [family in Afghanistan], but I don’t have answers. The uncertainty is unbearable. My younger brother constantly asks, What if they come and take us as hostages? The fear is not just from the breach itself, but from the overwhelming amount of misinformation and panic spreading on social media. Even if the breach didn’t expose everything, the fake news alone is destroying their mental health.

[...] I ask for your understanding, and if possible, your support. Whether it's legal advice, mental health resources, or help accelerating family reunification, anything that can ease this burden would mean the world to me. Respondent ID 39, 333/444 Triple Special Forces; 999; NDS, currently residing in the UK.

 

Q: What is the risk to those individuals in the dataset who have not been resettled, and how has this risk been managed?

 

8.      Risk to Affected Afghans in Afghanistan and third countries: Open-ended responses detailed the risks faced by affected Afghans in Afghanistan and third countries, such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey:             

Yes, I have been threatened. I was initially identified through social media (Facebook and Instagram), and then the individuals threatening me came to my family’s residence. The severity of these threats led to the separation from my fiancé.

I previously served in Special Units 555 and 444 against the Taliban. For further information about me, you may contact the commander of Unit 444, who is currently residing in the UK. I am currently living in Iran without a visa and in hiding. I was very surprised that the Taliban obtained such extensive personal information about me, considering that this information was leaked by the UK government. I kindly request your assistance, as these circumstances have caused me serious mental health issues, including depression.
Respondent ID 98, 333/444 Triple Special Forces; currently residing in Iran.

 

9.      Lack of risk management: From the survey responses, there was no evidence that the Ministry of Defence offered local risk management or follow-up with individuals outside of the UK, who were affected by the data breach (and who were not offered resettlement).

Affected Afghans who had not been resettled reported this in the open-ended survey responses, for example:

The security advice provided by the Ministry of Defence was very general and limited. They only advised me not to answer calls from unknown numbers and to secure my emails. These instructions were insufficient given the serious threats and risks I faced, including my house being searched, my brothers being summoned by intelligence services, and direct threats to our lives. Such general advice did not provide any practical help to protect my situation.
Respondent 210, 333/444 (Triple -Special Forces), currently residing in Afghanistan.

The MoD’s official guidance on the data loss incident (shared by email with affected Afghans and via the MoD webpage) confirms this, as the only specific message for those affected by the data breach in Afghanistan or third countries confirmed that there was no support available in third countries, unless someone was offered resettlement and was limited to a warning not to travel:

“If you are outside the UK, please do not try to travel to a third country without a valid passport and visa. If you do so, you will be putting yourself at risk on the journey, and you may face the risk of being deported back to Afghanistan. We also cannot support you in a third country such as Pakistan unless you have already received an invitation to resettle in the UK and it has been confirmed by the UK Government that you have access to support in the third country.” (MoD 2025).

 

Use of Legal Injunction

Q: Did the Government take appropriate, well-informed, timely, effective action under cover of the injunction?

10.  Timeliness of Communication: The majority (63%) of Afghan respondents (146 out of 231) who had been informed by the MoD in July 2025 that their data had likely been compromised in 2023 felt that it took too long before they were informed of the data breach.

Only 48 out of 231 (21%) thought the length of time was acceptable, with 37 (16%) of Affected Afghans responding ‘prefer not to say’ to the survey question.

11.  Impact of Delayed Communication: The open-ended survey responses indicated that the delay in the communication to Afghans affected by the data breach, had a detrimental effect on the ability to take safety measures.

The respondents reported an increased risk due to the fact that they could not retrospectively apply the security advice that was provided or take any personal measures:

I think the time it took to inform me of the data breach was far too long. The delay significantly increased the risks to my life and the safety of my family, as the data breach left us vulnerable to threats, harassment, and potential harm from the Taliban and local intelligence groups.
Respondent ID 35, 333/444 (Triple Special Forces), currently residing in Afghanistan.

The security advice provided by the Ministry of Defence was insufficient and delayed. They should have informed us immediately so that my colleagues would not have been at risk and I could have been aware of potential threats.
Respondent ID 122, 333/444 (Triple Special Forces), currently residing in Afghanistan.

Well, you should have informed me right away, I would have realized my safety. I was hiding right then.
Respondent ID 162, 333/444 (Triple Special Forces), currently residing in Afghanistan.

The delay between the discovery of the data breach in 2023 and the communication in July 2025 is deeply concerning and unacceptable. Waiting almost two years to inform individuals that their personal data was compromised has put many lives at risk unnecessarily. Immediate notification could have allowed us to take protective measures much earlier. This delay shows a serious lack of urgency and responsibility from the Ministry of Defence, especially considering the sensitive nature of our backgrounds and the high-risk environment we live in. Respondent ID 184, Afghan National Army, currently residing in Afghanistan.

 

 

 

Resettlement

Q: What are the successes of the Afghan Resettlement Programme, and what are the key issues for Affected Afghans?

Overall, a mixed picture emerged from the survey responses from those respondents who have already been resettled to the UK (n=140).

12.  Successes of Resettlement: Commonly mentioned positive experiences related to a sense of security and educational opportunities for female members of the family.

Now I can work and study and can live free with good security, and my daughters can become what they want like a doctor, teacher, etc. And the thing which I really like in the UK is that the law is same for all human.So no one can hurt anyone. I hate crimes.
Respondent ID 104, interpreter, currently residing in the UK.

Since I came to Britain, I have been optimistic about life and the local officials and people treated us well and explained all the cultural differences, and it was a good experience for us.
Respondent ID 108, 333/444 (Triple Special Forces), currently residing in Pakistan.

There was some difficulty but at least we are alive.
Respondent ID 273, interpreter, currently residing in the UK. 

13.  Key Issues with the Resettlement Programme: Common negative experiences of Affected Afghan respondents who have been resettled to the UK relate to family separation, including long waiting times for a decision on AFM (Additional Family Members) relocation applications, based on extreme vulnerability or threats due to association with the principal applicant.

There was evidence of long waiting times and unevenness in the quality of resettlement support across the UK. There were also reports of racism, including assault.

My children, both boys and girls, attend school. However, me and my wife are struggling to enter the job market. [REDACTED] is a nice place with welcoming people However with lesser job opportunities. We have tried several times to move to a bigger city so we can get more opportunities.
Respondent ID 233, Interpreter, resettled to the UK.

I’m happy to be evacuated to the UK however I’m unhappy because my family got separated. My youngest daughters including my disabled brothers have been left behind in Afghanistan who entirely rely on me both financially and physically. I was given promise that they will join me in the UK, however I’m still waiting and it’s been more than a year and their application is still under process.
Respondent ID 319, Labourer, resettled to the UK.

My resettlement experience has been deeply stressful despite the relief of eventually reaching the UK. The long delay 20 to 24 months after receiving the offer letter left me and my family living in constant fear and danger. The lack of clear communication and support during this period caused unnecessary hardship. While I am grateful for safety now, the process was too slow and has left lasting emotional and physical strain. Such delays should never happen again for those in urgent danger.
Respondent ID 243, Interpreter, resettled to the UK.

While feeling safe here, there is still racism; some people don't like migrants, but they don't know how much assistance I did for the government of the UK [as an interpreter].

Respondent ID 249, Interpreter, currently residing in the UK.

“The agency that helped us resettle, treated us awfully.
Respondent ID 61, Interpreter, resettled to the UK.

 

Recommendations:

The impacts of the data breach and how it has been handled must be understood within the broader context of  significant and ongoing concerns that have bedevilled the UK’s Afghan Relocation Schemes[1].

The following recommendations consolidate the views of Affected Afghans in this regard. Given the severe consequences of the breach, they reflect the urgent need for a proactive approach to ensure long-term support for those affected. It appears hard to avoid that many will require interdepartmental initiatives and others the allocation of additional resources for effective implementation.

I. Urgent Relocation and Evacuation of Applicants affected by Data Breach

• Decisions on pending initial ARAP and ACRS applications (and Reviews) must be expedited with individuals and their families affected by the data breach urgently prioritised for relocation. Clear timeframes for decision-making must be communicated.

• The applications of all Afghans whose data was breached and who received negative decisions on their ARAP applications must be proactively reviewed. All applicants should be notified and provided with a reasonable opportunity to put forward evidence of the risks following the breach of their data.

 

II. Relocation of Additional Family Members (AFM) at risk due to the Data Breach

• Decisions on pending AFM applications must be expedited and clear timeframes for decision-making given. Affected Afghans must be invited to put forward evidence of risks AFM have faced following the data breach.

• AFM applications of Afghans whose data was breached and who received negative decisions on their AFM applications must be provided an opportunity to provide further evidence of the risks following the data breach and in any event their Decisions proactively  Reviewed.

 

III. Security and Protection Measures for Affected Afghans those in Afghanistan and third countries

• The UK Government should work with other UK Government Departments as well as  regional and international actors such as UNAMA, UNHCR and neighbouring Governments in order to:

-          Establish a secure, dedicated communication channel for reporting threats, receiving updates and providing assistance.

-          Provide security assistance, context-specific advice and support including physical protection, safe housing and relocation support for affected Afghans who report credible threats;

-          Enable access to humanitarian assistance including physical and/or mental health support;

-          Secure temporary visas or other immigration protection schemes and particularly for those awaiting relocation to the UK and/or with pending applications to prevent arrests, detentions and removals/deportation;

-          implement continuous monitoring of the security situation and the well-being of those impacted.

 

VI. Compensation

• Establish a  financial compensation scheme for those who have suffered due to the breach. This will significantly reduce legal costs and public resources.

 

Conclusion

As both the quantitative and qualitative data from our survey shows, the data breach has had devastating consequences for many individuals and families. The UK Government must act decisively to protect those affected, restore trust, and ensure that such a failure never happens again; or that if it does, those placed at risk will not also be left alone in the dark.

 

 

 

13th October 2025


 

Overview of Organisation and Expertise

Refugee Legal Support is a registered UK charity providing legal support to people who migrate. RLS has extensive experience with the ARAP and ACRS schemes through its Afghan Pro Bono Initiative (‘APBI’). The APBI project has since March 2022, operated as a collaboration between Refugee Legal Support, Safe Passage International, 14 leading law firms, along with Afghan communities in the UK to address the pressing need for Afghan nationals and their families to access crucial legal information, advice, and representation.

Shamim Sharabi, originally an Afghan refugee, is the Community Engagement and Research Lead at Refugee Legal Support (RLS). She has extensive experience in survey design and research and holds a Master’s degree in Social Research and Policy from University College London. Shamim has worked for more than six years on development projects in Afghanistan. Her current work focuses on facilitating legal support for Afghan refugees in the UK and documenting the challenges they face in integrating into UK society. Email: shamim.sarabi@refugeelegalsupport.org

Olivia Clark is the Executive Director of Refugee Legal Support (RLS). She has over a decade of experience advancing refugee rights and access to justice. Before joining RLS, Olivia led the legal programme for the Norwegian Refugee Council in Afghanistan and worked with UNHCR in South Africa. She previously spent seven years as the UK Pro Bono Director at the global law firm DLA Piper. Email: olivia.clark@refugeelegalsupport.org

Isaac Shaffer is a Solicitor and the Legal Director of Refugee Legal Support (RLS).  He has worked as a lawyer providing legal support to people who migrate for over 15 years and has worked for specialist immigration and asylum legal aid practices, as well as for not-for-profit organisations in the UK and internationally working on migrant rights. He was previously the Head of Legal Services for Justice Centre Hong Kong during which time the organisation received the 2022 International Ockenden Prize for providing strategic litigation in difficult circumstances. Email: isaac.shaffer@refugeelegalsupport.org.

Academic Consultants

Prof Victoria Canning is based in Criminology at Lancaster University where she acts as Global Lead for Social Sciences. Her work focuses on responses to refugee survivors of conflict, sexual violence, torture and torturous violence and is based on almost 20 years of research. She is co-chair of Statewatch and Associate Director at Border Criminologies. Email: v.canning@lancaster.ac.uk

Prof Sara de Jong is based at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of York. She has researched rights and resettlement of Afghan interpreters and other locally employed civilians employed by Western armies for the past 8 years, with her expertise informing national and international media, as well as legal and NGO practice. She is also the chair of the board of trustees of the Sulha Alliance, a UK charity that supports Afghan interpreters who worked for the British Army. Email: sara.dejong@york.ac.uk

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[1] See for example: Still Waiting: The Afghans  abandoned by the UK, August 2024 and Reforming the Afghanistan Resettlement Schemes: the way forward for ARAP and ACRS, 2023.