International Development Committee Inquiry Women Peace and Security Agenda

 

Written Evidence Submitted by Andra-Lucia Martinescu Submitted with support from the Foreign Policy Centre, October 2025

 

 

Introduction

  1. This submission was prepared by Andra-Lucia Martinescu who is a Senior Research Fellow with the Foreign Policy Centre and Co-founder of The Diaspora Initiative, a non-profit based in Luxembourg, specialising in migration and diaspora research. Since 2014, Andra-Lucia has conducted extensive fieldwork in the region, including the Republic of Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, and Russia. As of February 2022, she helps coordinate humanitarian efforts in Ukraine and from abroad, whilst researching the impact of decentralised/distributed networks in crisis response. She has written about humanitarian aid in Ukraine in previous articles for FPC.1

 

  1. This submission focuses on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Ukraine, with regard to the UK’s programming and funding allocations. The analysis provides a contextual assessment of how women and girls are systematically affected by the ongoing war in Ukraine, drawing on lived experiences from grassroots communities. These insights are evidenced by a series of semi-structured interviews with local actors, including civil society organisations, service providers and frontline responders, who are actively documenting conflict-related sexual violence, displacement, and the broader gendered impacts of the conflict.

 

  1. The evidence presented aims to highlight significant gaps between the UK’s rhetorical commitments to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in Ukraine and its operational implementation. Notable projects, such as funding for mobile sexual and reproductive health services and support for local women-led crisis response, demonstrate tangible benefits. However, UK aid remains fragmented, lacking a centralised mechanism capable of tracking WPS-specific allocations or outcomes. Funding is often routed through international intermediaries, with limited structural investment in local actors, thereby reinforcing dependencies and undermining programme-level sustainability. The absence of a cross-government accountability framework, mandatory WPS benchmarks, and context-specific indicators further weakens systemic coherence. Importantly, the UK’s WPS strategy does not sufficiently integrate or respond to the documented scale of conflict-related sexual violence, human trafficking, and multi-layered gendered harms in Ukraine, which are deeply embedded in the broader political and military architecture of the conflict.

Key insights:

 

To what extent does the UK government integrate Women, Peace and Security Principles across the ODA-funded programming?

 

 


1 The Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) is an independent and non-partisan international affairs think tank based in the United Kingdom. The FPC publishes independent research and provides an open and accessible space for the exchange of ideas, knowledge and experience, so that the voices of experts and advocates can be heard and acted upon.

 


What financial resources has the UK allocated towards advancing the WPS agenda? Are these resources appropriately distributed across programmes and regions?

 

  1. While multiple UK reporting mechanisms, such as the International Development Funding Finder,2 the Statistics in International Development (SID),3 and annual reports from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF),4 provide access to geographic data on the disbursement and impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA), there is no centralised database that consolidates WPS-specific funding streams across all departments. Such fragmentation makes it challenging to track comprehensive funding flows towards objectives related to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda or measure the full extent and impact of multi-departmental contributions. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) does publish UK aid performance assessments; however, the retrospective nature of such reports limits their utility for real-time accountability or strategic reallocation purposes.5 The latest ICAI thematic findings focused on Ukraine (April 2024), referencing a number of WPS initiatives such as:
    1. “Support for women’s organisations to promote participation of women and LGBTQ+ communities in political and civic life – implemented in partnership with the American National Democratic Institute.6
    2. The Women Leading Response and Recovery in Ukraine project, implemented by the NGO Pact, works with local women’s organisations in crisis response and social cohesion across 26 communities.7
    3. The UN Women, Peace and Humanitarian Fund supports women’s organisations for a more gender-sensitive humanitarian response.8
    4. Support for a consortium of local civil society organisations (CSOs) promoting women’s empowerment within the security sector and tackling gender-based violence (GBV) in the military.

 

 

 

 

 


2 The tracker details international development programmes led by the FCDO, other government departments, and partners, across sectors and geographical location. With a focus on Ukraine, the current budget approved for the 2025/2026 financial year totals £68.5M, across: Banking and Financial Services (with the highest allocation of 61%), followed by Industry 27%, Unallocated 5%, Other sectors approx. 3%, Education 0.07%, and Disaster Relief with 3.25%. Available online at: https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/countries/UA.

3 SID is published twice a year and provides an overview of the UK’s ODA expenditures, however statistical breakdowns are at a regional level, without country-specific programming insights. The latest report (2024) includes mentions of various schemes focused on supporting Ukrainian refugees in the UK, under the purview of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and the Department of Work and Pensions: Homes for Ukraine, Ukraine Extension Scheme, and Ukraine Family Scheme – all with significant decreases due to less arrivals, according to the latest SID report. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67f90e5f45705eb1a1513f58/Statistics-on-International-Development-Provisional-UK-ODA-Spend-2024.pdf.

4 According to the CSSF annual review (2023-2024), Ukraine was the top discretionary geographical recipient of ODA (with £36,38M), and ranking 4th for non-ODA funding (at 7.82M). Overall, the Gender, Peace and Security non-discretionary theme received 4.63M, approximately 0.57% of the 2023-2024 CSSF total spend. Annexes available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024#annex-a-cssf-financial-spend-2023-to-2024.

5 The latest ICAI report (dated 30th of April 2024) lists Ukraine as the largest recipient of UK-bilateral funding estimated at £228M (2023/2024 financial year), and likely to persist (no updates have been yet provided). The Rights and Accountability theme includes mentions of survivor-centred justice for conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and funding allocated to UNFPA to operate 25 mobile units for medical support, counselling to survivors as well as conducting forensic examinations.

6 Referenced on the NDI website: https://www.ndi.org/our-stories/collaborating-inclusive-recovery-ukraine, however with no explicit funding allocations.

7 Details about the project implemented by the NGO Pact, available at: https://www.pactukraine.org.ua/in_ukraine.

8 Annual report (2025) published by WPFH, available at: https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025-03/ukraine_wphf-annual_report_march_26_2025_final.pdf.


    1. A civil society support fund, initiated by the UK embassy in Ukraine, that provided resources to 120 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including women’s organisations, to help build their capacity to engage with government policy.”9

 

  1. To trace the implementation of the UK’s WPS projects in Ukraine, one must rely on scattered references (including but not limited to ICAI’s retrospective reviews), implementing partner disclosures, and/or embassy-level reports. The precise financial allocations and project performance data remain fragmented across multiple donor platforms, if available at all. This is not an argument in favour of additional bureaucratic layers, but rather an appeal for transparency and replicability, mirroring the same requirements exacted from local partners, who are increasingly burdened by ever-shifting multi-donor reporting frameworks that rarely afford the same flexibility.
  2. The UK’s WPS implementation is delivered by multiple actors, involving among other government bodies and partners, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Home Office, and the UK’s diplomatic missions. In the absence of a centralised database, transparency remains a core challenge in assessing the UK’s overall strategic integration of WPS principles across its aid portfolio. Most WPS-linked initiatives are funded through multi-sectoral budgets pertaining to the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), the Integrated Security Fund (ISF), humanitarian aid and other departmental sources. While institutionally embedded in the Fifth National Action Plan (NAP) for 2023-2027,10 the incorporation of WPS objectives/principles in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funding and programming is profoundly uneven and often reliant on externally driven interventions, rather than systemic coherence, particularly in the absence of a cross-government accountability framework or mandatory WPS spending targets.

 

  1. Despite a fragmented funding landscape, there are some notable successes for funding WPS. This includes a £1.5 million grant disbursed to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) for delivering mobile sexual and reproductive health services to women and girls affected by conflict, including survivors of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).11 The press release mentions that the funding has reached and supported 20,000 people with vital access to medical care, while providing sexual information to over 100,000. Another project, implemented by PACT (a US-based NGO) with UK support, ‘Women Leading Response and Recovery in Ukraine’, is briefly referenced, however, with no explicit disclosure of funding allocations.12 Additionally, the UK has pledged £12.5 million (globally) to support CSRV-related programming under the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVC), with Ukraine identified as one of the countries of heightened concern. Part of this funding is directed towards deploying legal and policing experts to support evidence collection and bolster survivor-centred justice mechanisms.11 It is essential to acknowledge the impact potential and the momentous contributions brought by the projects already funded. However, the


9 For civil society organisations there was a £10M allocation, referenced in the annotated bibliography on WPS in the UK and Ukraine (Section 5): https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-version/rapid-review-uk-aid-to-ukraine-bibliography. Other WPS-related initiatives cited above were mentioned in the main report, available online at: https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-version/uk-aid-to-ukraine-2/#section-4.

10 ‘The UK women, peace and security national action plan 2023-2027’, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-2023-to-2027/uk-women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-2023-to-2027. At the very top, the page includes a mention: “This was published under the 2022 to 2024 Sunak Conservative Government”, which in the author’s view indicates a politicisation of what should be a cross-party, rights-based agenda. While it may be standard for UK government publications to indicate the administration under which they were released/published, the explicit association of a gender-based peace and security framework with a specific political leadership may risk framing WPS priorities through the lens of shifting governmental interests rather than long-standing international obligations.

11 Press release (4 March 2024), UK supports most vulnerable women and girls in Ukraine, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-supports-most-vulnerable-women-and-girls-in-ukraine. Funds most likely routed through the FCDO’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVCI).

12 Mentioned on the PACT website, with no funding disclosure: https://www.pactukraine.org.ua/in_ukraine.


preferred institutional approach remains heavily skewed toward international intermediaries, with limited structural investment in building the long-term capacity and financial autonomy of local (implementing) actors.

 

  1. This model reinforces dependency and limits opportunities for sustainable, context-driven solutions shaped by those closest to the conflict’s gendered impacts, for a number of reasons:
    1. Decision-making power largely resides with external actors, who risk overlooking and misinterpreting the lived realities and strategic priorities of local communities, particularly the most vulnerable and underrepresented. Often, donor-driven outputs take precedence over community-identified needs—a dynamic that has been documented since 2022.
    2. In one particular case, albeit echoing numerous others, one Ukrainian NGO servicing southern Ukraine found itself navigating the tension between documenting and meeting urgent localised needs and adhering to shifting donor agendas. The humanitarian non-profit also conducted gender-sensitive needs assessments at the hromada level, in hard-to-reach areas, a process deemed necessary from a last-mile distribution perspective. However, when the external donor abruptly changed policy direction, funding halted, and all operations had to cease.

 

    1. Local women-led organisations most often lack the institutional scale or donor-facing infrastructure required to compete for funding on equal footing with international NGOs. Balancing administrative resources necessary for compliance and reporting with the actual delivery of community services continues to pose challenges on the ground. The structure and scope of funding mechanisms have perpetuated this imbalance, as well as the structural disadvantages disproportionately affecting local frontline actors.
    2. One organisation I have worked closely with on humanitarian distribution is manned by one of the most energetic and dedicated women I have come across. She is a paramedic and first responder covering Kyiv, Kharkiv, and the northern parts of Ukraine. Her small humanitarian outfit operates from the grassroots but has achieved tremendous results in the last-mile delivery of relief close to the frontlines. Regarding grant applications necessary to support the meaningful work of her organisation she stated: ‘In my day job I am a first responder, paramedic. When I get home in the evenings, I clean and cook for my family, for my husband and our two children. Then, in whatever free time I have left, I coordinate humanitarian deliveries.’13

 

    1. In a country that holds conservative values regarding gender roles in significant proportion, the work of women is often overshadowed and perceived as a tacit extension of duty rather than recognised and supported as leadership. The above story is by no means singular, but rather emblematic of the countless Ukrainian women who shoulder dual burdens: sustaining families, dependents, and often the most vulnerable, while simultaneously supporting communities affected by war. Yet despite their critical contributions in frontline response, these women remain largely invisible in donor spaces, where institutional recognition and reporting capacities tend to define eligibility criteria.


13 Multiple interviews and informal discussions with N. on an anonymous basis, November 2024-April 2025.


Are there appropriate accountability mechanisms in place to ensure that the Government is meeting its WPS commitments, and that these commitments are translated into substantive outcomes?

 

  1. While illustrative, the initiatives exemplified above (P.3) and implemented by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and the PACT NGO amongst others, reflect only a fraction of the UK’s broader rhetorical commitments to the WPS agenda in Ukraine. Overall, this dynamic underscores the persistent disconnect between high-level pledges and operational realities, with on-the-ground needs shifting, accruing and often outpacing the bureaucratic and programmatic responsiveness of donor mechanisms. The level of ambition present in policy documents such as the 2023-2027 National Action Plan (NAP), currently in its fifth iteration,14 is indeed high, but inconsistently matched by what should have been adequate mechanisms for delivery, monitoring and accountability. Furthermore, there is no explicit reference to how budget decisions align with the plan’s strategic priorities and objectives.
  2. The NAP further notes that focus countries (including Ukraine) “would support the collection of indicators for the monitoring and evaluation of NAP, as part of a baseline study in Year 1”15; however, it neither specifies nor describes how these indicators would be operationalised to inform funding allocations.

 

  1. Overall, there is a persistent fragmentation across UK policy instruments addressing WPS in Ukraine, characterised by policy silos and a lack of integration between strategic ambitions and evidence-based design. Notably, the UK’s primary frameworks – including the NAP and the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) – 16 are not explicitly anchored in the substantial body of evidence and documentation produced by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, which has recorded systematic violations and war crimes against women and girls since 2014 and the onset of the full-scale invasion.17

 

  1. There is indeed an argument to be made regarding the broad, adaptable outlook of such policy frameworks, which ought to resonate with myriad conflict-torn contexts. However, this generality should not preclude the development of country-specific baselines, risk assessments, and performance indicators, particularly for designated focus countries such as Ukraine. In the absence of a tailored context-sensitive framework, interventions risk becoming overly diffuse, which ultimately limits the accountability of funding mechanisms.
  2. The systematic nature of sexual and reproductive violence in Ukraine is a reality that outpaces policy. The testimonials collected from legal experts and humanitarian actors in Ukraine present an irrefutable account of the scale and complexity of war crimes being perpetrated against Ukrainian civilians, particularly women, girls, and children. In detention, the majority of victims of sexual violence are Ukrainian civilian and POW men (prisoners of war).18 In many cases, such sexual violence also constitutes torture.19 What emerges is a


14 The NAP 2023-2027 aims to deliver against the four pillars of the WPS agenda: prevention, protection, participation and relief and recovery.

15 Section – Focus Countries, available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-2023-to-2027/uk-women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-2023-to-2027#focus-countries-and-fragile-contexts.

16 The PSVCI dedicated website can be accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/preventing-sexual-violence-in-conflict-initiative.

17 The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine was established in 2014. The latest reports are available at: https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/reports.

18              Chatham              House,              The              Struggle              for              Justice              in              Ukraine              (12              May              2025),              available              online              at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/research-event/struggle-justice-ukraine.

19 Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ‘Report on the visit to Ukraine’ (15 February 2024) A/HRC/55/52/Add., §§ 36, 46-50.


pattern of systematic sexualised violence, deeply embedded in the Russian military’s operational conduct. Such patterns have been recognised and amply documented by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, UN Commission of Inquiry, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and numerous Ukrainian legal professionals, as part of a Russian state-level policy of domination, subjugation, and dehumanisation.20,21 This systematic use of sexual violence not only constitutes a grave violation of international law, but directly undermines the WPS agenda, specifically its pillars regarding protection, prevention, and accountability, through the targeting of civilians, the obstruction of justice for survivors, and the perpetuation of gendered harm.

  1. Rape, sexual slavery, and torture, often perpetrated during house-to-house searches in occupied territories, are reported as widespread, with victims ranging from young children to elderly women.22 These crimes are not incidental; they follow a clear, repetitive pattern of targeting civilians perceived as pro-Ukrainian, and are often committed with psychological intent (i.e.: in front of family members), amounting simultaneously to psychological torture. According to Dr Busol, “statistics are usually indicative, but the victims’ age has ranged from 4 to 82 of those (women, girls as well as boys) submitted to sexual slavery, forced to follow the Russian army; in fact, crimes of torture are much greater”. From interviews with legal investigators based in Ukraine, collecting and rigorously documenting testimonials from survivors, this corpus of evidence speaks of sexual slavery in which women are forced to travel with Russian battalions, of pregnant women raped and of women generally being denied medical (gynaecological) treatment.23

 

  1. Further evidence based on testimonials from female prisoners of war (POW) shows that “in captivity there is an absence of gender-treatment, with women very rarely being provided sanitary or hygiene products during menstruation, showers allowed once a week, which has aggravated the incidence of infectious and bacterial disease. Women with gynaecological problems have rarely received treatment.”24 In fact, the body of evidence collected by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found that this pattern of violence extended to all those unlawfully confined in ‘areas controlled by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, where ‘conditions were conditions were consistently inhuman’ and with detention often a precursor to torture and execution.’

 


20 Semi-structured interview with Dr Kataryna Busol (April 2025), a Ukrainian lawyer. Dr Busol is an Associate Professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, a British Academy Research Fellow at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, and a Legal Advisor to the International Centre for Transitional Justice.

21 Semi-structured e interview with Julia Sachenko (April 2025), anti-trafficking expert and activist, head of the Ukrainian-based NGO Child Rescue. This section builds upon extensive insights from Ukraine and the semi-structured interviews, with legal experts, and frontline non-profits and first responders, corroborated by evidence documented by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.

22 Corroborated by evidence provided by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (Report A/79/549), which established that ‘the span of locations where torture has been committed has been widespread’, ‘in all provinces of Ukraine where Russian authorities have taken control of areas, (              ) and in detention facilities it investigated in the Russian Federation.’

23 The Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (February-April 2023), under section B. Violations of personal integrity, stipulates that “Among the detention facilities that the Commission identified some were improvised (              ) Sanitary

conditions were inadequate, with at times, buckets or a bottle used as a toilet and limited no possibility of washing. (              ) Such conditions of

detention can disproportionately affect people depending on their gender. Some women restricted their water and food intake out of shame of having to use the toilet in front of others. When water was available, there was no privacy. Menstruating women suffered because of a lack of hygiene, which can lead to serious infections and diseases (...)”. P.: 11. Available online at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/52/62.

24 Corroborated in a multitude of reports, including from the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Alice Jill Edwards (Human Rights Council, Fifty-fifth session, 26 February – 5 April 2024, Advance unedited version); Tetiana Katrychenko, Female Face of Donbas Hostages project, available online here; Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (Advance unedited version, Human Rights Council, 24 February – 4 April 2025). Furthermore, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, has documented numerous cases in which medical assistance was systematically denied in detention, but also the participation of medical personnel in acts of violence inflicted upon detainees: ‘victims and witnesses reported the deterioration of the health of those affected, at times coupled with severe complications, and even death.’ Report A/79/549 (October 2024), available online at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549.


  1. Sexualised violence against pregnant women, in some instances, resulted in the loss of pregnancy. There are testimonials and evidence of babies/newborns being murdered – allegations emerging from Donetsk and Luhansk regions (in eastern Ukraine). Such actions go beyond isolated war crimes and move towards crimes against humanity. Dr Busol states that “(...) in fact, this is not something extraordinary, it’s part and parcel of the Russian state’s sexualised behaviour in war. Furthermore, there are references to dehumanising rhetoric that transposes into action – dehumanising [Ukrainian] pregnant women, allegations of Nazi/fascist belonging with the explicit purpose of dehumanising children, babies and the unborn.25 The Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine ‘documented cases of sexual and gender-based violence involving women, men and girls, aged 4 to 82 years, in nine provinces of Ukraine and in the Russian Federation. (...) In one incident, the victim was pregnant and begged the soldiers to spare her, in vain; she had a miscarriage a few days later.’26
  2. In parallel, male and adolescent victims have consistently reported sexual torture in detention, including but not limited to beatings and electrocution of genitalia, used not only to inflict pain but to damage reproductive capacity and psychological integrity. As one lawyer affirmed, “Russia’s use of sexualised violence in detention is part of a broader geographic and political architecture of torture” – one that leaves survivors, particularly men, with long-term traumas that often distort reintegration and drive domestic instability.27

 

  1. The effects of conflict-related sexual violence do not end with the moment of violation, echoing into the homes, relationships, and the broader social fabric. Testimonials from legal and humanitarian professionals reveal a concerning rise in domestic violence, in households where individuals, often men, have experienced detention, torture or displacement. The psychological scars left by sexualised torture and emasculating forms of abuse in captivity, including forced nudity, electrocution and genital mutilation, often manifest in profound identity crises.28 These traumas, if left unaddressed, disrupt reintegration and may result, as evidenced, in controlling and/or abusive behaviour within families – with women as caregivers, and children being disproportionately affected, a dynamic that fundamentally exacerbates cycles of abuse and instability. The International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine also documented a case whereby a victim ‘committed suicide several months after his detention and torture. His family, devastated by the loss, stated that he could not cope with the psychological impact of what he had gone through.’29
  2. The destruction of support systems – schools, health clinics, community centres – has left many women and children with nowhere to turn to. Relocation and housing insecurity exacerbate the risk: survivors of domestic violence frequently face barriers to accessing public services, safe shelters, or employment opportunities. The latter would enable them to leave abusive environments. However, in many cases, women decide to remain


25 Interview with Dr Kateryna Busol (April 2025). Also corroborated in the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/HRC/52/62): ‘According to some former detainees, the authorities of the Russian Federation referred to them as “Nazis”, “Fascists” and “terrorists” and forced to undergo “denazification sessions” consisting of severe beatings.’ Furthermore, the Commission has examined allegations that raise issues under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in particular whether the rhetoric transmitted in Russian state and other media constitutes direct and public incitement to commit genocide.

26 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/HRC/52/62), available online at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/52/62. All reports from the Commission

27 The use of torture upon detainees has been documented consistently in penal colonies and detention centres under Russian authority, including the use of electrocution, mock executions, suffocation, rape and numerous such heinous acts. Commission Reports: A/HRC/55/66, A/78/540, A/79/549.

28 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/78/540). Available online at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/540.

29 Idem.


with abusive partners out of economic necessity or due to the stigma attached to separation during wartime.30

 

  1. One testimonial from a legal expert also pointed to the emerging legal recognition of children born out of rape, as victims entitled to reparations, a significant step forward in Ukraine’s legal system. However, without accompanying services such as trauma-informed legal counselling, mental healthcare, and shelter access for women raising these children, such formal recognition remains largely symbolic.
  2. “What is lacking at this stage, apart from funding, is a formalisation of policy responses informed by expertise. For instance, can the child access information related to birth in such extremely sensitive circumstances? Or, [...] the idea of urgent interim reparations, funding needs to become available, one important policy recommendation in this sense, being repurposing Russian frozen/seized assets to ensure that those entitled to funds have access to adequate, integrated medical and psychological support.”31

 

  1. The UK’s WPS and broader ODA strategies must therefore account for these interconnected forms of violence and victimhood, whereby the battlefield expands into domestic spheres and community-based livelihoods. Trauma itself is not siloed, migrating from the unlawful military occupation into everyday life. The Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine acknowledges that such violent events also ruptured family relations.32 Furthermore, funding for frontline services should not exclusively address conflict-related sexual violence in its immediate form, but also the long tail of harm inflicted on the generational well-being of survivors, their children, and the future cohesion of communities.

 

  1. Insights and documentation from organisations such as Save Ukraine, A21 and Child Rescue reveal a landscape in which the war has created a permissive environment for a broad spectrum of atrocities, as one humanitarian described it, “the perfect background for any crimes”, often interrelated. This multifaceted violence does not emerge in isolation, but thrives in conditions of displacement, fragmentation of governance or the collapse of protective infrastructures, disproportionately affecting women, girls and vulnerable children.
  2. Child Rescue, a Ukrainian-based NGO focused on the most vulnerable and conflict-affected children, reports that their organisation is witnessing an increase in referrals of children affected by domestic violence and predatory abuse (perpetrated in some instances by civilians). Among the children in their care (receiving specialised and integrated support) – 19% are boys and 81% girls, respectively.33

 

  1. According to Julia Sachenko from Child Rescue “(...) it is often difficult to determine what is conflict-related or not. An excruciating example from occupied territories – a single mother was the sole provider for her children with whom she was living in a rented flat. One day, she left to look for a job to cover the due rent and utilities, otherwise the mono-


30 Multiple interviews and online discussions with legal experts and organisations offering support for victims of domestic violence. The Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine stipulated that in the case of gender-based violence, ‘these crimes left victims with serious physical and mental health challenges, long-lasting trauma, stigmatization and feelings of shame, including towards their own families. In some documented instances, victims ‘spoke of blame and stigma by some community members and decided not to report the crimes.’ Furthermore, ‘two victims who reported the crimes stated that the interrogation by the Ukrainian police was disrespectful and intimidating, and a source of additional trauma. They consequently withdrew their complaints.’ Report A/HRC/55/66, P. 17, available online at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/55/66.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. The Reports have documented such cases when ‘a victim broke up with her fiancé because he stigmatised her after the rape.’ (P.:17).

33 This is based on the reports shared with the author, reflecting the organisation’s caseload, not necessarily indicative of national-level tendencies. The organisation has 52 active cases documenting sexual exploitation and abuse of children.


parental family risked eviction. The mother never returned [killed, detained or simply fled under pressure; the cause of disappearance remains unknown]. The children [a girl and a boy] were left alone in the flat. After some time, the landlord kicked them out onto the streets, and they became homeless. Someone who appeared to be a nice man offered them shelter, but then soon began sexually exploiting children for his own purposes. When the territory was de-occupied [Kherson] our organisation [Child Rescue] took the children into care, providing legal support, psychological rehabilitation and a number of services [...].”34

  1. In such instances, delimiting abuse as either “conflict-related’ or not becomes increasingly narrow and unproductive, especially since the war’s destabilising effects bleed into every layer of social life. The conditions of vulnerability, displacement, and forced abandonment induced by the conflict are themselves enabling environments for exploitation – ‘[...] those gaps are quickly filled in by those seeking to exploit, oftentimes opportunistically.’ This highlights the urgent need for WPS and child protection frameworks to adopt a broader lens that captures the continuum of harm experienced during and as a result of the ongoing conflict.

 

  1. Furthermore, the evidence provided by frontline organisations reveals alarming patterns of human trafficking catalysed by circumstances of war, targeting children and vulnerable women.35 The erosion of protection systems, coupled with mass displacement, has created ripe conditions for exploitative networks to flourish, some pre-existing, both in Ukraine and across its borders. Frontline organisations have assiduously tracked numerous trafficking indicators consistent with definitions outlined in the Palermo Protocol36 and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings,37 including but not limited to: deception, abuse of vulnerability, and coercion for the purposes of sexual exploitation, forced labour and military use.

 

  1. One alarming case shared during the interview points to instances of sex trafficking under the guise of familial guardianship or humanitarian assistance. This evidence involves a father who, under material pressure and/or substance abuse, attempted to sell his daughter to a Russian officer for sexual exploitation, after falsely claiming the mother had abandoned her family. In occupied zones, single mothers, isolated and unable to evacuate for various reasons, are vulnerable to such predatory arrangements, where Russian military personnel exert unchecked control.38
  2. In the troubling case of children, girls and boys, deported to the Russian Federation, evidence of systematic trafficking has emerged. While officially framed under the Geneva Conventions as unlawful deportations, many of these cases bear the hallmarks of trafficking, as defined in

 

 


34 Interview with Julia Sachenko (Head of Child Rescue Ukraine). These patterns of extreme vulnerability have been consistently evidenced by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, in several reports: A/HRC/55/66, A/78/540, A/79/549.

35 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/78/540) concluded that multiple forms of violence were experienced by the victims and their families. Furthermore, ‘fear, trauma, physical and psychological harm, and damage to livelihoods are experienced in parallel, as evidenced in victims’ accounts.’ In one such documented case ‘a woman who lived alone with her children reported, that after Russian authorities had taken control of the village, she felt compelled to move in with a man in order to seek safety. Taking advantage of the situation, he mistreated the children, took the social aid that she was receiving and aided her rape by Russian soldiers.’ (P.: 16).

36 The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons was adopted by the United Nations in November 2000 as part of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Available online at: https://www.unodc.org/res/human-trafficking/2021the-protocol-tip_html/TIP.pdf.

37 Council of Europe Treaty Series (CETS) No. 197, available online at, https://rm.coe.int/168008371d.

38 Interview with Julia Sachenko (Head of Child Rescue Ukraine). Corroborated with evidence provided by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, in several reports: A/HRC/55/66, A/78/540, A/79/549.


the Palermo Protocol and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.39 In another instance:

 

  1. A child left home unattended was seized during a house raid and transported under the pretext of attending a summer camp. In reality, the site he was sent to was a facility for hard labour and ideological indoctrination operated by the Russian military, where boys and girls as young as twelve were forced into auxiliary maintenance work and eventually channelled into military education and combat. These practices amount not only to labour and military exploitation, but to a form of state-sponsored trafficking, weaponising children’s displacement for long-term militarised ends.40
  2. In addition to the forced movement and indoctrination of children, Russia’s recent legal amendments simplifying adoption procedures raise further alarms. These laws permit the adoption of forcibly deported Ukrainian children with minimal oversight, potentially enabling trafficking under the guise of legality. Although concrete evidence of such adoptions being abused for exploitation has yet to surface, the structural risk and inherent threat are significant, given Russia’s track record of state-facilitated harm. As one of the interviewees has aptly stressed, this issue urgently demands public and diplomatic attention, not only as a war crime, but as a transnational trafficking crisis.41

 

  1. Overall, current international responses have largely failed to frame these deliberate actions through a trafficking lens, which has resulted in legal and protection mechanisms being severely underutilised, and survivors being insufficiently recognised and supported.

 

  1. Victimhood in Ukraine’s context is not singular, but layered, situated at the intersection of multiple, compounding forms of violence, including but not limited to sexual torture, forced displacement, trafficking, psychological warfare, and militarised exploitation. Correspondingly, survivors are often subjected simultaneously to violations that span the legal definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and human rights abuses.
  2. For the UK to ensure its WPS commitments remain credible and sustainable amid global political shifts, the UK government must move beyond rhetorical ambition towards policies grounded in local realities, survivor-centred evidence, and long-term structural investment. Anchoring WPS programming in a documented and accruing body of evidence is of the utmost importance. Sustainability depends not only on financial continuity, should it be momentously achieved, but on creating resilient systems of care, protection and justice that persist beyond political or geopolitical cycles.

 

 

 

 


39 Also corroborated by the Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/78/540). In May 2022 it documented ‘the transfer of 31 children from Ukraine to the Russian Federation’ concluding that such acts amount to ‘unlawful deportation and a war crime.’ Attesting a consistent pattern of unlawful transfers, another Report of the Commission (A/HRC/55/66), evidenced the unlawful transfer of ’46 children from Kherson’s Regional Children’s Home on the orders of Russian authorities on 21 October 2022’. P.: 17. Available online at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/55/66. Furthermore, investigations uncovered documents and satellite imagery that confirm [Ukrainian] children being taken to sites for patriotic indoctrination, weapons training and combat drills. See, Liz Cookman (September 2025). ‘Russia has a network of 200 camps for brainwashing Ukrainian children – report’ in the Guardian, available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/sep/16/russia-has-network-of-200-camps-for-brainwashing-ukrainian-children-report. Also refer to Ukraine’s Stolen Children: Inside Russia’s Network of Re-Education and Militarization (September 2025). Report by the Yale School of Public Health Humanitarian Research Lab, available online at: https://medicine.yale.edu/lab/khoshnood/news-article/ukraines-stolen-children-inside-russias-network-of-re-education-and-militarization/.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.