Written evidence submitted by The Deterrence Center (COM0040)
Introduction
The Deterrence Center serves as the hub for modern deterrence - bringing together applied research, strategic foresight, and cross-domain expertise to address today’s most complex and hybrid security threats. Built on over two decades of experience in security, law enforcement, defence, and academia, our work through the Deterrence Center focuses on advancing security by creating solutions that deter threats and address the modern world's complex challenges. We combine academic rigour with operational insight to deliver impactful, real-world outcomes.
Our four core divisions - Strategic Support; MIRA (Monitoring, Intelligence, Response & Analysis); the Education & Training Hub; and our Policy Unit - deliver cross-sector capabilities designed to meet the evolving security demands faced by the UK.
This submission draws on our recent research and policy briefs: Rethinking Counter-Terrorism: Beyond Ideology- Violence, Vulnerability, and Deterrence in the Age of Hybrid Threats (2025), Disrupting Deception: Misinformation, Disinformation and the Link with Radicalisation (2025), and Beyond Espionage: The Radicalising Reach of Foreign State Disinformation (2025). It supports the Home Affairs Committee’s inquiry by highlighting the diversification of the extremist threat landscape, the erosion of traditional ideological boundaries, and the critical need to reconfigure Prevent and wider safeguarding frameworks to confront emerging extremism and radicalisation vectors - particularly those driven by grievance, digital ecosystems, and foreign interference.
In an era where threats are hybrid, decentralised, and digitally amplified, deterrence must evolve beyond passive containment to become anticipatory, intelligent, and strategic. Our evidence aims to complement the Committee’s work by sharing insights on emergent trends in extremism, underlying drivers, intervention challenges, and practical remedies. Our analysis is grounded in the UK Government’s updated operational definition of extremism (2024), which recognises the complex, hybrid nature of contemporary threats.
Preamble
We operate within an era defined by societal polarisation, weaponised online narratives, and contested truths. Extremism has outgrown its historical confines, emerging as a hybrid, networked, and digitally sustained phenomenon. Rethinking Counter-Terrorism: Beyond Ideology- Violence, Vulnerability, and Deterrence in the Age of Hybrid Threats emphasises that “violent extremism today often arises less from rigid ideology and more from fluid vulnerabilities - including social isolation, identity crises, and exposure to polarising narratives”. This non-linear pathway - from grievance to violence - demands responses that are as adaptive and multi-dimensional as the threats themselves.
What trends are evident in the growth of extremism and radicalisation in the UK?
The UK is witnessing diversification and decentralisation of extremist vectors, characterised by the rise of mixed, unclear, or unstable ideologies (MUUs), where ideological coherence is less important than grievance, identity fragmentation, or emotional resonance.
Rapid, digitally embedded radicalisation. Radicalisation pathways are shorter, personalised, and digitally embedded. Exposure to emotionally charged content across mainstream platforms- fuelled by algorithmic echo chambers- shortens recruitment timescales. Radicalisation no longer follows a structured recruitment model but occurs via ambient exposure to emotionally charged, identity-fracturing content seeded across mainstream platforms. The process is algorithmically fuelled, reflecting a shift from ideological indoctrination to information and psycho-social manipulation.
Convergence between domestic extremism and foreign state disinformation: adversaries exploit our digital openness not to persuade, but to destabilise shared reality, normalise radical narratives, and deepen social fractures, Concurrently, domestic extremism is increasingly entwined with foreign state disinformation campaigns. Adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and China exploit democratic openness to sow division, delegitimise institutions, and amplify polarising narratives around race, religion, and politics- not to persuade but to destabilise and erode shared social reality. A tactic explored in depth in our recent policy brief: Beyond Espionage: The Radicalising Reach of Foreign State Disinformation (restricted/not yet published) - attached to this submission as a separate document for further reference.
What factors are contributing to a rise in extremism?
Key drivers include:
What approaches are most effective for identifying and intervening to prevent young people being drawn into extremism?
Given the potential for the ambient-like nature of radicalisation, interventions must:
Additionally, our research advocates for intervention pilots using narrative inoculation, combining behavioural science and peer-to-peer engagement that neutralise extremist framing before it takes hold.
What impact are new technologies, such as AI, having on efforts to combat online extremism and radicalisation?
AI acts as both an accelerant and shield in the digital radicalisation landscape. On the one hand, generative models enable hyper-tailored disinformation, manipulated visuals, micro-targeted campaigns, and astroturfing. On the other, AI systems have the potential to identify coordinated inauthentic behaviours, map narrative origin points, and provide real-time risk modelling. The challenge - highlighted in Beyond Espionage: The Radicalising Reach of Foreign State Disinformation - lies in regulation: without ethical guardrails and multi-sector cooperation, AI’s defensive capabilities will remain underutilised.
To what extent do ‘com networks’ represent a new form of online extremism?
Online extremist networks - on Discord, Telegram, or dark forums - represent a new form of radicalisation incubator. These are relationship- and identity-based communities, not purely ideological forums. They offer psychological safety, status, and belonging. These networks are deliberately resistant to conventional detection, relying on anonymity, encryption, and tokenised loyalty dynamics. Extremism is often gamified and aestheticised within meme and gaming culture, complicating detection by traditional content tools.
How effective are existing interventions at identifying extremism threats arising from ‘com networks’?
Existing systems fail ‘com networks’:
We urgently need digital ethnography units, strengthened community-intelligence partnerships, and capability across law enforcement, safeguarding, academia, and tech platforms to map subcultural trends in real time.
What changes might be required to ensure Prevent is set up effectively to stop people with mixed, unclear, and unstable ideologies from becoming radicalised?
Prevent must focus on both ideological gatekeeping and grievance and vulnerability-based detection. Operationally, this requires:
Can Prevent effectively manage cases involving new mechanisms of radicalisation such as online platforms?
To remain effective in a digital threat landscape, Prevent must:
Are any mechanisms other than Prevent required to address mixed, unclear, and unstable ideologies?
Prevent alone is insufficient. We advocate for:
What factors will determine whether or not new Youth Diversion Orders would be effective in preventing young people from becoming radicalised?
Effectiveness depends on:
Conclusion
Extremism has transcended ideology. It is now driven by emotion, identity flux, digital ecosystems, and hybrid geopolitical interference. Our counter-extremism strategy must evolve accordingly - from reactionary containment to strategic deterrence. This requires a combination of:
Our goal is not merely to stop extremist action but to shape a society in which radicalisation cannot flourish. This is modern deterrence - anticipatory, interdisciplinary, and strategically aligned.
July 2025