Written evidence from HOPE not hate [MIS0061]

About HOPE not hate 

HOPE not hate exists to challenge the organised far-right, build resilience in the communities who are susceptible to them and address the issues and policies which give rise to them. We are submitting this evidence as we are concerned about the impact that the manosphere has on young people, particularly related to the emerging relationship between misogyny and the far right online. For further questions related to this submission, please contact Anki Deo at anki@hopenothate.org.uk. 

 

How prevalent are misogynistic views, attitudes and behaviour among young people today, particularly in educational settings? What examples are there of these views, attitudes and behaviours? In what other settings are such behaviours prevalent?

While there has been some progress in advancing women’s rights in recent years, sexism still underpins British society. Misogyny certainly existed before the internet, and continues to exist independently of it, but the evolving manosphere has invited new debates on the subject. HOPE not hate defines the manosphere as ‘a loose collection of websites, forums, blogs and vlogs for men “red-pilled” (awoken) to their supposed emasculation by feminists’.

 

Misogynist influencers glamorise sexism. Influencers like Andrew Tate and Myron Gaines are front-facing figures of the manosphere with thousands of social media followers. They promote a luxurious lifestyle and situate misogyny as part of achieving their social and financial success, thus glorifying misogynistic values which otherwise would have been considered niche or unfashionable. Where incels, for example, would be considered to have low social status due to their lack of sexual success, influencers produce a form of misogyny which is more socially appealing to a young audience. Therefore, misogynist views have increased in prevalence partly due to influencers' abilities to assign social kudos to misogyny.  

 

Across a survey of 2040 16-24 year olds in January 2024 (conducted by Focaldata on behalf of HOPE not hate, referenced throughout this submission) 95% had heard of Andrew Tate and 1 in 4 of those who had heard of him had a favourable opinion of him, with a stronger skew towards young men. Only 12% of female respondents had a favourable opinion of Tate, as opposed to 41% of male respondents.

 

Tate is of a mixed ethnic background, and recently converted to Islam. Both of these factors mean that young men from minority ethnic backgrounds might be more likely to find Tate more relatable than white manosphere influencers. In our polling1 we found that 41% of Asian and Asian British respondents had a net positive opinion of Tate, while 36% of Black and Black British respondents shared the same view. 51% of young Muslims support Tate, alongside 44% of young Sikhs. However, again there is a gendered split between these statistics; 72% of young Muslim men surveyed had a positive view of Tate, while only 25% of young Muslim women expressed the same sentiment. 

 

Some young women do endorse Tate’s opinions. Amongst female respondents, we found that 30% of young women think that men and women are born different, to perform different roles in society. 22% thought that feminism had gone too far, and 20% agreed that women cry rape after having sex they regret. Young women’s support for Tate is complex but is broadly linked to paradox whereby young women might feel safer to act within the status quo by endorsing Tate’s misogyny, than risk challenging it. Similarly, it is unsurprising that some women absorb societal sexism from their environment; they are no more immune to social pressures than their male peers. 

 

We acknowledge that expressing a liking for Andrew Tate is not necessarily a direct indication of misogyny. Many young people expressed that their liking for him derived from wanting to learn from him financially or embracing his ‘self-help’ guidance. However, individuals who like Tate are almost twice as likely to have a negative opinion of feminism (42% vs 23%) and are similarly twice as likely to think negatively of LGBTQIA+ individuals.1 Therefore, while one should not simplify support for Andrew Tate as endorsement of misogyny, there is a clear connection whereby individuals who endorse Tate tend to hold more misogynistic values. They may not have been initially attracted to him based on his sexism but tend to absorb the rhetoric regardless. In other contexts, supporters might not see Tate’s misogyny as enough of an issue to deter them from liking his content. 

 

In a poll of 6420 teachers conducted by Teacher Tapp in February 2023, 83% of teachers said they were worried about Andrew Tate’s views having a negative effect on male pupils' behaviour. Worryingly, in polling conducted by Teacher Tapp on behalf of HOPE not hate in February 2024 (n=4031) 41% of secondary school teachers reported having seen aggressive misogyny from students, and 15% reported seeing students advocating for sexual violence. We heard the following accounts from teachers recounting male students’ attitudes towards staff:

 

“They have a real issue with female members of staff. They will blatantly ignore female members of staff’s instructions but whenever a male member of staff speaks to them, it is absolutely fine, they did it [follow the instruction].” 

Secondary school teacher, Kent (male) 

 

“The problem is that they’ve learned the kind of dogmatic behaviours that those characters [Andrew Tate and others] have taught them. They also try to use their physical presence against you… often targeting or challenging those they view as assertive female members of staff.” 

Secondary school teacher, Kent (male)

 

How are social media influencers shaping attitudes towards women and girls?

 

Influencers construct an aspirational ‘alpha male’ figure and situate misogyny as the exclusive path to achieving this position. Simultaneously, they position feminism as ‘woke’, and thus uncool, meaning students wishing to preserve social credibility may be hesitant to speak out.

 

Misogyny is often featured alongside lifestyle or self-improvement content. Jordan Peterson markets himself as a ‘psychologist, author and online educator’ with a strong online influence, but reinforces harmful stereotypes of binary gender roles. Other influencers combine fitness-based content with extreme misogyny. ‘Gymcels’ (an incel who works out to improve his looks) have popularised muscle-based looksmaxxing to, in theory, achieve ‘alpha male’ status and thus gain access to women. Andrew Tate exploits financial aspirations by marketing get-rich-quick schemes to young men, often in the form of sexually exploiting women. By promoting aspirational lifestyles, influencers market misogyny as a vehicle for success. 

 

However, it is key to note that in our polling, the top reasons for liking Tate did not include his financial success.1 Instead, the first was that “He’s not afraid to push back against ‘woke’ ideology” (24%), then that “He wants men to be real men” (22%). As a result, while his content is embroiled in obtaining social and financial status, it is his hateful activism which pulls the most attention.

 

“Some of his ideas are just out of pocket like his misogyny, and it’s just not it, no, but like his belief of bettering yourself and then making yourself like the best version can be – I associate with that” 

Year 9 pupil (male, West London)

 

Because misogynist content typically exists as an undercurrent to lifestyle content, initial engagement tends to stem from innocent searches regarding fitness or dating. Many young men are not necessarily seeking manosphere content out but are presented with it due to algorithmic targeting based on demographics and engagement. 

 

There is a pool of female influencers within the manosphere, known as ‘tradwives’, who shape ideas about women and girls by promoting domesticity as aspirational for women. Where male figures embody traditional concepts of masculinity within a context of financial success, ‘Tradwives’ embody an aspirational stay at home wife figure, flanked by adorable children, home baking and farm animals. By embodying an idealised version of the house-wife role, tradwives glorify women exclusively as homemakers and reproductive vessels, typically in a Biblical context. In a similar way to Tate, tradwives market a desirable lifestyle attainable only through conforming to firm gender roles.

 

Although the question is framed through the lens of women and girls, the manosphere’s fixation on gender roles means that LGBTQIA+ students are also impacted. In the same way as women are targeted for deviating from traditional female roles as a housewife, LGBTQIA+ individuals are similarly targeted for not conforming to gendered standards. Gay students may be targeted for not adhering to heteronormative gender roles, and gender non-conforming students may be targeted for refusing to adhere to traditional binary ideas of gender.

 

How is content on social media and online, such as violent pornography, contributing to sexist and misogynistic attitudes and behaviour and violence against women and girls both online and offline?

Our January 2024 polling indicates that 56% of young people agree that online pornography contributes to levels of violence against women and girls.1 Furthermore, 61% of young people (50% of male respondents, 71% of female respondents) agree that the violence and sexual violence young people see online and in gaming worlds has a detrimental effect on their real-life relationships. 56% of young people (48% men and 64% women) agreed that young women are less likely to participate in online debates, platforms and games because of fear of online abuse by men. As a result, young people recognise that the sexual narratives they encounter online have an impact on their real-world relationships and interactions. 

 

What role are social media companies and online platforms playing in the promotion of misogynistic content?

Social media companies provide a platform which can reward extremist content through algorithmic design. Research by Milli et al. (2025) indicates that social media platforms, including YouTube, X and TikTok, function on an algorithm prioritising user engagement. They found that engagement-based algorithms amplified tweets that exhibited partisanship and out-group animosity, and significantly amplified tweets expressing anger. Thus, inflammatory content spreads quickly and is more likely to feature in searches. This means that the algorithmic design of some platforms play an active role in promoting misogynist content.

 

Furthermore, platforms with engagement-based algorithms prioritise content which confirms pre-existing values, creating an ‘echo chamber’. Milli et al. (2025) established that users had more positive perceptions of their in-group and more negative perceptions of their out-group after reading posts selected by an engagement-driven algorithm.  Because engagement-based algorithms keep users in an echo chamber, users are no longer challenged on potentially harmful viewpoints. Without interacting with content which disputes misogynist claims, users are more likely to become further entrenched in those values. 

 

These trends are particularly worrying due to the amount of young people who see social media as a less biased news source than mainstream media. This is because of the perception that more people contribute to social media, and therefore a wider range of views are presented; this shows a clear underestimation for the power of algorithmic bias online. 

 

However, young people on average do hold social media companies accountable for radicalisation. In our polling,1 when asked “Who should bear the most responsibility when a teenager is radicalised by the content they see online?” young people responded:

  1. Social media companies who allow extremist content on their platforms (28%)
  2. The people who produce the content (26%)
  3. The parents/carers for not putting the right controls in place (23%)
  4. The young person themselves (15%)

 

In the same polling, 57% of young people agreed that social media companies should be encouraged to redirect young people who view extremist websites to alternative sites where these extremist views are challenged.1 Overall, it is not only clear that social media plays an active role in promoting misogynist content through financial and interactive means, but that young people are aware of social media companies' role in this process. 

 

Who is gaining financially from the marketisation of misogyny online, and how? What policies do social media companies have in place for deplatforming or demonetising this content and are they enforced?

Both influencers and platforms benefit financially from the marketisation of misogyny. Many influencers sell courses, typically styled as financial, lifestyle or dating advice. The most well-known of these is Tate’s ‘Huster’s University’, for which users paid $49 per month. Hustler’s University has since shut down, but Tate now offers a new course known as ‘The Real World’, offering memberships ranging from $70-$99 a month. This type of course originated in the manosphere through the Pickup Artist community, where ‘dating coaches’ sold courses offering romantic advice to young men.

 

We are aware of more in depth contributions to this inquiry given by Jacob Davey and Janaya Walker regarding this topic, who explore donation systems and paid content from favoured influencers. We support the argument that influencers financially exploit young boys’ vulnerabilities and insecurities around romantic relationships. Furthermore, we support their conclusions regarding the way in which misogynist content is often rewarded through monetisation, where platforms and influencers alike may profit.

 

As it currently stands, some larger social media companies de-platform misogynist content, but this is typically dependent on the individual platform rules, meaning some platforms are more accommodating of misogynist content than others. Enforcement is also irregular, usually focussing on the most extreme examples. Furthermore, platforms with less efficient content moderation systems may struggle to moderate misogynist content at all. Andrew Tate was famously de-platformed by YouTube and Facebook, and more recently had his podcast removed from Spotify. Deplatforming has an impact on personal reach, but Tate’s content is still widely accessible through accounts which repost Tate’s videos. Furthermore, removing someone from one platform does not mean they cannot simply reappear on another. Deplatformed users still have access to the wider online ecosystem, and thus, while often warranted, is not a fix-all solution.

 

However, many platforms are backsliding from some of the progress made in moderating harmful content over past years. X, particularly, has become a welcome environment for misogynist influencers like Tate, Myron Gaines, Pearl Davies and Nick Fuentes. As X dramatically downsized their Trust and Safety teams and Meta switched from fact-checking to user moderation, the current trend amongst large platforms is away from moderation, rather than towards. The Online Safety Act’s specific guidelines regarding violence against women and girls (VAWG) establishes some relevant frameworks for tackling misogynist content online but concerns about enforcement could hinder the Act’s power to genuinely make changes across platforms.  

 

What strategies and interventions are needed to address misogyny among young people?

HOPE not hate’s segmentation of young people separated them into groups based on similar attitudes.1 We identified two sub-groups of young people, ‘Progressive Advocates’ and ‘Disengaged Liberals’, who already subscribe to liberal ideologies but feel disillusioned with politics. We recommend empowering these groups to give them a sense of political autonomy, either through leadership training or more casual spaces where young people can speak about the issues which affect them and feel there is a solution. Preventing young people from feeling disenfranchised is important for political self-worth and they might be able to lead their peers through interventions rather than exclusively top-down delivery of work with young people.

 

On the other hand, challenging ‘Engaged Reactionaries’, who are engaged in politics but possess reactionary opinions on culture issues, is equally important. They are the largest group of young people (around 33%). As this group is still trustful of politics and the mainstream media, interventions through traditional and mainstream channels are likely to be successful at engaging them. Introducing alternative and, crucially, charismatic role models in both political, educational and social spaces to challenge their emotive responses to culture war issues is an opportunity that should be explored.

 

Within the classroom, we suggest tackling the popularity of manosphere influencers. Part of the attraction to the manosphere ideology is the social validation it can bring young people; by removing the status of harmful influencers, this can diminish the social kudos associated with supporting them. This might be more effective coming from peers, positive influencers or authority figures, rather than teachers. 

 

Challenging misogyny within content contributes to de-normalising misogynist ideas amongst young people. Equipping young people with critical thinking skills, including media literacy, is essential in building resilience to hate as young people feel more empowered to challenge content. By providing opportunities to discuss content in a safe environment, alongside providing alternative viewpoints, young people are more likely to be able to challenge misogynist ideas and recognise them as harmful.


It must also be understood that the manosphere, and broader misogyny amongst young people, thrives in a culture of everyday sexism. To derail the most extreme forms of misogyny, adults must challenge all forms of misogyny which exist across the vast majority of society - sometimes described as a “pyramid” of violence. We understand that this is difficult, particularly regarding situations where parents are supportive of misogynist viewpoints voiced by individuals like Andrew Tate. Despite these challenges, misogyny must be understood to exist externally to the manosphere itself and therefore should be challenged in all of its forms. 

 

However, government guidance, particularly to support teachers, is needed. Our research has overwhelmingly shown that teachers lack the confidence and resources to address hateful attitudes amongst young people decisively; only around half reported being confident in identifying and resolving conflicts involving incidents of discrimination. Schools cannot be expected to solve misogyny, but their part in engaging with young people about social ideas is essential. The government must offer usable and flexible guidance on how to speak about misogynist narratives within an educational context. 

 

Finally, the proper regulation of social media platforms, supported by OFCOM guidance, is needed to tackle misogyny. We are yet to see the impact of OFCOM guidance surrounding VAWG, but robust guidelines regarding misogynist content online are essential in preventing harmful narratives from gaining traction amongst young people. As it currently stands, OFCOM guidance for VAWG is split into ‘Foundational Steps’ and ‘Good Practice’, with the latter describing steps which are preferable, but not integral. With many social media platforms already hesitant to enforce content moderation, accountability and clarity are key for any new guidance. We feel that there should be a clearer line on what is required of tech platforms, rather than separating guidance into what ultimately becomes ‘optional extras’. We suggest a far more robust approach to this issue, which would include reopening the Act, as well as guidance around it.    

 

June 2025