Written evidence submitted by Dr Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (COM0036)

Executive Summary

Misogynistic extremism constitutes a distinct and rapidly growing form of ideological extremism. It undermines women’s human rights, as defined under international frameworks.[i] Based on our recent research at the University of Manchester [link], misogynistic extremism is shown to meet the criteria of the UK Government's revised 2024 definition of extremism. It promotes hatred and intolerance, denies the fundamental rights of women and girls, and fosters environments that legitimise violence and coercion. Misogynistic extremism is not confined to isolated incidents or fringe communities. Instead, it’s driven by a male supremacist ideology that contributes to radicalisation by offering disaffected young men a moralised narrative of grievance and retributive violence.

Recommendations to the Inquiry: To respond effectively, the UK Government should:

•         Formally recognise misogynistic extremism as a distinct ideological threat under counter-extremism policy;

•         Integrate strategies for preventing gender-based violence with counter-extremism efforts, recognising their shared ideological roots;

•         Reform the Prevent strategy to include gender-based ideological violence and develop new guidance for cases involving hybrid, decentralised ideologies;

•         Hold platforms accountable for the algorithmic promotion and monetisation of misogynistic content, through regulation and transparency requirements;

•         Implement inclusive, trauma-informed interventions that address both online and offline structures sustaining male supremacist ideologies and support recovery pathways for those at risk of radicalisation.

Misogynistic Extremism as Gender-Based Violence

We need to recognise violence against women and girls (VAWG) not only as a legal issue, but a structural and systemic harm deeply rooted in extreme patriarchal ideologies. Male supremacist extremism is one such ideology. It actively seeks to undermine gender equality, erode women’s autonomy, and justify coercion, harassment, and violence. Our research defines misogynistic extremism as: “Content, acts, and practices that enforce or police the patriarchal order by promoting and advancing male supremacy—often through intimidation, coercion, systematic dehumanisation of women, and violence.” This definition aligns with an established analysis of extremism along three important dimensions of extremism:[ii]

• Ideological: rooted in male supremacist beliefs that reject gender equality;
• Methodological: involving the endorsement or glorification of violence and coercion;
• Psychological: characterised by grievance, victimhood, and a refusal to compromise.

Our definition also aligns with the UK Government’s 2024 revised criteria for extremism, especially:

• Aim 1: negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, and
• Aim 3: intentionally create permissive environments for others to achieve the results in (1) [or (2)].

Notably, the threat of misogynistic violence is not confined just to physical violence but includes narrative practices that incite hatred, justify past attacks, and create ideological conditions for harm.

1. RECENT TRENDS

What trends are evident in the growth of extremism and radicalisation in the UK?

Recent patterns show a troubling rise in the mainstreaming of extreme misogyny in the UK. This trend is increasingly intertwined with conspiracy theories, racial hatred, and anti-democratic narratives. We are witnessing the emergence of ideological convergence—particularly among younger online users—where incel forums, men’s rights spaces, and conspiracy-driven influencers blend into hybrid belief systems. These ideologies do not always fit neatly into established terrorism categories but are clear drivers of radicalisation and social harm.

Our research at the University of Manchester[iii] indicates that misogynistic extremism is accelerating, fuelled by the rise of online male supremacist networks. These include incel forums, the broader manosphere, and influencer-led digital ecosystems. Within these spaces, misogynistic beliefs are not only normalised but actively celebrated. They recast male entitlement as moral justice, frame female autonomy as betrayal, and portray gender-based violence as heroic or justified retaliation. Violent misogynistic incels like Elliot Rodger are venerated, while influencers like Andrew Tate are algorithmically boosted, reaching vast audiences of young men and boys. These platforms offer more than content; they provide community, identity, and a moral narrative grounded in grievance and domination. They promote a worldview in which violence against women is rationalised as necessary or deserved.

Although the incel community and the wider manosphere may appear decentralised or loosely connected, they are bound by a shared ideological objective: to reverse the gains of gender equality by coercive or violent means. This agenda is evident in repeated patterns:

• Dehumanising women and casting their rights as optional;
• Justifying violence in defence of “traditional” gender hierarchies;
• Mobilising young, disaffected men against feminism and democratic norms.

These are not isolated behaviours. They are expressions of a coherent ideological programme. When misogyny becomes a vehicle for grievance, radicalisation, and coercive mobilisation, it should be recognised as a form of extremism.

What factors are contributing to a rise in extremism?

There are many factors—economic, social, cultural, and technological—fuelling the rise in extremism. These factors do not operate in isolation but interact and reinforce one another in ways that intensify vulnerability to radicalisation. First, economic precarity and status anxiety are major drivers. Many young men feel excluded from stable employment, home ownership, or social recognition. Within extremist networks, this disaffection is reframed as moral grievance, targeted not at structural inequality, but at feminists, migrants, and “liberal elites.” Economic insecurity becomes personalised, giving individuals a sense of righteous anger and a defined set of enemies. Second, social and emotional isolation—particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic—has left many individuals disconnected from meaningful sources of belonging. Online communities step to fill this void. These online communities offer not just connection, but identity, status, and purpose. Their appeal is not just ideological; it is deeply emotional. Third, there has been a cultural shift toward the legitimation of gendered hate. Violent misogyny, once marginal, is increasingly normalised or defended under the banner of “free speech” or “anti-woke” resistance. Influencers who promote deeply misogynistic views enjoy mainstream platforms and commercial success. This normalisation creates fertile ground for radicalisation, particularly for young people navigating questions of identity and power.

Finally, platform architecture and algorithmic design are critical. Extremist content that is emotionally charged, transgressive, or identity-affirming is more likely to be promoted by algorithms optimised for engagement. As a result, users are steered toward ever more polarised and radical content, even without actively seeking it. The system rewards outrage, not moderation. These combined factors—economic, emotional, cultural, and technological—create a permissive environment for extremist ideologies to flourish. Effective counter-extremism policy should engage with these underlying conditions, rather than treating extremism as a standalone problem.

What approaches are most effective for identifying and intervening to prevent young people being drawn into extremism?

Preventing young people from being drawn into extremism requires more than surveillance or punitive measures. It demands interventions that understand how and why extremist ideas take hold, especially during periods of identity formation, vulnerability, and disconnection. One key approach is education that targets epistemic vulnerability—namely, the ways in which young people come to trust harmful sources and absorb extremist narratives as truth. Without critical tools to assess credibility and bias, many are left exposed to persuasive misinformation and ideological manipulation. Education systems must equip young people not only with facts, but with the capacity to question how knowledge is formed and why certain narratives appeal.  Equally important is narrative disruption. Extremist ideologies often offer compelling emotional and moral stories about identity, masculinity, power, and justice. Effective interventions must counter these with alternative narratives that resonate emotionally and socially. Digital literacy should go beyond fact-checking and include affective engagement which challenges the emotional pull of extremism by offering young people stories that affirm dignity, agency, and belonging. Finally, community-based, youth-led interventions are essential. Top-down messaging often fails to reach young people where they are. Peer mentorship, gamified education tools, and outreach on the platforms young people already use (e.g., YouTube, TikTok, and Discord) have shown promise. When young people are given leadership roles in shaping these interventions, the results are more authentic, relevant, and impactful. The most effective strategies should respect young people’s agency, address their vulnerabilities, and offer compelling alternatives to extremist identity structures.

2. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND ‘COM NETWORKS’

What impact are new technologies, such as AI, having on efforts to combat online extremism and radicalisation?

New AI technologies are reshaping the landscape of online extremism in harmful ways. A key dynamic in this shift is the role of ‘com networks’: loosely organised, self-sustaining online communities that function as pseudo-communities for extremist engagement. Misogynistic extremism thrives in these networks, which use in-group slang, memes, and humour not just for bonding, but to normalise hate and erode moral restraint.[iv] Members are drawn into an environment that rewards ideological loyalty, punishes dissent, and fosters a sense of belonging rooted in grievance and desire for domination. Even where direct violence is rare, these spaces serve as psychological preparation zones for it. AI technologies amplify these risks thus:

•         Generative AI tools enable users to produce hate memes, deepfakes, and tailored propaganda with minimal expertise, making the production of harmful content faster and more accessible.

•         Recommender algorithms on social media and video platforms intensify ideological echo-chambers, directing vulnerable users toward more extreme content over time.

•         Automated moderation systems fall short in detecting gendered hate, coded language, and ironic slurs, which are central to misogynistic extremist subcultures.

If developed and deployed responsibly, AI systems could offer potential for early intervention and risk detection. For example, they could be trained on linguistic and cultural cues used in non-traditional forms of extremism, such as misogyny, anti-LGBTQ+ hate, and targeted abuse of neurodivergent individuals. They should use strong ethical oversight, transparency, and safeguards against misuse and spreading of extremist ideologies.

To what extent do ‘com networks’ represent a new form of online extremism?

‘Com networks’ are a distinct form of online extremism: decentralised, fluid, often gamified, and shaped by peer reinforcement and viral content. What distinguishes com networks from political forms of extremism is their strategic use of ambiguity and deniability. Hate is circulated through irony, satire, and “dark humour.” This creates plausible deniability for both users and platforms, allowing extremist content to flourish under the guise of entertainment.

These networks function essentially through identity-based bonding. Affective solidarity is built not through ideology alone, but through shared resentment, in-group slang, and ritualised expressions of contempt for outsiders, especially women, minorities, and perceived “elites.” The sense of belonging created in these communities is often stronger than in formal, hierarchical organisations. Rather than relying on manifestos or traditional propaganda, com networks engage in memetic warfare, e.g., spreading extremist ideas through humour, visual symbolism, and in-group cultural references. These tactics lower the barrier to recruitment, mask ideological content, and make participation feel low-risk and high-status. Because their influence is cultural, incremental, and slow-moving, com networks often evade traditional counter-extremism frameworks, which focus on immediate threats, clearly defined and political ideologies. Yet their impact is profound: they incubate long-term shifts in norms, values, and moral boundaries that legitimise hate and dehumanisation. Recognising com networks as a new mode of extremism is essential for developing responsive strategies to protect young people.

How effective are existing interventions at identifying extremism threats arising from ‘com networks’?

Current interventions fall short in identifying and addressing the extremist threats emerging from com networks. These decentralised communities operate in ways that existing counter-extremism frameworks are not equipped to handle. Most policing and content moderation efforts remain focused on overt threats or incitements to violence, while the more subtle processes of ideological grooming—often framed as humour, irony, or cultural commentary—go undetected. This allows radicalisation to unfold incrementally and invisibly, especially among young users. Similarly, the Prevent strategy and broader counterterrorism frameworks tend to overlook misogyny and gender-based hate unless they are explicitly tied to identificable terrorist organisations or ideologies. As a result, large and influential ecosystems of hate remain unmonitored and unchallenged, despite their clear role in normalising dehumanisation and preparing individuals for more extreme beliefs or actions. Social media platforms also routinely fail to enforce their own policies against hate speech and extremist content. Detection systems are poorly equipped to recognise the coded language, in-jokes, and context-dependent slurs that characterise communication within com networks. Inconsistencies in enforcement further undermine trust and allow harmful communities to adapt. To address these challenges, it’s important to recognise the ideological hybridity of com networks and understand the moral and emotional drivers of radicalisation. Without this shift, interventions will miss the signals of emerging threats and leave vulnerable young people exposed.

3. REMEDIES

What changes might be required to ensure Prevent is set up effectively to stop people with mixed, unclear and unstable ideologies from becoming radicalised?

To be effective, the Prevent strategy needs to adapt to digital and ideological challenges. Many concerning forms of radicalisation now arise not from clearly defined ideological movements, but from hybrid, fluid, and often unstable belief systems, particularly those emerging in online subcultures. Current frameworks are not designed to capture these threats. First, Prevent should expand its conceptual scope. It continues to be shaped primarily by concerns around religious extremism and racialised forms of threat. This leaves significant blind spots, especially around gender-based ideologies, such as misogynistic extremism, and hybrid movements that blend conspiracism, hate, and moral grievance. These ideologies are growing in influence and cannot be addressed effectively if they remain outside the official frame. Second, Prevent should be equipped to recognise memetic forms of extremism: the use of humour, irony, and coded language to spread harmful ideas. This requires deeper engagement with online (sub)cultures, platforms, and affective techniques that shape online radicalisation. Without this, early signs of ideological grooming and socialisation into hate will continue to go unnoticed. Finally, a reformed Prevent should shift emphasis from a securitised, referral-based approach to one that centres community partnerships, safeguarding, and mental health-informed pathways. Young people drawn into extremist networks are often struggling with isolation, identity confusion, and emotional distress. Effective intervention requires supporting them, not just monitoring or penalising them. Prevent should become less reactive and more attuned to the social and emotional dimensions of radicalisation.

Can Prevent effectively manage cases involving new mechanisms of radicalisation such as online platforms?

In its current form, Prevent is not equipped to manage the evolving mechanisms of online radicalisation. Today, radicalisation often unfolds in spaces far removed from mainstream platforms, e.g., Discord, Telegram, and private gaming servers, where content moderation is limited and ideological grooming happens under the radar through peer-to-peer pressure. To respond effectively, Prevent should develop digital infrastructure and partnerships capable of tracking radicalisation in less-visible online environments. It should also adopt youth-centred frameworks that reflect how platform culture, algorithmic reinforcement, and peer dynamics shape the ideological development of young people. Without these adaptations, Prevent risks missing early warning signs and failing to engage those most at risk in the spaces where radicalisation is actually occurring.

Are any mechanisms other than Prevent required to address mixed, unclear and unstable ideologies?

While reforming Prevent is essential, it cannot be the sole instrument for addressing the complex nature of today’s ideological threats. The rise of hybrid, unstable ideologies, particularly those formed in online spaces, requires a broader, multi-layered response that goes beyond counter-extremist frameworks. First, we recommend the development of a Digital Culture Resilience Programme aimed at equipping young people with the tools to navigate online influence. This would include building epistemic agency—the ability to critically evaluate sources of information—as well as fostering emotional literacy and critical thinking skills that help resist the moral and psychological pull of extremist narratives. Second, there is an urgent need for public service interventions targeting algorithmic harms. This includes regulatory measures that compel platforms to be transparent about how their recommendation systems function and how they may contribute to radicalisation. Without oversight, platform design will continue to amplify harmful content and reward engagement over safety. Finally, it is important to encourage counter-speech strategies and civil society actors already working to combat online hate, particularly those focused on misogyny, anti-LGBTQ+ violence, and digitally enabled abuse. A coordinated response to modern extremism should blend education, regulation, and community-based resilience. Prevent alone cannot carry that burden.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

What factors will determine whether or not new Youth Diversion Orders would be effective in preventing young people from becoming radicalised?

The success of new Youth Diversion Orders in preventing radicalisation will depend entirely on how they are designed and delivered. If these interventions are to be effective, they should move beyond behavioural correction and engage with the deeper, structural and emotional drivers of youth vulnerability. First, the interventions should address root causes such as alienation, loneliness, and identity insecurity. These are the conditions in which extremist narratives take hold, offering belonging and a sense of purpose to those who feel excluded. Diversion efforts that ignore these underlying dynamics risk being short-lived. Second, the professionals delivering these interventions should be trained to understand the gendered dynamics of online radicalisation. Many young people are drawn in through digital cultures that frame misogyny, racism, or conspiracism as forms of empowerment or truth-telling. Without a clear understanding of these ecosystems and the emotional appeal they hold, practitioners will be ill-equipped to intervene effectively. Finally, the interventions should be non-punitive, restorative, and future-facing. Young people at risk of radicalisation need reintegration, not surveillance or stigma. Interventions should build trust, foster critical reflection, and open up pathways to belonging, growth, and resilience. Youth Diversion Orders can therefore be a powerful tool, but only if they are built around empathy, expertise, and a genuine commitment to prevention over punishment.