Written evidence submitted by Mr John Simmons (EVO 15)

 

1              Author

This submission is made by John Simmons. He is studying for a PhD in Business Studies at the University of Hertfordshire. His subject includes the creation of a software program capable of delivering unbreakable ciphertext, which can contribute to the safety of online voting.

2              Questions addressed

The following questions are addressed, either in full or in part, by this submission:

  1. What are the potential perceptual risks with the current voting system and any potential electronic voting system? How does this interact with the principle that it is and should be only MPs that are able to vote in divisions in the House of Commons?
  2. Would electronic voting, or the introduction of technology into the divisions process more broadly, impact on other House of Commons practices and procedures and, if so, how?
  3. What impact would the introduction of electronic voting have on the House Administration in terms of resourcing?
  4. What impact do the current arrangements for divisions have on Members with protected characteristics and what would be the impacts of introducing electronic voting on such Members?
  5. What security concerns are there about electronic voting and what measures could be put in place to mitigate against those concerns?

3              Responses

3.1              Q1

There is the risk with all electronic communications using the Internet, in that they can be intercepted, read, altered and prevented from reaching their intended destination. All of these threaten the principle that it is, and should be, only MPs who are able to vote in divisions in the House of Commons. Nonetheless there are protective measures that can be taken to prevent this. Please see my response to Q5.

3.2              Q2

I envisage the following advantages to electronic voting, especially if it were to be extended to holding a complete debating process online. For these debates:

Please note that remote operation as described above would work equally well for Scrutiny and Select Committees, with the exception of taking oral evidence in the form of questions and answers, which could still be done remotely via a meetings app like Zoom or MS Teams.

3.3              Q3

Online debates can be conducted by MPs from any location including their homes. This would generate savings by reducing costs incurred by MPs for:

Should a sufficient number of debates be put online, it would be possible to:

The office space saved could be re-purposed for accommodation for MPs who have a valid requirement to stay in Westminster overnight. In recognition that managing hotel accommodation may not be a core skill of House Administration staff, this task could be outsourced to a hotel chain, who would be likely to offer a highly competitive price in order to obtain such a prestigious client.

It would also increase the availability of the debating chamber for tourism and even for the film industry.                                                                                                 

3.4              Q4

I can see no disadvantages of moving to electronic voting or online debating for Members with protected characteristics. The ability to work a great deal more from home has advantages for Members who have difficulty with travel and mobility.

3.5              Q5

As stated in my response to Q1, there is the risk with all electronic communication using the Internet, in that it may be intercepted, read, altered and prevented from reaching its intended destination, but there are protective measures that can be taken to prevent this. Most of these measures involve encryption to prevent eavesdroppers from reading the information being sent across the Internet. For good reasons, current government guidelines sets rules for the transmission of any information classified as “Official Sensitive” and prevent the use of the Internet for the transmission of anything classified as “Secret” or “Top Secret”1.

To make any system of online debating and voting effective it must be secure. Whereas the information placed on a debate website should be open to the public to read, it is important to ensure that information cannot be corrupted by hackers, including those seeking to undermine our democratic processes. This issue has been addressed by several companies who offer suitable solutions that allow businesses to operate this way, so it should be possible to develop a suitable system for Parliament, even if that system is bespoke.

Voting would need to be covered by a different system with much greater security to ensure that only Members can vote and their votes cannot be altered. This will require the most secure encryption systems available. My own research could provide a key element of the solution. Having discovered that all threats come via the Internet, an important feature is to ensure that only encrypted data is sent via it. All encryptions must take place using devices not connected to it. Furthermore that encryption must be guaranteed to be secure against any form of encryption breaking attempt. My research has developed an encryption system that meets the requirements of a One-time Pad, which was proven by Shannon to be unbreakable2.

4              References

1 - Ministry of Justice, (2024) Security Classification Scheme available from: https://security-guidance.service.justice.gov.uk/government-classification-scheme/#controls (Accessed 23 February 2024)

2 - Shannon, C. (1949) 'Communication theory of secrecy systems'. Bell Syst Tech Journal 28 pp. 656–715

 

23 June 2025