Written evidence submitted by United Against Nuclear Iran (COM0033)

Background on organisation submitting evidence

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) is a nonprofit and non-partisan policy organization formed to combat the threats posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. UANI educates the public, policymakers, and businesses about the dangers of the Iranian regime.

Summary

  1. The Islamic Republic of Iran is increasingly posing a significant and worsening threat to British security. Since the start of 2022, the UK has responded to at least 20 Iran-backed plots, many of which presented potentially lethal risks to British citizens and residents. These threats are not isolated incidents but form part of a deliberate strategy by the Iranian regime to target and suppress opposition, particularly targeting Iranian dissidents, journalists, and the Jewish community in the UK.

 

  1. In the recent review by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism and State Threats Legislation, Iranian activities targeting the UK have predominantly been classified as "foreign state threats" rather than terrorism.

 

  1. The review argues that the Terrorism Act 2000 was designed to address non-state terrorist organisations, not state actors, and that using it to proscribe a state body. Despite this, other quasi-state groups like Iran-backed Hamas and Hezbollah have been proscribed as terror organisations.

 

  1. The threat posed by Iran’s regime should also be recognised as an extremist threat – and not solely through the prism of a hostile state actor. The Iranian regime is a Shia Islamist extremist theocracy, with a hardline Shia Islamist ideology embedded at its core. The Islamic Republic of Iran is unique in being an Islamist extremist movement that has successfully occupied and governed a state. Other examples of Islamist extremist movements holding state power include the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and ISIS in Syria and Iraq from 2014 to 2019. Given the Iranian regime’s Shia Islamist extremist ideology and its expansionist ambitions backed by state resources, the Islamic Republic represents a uniquely serious and dangerous threat.

 

  1. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Iranian regime’s ideological military force, and associated entities actively promote radicalisation and Shia Islamist extremist ideology both within Iran and internationally, including on British soil. The IRGC's goal is to foster new generations of Islamists through indoctrination and soft-power campaigns, which directly contribute to homegrown radicalisation in the UK. As such, these activities should be addressed using counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) frameworks, not solely as state threats.

 

  1. Proscription of the IRGC has been dismissed as symbolic and not meaningful. Given the surge of IRGC activities in the UK, however, it is in fact a necessary and substantive step that would provide law enforcement and security agencies with enhanced legal powers to disrupt IRGC-linked networks, close regulatory loopholes exploited by Iranian-backed entities, and send a clear message that all forms of state-sponsored Islamist extremism will be met with decisive action.

 

  1. Iran’s regime has been a longstanding state sponsor of terrorism. The IRGC provides financial, logistical, and operational support to Islamist proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. These groups have carried out attacks across the Middle East, Europe, and beyond, destabilizing regions and threatening international security.

 

  1. For decades, the Iranian regime’s military doctrine had centred on three pillars: Islamist proxies abroad, ballistic missiles (combined more recently with drones), and a nuclear weapons program. Israel’s response to October 7 almost entirely dismantled Iran’s Islamist terror proxies. The two direct IRGC attacks on Israeli territory last year surprisingly revealed the weaknesses of the Iranian ballistic and drone programmes against Israel’s air defence systems. Israel’s ongoing strikes on key enrichment nuclear facilities and scientists have caused substantive damage to Iran’s nuclear program. As their military doctrine unravels, Iran’s regime will likely embark on a global campaign of terror against Israeli, Jewish and Western soft targets. Europe – including the UK – is a likely location for such terrorist operations.

 

  1. The Iranian regime’s reach already extends into Europe, with documented cases of the IRGC and Iranian intelligence services recruiting criminal networks for targeted violence against dissidents and Jewish or Israeli targets in multiple countries, including the UK.

 

  1. Iran’s threat to the UK is not limited to direct acts of terror. The regime also engages in homegrown radicalisation by establishing infiltration networks on British soil and amplifying Shia Islamist extremist narratives online. These infiltration operations are designed to exploit societal divisions, spread antisemitism, and promote Islamist extremism in the UK.

 

  1. At United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), our research has consistently revealed the IRGC’s shadowy Shia Islamist extremist and radicalisation apparatus, and exposed malign Iran-linked entities—including charities, mosques, cultural centres, and student associations—that are spearheading the Iranian regime terror and soft-war campaigns on British soil.

 

  1. Evidence collated by UANI highlights the necessity for comprehensive action that addresses the extremist dimensions of the Iranian threat, ensuring that British security is protected from all facets of Iranian malign activity.

 

  1. Iranian-backed entities and individuals are systematically exploiting gaps in the UK’s regulatory and enforcement frameworks to advance their Shia Islamist extremist ideology and foster homegrown radicalisation, with the explicit aim of cultivating future recruits.

What trends are evident in the growth of extremism and radicalisation in the UK? 

Iran-backed Islamist extremism is rising

  1. Like all other Islamist extremist movements, groups and states, the Iranian regime adheres to the four pillars of Islamism, set out by the UK Commission for Countering Extremism in 2019, which include: ummah, Islamic state, sharia and jihad. Ummah: Islamists promote the idea that Muslim identity overrides all others, dividing the world into Muslim and non-Muslim people, lands, and values. Islamic State: This worldview supports creating a unified Islamic nation-state—either a Caliphate (Sunni) or Imamate (Shia)—for all Muslims. Sharia: An Islamic state must be governed by sharia law, strictly imposed and enforced. Jihad: Islamists emphasise the physical/military aspects of jihad, using it to justify violence, terrorism, and war to defend or expand the Islamic state. The Iranian regime embodies core Islamist extremist tenets by enforcing absolute loyalty to the global Muslim ummah and striving to impose a Shia Imamate governed by strict sharia law. It also emphasises jihad’s military aspects, using violence and terrorism to defend and expand its ideological and political influence both domestically and abroad.

 

  1. The IRGC is an explicitly ideological Shia Islamist extremist paramilitary force, with radicalisation forming the core of its training and operational ethos. Per the author’s research and findings, over 50% of IRGC training is dedicated to ideological indoctrination. These training manuals instruct recruits in a violent, state-sanctioned Shia Islamist worldview, glorifying armed jihad and explicitly calling for violence against Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, who are described as lacking “true and acceptable faith.” Members are taught that it is obligatory to fight these groups until they abandon their beliefs and accept Islam. The IRGC’s materials also advocate for the torture and execution of Iranian dissidents, labelling them “moharebs” (enemies of God), and outline brutal punishments such as execution, hanging, cross-amputation, and exile. This radicalisation is not peripheral but is embedded at every level of IRGC training, making the organisation the physical embodiment and enforcer of Tehran’s expansionist, violent Shia Islamist ideology.

 

  1. The IRGC has significantly intensified its terrorism activities globally and within the UK. This surge manifests in three interconnected forms: direct terrorist operations, proxy warfare through affiliated groups, and radicalisation efforts aimed at cultivating homegrown Islamist extremists.

 

  1. Direct terrorism activities: The IRGC itself has been directly involved in planning and executing terrorist plots targeting British soil. Since 2022, UK security agencies have disrupted at least 20 Iran-backed plots. These plots have included assassination and kidnapping attempts, attacks against dissidents, journalists, and the Jewish community in the UK.

 

  1. Recent arrests under counterterrorism and counter-state threat powers highlight the scale and sophistication of these threats. For example, in May 2025, eight men, including Iranian nationals linked to the IRGC, were arrested across multiple UK locations on suspicion of preparing to target the Israeli embassy in London. According to a former British military intelligence officer, the plan was likely ordered by Iran’s Supreme Leader and linked to Unit 840 of the Quds Force, a branch of the IRGC.

 

  1. Iran’s campaign to silence dissidents is similarly systematic and ruthless, both within its borders and abroad. The IRGC is at the heart of this effort, using violence and intimidation to suppress criticism both inside and outside of Iran. This pattern of repression extends to the UK, where the IRGC and Iranian intelligence services have targeted opposition activists and journalists. In November 2022, two British Iranian journalists in London received credible and imminent death threats from IRGC agents, prompting police protection. In June 2025, the BBC said that its BBC Persian journalists were witnessing "a disturbing rise in the persecution of their family members". The Iranian regime has targeted BBC Persian journalists and family members via random interrogations, travel bans, passport confiscations, asset seizure threats, and violence aimed at pressuring them to abandon their work.

 

  1. Proxy terrorism: The IRGC sponsors and controls numerous proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, which conduct terrorist and destabilising activities worldwide. These proxies receive financial, logistical, and operational support from the IRGC, enabling them to carry out attacks that serve Tehran’s strategic interests.

 

  1. The UK has witnessed the IRGC’s proxies being used to target Iranian dissidents and Jewish communities within Europe, including the UK, often employing criminal networks to carry out violence and intimidation. This proxy warfare allows the IRGC to maintain plausible deniability while advancing its Islamist extremist agenda. In March 2024, the Iranian regime’s cyber apparatus doxxed British Journalist and Iran International presenter, Pouria Zeraati, who was then stabbed outside of his London home by members of a criminal gang hired by the Iranian regime.

 

  1. Extremism and homegrown radicalisation: These activities are not isolated incidents but part of a broader, deliberate strategy. The IRGC actively promotes radicalisation and Shia Islamist extremist ideology within the UK. Through a network of charities, cultural centres, mosques, and student associations, the IRGC disseminates Shia Islamist extremist narratives that glorify violence, antisemitism, and anti-Western sentiment.

 

  1. The IRGC’s radicalisation efforts mirror those of ISIS and al-Qaeda, disseminating Islamist extremist propaganda to recruit Western nationals for terror-related operations and promoting their ideology through mosques, charities, and schools. These efforts aim to cultivate a new generation of Islamist extremists loyal to the Iranian regime and its revolutionary ideals, contributing to homegrown radicalisation that poses a long-term threat to UK security and social cohesion.

 

  1. The IRGC’s terrorism surge in the UK is a multifaceted threat that blends direct attacks, proxy violence, and ideological radicalisation. This complex challenge requires a comprehensive response. First, proscription of the IRGC will enhance legal tools for disruption and prosecution. Second, strengthen intelligence and law enforcement cooperation to better detect and dismantle IRGC-linked networks. Third, expand Prevent and other counter-extremism programmes to explicitly address Shia Islamist extremism propagated by the IRGC.

What factors are contributing to a rise in extremism?

Iranian infiltration networks across Europe

  1. The Iranian regime’s infiltration efforts in Europe – including the UK – are carried out through a network of organizations and individuals that promote the Iranian regime's Islamist extremist ideology, propagate antisemitism and facilitate terrorist activities.

 

  1. Since the 1980s, the Iranian regime and the IRGC have developed a shadowy soft-power infrastructure across Europe to facilitate Khamenei’s soft and hard power objectives, not least disinformation and propaganda campaigns. This infrastructure includes a network of ideological, cultural and religious charities, centres and organisations – including official offices for the supreme leader – across Europe. These entities are not only operating to disseminate Iranian regime’s Islamist extremist and antisemitic ideology but also play a key role in nurturing homegrown Islamist radicalisation across the European continent, not least the UK.

 

  1. The network of Iranian regime-linked entities in the UK, among others, include: The Islamic Centre of England; the Islamic Students Association of Britain and the Union of Islamic Students Association of Europe; Labaik Ya Zahra; and the Islamic Human Rights Commission. 
     
  2. The Islamic Centre of England (ICE) – a UK-registered charity – serves as a key hub for Iranian regime influence in the UK. As the official offices of Iran’s supreme leader in the UK, the London-based ICE has consistently been involved in Islamist extremist activities affiliated with the IRGC. In June 2022, an IRGC-affiliated propaganda anthem, “Salute Commander” – designed to radicalise children –was filmed at ICE premises with British children. Likewise, in 2020, ICE held a vigil for the late IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was designated a terrorist by the UK. Likewise, in October 2022, the director of ICE – who is also the official representative of Iran’s supreme leader in the UK – referred to women who take off their hijabs as “poison” and called pro-democracy protestors in Iran “soldiers of Satan.” ICE has consistently violated Charity Commission guidelines on extremism and terrorism.
     
  3. The Islamic Students Association of Britain (ISAB) and the Union of Islamic Students Association of Europe (UISA) operate under the formal structure of the Office of Supreme Leader. These two organizations operate from the Kanoon Towhid centre in Hammersmith and are part of the Al-Tawheed Trust – a UK-registered charity. It is actively involved in propagating Iranian regime’s Islamist extremist ideology, antisemitic rhetoric and homegrown radicalization. In 2024, UANI obtained and exposed material that revealed that the Hammersmith-based ISAB and UISA had hosted online at least eight IRGC commanders, including sanctioned officials. In these meetings, these commanders glorified IRGC terrorism, propagated extreme antisemitism – including Holocaust denial – and even called on UK-based students to join their “apocalyptic army” that would – in their own words – “bring an end to the life of the oppressors and occupiers, Zionists and Jews across the world."

 

  1. In January 2025, a joint investigation by UANI and The Times revealed that Labaik Ya Zahra (LYZ) – a UK-registered charity – and its head, Syeda Umme Farwa, had glorified a terrorist chief, promoted Iranian regime extremists who celebrated the October 7 terrorist attacks and personally accepted an award from Iran’s “Butcher of Tehran” president.  Despite fundraising and operating in Britain, LYZ held its annual conference in Iran in partnership with entities sanctioned by the UK and US.  Its annual conference in Iran included keynote speeches from Ayatollah Mohammad Hassan Akhtari, former Iranian ambassador to Syria – known by IRGC-media as “the battlefield father of Hezbollah – who urged attendees to “wage jihad”, and Alireza Panahian, a senior member of the supreme leader’s office and an IRGC-affiliated cleric. The charity's activities contribute to the spread of Shia Islamist extremism and rhetoric in the UK.
     
  2. The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), located in London, plays a role in Iran's disinformation efforts by sponsoring events like the Al-Quds Day Rally in London, which was founded by former supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and often promotes antisemitism and support for terror against Israel. The Telegraph revealed that IHRC has even written to 460 town halls and educational centres asking them to boycott the UK's Holocaust Memorial Day 2025. In January 2025, the Jewish Chronicle reported on material obtained by UANI that revealed IHRC’s Director Massoud Shadjareh has ties to, and communication with, the IRGC’s domestic militia, the Basij – an entity subject to UK sanctions gross human rights abuses. In February 2024, Shadjareh appeared alongside EU-sanctioned IRGC commander Brigadier General Esmail Kowsari. In November 2023, at an event organised by the EU sanctioned IRGC Student Basij Organisation in Tehran, Shadjareh appeared on a panel and spoke alongside individuals affiliated with the Basij and the Ansar-e Hezbollah militia – a vigilante group composed of ex-members of the IRGC and Basij that has committed human rights abuses.

 

  1. These organisations, along with over 30 others, form part of a broader Iranian regime-linked network that operates in the UK. Other entities in the UK that carry out Iranian regime-linked propaganda activities include: the Islamic College, the Dar Alhekma Trust, the Abrar Islamic Foundation (AIF) and the Alhulbayt Islamic Mission (AIM). These networks utilize social media, online platforms, and in-person events to spread pro-regime narratives, antisemitic content, and anti-Western rhetoric.

 

  1. The failure to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation in the UK has significant consequences for local communities’ ability to counter Iranian-backed Islamist extremism. Without proscription, it is not a criminal offence to belong to, support, or promote the IRGC in the UK, unlike with other designated terrorist groups.

 

  1. As a result of not being proscribed, community leaders, civil society organisations, and law enforcement lack the legal and operational tools needed to disrupt IRGC-linked activities at the grassroots level.

 

  1. The Iranian regime's infiltration efforts in the UK aim to radicalise vulnerable individuals with their Islamist extremist ideology and Iranian regime propaganda. The lack of proscription allows the IRGC’s influence networks to operate with relative impunity, making it harder for communities to resist infiltration and intimidation.

 

  1. Entities linked to the Iranian regime and the IRGC have systematically exploited loopholes in the UK’s regulatory bodies, such as the Charity Commission, and enforcement frameworks. By operating through seemingly legitimate charities cultural, religious, and human rights organizations, Tehran’s infiltration network can more easily promote its ideology and facilitate the growth of extremist networks while avoiding scrutiny.

 

  1. In an effort to expose these infiltrations networks across Europe, UANI has launched its #KhameneiFreeZone campaign. The campaign –which seeks to make Britain and Europe a Khamenei Free Zone – seeks to expose cultural, religious ideological centres used by Khamenei and the IRGC to spread its Shia Islamist extremist ideology, propagate homegrown radicalisation, promote extreme antisemitism and recruit European nationals for terror-related activities.

Iranian infiltration networks online

  1. Having established a physical presence and targeted key constituencies in the UK, the Iranian regime and the IRGC have also built extensive online networks to disseminate regime propaganda and Shia Islamist extremist ideology. These digital operations are a core component of Tehran’s strategy to radicalise, recruit, and mobilise individuals in Britain, while also intimidating dissidents and targeting minority communities.

 

  1. The Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has mandated the IRGC as well as other key entities, to both expand their propaganda and psychological warfare apparatus and double-down in their efforts to wage disinformation, propaganda and radicalisation campaigns, both inside and outside of Iran.

 

  1. The IRGC exploits social media platforms to spread Islamist extremist narratives, antisemitic content, and anti-Western rhetoric. IRGC-linked networks use social media to glorify violence, promote martyrdom, and incite hatred against Jews, Israelis, dissidents, and Western institutions. For example, Iranian state media, including Press TV, continues to broadcast anti-Western and antisemitic propaganda in English, reaching UK audiences through websites and social media even after losing its UK broadcast licence.

 

  1. In addition to the promotion of homegrown radicalisation, Iran uses online proxies, including hacktivist collectives with ties to Iran-backed militias, to target UK interests. In the UK, IRGC-linked hackers were caught using spear-phishing attacks to gain access to victims’ personal and business accounts online targeting diplomats, researchers, activists and journalists in September 2024.

 

  1. By leveraging digital platforms, Iran-backed actors are able to radicalise individuals, incite hatred, and coordinate extremist activities with unprecedented speed and reach. Countering this threat requires robust collaboration between government, tech companies, and civil society to detect, disrupt, and dismantle these online extremist networks.

What changes might be required to ensure Prevent is set up effectively to stop people with mixed, unclear and unstable ideologies from becoming radicalised?

  1. Ensure the remit of programmes such as Prevent is sufficiently wide to tackle the ideological challenge of Shia-Islamist extremism. The UK's Prevent program, which aims to safeguard vulnerable individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, needs to broaden its definition of Islamist extremism which currently only focuses on Sunni Salafi Jihadist Islamist extremism. To effectively identify, prevent and counter Iranian regime – not least IRGC – extremism and terror threats, it is necessary to broaden the programme’s scope to explicitly include Shia Islamist extremism propagated by the Iranian regime.

 

  1. Expanding the remit of Prevent to address Shia Islamist extremism demands updated training that specifically covers Shia radicalisation tactics, refined assessment tools capable of identifying Shia extremist narratives, targeted community engagement with groups at risk of IRGC influence, stricter oversight of organisations with links to Iranian-backed networks, and dedicated research into Shia Islamist propaganda and recruitment methods. Only by recognising and directly confronting the threat posed by Shia Islamist extremism can Prevent effectively safeguard vulnerable individuals and protect UK society from this growing form of radicalisation.

We make the following recommendations to the Home Office:

  1. Recognise that the UK’s current understanding of the IRGC is flawed, as it categorises the organisation as a state threat rather than recognising its extremist nature. The IRGC is not just a violent force of the Iranian regime but a key driver of Shia Islamist extremism and terror activities, including radicalisation and violence within the UK.

 

  1. Proscribe the IRGC in the UK. The current UK sanctions regime on the IRGC does not prohibit its soft-power activities or ability to propagate homegrown radicalisation – which is presently on the rise. Proscription would change this. Proscription would give the government, regulatory authorities and technology companies a clear mandate to ban any activity either directly or indirectly linked to the IRGC. Proscription would criminalize any association with or support for the IRGC within the UK, meaning that its members would be barred from operating in any capacity, including participating in or addressing gatherings. Individuals in the UK would face legal repercussions for affiliating with the IRGC, expressing support for it, distributing materials produced by the organization, or attending meetings involving its representatives. Additionally, online content linked to the IRGC would need to be removed from platforms accessible in the UK. Ultimately, proscription would disrupt the IRGC's network of influence, thereby enhancing national security and countering Iranian state-sponsored extremism and disinformation in the UK.

 

  1. Investigate and shut-down the Iranian regime’s soft-power infrastructure in the UK and expel their representatives, if necessary. The closure of these centres and investigations into their representatives are crucial to protect communities in the UK from the Iranian regime's malign influence operations. The UK has the means to close these centres through the National Security Act (2023). The Act provides a framework for disrupting the operations of IRGC-linked centres if they are found to be engaged in activities that threaten national security.

 

  1. Ensure regulators (Charity Commission, Ofcom) and authorities (Police), in accordance with new Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), are given sufficient power and resources to investigate the activities of Iranian regime-affiliated organisations and individuals to help target the spread of Iran-backed Islamist extremism.

 

  1. Social media companies should be held accountable, whether under the Online Safety Act or through other regulatory mechanisms, for enabling the spread and amplification of extremist content on their platforms. Social media platforms can serve as echo chambers that reinforce and intensify extremist beliefs, facilitating recruitment, radicalisation, and the coordination of extremist activities. Representatives from major social media companies should collaborate with government security and counter-extremism experts to develop robust strategies for detecting, disrupting, and removing content that promotes or glorifies Iranian-backed Islamist extremism, as well as for identifying networks that facilitate radicalisation.

 

Author biographies

Kasra Aarabi is director of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). He specializes in Iranian military and security affairs and Shi’a extremism. Previously, he was the Iran Program lead at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and served as an advisor on Iran to the executive chairman, former British prime minister Sir Tony Blair. Kasra is a native Persian (Farsi) speaker and is undertaking a PhD at the University of St Andrews, where his research focuses on the IRGC. 

Jemima Shelley is a senior research analyst at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). Previously, she was a senior analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, where she focused on Islamist extremism, women’s rights and civil society movements in Iran and Afghanistan.

 

June 2025