AUKUS0010

Written evidence submitted by Council on Geostrategy.

The Council on Geostrategy is an independent non-profit organisation situated in Westminster. It focuses on shaping British strategic ambition in an international environment increasingly defined by geopolitical competition and the environmental crisis, so that the United Kingdom (UK) is best able to succeed and prosper in the 21st century.

William Freer and Dr Emma Salisbury are Research Fellows at the Council on Geostrategy. They both have a focus, and are published widely, on maritime security, naval strategy, international relations and defence industrial policy. Patrick Triglavcanin, Associate Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy, has a focus on Britain’s Indo-Pacific engagement, Australia-UK relations and the AUKUS partnership. He currently works as a Research Officer for the University of Western Australia Defence and Security Institute.

How far have changes in the geopolitical situation affected the assumptions which underpinned the partnership when it was announced in 2021? Do they present a threat to the success of AUKUS?

1. The primary impetus for the creation of the AUKUS security partnership was Australian requirements for long-range submarine capabilities (and issues Australia had with a previous contract to replace their current submarines with a French design). This is a product of rising concern around the expanding influence and military might of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has not only significantly increased its military investment – particularly in the maritime domain – but is also engaging in assertive territorial claims in regional waters, centred around the South China Sea and Taiwan.

2. AUKUS represents a significant landmark in collaboration between like-minded nations on security and defence. The trilateral relationship not only provides a solid framework for deeper cooperation between the three members, but also provides reassurance to other Indo-Pacific states which share concerns about the stability of the region.

3. The AUKUS agreement offers the three participants clear strategic benefits: an enhanced deterrence posture against the PRC, a bolstered alliance framework, and a stronger technological edge. However, the full realisation of these benefits is contingent upon the effective management of a series of complex challenges and risks over a prolonged period, subject to the potentially changing preferences of governments in all three countries.

4. The new administration of Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), supported by a Republican-controlled Congress, may look to renegotiate the AUKUS agreement, or even pull out of it altogether if it is no longer felt to be in American interests. Trump’s unpredictable approach to foreign policy and his predilection for making deals which favour US interests heavily mean that guessing his future approach to AUKUS is very difficult.

1. Any isolationist tendencies may be outweighed by the bipartisan consensus on the importance of countering the PRC’s rise and strengthening US posture in the Indo-Pacific. There is also a great deal of support for AUKUS within the US military: Adm. Samuel Paparo (US Commander in the Indo-Pacific) described AUKUS as conferring ‘generational advantage’ – a view which will be given serious weight by the Trump administration.[1]

5. While it seems AUKUS is not on the chopping block in the US, the Trump administration will need to be reminded of its utility for American interests. Both the UK and Australia will need to leverage their close relationships with Washington to reassure sceptical members of the new administration.

6. Australia has engaged in the most lively and polarised debate around AUKUS out of the three members. This debate is widespread and conducted in the public domain by a range of stakeholders such as environmentalists, industry leaders, local and community groups, and academics, as well as multiple ex-Prime Ministers and others previously in ministerial positions.[2] These commentators focus mainly on a mix of the following four aspects:

1. Whether or not AUKUS ‘locks Australia in’ to America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and obligations this may entail, such as fighting a war over Taiwan;
2. Whether or not Australia should be leaning so heavily on the US and the UK in acquiring their next-generation defence capabilities given existing complications within the two nations’ defence industrial bases;
3. Whether or not Australia needs nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) given their large cost – which could be used to acquire other defence capabilities – and Australia’s relative safety given its geographic isolation and vast landmass; and
4. What the impact of the nuclear waste and material resulting from the submarines on Australia’s sensitive ecosystem, and environmental record generally, could be.

7. The changes in the US’ global posture and adherence to established international norms have intensified this debate and further emboldened those in Australia critical of the agreement. Such criticism is employed in favour of a more independent, Indo-Pacific focused Australian defence policy; meaning closer relationships with nations such as Indonesia compared to nations Australia typically seeks security from, such as the UK and US.[3]

8. These arguments already had currency in Australia. Anthony Albanese and Penny Wong, respectively current Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Australia, came into power promising a more Indo-Pacific focused foreign policy, and since then have worked to build Australia’s relationships within the region as a primary area of interest. However, they have done so while endorsing AUKUS and driving it forwards, weaving it into their vision of an inclusive Indo-Pacific where ‘no country dominates’.[4] Indeed, AUKUS has, so far, been able to withstand the shocks of Australia’s debate, but the debate is now becoming more heated.

9. Critics are also becoming more vocal and detached from Australia’s geostrategic reality in making their claims. An article in The Guardian on 21st April 2025 – which was amplified by an ex-Prime Minister[5] – argued that ‘...Australia does not need any crewed warships or submarines at all’, an outlandish take given Australia’s vast and vulnerable maritime approaches.[6] There are analysts and commentators who counter articles such as this, but the government’s role in doing so is minimal.[7]

10. The call from critics for greater transparency around the impetus for AUKUS is also gaining more traction. Australia does not have the history which the US and UK do in operating these highly sensitive and advanced capabilities, and the Australian Government has so far failed to employ a narrative which convinces the public at large of the need to embrace them. Cost of living pressures lend credence to those asking what else Canberra could be doing with the AU$368 billion (£176 billion) earmarked for AUKUS.

11. The establishment of the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) in July 2023 was intended to overcome some of the existing communication difficulties, with the Agency being declared ‘...responsible and accountable for the management and oversight of the nuclear-powered submarine programme.’[8] However, it is widely considered to be failing in this task currently, with some involved in AUKUS-related industry even joking that they are unaware of its existence.[9] It was even disclosed how the ASA had approached some of these industry leaders for procurement advice and demand signal guidance,[10] a process one would expect to occur in reverse. The ASA was placed under review only 18 months into its existence.

12. Critics of AUKUS have cited this Defence Committee inquiry specifically as something the Australian Government should be emulating. However, some do so from a fundamental misunderstanding of the intentions of this inquiry, believing it has potential to be a government ‘hit job’ on AUKUS. Three independent House of Representative Candidates in Australia (two of which are sitting Members of Parliament) have called for an inquiry into AUKUS since this one was launched.

13. The intensified Australian debate as a result of Trump’s reorientation of America’s defence posture and global outlook does not present a threat to AUKUS. But, it does make advancing the agreement more difficult for the Australian Government. His Majesty’s (HM) Government should remain acutely aware of the debate in Australia (overlooked in Britain’s AUKUS discourse) and tailor its AUKUS rhetoric accordingly when appropriate. This fact raises the value of an AUKUS ‘public diplomacy division’, which would aid all three governments in countering mis/disinformation about the pact and ensuring their respective publics are aware of the rationale behind the agreement, potentially leading to greater public support.[11]
     
14. The re-election of Albanese as Prime Minister in 2025, and reinstatement of Richard Marles and Wong as Defence Minister and Foreign Minister respectively, is welcome continuity in Australia. Albanese was consistent in his desire to drive AUKUS forwards in his first term. It is likely that Peter Dutton, his opponent during Australia’s 2025 general election, would have been slightly more enthusiastic about the agreement (particularly given he was Defence Minister when it was announced), but the Australian Government’s commitment to AUKUS, and desire to see it driven forwards effectively, remains rock solid.

Is there sufficient clarity about the scope, funding, objectives and delivery of Pillar II?

15. The intended scope of Pillar II is relatively clear.[12] However, the funding, objectives and model for delivering Pillar II have been relatively opaque. The urgency of the geopolitical climate prompted some to view it as a quick-fire way to deliver new, cutting-edge capabilities to the militaries of the UK, US and Australia. The governments of all three nations were right to point out the legal hurdles which would have to be overcome first, but did not do enough to dispel the narrative that Pillar II was going to deliver shiny new capabilities quickly. Compounding this, there has been a dearth of related announcements, and seemingly no procurement contracts being issued to drive Pillar II forward and garner greater industry support, which is lacking currently.[13]

16. Pillar II should be reconceptualised and marketed by the three member governments as something which is more about ‘...setting the conditions for more streamlined cooperation on advanced capabilities as it is about the specific capabilities themselves.’[14] The alignment of regulation, for example, is a win for the actual advancement of Pillar II, and should be billed by the three governments as such. The UK and Australia should take the opportunity presented by a new US administration to reconceptualise Pillar II to ensure it is high on the agenda, accompanied by an appropriate information strategy to communicate any changes to officials and the public.

17. The streamlining of regulation and removing of barriers across the British, Australian and American defence industrial bases is a great benefit in itself. However, if Pillar II is to deliver capability developments or production as an outcome, significant changes will be required. Without a funding pot for Pillar II contracts, and a more senior and more formal organisational structure to deliver more Pillar II related outcomes, it is unlikely to amount to anything further.

18. Ultimately, the governments in London, Canberra and Washington must decide whether Pillar II is about providing a framework/forum to enact defence collaboration reform or about delivering tangible capability outcomes (whether increasing production capacity or reinforcing research and development [R&D]) – or both.

Have amendments to export control regimes across the three countries achieved their aim of maximising collaboration and promoting innovation?

19. The collaboration on R&D between the three AUKUS nations under Pillar II offers more value than each going alone due to the possibilities for cost-sharing and the cross-pollination of innovation, accelerating the development and deployment of cutting-edge military technologies. However, coordinating joint R&D efforts between three countries with different defence industries, regulatory environments and strategic priorities is a complex task.

20. The US tends to focus on protecting its national intellectual property and securing its own supply for military purposes, while the UK and Australia are more open to multilateral defence industrial integration. Both Australia and Britain are wary of the excessive amount of classification within the American system, and have expressed concerns around US information sharing protocols and export controls, particularly around the famously bureaucratic Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).[15]

21. Sharing and collaborating on advanced military technologies raises considerable issues around intellectual property rights and information deemed sensitive in a national security context. It will be legally complex and often contentious to balance between protecting sensitive information and ensuring the fair distribution of technological benefits between the three AUKUS nations. The issues will be specific to each technology involved in Pillar II, so along with broader efforts to create a fertile environment for knowledge sharing, there will need to be a mechanism to resolve problems on a case-by-case basis as they arise.

22. These challenges have caused many to doubt that any significant changes would occur, but there have been important steps from the US to make collaboration easier since Pillar II was announced. In particular, Congress – with wide bipartisan support – passed legislation to reduce ITAR barriers significantly for the UK and Australia (although not to remove them totally).[16] Further to this, the Trump administration has signalled its intent to make FMS a far smoother process – though this is not directly related to AUKUS.[17] These steps represent a significant step-change in American attitudes on the sharing of sensitive military technology, but Britain and Australia would like the US to go further.

What are the implications for UK defence – in terms of both benefit and risk – of the commitment to rotate an Astute class submarine out of Australia from as early as 2027?

23. By 2027, all seven of the Astute class SSNs should be in service. Usual naval estimates conclude that in order to have one ship (or ‘boat’ in the case of submarines) available for tasking, at least three are actually needed. This means that at least two Astute class submarines should be available for tasking at any given time from 2027 onwards, with surge capacity for a third if needed.

24. The foremost task for British SSNs is the protection of continuous at sea deterrent (CASD) submarines on patrol. Other tasks include contributing to protection of maritime task groups and providing global strategic intelligence and reconnaissance gathering.

25. The Astute class has previously suffered from availability issues due to bottlenecks in support infrastructure. HMS Audacious spent a concerning 22 months berthed at Devonport waiting for dry dock availability. Knock-on effects may have resulted in a situation in which the UK needed to rely on allied SSNs to conduct CASD escort duties, though this was denied. However, the worst of these infrastructure problems have now been resolved: 15 Dock at Devonport has been refurbished to take on Astutes; from 2027, 10 Dock should be available for SSN and ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) maintenance; and Project Euston is further exploring the option of floating dry docks.

26. If an Astute class is out on rotation in Australia, this will make it unavailable for tasking in the Euro-Atlantic. If there is no surge submarine available, this will limit Britain’s ability to conduct SSN operations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) area of responsibility in addition to CASD protection.

27. However, it is vital to stress that the risks of stretching Astute class taskings are far outweighed by the benefits of such a deployment.

1. Given Australia has selected the British-designed SSN-AUKUS for its future SSN plans, the ability for Australian crews and technicians in Western Australia to become accustomed to British submarines will ensure that the transition from Virginia class SSNs to SSN-AUKUS will go more smoothly. AUKUS Pillar I promises to deliver huge economic benefits to the UK, as well as the reduction in overall unit costs for SSN-AUKUS due to increased unit numbers (Australia plans to acquire up to five SSN-AUKUS; while some will likely be built in Australia, many of their parts will come from Britain). This will reduce SSN-AUKUS production costs for HM Government, enabling it to order more which will significantly bolster North Atlantic security in the long-term.
2. The addition of another SSN, as well as the presence of another flag in the Indo-Pacific, will bolster allied deterrence efforts and better secure Britain’s regional interests.
3. Recruitment and retention in the submarine force is a known problem. The ability to be deployed for a period of time to Australia could be a useful selling point to attract and retain submariners – the submarines will undergo three-month maintenance periods in Australia.[18]
4. Australia has committed to investing in HMAS Stirling to ensure the infrastructure is in place to maintain rotational submarines, thus expanding the infrastructure available to support the Astute class, and further helping to avoid bottleneck problems.
5. In an emergency, the Astute on rotation in the Indo-Pacific can always be redeployed home, though there will be a transit period.

US industrial base concerns

28. The AUKUS partnership contains a commitment from the US to sell between three and five Virginia class attack submarines to Australia in order to cover the gap between the decommissioning of its Collins class boats and the arrival of the new SSN-AUKUS. This will take place in the early 2030s. These Virginia class boats will need to be replaced in the American fleet. A foundational problem with this section of the AUKUS deal will therefore be whether the US submarine industrial base can cope with ramping up to the production rate needed to fulfil these commitments.

29. Since 2022, the US has only been able to produce 1.2 to 1.4 Virginia class boats per year, due to challenges around shipyard capacity, supply chains and skilled workforce personnel. However, in order to meet both the US Navy’s needs and the AUKUS obligation, this rate will need to increase to at least 2.33 boats per year.[19]

30. While the Biden administration put in place some promising investment, and the Trump administration has committed to a significant focus on naval shipbuilding, it remains unclear whether the deep structural problems in the industrial base can be ameliorated quickly enough to fit in with the AUKUS timeline. If they cannot, the Trump administration has sent conflicting signals on its view as to whether the transfer of Virginia class boats to Australia is too great a risk to the strength of their submarine fleet at a time of heightened risk of conflict with the PRC.
1. There are two caveats to this risk: firstly, when it comes time for the potential transfer of submarines there will be a different US administration in place; and secondly, a US-PRC war could break out before the transfer is scheduled to take place.

30th May 2025