Submission by Conciliation Resources to the International Development Committee inquiry on Women, Peace and Security

May 2025

Summary

1. This submission has been developed by Conciliation Resources to provide evidence for the International Development Committee inquiry on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). It is motivated by and draws on 30 years of our experience as an international peacebuilding organisation, and our research and policy expertise on WPS.

2. As we approach the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the WPS agenda faces unprecedented challenges. The UK Government faces a policy choice: whether to lend its political and financial support to this vital area of conflict prevention and sustainable peace or see it regress after years of hard-won progress. 

3. Our submission assesses the potential of and risks to delivery of the UK's current WPS National Action Plan, and highlights examples of successful UK-funded WPS initiatives, such as the Women Mediators Across the Commonwealth network and women's inclusion in security and decision-making in Ethiopia and Nigeria. It sets out several negative global and national trends impacting delivery of the WPS agenda, including a global decrease in women’s participation, rising anti-gender movements, a lack of international leadership on WPS and increased securitisation of the agenda.

4. The submission concludes with suggestions for how the UK Government can strengthen and build on its WPS efforts, through reliable funding, ‘minilateralism’ on WPS, capitalising on its history as a WPS thought leader and a greater focus on the WPS Prevention pillar.

Introduction to Conciliation Resources

5. Conciliation Resources (CR) is an international organisation committed to stopping violent conflict and creating more peaceful societies. For 30 years, we have brought together communities torn apart by violence to help them resolve their differences, shape political processes and find alternatives to conflict. In this time, gender and the WPS agenda have become an important part of our work. We have led cutting-edge research on the inclusion of women and gender and sexual minorities in peacebuilding, and analysis on the role that masculinities and climate change can play in shaping efforts to bring about gender equality. Alongside Saferworld, we developed a gender-sensitive conflict analysis toolkit, used across the world. As a member of Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS), we also contribute to annual shadow reports assessing progress against the UK National Action Plan on WPS (WPS-NAP).

6. Our work on WPS – much of which has been supported by the UK financially and diplomatically – has focused on strengthening women’s meaningful participation in mediation and peace processes across Africa, Asia, Europe and the Pacific, including UK WPS-NAP priority countries. This includes supporting the establishment of the Women’s Dialogue Space in Somali Regional State in Ethiopia, which amplifies Somali women’s voices in the peace process. With our partners in Nigeria, we supported the establishment of 20 Women Peace Committees, which have facilitated over 3,000 community dialogues and advocated to authorities for more gender-inclusive peace processes. From 2021, as a partner of the UN’s Women Peace and Humanitarian Fund Rapid Response Window, we supported 12 civil society organisations to advance women’s participation in Track I and II peace processes and deliver more gender-responsive implementation of peace agreements in Kenya, Liberia and Niger.

7. CR also advises national governments on WPS policy, including UK Government departments through the Integrated Security Fund’s (ISF) Women Peace and Security Helpdesk, where we provided guidance on integrating WPS priorities into the FCDO’s first-ever planned Climate Security Policy. We have partnered with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to integrate a more gender transformative-lens into implementation of its WPS-NAP, and have delivered training on gender sensitivity to EU delegations.
8. From 2018, CR helped to establish and hosted the Women Mediators Across the Commonwealth network (WMC), supporting women mediators from 22 countries to participate in local, national and regional peace processes through small grants, mentoring and protection support. CR was also part of the Expert Group on Women’s Meaningful Participation in Negotiating Peace and the Implementation of Peace Agreements in 2018, and contributed to subsequent UN guidance that followed.

9. This submission focuses on the questions posed in the Call for Evidence on which CR can offer the most insight:
1. global trends affecting implementation of the WPS agenda;
2. performance against the UK’s current WPS-NAP;
3. examples of initiatives where the UK WPS framework has led to transformative improvements for women’s security and participation.

10. Our evidence also draws on several resources CR has published in the last four years:

●        Gender transformative peace processes: What, who and how. Lessons from the Philippines and West Africa (2025 - not yet launched publicly)

●        Enabling Change: lessons from grant-making to increase women’s participation in peace processes (2024)

●        Ugaaso: Lessons from a women’s dialogue space in Somali Regional State (2024)

●        Beyond the vertical: what enables women to mediate (2021).

The current context for Women, Peace and Security

11. As we approach the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, the WPS agenda faces unprecedented challenges. The number of violent conflicts has doubled globally, now impacting more countries than at any point since the Second World War.[1] Yet rather than bolster investments in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and WPS, we have seen governments around the world foregoing support to international assistance, gender equality and peace-making and pursuing rapid rearmament. Aid cuts by the UK and many of its allies have coincided with or often helped fund a dramatic increase in global military expenditure over nine consecutive years.[2][3]
12. In parallel, the WPS agenda has securitised, shifting its emphasis from women’s participation in decision-making, conflict prevention and resolution, to a focus on increasing their role within militaries and security institutions. Since its inception, the agenda has also been instrumentalised by those in positions in power. Nowhere is this clearer than in Afghanistan, where the justification of military intervention in the name of ‘protecting’ women challenged the WPS agenda’s founding principles, and where women today experience systemic oppression on unprecedented levels.

13. The rapidly rising anti-gender movement is also challenging the WPS agenda. For example, women peacebuilders face increasing harassment, new digital technologies are being used to facilitate online forms of gender-based violence, gender and sexual minorities are at acute risk in many contexts, and opponents to gender equality are behind brutal crack-downs on women protesting patriarchal laws in Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Worryingly, political right-wing, anti-gender sentiment is also impacting the willingness and ability of traditional WPS champions to further the agenda, as shown by the targeted cutting of WPS programming by the US and Netherlands.

14. Shifting global power dynamics, decreased respect for the rules-based international system and a shift away from comprehensive, inclusive peace agreements to transactional deal-making, pose urgent risks to the WPS agenda. At the same time, systemic de-funding of gender and WPS work, and the politicisation of the efforts of women peacebuilders, restricts the ability of the WPS sector to respond. If the next phase of the WPS agenda is to maintain its relevance and make a tangible difference to global security and gender equality, its most prominent supporters – including the UK – need to offer bold new solutions which address these pressing challenges.

15. As the penholder on WPS at the UN Security Council, and as a long-standing thought leader, convenor and partner on WPS, there is a unique opportunity for the UK to (re)galvanise global support for core WPS principles. Yet the Government’s February 2025 decision to cut the Official Development Aid (ODA) budget to 0.3 per cent by 2027, and recent remarks to the IDC by Baroness Chapman which confirm gender will be deprioritised as part of this, calls this commitment and leadership into question. Research already shows that women in conflict contexts and women peacebuilders are suffering the most as a result of similar cuts made in the US.[4][5]

Assessing the UK’s current WPS National Action Plan (WPS-NAP)

16. The UK’s 2023 WPS-NAP was the most ambitious to date, sending a strong signal that the UK intended to maintain its global leadership role on WPS. Despite this, it has faced several problems preventing it from being effectively implemented. It has lacked an appropriate vehicle for delivering its ambitious objectives, an adequate approach to intersectionality[6] and the means to identify, learn and adapt from mistakes.

17. The current UK WPS-NAP is the most ambitious and sophisticated yet. Compared to its predecessors and WPS-NAPs presented by other countries, the UK’s WPS-NAP demonstrates a strong understanding of multifaceted threats to women's security and the stubborn barriers to their leadership. Rather than solely focusing on the symptoms and effects of insecurity and exclusion on women and girls, it acknowledges the role that underlying structural power dynamics and gender norms play in perpetuating violence and excluding women from peace processes, shifting the onus from women towards those in positions of power: “while women and girls can be empowered to participate, it is systems and structures that must be transformed to remove the barriers that impede women’s meaningful participation. This requires challenging and changing the beliefs, values, and behaviours held by those in power”.

18. Secondly, the UK WPS-NAP has been praised for substantively prioritising climate change as a transnational threat, committing to “invest in research and pilot projects on gender-transformative approaches to preventing climate related and cyber-related insecurity, violence and conflict through the CSSF [Conflict Security and Stability Fund] Gender, Peace and Security portfolio”. Whilst 64 per cent of current WPS-NAPs across the world mention climate change, in most cases this is only a cursory reference.[7] The UK’s commitment also notably marks the first time a UK WPS-NAP commits to gender transformative ambitions, which aim to address the underlying drivers of conflict most heavily impacting women and girls. This is much more likely to have a sustainable impact on gender equality and peace than ‘gender sensitive’ objectives which merely aim to avoid negative gendered impacts or ‘gender responsive’ objectives which respond to the symptoms of inequality.[8]

19. However, the WPS-NAP lacks the appropriate vehicle for delivering its aspirational objectives. The CSSF, though responsible for some powerful WPS projects that have had gender transformative impacts (see below), was set up to deliver short-term, ‘catalytic’ interventions which are often less equipped to address the deeply ingrained, root causes of insecurity and gender inequality which requires a longer-term horizon. Gender transformative outcomes take time to materialise and require deep and adaptive engagement with resistors in context. A lack of sufficient follow-up mechanisms, funding, and challenges with internal learning within the UK Government, limited its ability to utilise evidence from pilot CSSF initiatives across the FCDO and scale-up results. Because of this, and the significant cuts to work on WPS and peacebuilding in what is now the UK Integrated Security Fund, it is crucial that new mechanisms are identified to support and fund the delivery of the UK’s gender transformative WPS ambitions.

20. Intersectional issues are acknowledged on paper, but not matched in practice. While the WPS-NAP acknowledges “many [women] face multiple and overlapping forms of discrimination based on their sexual orientation, gender identity, race, ethnicity, class, religion or belief, and disability”, without a specific commitment to taking an intersectional approach to WPS, it risks being tokenistic and could be seen to legitimise attempts to politicise such language as part of a so-called ‘gender ideology’. The WPS agenda has been criticised for simplistic assumptions of gender roles, which position women and girls as vulnerable and men and boys as prone to violence, and overlooking the specific experiences of women in terms of race, ethnicity, gender identity and sexual orientation.[9] An intersectional approach is critical to advancing a just, feminist peace. It explicitly recognises how the experiences and power of people differ based on gender and other culturally relevant identity factors and challenges the systems which influence this. Without this lens, UK WPS programming can perpetuate inequalities and miss vital insights for unlocking more inclusive peace processes.

21. The ability to learn from and scrutinise WPS-NAP implementation is limited. It is difficult to assess progress made against the WPS-NAP because delivery has not been accompanied by a participatory evaluation or feedback mechanism, and reports to Parliament now only happen every two years (compared to every year under previous plans). While the commitment to create Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning processes was welcomed by civil society when the WPS-NAP was published, the Government has still not developed these tools nor published a planned baseline study. This means there is little chance to identify the successes, failures and best practices developed in the WPS-NAP, and crucial lessons and opportunities to adapt initiatives are missed. It also constrains the ability of parliament and civil society to advise on the delivery of the WPS-NAP, and shields possible failures from public scrutiny. Such scrutiny is particularly important in a time of considerable global uncertainty, when the Government is quickly changing its approach to international affairs.

22. Ample external expertise could strengthen implementation. Finally, we welcome the WPS-NAP’s call for civil society to be recognised as a strategic partner. This is an important commitment in terms of rebalancing power dynamics between governments and the organisations working most closely with women in conflict-affected contexts and ensuring a tailored approach to the implementation of WPS initiatives. Going forward, it will be critical to outline what this strategic partnership meaningfully looks like and to ensure the inclusion of Global South organisations as part of this thinking. The UK Government should follow best practice guidance in the Beyond Consultations toolkit when engaging women’s organisations to ensure this avoids being extractive, tokenistic or disempowering. Consultations can be mutually beneficial: women help to advance UK security priorities through building peace and dealing with the effects of conflict in priority UK contexts, but the NAP should also serve their interests too.

Successful programmes and initiatives within the UK’s WPS framework

23. The UK’s WPS framework has spearheaded and supported several transformative initiatives, some of which in collaboration with CR. We summarise examples of these below, outlining their impact.

24. Women Mediators across the Commonwealth network (WMC). UK funding helped to establish WMC in 2018, bringing together women mediators working at all levels and representing all Commonwealth regions. The explicit backing of the UK – visible through endorsements by ministers and the Duchess of Edinburgh amongst others – helped to strengthen the legitimacy of the network and its members, many of whom have credited membership as helpful for their own peacebuilding work.

25. With UK support, the WMC has supported members to train local mediators in Nigeria, Niger, Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Pakistan among other countries. A 2023 study for the European External Action Service on regional women mediator networks highlighted the importance of networks such as the WMC in supporting members’ participation in peace processes in their contexts, by conferring additional credibility as well as offering peer support and space for creative problem solving. Indeed, after the coup in Niger and in the lead-up to and during its strategic national consultative conference, the WMC played a key role in empowering local women mediators to influence this process through targeted training, accompaniment and dialogues with key stakeholders. Member-led research, for example on the psychosocial impact of peacebuilding on women peacebuilders, has also addressed key knowledge gaps[10] on the overlap between WPS Participation and Protection pillars and contributed unique, underrepresented perspectives on trauma-informed approaches to peacebuilding.

26. Despite the global environment for WPS being far more restricted, the WMC has generated wider interest and engagement in the work of women mediators as the current coordinator of the Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediator networks. Recent meetings co-facilitated by the WMC resulted in plans for joint work to capitalise on the UNSCR 1325 anniversary, including high-level meetings and coordination with multilateral institutions and Member States. However, the WMC’s ability to take this forward with the Global Alliance is now hampered due to uncertainty over its future following the announcement of cuts to UK ODA. Planned WMC activities in 2025, such as participation at a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting as an accredited organisation to the Commonwealth, which have helped the UK demonstrate its commitment to the WPS agenda on the international stage, are now at risk.

27. UN Secretary General reports show that women’s participation in high-level peace processes globally is reducing.[11] It is therefore critical that the UK ensures networks like the WMC have sufficient mechanisms in place to access further funding and to establish sustainable structures, and that the Government publicly supports these efforts and uses lessons to strengthen participation in wider contexts.

28. Women’s Parliamentary Caucus in the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. The UK Embassy in Ethiopia provided pilot funding to establish the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus, a network of more than 70 female MPs and cabinet members in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The Caucus has been instrumental in building the credibility of women leaders in the region and challenging resistance to their participation in political decision-making in order to meet regional targets for 50 per cent representation of women in Parliament. The Caucus has also enhanced women’s impact on political decisions through training on legislative processes, public speaking, and support with drafting legal and constitutional documents. In doing so, it has helped to create lasting conditions for inclusive peace in the region following the 2018 peace agreement, for example by developing policies on eradicating harmful practices such as female genital mutilation (which has led to debates around its potential criminalisation) and engaging with religious actors to influence their position on this.

29. Members of the Women’s Caucus, along with other women leaders in the Somali region, also played a central role in developing the Women’s Dialogue Space (Ugaaso-WDS), an initiative which started out as an informal collective of current and emerging women leaders across political divides, civil society and business to build connections, engage in joint advocacy and amplify women’s voices in the public sphere, and has since registered as a local civil society organisation. Although now funded by Irish Aid and the Embassy of Ireland in Ethiopia, this demonstrates the scale-up potential of UK seed support for women’s participation.
30. Ugaaso-WDS has developed innovative strategies to navigate and disrupt some of the more enduring barriers to women’s political participation. It has generated support for women’s participation, including among traditional and religious leaders who have raised awareness on regional state television of the importance of women in public and political life, and helped to dispel common myths which previously restricted their work. At the same time, it has built connections and trust between influential women across political parties, helping it to establish a strong constituency that cuts across the political spectrum in favour of women’s participation in politics. This has also helped to de-escalate flashpoints between parties that have previously escalated into violence.[12] 

31. Cross-government WPS Helpdesk. The WPS Helpdesk, established in 2022, can provide on-demand advice, analysis and training to all UK Government departments responsible for implementing the UK WPS-NAP. In its first three years, it has led to a number of outcomes including supporting more equitable partnership models between the UK and civil society, and empowering women’s rights organisations (WROs) to play more meaningful roles in the implementation of NAPs. In Jordan, for example, a Helpdesk assessment outlined key strengths, gaps and recommendations for supporting WROs to implement the country’s second NAP, leading to the design and tender of the FCDO Tamasok programme which supported WROs to expand access to women’s decision-making, marking a shift from the UK’s previous approach of supporting NAP implementation via multilateral organisations.

32. Through CR’s experience of implementing wider CSSF (and now ISF) projects, we have seen there are both missed opportunities to integrate WPS objectives into actions where WPS is not a primary objective, and examples of UK Government teams requesting partners to mainstream WPS in tokenistic and potentially damaging ways to demonstrate compliance (for example, by reporting against simplistic measures of women’s participation in meetings rather than ensuring their meaningful engagement through addressing the barriers that restrict their inclusion). Utilising the WPS Helpdesk in a more intentional way could help departments which lack WPS expertise or capacity to mainstream WPS objectives in more meaningful ways and feel more ownership over their contribution towards WPS-NAP objectives.

33. Strengthening women’s inclusion in community security in northeast Nigeria. The UK has funded and encouraged partners to pilot initiatives and share best practice on WPS approaches, which is critical for strengthening impact through innovation. For example, in 2021, the CSSF Gender, Peace and Security portfolio supported CR and its partners to pilot and document approaches to broadening the inclusion of women facing multiple challenges – including young women, women with disabilities and women from religious minorities – in community security and rehabilitation initiatives in northeast Nigeria. Previously, these processes were dominated by male elites, leaving excluded groups feeling less secure and increasing their vulnerability to being attacked and/or recruited by armed groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa. UK funding enabled us to pinpoint successful strategies in facilitating the inclusion of these groups, including training male leaders in gender-sensitive conflict analysis, and creating ‘power circles’ (bringing together men of different levels of power) to help them to understand the importance of applying a power lens and addressing intersectional concerns to prevent further outbreaks of violence.

34. As a result of this approach, several male leaders noticeably shifted their attitudes and behaviour in support of diverse women’s participation in community security. Traditional Bulama leaders set up regular meetings with elder women to take decisions on allocating community resources. They reported that this made their jobs easier and exposed them to greater access and ideas in addressing community challenges. Similarly, CR tested the effects of using more informal spaces such as peace kitchens, market stalls, tailoring shops and hair salons to facilitate discussions between traditional leaders and marginalised groups. These proved to be less intimidating spaces for dialogue because they were less rooted in deeply hierarchical customs and enabled marginalised groups to build solidarity and communicate their collective priorities to leaders. Documenting these approaches enabled us to design them into new programmes and contributed to the WPS-NAP goal to “strengthen delivery of WPS, disability and social inclusion learning…through global peer exchange”.

Trends impacting global adherence to WPS and the role of the UK in relation to this

35. The WPS agenda is in danger of floundering as crises proliferate, toxic anti-gender movements gain power, and global WPS resources plummet. Below we outline some of the most significant trends shaping adherence (and resistance) to the agenda, and the role of the UK in relation to these.

36. There is a global downward trend in women’s participation. Despite arguably receiving the most attention to date, data from analysis of over 50 peace processes indicates that women’s participation is taking a downturn.[13] In 2023, women represented just 9.6 per cent of negotiators in peace agreements, 13.7 per cent of mediators and 26.6 per cent of signatories.[14] At the same time, only 26 per cent of the agreements even mentioned women, girls or gender and none included women's groups as signatories.[15] Of the top priority global conflicts for the UK (Ukraine, Sudan and Gaza), women’s participation in ceasefire negotiations and specific protections for them in eventual agreements have been absent.

37. Where women have gained access to peace discussions, their presence has still too often been used to legitimate decisions taken by others. For example, despite women being allocated a quota in all six reconciliation committees as part of the Somali peace process, decisions required the authorisation of a committee of male clan elders.[16] In the 2021 Afghanistan peace talks in Doha, no women were nominated to take part by the Taliban and the four women nominated by the Government were relegated to note-taking roles. To date, too much focus has been placed on increasing the number of women physically taking part in peace talks, while placing the onus largely on women to strengthen their influence (for example, by building their capacity, networks, advocacy and skills). Comparatively, very little attention has centred on the responsibility and accountability of those in positions of power, who often gatekeep spaces and control what is discussed and agreed.

38. The UK has taken some steps to further promote and strengthen commitments to increasing women’s participation on an international scale. If passed, the WPS Bill, currently at its second reading in the House of Commons, commits to “systematic recognition and participation of sufficient women in delegations to support peace processes that are supported by the UK… including women from minority ethnic groups, women with disabilities and women who may be discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity” and for “gender and inclusion mediation experts to be included in diplomatic missions relating to peace processes”, though it remains unclear who would be accountable for this in practice. As a signatory of Commitment 2025, the UK commits to guarantee the meaningful participation of women in international and regionally-led negotiation processes and offer political, technical and financial support to negotiating parties, though there is a lack of evidence on what it has delivered against these. The UK has not yet signed the UN Secretary General’s Common Pledge for Women’s Full, Equal and Meaningful Participation in Peace Processes, launched in 2024, which could further formalise its commitment to take and report on concrete steps to addressing this global downward trend.

39. An increasingly powerful and dangerous anti-gender movement is gaining power. Across the world, national and global initiatives that oppose gender equality and so-called ‘gender ideologies’ are gaining traction, including with political elites in countries that have been traditional stalwarts of the WPS agenda. The UK explicitly acknowledged the threat this posed in its 2023 International Women and Girls Strategy (“in recent years, systematic attempts by regressive actors to roll back on women’s and girls’ rights have gained momentum… well-funded and well organised, these actors have sought to disrupt multilateral negotiations, threaten consensus, and block texts that set the global standard and ambition on gender equality”). The Strategy identifies the UK as “well-placed to step up, defend the gains and drive progress for women and girls”, pointing to its efforts to safeguard language on gender equality and promote women’s rights at the UN Security Council.

40. The Labour Government’s alignment with the April 2025 Supreme Court Ruling that a ‘woman’ refers to sex assigned at birth, however, indicates a concerning alignment with anti-gender narratives from which the UK previously distanced itself. According to a report by UN Women, one in four countries reports that anti-gender backlashes are hampering implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, a global agenda signed by 189 countries in support of gender equality. The backlash has also created roadblocks in international negotiations on WPS issues, exemplified by the US’ threats to veto the introduction of UNSCR 2467 on conflict-related sexual violence unless references to sexual and reproductive rights were withdrawn. In late 2024, the US administration banned terminology associated with ‘woke’ initiatives, including ‘gender’, ‘women’, ‘diverse groups’, ‘inclusivity’, ‘racial justice’, ‘disability’ and ‘feminism’.[17] The Global Philanthropy Project found that at least USD 1 billion was channelled overseas by US organisations to ‘fight’ LGBTIQA+ and women’s rights between 2008-2017.[18]

41. While not new to women peacebuilders operating in conflict contexts, anti-gender backlashes continue to place them at acute physical risk while discrediting their work. Our own research has shown that in Liberia, for example, online abuse towards women peacebuilders has taken a significant emotional toll on them and their families, causing them to self-censor or withdraw from their work. Anti-gender rhetoric continues to be used to create fear and division, particularly targeting LGBTIQA+ individuals and those who challenge what are perceived as traditional gender roles, family values and power hierarchies. The shrinking of space for civil society more broadly heightens the vulnerability and risk for women peacebuilders and activists. USAID cuts and the demise of organisations such as the United States Institute for Peace and Freedom House limits critical monitoring and accountability towards governments and security actors on WPS and human rights, while increasing confidence among authoritarian governments that they can stifle their activity with impunity.

42. WPS lacks global leadership. Several historical champions of WPS have either softened, fully withdrawn or, like the UK, seemingly deprioritised the agenda. In April 2025 the US announced plans to eliminate the Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues which is essential to implementing the WPS Act. Later that month, the US Defence Secretary terminated the WPS programme under the Department of Defence, citing WPS as “yet another woke divisive/social justice initiative that… distracts from our core task: WAR-FIGHTING. WPS is a UNITED NATIONS program pushed by feminists and left-wing activists. GOOD RIDDANCE WPS!”. The Netherlands plans to cut gender programming and abandoned its Feminist Foreign Policy. More broadly, UN and Western states’ engagement in peace processes and as signatories of peace agreements has decreased since the passing of UNSCR 1325. Conversely, states such as Kenya, Qatar and Türkiye, and regional organisations, are playing an increasingly influential role as mediators and third-party signatories. This could signal a turning point – or at least a departure from unity of purpose – in commitment to normative frameworks around WPS and women’s participation.

43. Despite being the penholder on UNSCR 1325 and encouraging statements committing to WPS made by the Prime Minister, former International Development and Women and Equalities Minister and the Minister for Africa and WPS, there are few concrete signs from the UK Government that it has the ambition or means to fill the current WPS leadership gap and influence potential WPS allies or blockers to support the agenda. Significant cuts to the ISF and the UK aid budget will undoubtedly impact resourcing for the UK’s own WPS efforts, but there are still important normative and diplomatic actions the UK could take to champion the agenda (detailed in the final section).

44. An increased focus on transactional deal-making threatens WPS principles and progress. As global conflicts have become more fragmented, the linear and comprehensive peace agreements of the 1990s and 2000s are increasingly rare, and multiple – often local level – processes are taking precedence. This can reduce the space for more wide-ranging negotiations between civil society, conflict parties and mediators and the likelihood of more gender transformative aspirations. Comprehensive processes often seek to shape inclusive governance arrangements and delve into socio-cultural issues, and it is comparatively straightforward to make a strategic case for women’s inclusion within them.
45. President Trump’s re-election and approach to external relations makes it more likely that issues-based, transactional deals will become the norm. These approaches focus on narrow, often economic issues, like the Black Sea Grain initiative or temporary ceasefires in Gaza and Ukraine. There is relatively little time, scope or appetite among conflict parties to prioritise women's participation (often seen as resource and time-intensive) within these processes, and fewer clear entry points for WPS advocates to exert influence. As such, it is unsurprising that the 2024 report[19] of the UN Secretary-General on WPS found that the extent to which gendered conflict drivers and effects are acknowledged in peace agreements is already reducing.

46. The UK is well placed, and has the tools, to advocate for WPS principles within these evolving processes. In 2025, CR carried out research funded by the FCDO on how to create a more enabling environment for gender transformative peace processes and outcomes, including specific actions that international organisations and national governments can take as conflict is becoming more fragmented and complex. The UK also has a strong track record of using gender-sensitive conflict analysis in its own peace and security programming. This approach could be adapted, streamlined and shared as a key resource with counterparts playing increasingly influential roles in peace and mediation processes.

47. There is a need to learn from, and support, women who are overcoming barriers to inclusion and asserting their rights. CR’s own programming and partnerships has shown that women can and will continue to advocate for their own security, justice and inclusion in decision making at all levels, regardless of international funding levels or political changes and often at great personal risk. The question for the UK Government and its allies is whether they are content to pull back support to these women and the movements they lead at this moment of particular vulnerability, or reassert their diplomatic and financial backing for WPS.

48. For example, despite the systemic oppression of Afghan women and girls, in September 2024 Afghan women leaders developed and advocated on the Tirana Declaration, produced following a summit of 120 Afghan women in exile, diaspora and within Afghanistan. The Declaration includes proposals to ensure women’s voices are heard in the future resumptions of peace talks. In Bougainville, women have used their familial positions to mediate between armed groups and organise platforms for peace, going on to play critical roles in the development of the new constitution for an independent Bougainville. The Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediator networks provides vital connectivity between peace tracks through its diverse membership, and is well-placed to offer creative solutions to inclusion within new approaches to peace mediation and among increasingly influential mediation powers.

Suggestions for the UK Government to ensure its WPS efforts are sustainable amid global political shifts

49. With the WPS agenda at an important crossroads, the UK should re-assert its support for and leadership of the agenda. This will require steadfast diplomatic backing, engagement on WPS priorities with a broader range of partners and coalitions, a renewal of its ambitions in line with emerging challenges and innovation and, most importantly, reliable support for women leading the agenda.

50. Redouble diplomatic support for the WPS agenda to bolster commitments among allies and new partners. As penholder for the WPS agenda, the UK has the responsibility and authority to (re)galvanise international support for WPS among both traditional allies and potential new allies or blockers of the agenda. The UK has played an instrumental role in shaping and integrating WPS priorities within various international mechanisms, including the Sustainable Development Goals, spearheading the flagship Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) and within the UN’s New Agenda for Peace. In 2024, the UK further reiterated its support for the agenda at the UN Security Council, committing to “addressing structural gender inequality… not just in criminal courts or in peace negotiations halls, but in how girls and boys, men and women relate to each other”.

51. More practically, (re)galvanising international support could include leading coordination efforts to identify WPS priorities to advocate for within the upcoming UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review, and engaging in ‘minilateralism’ on aspects of WPS where coordinated multilateral messaging is becoming too challenging. For example, the UK could gather a smaller group of pre-existing proponents of WPS (such as Finland, Canada and Japan) to strategise and develop common messaging on WPS at the UN Security Council and other fora ahead of the 25th anniversary (particularly in relation to ensuring WPS principles are prioritised in current ceasefire negotiations and peace discussions). The UK could also initiate conversations with UN Member States playing increasingly influential roles in peacebuilding and mediation (such as Qatar, Türkiye, Kenya and Oman) as well as those which have signalled support to WPS (for example, through Feminist Foreign Policies or newer members of the Security Council which have signed the shared commitments on WPS) to understand more about their own commitments, exchange learning and expertise, position WPS principles within broader priorities and ramp up their support.

52. Reclaim the UK’s historical role as a ‘thought leader’ on WPS by embracing new and innovative approaches to respond to emerging threats and opportunities. As a first step, the UK Government should use the planned refresh of the WPS-NAP to gather substantial feedback and suggestions of approaches and solutions from not only WPS civil society actors in UK priority contexts but also international experts and civil society working across a range of disciplines (including climate, technology and security sectors). The UK could also trial innovative approaches to transnational threats to WPS, using existing research and recommendations commissioned by the WPS Helpdesk. For example, research that explained the linkages between gender inequality, climate change and conflict could inform WPS initiatives designed to prevent climate-related insecurity and minimise the effects of climate shocks on vulnerable groups. This could include initiatives to integrate climate and gender-related alerts and escalation markers into early warning mechanisms. The UK could also scale-up good practice in the use of digital tools for peacebuilding, which offers both significant opportunities to promote WPS principles - by removing physical barriers to participation - as well as potential risks, excluding those who lack digital literacy or connectivity.

53. Build an enabling environment for women’s participation beyond peace talks. As this submission demonstrates, the UK has given invaluable support to women's participation in peace processes. However, the impacts of this work are already being unravelled as consecutive cuts to UK aid budgets, compounded by global funding cuts to aid, leave women peacebuilders without the resources they need to continue their work. The UK needs to double down on its support for women’s meaningful participation, focusing more on creating spaces conducive to their inclusion, engaging resistors and challenging anti-gender movements. The Government could ensure senior male representatives promote the importance of women’s participation publicly and with counterparts in other Governments; use opportunities for diplomatic engagement with male political, religious and business leaders to advocate provisions for women’s engagement in these negotiation spaces; ringfence portions of existing funds to provide flexible support to women’s participation (to cover services like childcare); and showcase the impact of women’s involvement in peace talks to help make the political case for their meaningful engagement.

54. Broaden support for the WPS Prevention pillar beyond a limited focus on Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV). Prevention is the least developed pillar of the formal WPS agenda and has been disproportionately associated with CRSV and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in WPS resolutions.[20] While both agendas have important ambitions, they focus only on preventing specific forms of violence against women, and in the case P/CVE have been criticised for burdening women in enhancing national security by ‘spotting’ and reporting cases of radicalisation rather than improving women’s rights and wellbeing.[21] In comparison, there has been relatively little focus on identifying and addressing the root causes of conflict and inequality that create conditions for broader forms of community violence. The 2015 Global Study on implementation of the WPS agenda drew considerable attention to this: “The world has lost sight of some of the key demands of the women’s movement while advocating for the adoption of resolution 1325: reducing military expenditures, controlling the availability of armaments, promoting nonviolent forms of conflict resolution, and fostering a culture of peace” not “making war safe for women”.
55. Currently, little more than 1 per cent of UK ODA is directed towards peacebuilding or conflict prevention, a proportion that could easily fall as a result of further upcoming cuts to the UK aid budget.[22] As such, the UK should reinforce its commitment to conflict prevention as part of its own WPS strategies and integrate gender throughout the UK’s approach to conflict prevention. It should also prioritise funding grassroots women in their vital, and often underpaid and overlooked roles in preventing conflict.

56. Prioritise reliable partnerships that enable women peacebuilders’ institutional development and resilience. Women working on WPS have often struggled to access long-term funding that they can use beyond immediate interventions for their own institutional development. Such funding is essential to build their capabilities, systems and strategies and therefore for their long-term impact and sustainability.

57. Resources from the UK ISF or UN and civil society-partner mechanisms like the Rapid Response Window often prioritise ‘catalytic’, short-term interventions that can respond quickly to opportunities but without the means for scaling or following up. CR’s research on the Rapid Response Window highlighted that women’s organisations in Kenya, Liberia and Ethiopia found these time-bound mechanisms created expectations and demands for their support and expertise from communities and local powerholders that they were unable to fulfil after projects and funding cycles concluded. This affects their legitimacy and can also be used by opponents to discredit their work.[23] Similarly, the WMC network has been frequently hindered by funding gaps, which has made it difficult to innovate, scale up or sustain member engagement and momentum.[24]

58. There are several ways that the UK can be a more reliable partner even within a constrained funding environment. First, it can review funding requirements for women’s organisations to ensure they are proportionate and that related administrative burdens are not prohibitive or at worst, harmful. For example, under the Rapid Response Window we were able to pare back the administrative burden on partners, thereby strengthening mutual trust and ensuring grants reached smaller, newer and even unregistered organisations. The UK should seek to ensure multilateral contributions support this or similar mechanisms and continue to advocate for proportionate approaches to risk management. Second, longer funding timeframes for civil society organisations working on WPS would enable transformative impacts and reduce the transaction costs and capacity absorbed by repeat contracting and fundraising. Realistic levels of operational costs in partner budgets is essential (including for staff salaries), as is gender-sensitive budgeting (for example, ringfencing or requiring funds for safe transport for women and childcare costs to be included in budgets). Lastly, to support partners’ sustainability and independence, the UK should invest in training on financial reporting, fundraising and risk management for civil society partners.

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