Written evidence submitted by the Wellcome Trust (SDY0056)

Wellcome is a global charitable foundation, based in the UK, supporting science to solve the urgent health challenges facing everyone. As the largest non-governmental funder of UK research, we have committed to spending £16 billion in 2022-32 to achieve our mission globally and our total active grant funding for UK organisations is £3.8 billion. Wellcome is politically and financially independent, but we are committed to partnering with the UK Government to realise our shared ambitions for UK research. In 2020, Wellcome published “The UK’s role in global research”, setting out principles and recommendations to guide the UK’s long-term approach to international research policy.[1] A refreshed report is currently being developed, due for publication later in 2025.  

1.    Summary

1.1.  There is no national security without health security, and there is no health security without science diplomacy: the notion of defence must be expanded to include subtler threats that are globally shared and which require global collaboration – infectious disease, the effects of climate change on health, and funding for a global health architecture that will reduce the spread of misery and disease. The Government must ensure the Ministry of Defence, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Department for Health and Social Care have dedicated funding and work together to address health security. The Government must also remain committed to multilateral efforts to address health security issues – ensuring there are NATO equivalents for health.

1.2.  The world is increasingly looking inwards – there is an opportunity for the Government to use science diplomacy to build new partnerships based on shared interest and mutual reciprocity: the UK must avoid the slide to protectionism and isolationism and lead the way in creating new bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral partnerships through science, based on mutual reciprocity and tackling shared challenges. The Government should use its refreshed Science and Technology Network (STN) to identify relationships and fora where the UK can invest with partners at scale and with impact. The UK must not retreat from the multilateral fora that protect global health and science.

1.3.  The Government must switch from projecting the UK as a “Science Superpower” to the “Global Partner of Choice for Research and Innovation”: the idea of the UK being a superpower, competing with others for supremacy, is increasingly out of step with the evolving geopolitical reality. We are stronger as a nation when we partner with others. The Government should project itself as the global collaborator of choice in research and innovation and amend the GREAT campaign to make us a more attractive partner globally.

2.    Introduction

2.1.  This submission makes the case for science diplomacy and research and development (R&D) to be a central part of the UK Government’s strategies to achieve its growth mission, enhancing the UK’s international influence and contributing to national security.

2.2.  The UK’s R&D sector is an internationally recognised strength, but the Government can go further in realising its full potential by using its research and innovation base to accelerate its global mission. There is no national security without health security. Global challenges don't stop at borders and as the rest of the world is seemingly looking inward, R&D can be used to offer the UK as a stable partner and collaborator.

2.3.  The world is in a growing state of geopolitical instability. Through Brexit and the instability of previous governments, the UK has seen an erosion of its global reputation. The UK’s continued strength in science provides it with an important opportunity to strengthen collaboration, enhance its influence and rebuild its international reputation.

2.4.  Science diplomacy should play a significant role in the UK’s diplomatic strategy because shared endeavour and mutual benefit are at the heart of research and innovation. There is an opportunity for the UK to build new, modernised partnerships through science – bringing growth and prosperity while tackling some of the world’s greatest shared challenges. The Government should leverage this to build and sustain a diverse network of alliances and partnerships.

2.5.  Using science to catalyse the UK’s global reputation will make the UK more attractive to investment and encourage economic growth. Investing in research and innovation gives the UK a chance to move from regulation adopters to regulation innovators. This will allow the UK to be “first-movers” creating favourable environments for the attraction and development of investors. For this to happen, the UK needs to be an attractive place to come for top researchers and their teams. This means moving away from a fixed idea of inward migration to a more transitory model that acknowledges talent is mobile and values the diffusion of knowledge. Combining top talent here in the UK with new partnerships abroad can help to tackle global challenges and make our country safer in an increasingly unstable world.

3.    To what extent is the UK considered a global leader in science and innovation and how does this contribute to its soft power on the global stage?

3.1.  The UK is globally recognised for its research and innovation base. The UK is home to four of the world’s top ten universities.[2] It also ranks first in the world for the quality of academic publications, as measured by the field-weighted citation impact.[3] The UK’s strength continues to grow; the proportion of UK university research which is world-leading increased from 30% in 2014 to 41% in 2021.[4] The UK produced 57% more academic publications per head of population than the US and 6 times more than China in 2020.[5]

3.2.  The UK also has a vibrant startup scene with an ‘increasingly skilled entrepreneurial workforce’.[6] It ranks first in Europe for tech unicorns and has the world's third largest venture capital market.[7] It is also home to globally leading R&D institutions, including the Wellcome Sanger Institute, Francis Crick Institute and Diamond Light Source. The "Golden Triangle" of Oxford, Cambridge, and London is described as one of the most dynamic research and innovation ecosystems globally.[8]

3.3.  Access to the UK’s research and innovation base is a valuable diplomatic tool and source of influence. A greater proportion of UK research publications (60.4%) are produced with international co-authors than any other top 10 research-producing system,[9] demonstrating that other countries find the UK an attractive partner to collaborate with.

3.4.  The UK also has a global offer of regulatory diplomacy. The UK can unlock the potential of regulatory diplomacy by leaning into the expertise of the UK’s research and innovation base, which can unlock new routes to influence on international policymaking. For example, the Government’s AI Action Plan recognises that the UK has ‘strong fundamental AI research, and high-quality research and engineering talent coming out of UK universities, which are some of the best in the world for AI’.[10] As other countries look for leadership amidst the rapid pace of technological advancement, particularly fast in disruptive fields such as artificial intelligence, the UK’s strength in research and innovation positions it to benefit from the opportunity to set the global regulatory agenda, mitigating the risk of technological misuse and reducing barriers to collaboration and trade. By championing principles that guide technology to be open, responsible, secure, and resilient, the UK can influence the global landscape, embed its values into technology, and protect its security interests.

Recommendations:

3.5.  The Government should deliver an event in London on the global regulation of emerging technologies to make progress on determining shared norms and standards – Wellcome would be happy to assist.

3.6.  The Government should consider broadening the remit of the Regulatory Horizons Council to have an explicit international focus, to allow the Council to monitor, work with, and learn from, similar bodies around the world.

4.    How has this agenda been impacted by the current geopolitical environment, including the international activities of Russia and China?

4.1.  In an increasingly unstable geopolitical context, global collaboration has been strained by conflict, increased protectionism and reduced engagement in multilateral processes by major powers. An increased focus on science diplomacy can help mitigate this through research and innovation’s inherent need for collaboration and the reciprocity provided by its innovations. But maintaining the UK’s leading role in global science will require ongoing investment given the rapidly strengthening position of other countries, including China, on science an innovation.

4.2.  Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has raised significant questions about security on the European continent and perhaps irrevocably damaged collaboration on shared research endeavours. It is important we recognise the limits of science diplomacy, the potential of which does not stretch to solving “hot” wars.

4.3.  Chinese prominence in certain technologies including AI, batteries, and physical sciences is becoming increasingly evident. Ministers have set out the Government’s intention to “co-operate with China where it can [...] and challenge where it must.”[11] While the limitations of science diplomacy are obvious when pressed up against significant differences in values, science diplomacy can create bonds through reciprocity and by cooperation to solve shared global challenges. This means taking a pragmatic approach to UK research collaborations with China, managing information sharing and joint projects sensitively.

5.      How does science and technology innovation contribute to the UK’s national security?

5.1.  Wellcome sees the role of research and innovation as important in contributing to national security through delivery of health security. Even as global instability and so the risk of conflict increases, some of the biggest global threats are not from military technology. Research and innovation play a vital role in biosecurity by reducing the risk of the spread of infectious disease through developing, testing, and distributing vaccinations, surveillance, and other preparedness. Examples that Wellcome has funded include the research and development of the first-ever vaccine to protect against the mosquito-borne viral infection Chikungunya,[12] supporting the phase 3 clinical trial of the M72 vaccine, which, if effective, has the potential to become the world’s first new tuberculosis vaccine in over a century,[13] and our part in setting up the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI).[14] All of these demonstrate the role of research and innovation collaborations in augmenting our national security. Wellcome strongly supports the Government’s recognition of this issue through the collaboration between the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and the Pandemic Institute (TPI) to fund vital research into emerging infectious diseases[15] – and strongly urges the Government to continue funding issues that expand the traditional conceptions of national security. There is no national security without health security and there is no health security without science diplomacy.

5.2.  Science and research allow us to create trusted, co-operative and stable partnerships to work on pressing global issues. In this way, science can encourage understanding, reduce misperceptions, and promote a sense of common purpose, even during periods of diplomatic strain.

6.    How effective is the UK Government’s strategy for positioning the UK as a global leader in science and technology and what role does the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) play in advancing this agenda?

6.1.  The previous government’s strategy of framing the UK as a science superpower is increasingly out of step with the reality of the UK’s evolving place in the world. Despite having the intention of showing the UK is “open for business” with new trade partners post Brexit, the science superpower narrative encourages transactional competition between the UK and potential partners when it is collaboration and reciprocity that is needed to solve global challenges. The UK Government should lean into a new narrative that frames the UK as the global partner of choice for research and innovation. It should move away from solely focusing on what the UK stands to gain and recognise ‘that collaborating with international partners allows us to access global expertise and accelerate innovation.’[16]

6.2.  Ideas of the UK as a science superpower or powerhouse also do not cut through with the public. Recent CaSE research shows that 65% of 4,005 respondents said they had never heard the phrase ‘Science Superpower’. 61% of respondents did not feel that R&D was a competition between countries and nearly two-thirds (64%) think it is better for the UK to work with other countries to solve global issues. [17] In researching a Wellcome report set to be published in the summer, we heard from a range of experts, both in policy and academia, who criticised the “GREAT” and “Superpower” narratives, with some going as far as to say that pitching the UK this way was actually damaging our ability to negotiate international deals rather than boosting our appeal.

6.3.  Wellcome was pleased to see the launch of the UK Soft Power Council and the development of the UK’s Soft Power Strategy. Wellcome encourages FCDO and DCMS to co-ordinate a cross-Government approach, with DSIT and the cross-government science advisory system playing a key role in the shaping of the strategy. The UK Soft Power Council should include greater representation from the R&D sector, to ensure the soft power opportunities and benefits of R&D are identified at a strategic level.

Recommendations

6.4.  The Government must move away from the Science Superpower narrative and talk about the UK as the “global partner of choice for research and innovation”, developing communications approaches to support this.

6.5.  The Government should ensure a DSIT representative sits on the Soft Power Council.

6.6.  The Government must ensure that any soft power strategy ensures collaboration between DSIT and FCDO to maximise success – with a dedicated chapter on science diplomacy.

7.    Does the UK need an International Science Strategy and what would it contain?

7.1.  During development of our refreshed report on the UK’s role in global research, due to be published in the summer, we repeatedly heard that action is required to accelerate the role research and innovation can play in activating the UK’s potential. In our 2020 report, Wellcome suggested that the previous Government's International Research and Innovation Strategy did not ‘create a clear enough vision or provide enough direction for the many choices that need to be made.’ This is still the case. Wellcome would support a strategy if it was published at pace and there were clear timelines for implementation of recommendations. The time for action is now if we want to maximise the potential of science diplomacy.

Recommendations

7.2.  Any strategy, whether publicly published or internal, should identify new partners, and augment existing ones, based on where both parties bring complimentary expertise and where mutual reciprocity is the greatest. This should include both bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

7.3.  Any strategy should expand beyond DSIT’s role, to include the role of research and innovation in the activities of other departments internationally, particularly the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and be complimentary to and coordinated with the upcoming Soft Power strategy.

7.4.  Any international strategy must also consider the connection between itself and the UK’s domestic research base, which is under considerable pressure. Further recommendations for promoting domestic strength in research and innovation can be found in Wellcome’s Spending Review submission here.

8.    What are the key international scientific relationships for the UK?

8.1.  The UK’s relationship with Europe is a vital component of the UK's international relationships in science. Europe, including the UK, is described as one of the most research-intensive areas in the world. Scientific collaboration between the UK and Europe has a long history and has been facilitated by EU Framework Programmes.  Prior to leaving the EU, UK and EU27 partners produced a third of the world's scientific publications with only 7% of the global population. Over half of the UK's collaborative papers up to Framework Programme 8 were with EU partners.[18] UK association to Horizon Europe provides a compelling case study for the efficacy of science diplomacy. Despite persistent political difficulties, research and innovation transcended the political divides caused by Brexit – with near unanimous support for UK association to Horizon Europe.

8.2.  The shifting global power balance presents an opportunity for the UK to reposition itself as the global partner of choice for research and innovation in developing countries. To achieve this the UK needs to build modern, equitable partnerships with the countries most affected by global challenges such as infectious disease and climate change. Wellcome has worked closely with FCDO to build strong relationships in Africa through co-funding major programmes, such as the DELTAS I programme administered by the Science for Africa Foundation, which collectively produced 1,496 peer-reviewed articles, competed successfully for additional grants worth $267m, and won 339 prizes for scientific excellence worth $9.1m. It also included advising the World Health Organization on the development of a protocol to eliminate rabies and creating an affordable test for HIV drug resistance in Botswana. DELTAS I also trained over 2,000 undergraduate, masters, PhD, postdoctoral and senior researchers, of whom 50% were women.[19]

Recommendations

8.3.  The Government should, in anticipation of joining, earmark funding for the UK’s association to EU Framework Programme 10 in 2027 and assess the benefits of association as the Programme is designed. Continuing to be associated to the EU Framework Programmes strengthens and opens new opportunities for networks in Europe that will pay dividends in terms of perceptions and relationships as well as in scientific advancement. 

8.4.  The Government should look to partner and invest in developing countries where there is an opportunity for co-creation, co-benefit, long term stability, and opportunities for researcher-led (bottom up) partnerships.

9.    What impact will the rebranded Science and Technology Network have on the UK’s global position?

9.1.  Wellcome supports the Government’s increased focus on the Science and Technology Network (STN), which is vital to both projecting UK openness to research collaborations and identifying new partnerships based on mutual reciprocity and strategic alignment. The increased focus on the network now needs to shift from branding to providing the resource to achieve the network’s objectives (protecting UK excellence in research and innovation, building and facilitating science, technology and innovation collaborations, and providing insights and intelligence).

Recommendations:

9.2.  The Government should resource the newly relaunched Science & Technology Network (STN) to be a “single front door” for UK research. Beyond its intelligence-gathering and networking role, STN needs to become comfortable pushing the UK’s research ambitions in-country – speeches, policy announcements and campaigns from the UK can only partly get the message out to the world. 

10.           Are the thematic areas selected by the Network the right ones to prioritise?

10.1.                     There is close alignment between the Network’s thematic areas and Wellcome’s. Wellcome has identified three health challenges which must be addressed to achieve our vision of a healthier future for everyone (climate and health, infectious disease and mental health). Through our focus on discovery research, we also seek to create opportunities for making discoveries that could fundamentally change the way health challenges are recognised, managed, prevented or solved in the future. We believe supporting global research partnerships on these issues are essential to solve the most pressing global challenges collectively.

11.           What areas or sectors should the Network prioritise in the coming years?

11.1.                     The UK has existing strengths in particular emerging technologies, including AI and Engineering Biology, that the Network should identify opportunities and partnerships for. Beyond that, the Network should identify where the UK can support partnerships that look to tackle shared global health challenges like climate changes, pandemic preparedness, and mental health.

12.           How can the impact of science diplomacy activities be measured, particularly in terms of enhancing national branding, fostering international influence, and contributing to conflict resolution?

12.1.                     Reducing science diplomacy to a list of metrics would not fully capture the intangible benefits offered to UK influence by using research and innovation to create collaborations based on mutual reciprocity. The goodwill created through these collaborations could have an immeasurable impact on UK influence and prosperity.

12.2.                     However, the UK could gauge some of the success of science diplomacy through monitoring data on international collaborations, including by conducting qualitative research with international partners working with the UK and documenting case studies of shared achievements through research and innovation.

13.           To what extent are science and technology innovation activities supported through UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending?

13.1.                     Historically, the UK has been a leader in funding and conducting research and development targeted at neglected diseases, largely supported by ODA. Investments in global health R&D, supported by ODA, have a proven record of delivering lifesaving interventions, stopping the international spread of infectious threats, generating new scientific discoveries, supporting jobs and industries, and fostering goodwill and leadership on the global stage.

13.2.                     Successive cuts to ODA from 2019 onwards have weakened the UK’s pre-eminence in international development research and have sparked concern about the fate of global health R&D funding. Amid cuts in 2021, ODA R&D was disproportionately affected, with UKRI removing three major funds for international development research, with consequences for relationships in the international research community.[20] These cuts have limited ODA’s capacity as a soft power tool.

13.3.                     The UK's contribution to neglected disease[21] R&D, between 1994 and 2040, is estimated to be responsible for significant health gains: 1.43 million lives saved, 99.1 million disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), and 183 million cases averted. If ODA cuts also affect the rollout of products already launched, this impact could be substantially affected.[22] This illustrates the extent to which science and technology innovation is supported through UK ODA, but also the real-world impact of ODA funding on research.

13.4.                     The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) – co-founded by Wellcome in 2017 and supported by the UK Government using a contribution from ODA funding – has achieved scientific breakthroughs that are creating a healthier future in the UK and abroad. CEPI developed a portfolio of over 60 vaccines in a short period enabled, in part, by UK ODA funding. Their underlying ChAdOx platform, initially focused on malaria and other emerging pathogens, served as the foundation for the COVID-19 vaccine. CEPI thus supported the Oxford/AstraZeneca, Moderna, and Novavax COVID-19 vaccines. This highlights how early R&D funding from ODA led to groundbreaking innovations that saved lives globally and protected UK global health security.

13.5.                     Mapping ODA Research and Innovation (MODARI) maintained by UKCDR as a UKRI-led cross-government asset visualises the global opportunities that ODA provides for research and UK partnerships.

13.6.                     While public and political support for the UK’s international development role has come under strain, 77% of the British public still agree that R&D should be used as a tool to solve global issues and at least half think the UK investing money into solving global problems would have a positive impact on the UK’s security, economy and reputation overseas.[23] In this instance, ODA is more than aid. It is about using global health R&D to achieve the global changes that will benefit everyone.

Recommendations

13.7.                     At least maintain the percentage of ODA which is spent on research and innovation, and more broadly uphold the UK’s contribution to global health and scientific research through financing, policy and diplomacy.

14.           What are the benefits of bilateral agreements or global collaborations, such as CERN, for the UK economy and its innovation ecosystem?

14.1.                     Bilateral agreements continue to gain prominence as trust and funding for multilateral fora erodes. Bilateral funding agreements need to be chosen strategically, based on where the UK has strengths and where partners strengths complement UK weaknesses – both in research areas, but also regarding infrastructure. This means forgoing the proliferation of small investments that don't add up to much and investing at scale to increase impact. The Committee should investigate relevant case studies to assess the impact of bilateral science agreements on research collaboration, and whether these are backed up by funding to support them.

14.2.                     Global collaborations are vital to R&D. Examples of successful international collaboration at scale include the Human Genome Project, based at the Wellcome Genome Campus, and the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. These projects carry significant costs and risks but are increasingly vital in areas of science which are beyond the budget of any one country. The UK must therefore position itself as the willing collaborator of choice in research and innovation.

14.3.                     As well as leaning on the STN to identify new partnerships, the Government should create space for bottom up, researcher led multilateral engagements. This will ensure that the people best placed to identify new opportunities for international collaboration, the researchers themselves, are shaping the UK’s strategy.

Recommendations:

14.4.                     With the help of the STN, DSIT should identify bilateral partnerships based on where co-investing at scale can generate the highest impact – for instance, in shared infrastructure or data sharing.

14.5.                     With the help of the STN, DSIT should identify plurilateral partnerships, not necessarily limited to the conventional multilateral fora, where the UK can collaborate with other countries on shared endeavours or complement our own research strengths with the strengths of other countries.

14.6.                     The Government should set up a UK research alumni network to identify research collaborations from the bottom up.

15.           How can the UK be made an attractive destination for global R&D investment, and how can the benefits of this investment be maximised locally and nationally?

15.1.                     Amidst rising international competition, the UK must secure its strategic advantage in R&D to ensure it remains a soft power asset in the long-term. Wellcome set out how the UK can secure its research base and make itself attractive to international investment in its Spending Review submission here.

16.           How can the government ensure leading scientific researchers continue to view the UK as an attractive place to base themselves?

16.1.                     The UK’s attractiveness to globally mobile talent has faced significant challenges in recent years. The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee referred to the UK’s current visa policy as an “act of national self-harm.”[24] Leading R&D institutions like the Francis Crick Institute and Cancer Research UK (CRUK) Institutes are finding it progressively harder to attract international talent. As of 2023, 76% of UK cancer researchers faced difficulties with recruitment and retention of staff since the UK’s exit from the EU.[25] The Royal Society found that the total upfront cost of a 5-year Skilled Worker visa (£11,933) is now 970% higher than the average for equivalent routes across all other leading science nations in the study. While the fee for a Global Talent visa is lower than for a Skilled Worker visa, upfront costs are still high at £5,891.[26] This is 17 times higher than the average cost for dedicated routes for researchers.[27] It now costs £20,980 for a researcher to come on a 5-year Global Talent visa with 3 family members, which has risen by 57% as a result of the cost increases.[28] CRUK Institutes spent over £470,000 on visas in 2022/23, prior to increases, and to recruit the same number of international researchers now costs nearly £690,000, a 44% increase. Visas will now cost the Crick alone half a million pounds a year.[29] This draws money away from vital research.

16.2.                     The proportion of people saying that levels of immigration is one of the most important issues facing the UK rose from 17% in May 2022 to 34% in September 2024, according to data from CaSE.[30] However, the Government must not conflate rising public concern over immigration with the UK encouraging globally mobile talent to come here. The same CaSE polling suggests a majority (52%) would prefer universities in the UK to recruit the best global talent, even if it means more immigration to the UK.[31] The Government should move from an inflexible approach of modelling immigration statistics to a system that reflects the transitory nature of research and innovation talent coming to the UK.

Recommendations

16.3.                     The Government must reduce the upfront costs associated with researchers, their families, and their teams coming to the UK.

16.4.                     The Government should encourage an exchange of research talent with strategic partners around the world by including provisions in Free Trade Agreements or science and innovation agreements, or singular standalone programmes such as joint PhD or exchange schemes.

16.5.                     DSIT should work with the FCDO and the Home Office to discuss how to move from a fixed method for modelling immigration to a transitory model that acknowledges people come to the UK, leave the UK, and disperse knowledge.

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