Written evidence submitted by The United Kingdom Without Incineration Network (UKWIN) (NPE0005)

  1. The United Kingdom Without Incineration Network (UKWIN) is a network of anti-incineration campaigners and groups operating as an environmental non-governmental organisation.
  2. UKWIN has extensive experience of Examinations for Nationally Significant Energy Infrastructure proposals for waste incinerators (e.g. Boston, North Lincolnshire, and Medworth), alongside contributing to a host of non-NSIP planning applications for waste incinerators.

The 2024 updates to the National Policy Statements for Energy (EN-1 to EN-5)  

What are the most important changes needed to these National Policy Statements since the last update in 2024 and do the Government’s proposed drafts deliver these?

  1. With respect to policies associated with nationally significant waste incineration infrastructure, important changes to be reflected in the revised EN-1 and EN-3 policies include:
    1. 12 December 2024’s Leader of the House of Commons statement that: “The Government are committed to developing a circular economy in which we do not need waste incinerators...”;
    2. 13 December 2024’s Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, and its designation of incineration as not constituting a low carbon technology;
    3. 30 December 2024’s Residual Waste Infrastructure Capacity Note, which sets out ‘strict’ criteria to be applied to new incineration projects and which found there is sufficient Energy from Waste (EfW) incineration capacity in England; and
    4. 30 December 2024’s policy statement declaring the end of England’s reliance on burning household waste (linked to stagnating recycling rates), which announced the “need to minimise waste incineration” and that “New waste incinerators will only receive planning approval if they meet strict new local and environmental conditions”.
  2. While the 12 December 2024 statement was a significant step in the right direction, the Government’s proposed consultation drafts fall short of delivering on the Government’s policy position of bringing about a circular economy in which we do not need waste incinerators.
  3. By allowing new waste incineration capacity to be consented, and expansion of existing capacity, Government is allowing the transition to a circular economy to be more difficult, as incinerators perpetuate the linear economy and their feedstock demands are a barrier to the circular economy.
  4. UKWIN has a wealth of published evidence demonstrating how incineration overcapacity is harming recycling.
  5. The problems of incineration overcapacity will worsen unless Government acts more firmly.
  6. It is essential that relevant National Policy Statements (EN-1 and EN-3) are revised to include a moratorium on new waste incineration capacity.
  7. It seems absurd for Government to allow councils to send compostable food waste to incineration due to long-term waste contracts with feedstock commitments while allowing yet more new incineration capacity to be consented.
  8. Any new waste incineration capacity will inevitably lock England into more incineration in the long term which could make it impossible to meet targets, including the statutory target to halve residual waste, and to achieve significantly higher levels of recycling without importing significant quantities of waste from abroad to act as incinerator feedstock.
  9. Such a moratorium would be like those introduced to protect the circular economy in Wales and Scotland.
  10. While recycling rates in England have stagnated recycling in Wales and Scotland has improved since introducing their respective moratoria.
  11. On the 28th of February 2025 the Circular Economy Minister, responding on behalf of Defra, stated that: “…Where the evidence demonstrated that existing long-term waste disposal contracts presented an unavoidable barrier to the introduction of food waste collections by 31 March 2026, transitional arrangements were provided by Defra…”
  12. That is to say, waste authorities are being allowed to avoid implementing separate food waste collections because they have promised to send food waste to incineration.
  13. As around a third of residual waste is biodegradable, this amounts to a significant tonnage of recyclable/compostable material that is not only being incinerated but is making poor use of capacity at existing incinerators.
  14. Given the statutory target to halve residual waste per capita and the potential for other forms of residual waste management, to move towards a circular economy there is a need for incineration capacity to fall significantly.
  15. Most incinerators are relatively new, and older plants are often connected to district heating schemes and so are unlikely to be shut down without being replaced.
  16. As such, if the main policy objective is to move to a circular economy, planning policies must not be allowed to exacerbate incineration overcapacity.
  17. If there is a genuine need for residual waste treatment capacity in the short-to-medium term before additional measures to minimise residual waste are in place, this should be met by supporting waste authorities to renegotiate contracts to allow separately collected food waste alongside accepting genuinely residual waste from other councils to fulfil contractual feedstock requirements.
  18. Such an arrangement would be compatible with developing a circular economy, whereas allowing greater incinerator lock-in would not.
  19. With respect to the Clean Power Action Plan, the key element of which is the Technical Annex’s acknowledgement that Energy from Waste (EfW) incineration is not considered Critical National Priority infrastructure, as the energy exported from such EfW facilities cannot be considered low carbon energy, e.g. due to the feedstock’s plastic.
  20. This is an important change that should be more explicitly acknowledged in the Government’s draft.
  21. UKWIN urges Government to include an explicit statement within both the revised EN-1 and the revised EN-3 to make clear that EfW incineration is not considered Critical National Priority infrastructure and energy exported from EfW facilities is not low carbon energy.
  22. Such a statement should be accompanied by clarity regarding either the aforementioned moratorium or at least sufficient to make explicit that as a result of exclusion of incineration as Critical National Priority infrastructure EfW plants cannot be consented based on energy generation need and can only be approved if a sufficient clearly defined waste management need is demonstrated that clearly outweighs any adverse impacts of the proposed EfW.
  23. Turning to the Residual Waste Infrastructure Capacity Note and accompanying policy statement, while the draft has been updated in light of these the draft remains deficient as it fails to fully reflect the expectations set out in these documents.
  24. For example, the Capacity Note includes the following promise: “The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) are updating the decarbonisation readiness requirements to include EfW facilities. The proposals would require new build and substantially refurbished EfW facilities to be built in such a way that they can easily decarbonise by retrofitting carbon capture within the plant’s lifetime”.
  25. To fully reflect the expectations set out above, the revised EN-1 and EN-3 should repeat the Capacity Note line that new build and substantially refurbished EfW facilities would be required to be built in such a way that they can easily decarbonise by retrofitting carbon capture within the plant’s lifetime.
  26. Similarly, the revised EN-1 and EN-3 should repeat the Capacity Note lines that: “…in order to meet our residual waste reduction target, all residual wastes…must not exceed approximately 17.6Mt in 2042. Residual waste infrastructure must not lock-in materials that compromises the achievement of this target...To that end, government does not support overcapacity of energy recovery treatment…and all new developments must demonstrate the genuine need for additional or replacement energy recovery treatment capacity”.
  27. Also, further modifications need to be made to EN-1 and EN-3 to avoid the sort of confusion that has arisen with respect to the Capacity Note’s references to the East of England and East Midlands regions.
  28. To address this, EN-3 Paragraph 2.7.59 should be updated to reflect the clarity within the Capacity Note that even if a specific area is not already suffering from incineration overcapacity the use of existing residual waste treatment capacity elsewhere should be considered preferable to new capacity that would exacerbate national overcapacity.
  29. Mention should also be made in EN-1 and/or EN-3 to how the Capacity Note’s use of the phrase “alternative treatment options to landfill for municipal residual wastes” include treatments other than landfill and incineration, e.g. Solid Recovered Fuels to power cement kilns, alongside reference to using spare capacity at existing incinerators – including plants where contractual feedstock requirements currently mean the incineration of compostable material.

How successful were the changes introduced in the last update, including the Critical National Priority policy presumption for low carbon infrastructure? Are any modifications needed?

  1. Key changes to EN-1 and EN-3 – with respect to policies against incineration overcapacity and policies requiring consideration of the residual waste reduction target – seem to have been subsequently interpreted in a manner that appears to ignore the policy’s original intent, thus undermining their purpose.
  2. Such misinterpretation strongly suggests the need for the strengthened of policy wording.
  3. To provide context, it is important to understand some of the concerns in place at the time these changes to EN-1 and EN-3 were initiated.
  4. On 28 March 2019 John Grogan MP addressed the Environment Secretary as follows: "Most studies now indicate that we have an excess of incineration capacity to deal with residual waste. Is there not a danger that, if we build more incinerators, waste that would otherwise be recycled will be diverted to those incinerators?" and the Environment Secretary acknowledged: "That is a fair point".
  5. On 9 May 2019, Defra’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State told the Commons: "…[Defra's] assessment is that additional residual waste energy capacity above that already planned to 2020 should not be needed if we achieve our recycling targets".
  6. In February 2021 the Business Secretary refused permission for the proposed Wheelabrator Kemsley North (WKN) incinerator.
  7. As set out in Annex A, the Examining Authority concluded that “good intentions and market forces” were insufficient to protect the waste hierarchy and planning permission should be refused because “the risk that by over providing facilities a more sustainable management of waste would be prejudiced for many years to come” which went against the waste hierarchy.
  8. We also note the advice that Government received from the Climate Change Committee (CCC) that added additional impetus to this point, with the CCC telling Parliament in June 2021 that: “If EfW usage is left to grow unchecked, EfW emissions will quickly exceed those of the CCC pathway while undermining recycling and reuse efforts”.
  9. The CCC was clearly warning about the potential for incineration to harm recycling, similarly rejecting the notion that ‘market forces’ were sufficient to prevent incineration overcapacity and harm to recycling.
  10. September 2021’s draft EN-1 and EN-3 appeared to be an attempt to more solidly enshrine the principles established in the WKN decision and to respond to concerns from those such as the CCC regarding incineration harming recycling with policies such as: “The proposed plant must not result in over-capacity of EfW waste treatment at a national or local level”.
  11. Promoters of new waste incineration capacity anticipated that this would represent a high bar.
  12. For example, Richard Marsh from BDB Pitmans stated that the new requirement to avoid EfW overcapacity was "not as favourable as had been hoped", adding: "...this wording would mean they will need to be robust in making the case that there is demand for the project".
  13. However, subsequent planning decisions based on the updated EN-1 and EN-3 policy appear to have relied on the very ‘market forces’ and ‘good intentions’ that had reasonably been rejected in the WKN decision.
  14. A recent example of this recurring is the North Lincolnshire NSIP decision made in March 2025.
  15. DESNZ's North Lincolnshire NSIP decision was the first test of the Government's stated commitment to preventing overcapacity in line with the December 2024 Capacity Note and the accompanying Ministerial statement. It was also a test of the updated EN-1 and EN-3.
  16. On 30 December 2024 the Circular Economy Minister stated, as noted above, that: “For far too long, the nation has seen its recycling rates stagnate and relied on burning household waste...That ends today…”
  17. Yet for the North Lincolnshire NSIP decision, the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero adopted (and arguably misinterpreted) the findings from the December 2024 Defra Residual Waste Capacity Note in preference to Examination evidence that demonstrated how the proposal would result in overcapacity.
  18. This is problematic because the Capacity Note’s modelling did not take account of The Environmental Targets (Residual Waste) (England) Regulations 2023).
  19. While the Capacity Note acknowledged various limitations, these limitations were not explored in any detail – and the more detailed Examination-specific analysis which did take key limitations into account was somehow superseded by the Capacity Note.
  20. As can be seen in Annex B, while the Examining Authority faithfully applied the EN-1 and EN-3 policies to reach their conclusion that the North Lincolnshire proposal would be inconsistent with relevant policies against EfW overcapacity when they rejected the Applicant’s argument that a degree of overcapacity should be acceptable – which would have been antithetical to these policies.
  21. Despite this, the SoS decided to rely on the ‘market forces’ and ‘good intentions’ to assume that even if the plant was being consented despite not necessarily needed market forces could be relied upon to protect the waste hierarchy.
  22. Such a conclusion failed to adequately consider how the capacity once built could rely on feedstock that might otherwise have been recycled, or the potential for the capacity to undermine efforts to help councils with feedstock commitments to renegotiate those contracts to allow separate food waste collections.
  23. Worse still, the SoS appears to have ignored the central tenet of the policy by adopting a view that a degree of incineration overcapacity was acceptable, despite this going against the specific wording of the policy which says that overcapacity is not acceptable.
  24. Furthermore, the SoS’ acceptance of the North Lincolnshire applicant’s argument that it would be reasonable to assume that recycling targets would be missed risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby incineration overcapacity prevents the achievement of recycling targets.
  25. As such, the approach adopted by the SoS is incompatible with a clearly-worded policy against incineration overcapacity and fell well short of the ‘crackdown on waste incineration’ so boldly announced by the Circular Economy Minister in December 2024.
  26. Such attempts to re-interpret existing policy make clear that the policy language needs to be improved in order to ensure that the policy’s original purposes – of avoiding incineration overcapacity and preventing the associated harm to the waste hierarchy – is faithfully executed in all future planning decisions.
  27. Alternatively, the Government could simply impose a moratorium on any new waste incineration capacity, which would put the matter beyond doubt and thus support a shift of investment funding and associated efforts towards the top tiers of the waste management hierarchy.

Renewable energy infrastructure   

Should there be any amendments to the National Planning Policy Framework to align it with the updated energy National Policy Statements?  

  1. The NPPF contains policies promoting ‘renewable and low carbon energy developments’.
  2. In line with the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan and the April 2025 draft updates to the EN-1/EN-3 policies, clarification should be provided within the NPPF Glossary definition of Renewable and Low Carbon Energy to make it explicit that Energy from Waste (EfW) should not be considered renewable and low carbon energy for planning policy purposes. 
  3. The NPPF should clarify that due to the presence of plastics and other fossil carbon material in the feedstock, the process of deriving energy from waste involves the incineration of fossil fuels and so is not considered a form of clean power.
  4. In line with the Government proposed April 2025 updates to EN-1 and EN-3, the NPPF should further clarify that Energy from Waste development should be assessed against the three tests set out in the Residual Waste Capacity Note, i.e. that the proposed additional EfW capacity must meet a clearly defined need, must demonstrate that making use of the heat they produce is viable, and must demonstrate that they can be built carbon capture ready.
  5. These amendments should clarify that in circumstances where an extant Local Plan (including a Local Waste Plan, Waste Core Strategy, etc.) has identified a historic residual waste treatment capacity gap that this historic assessment would be insufficient to demonstrate a ‘clearly defined need’ when the identified capacity gap could be met through residual waste reduction in line with the statutory target to halve residual waste sent for incineration or landfill by 2042 relative to the 2019 base year.
  6. Similarly, it should be made clearer that even if a Plan has a principle of net self-sufficiency, in the event that there is a surplus of energy recovery capacity within a 2 hour drive time of the proposed local capacity then this should be seen as reducing the demand for local capacity accordingly so as to make the best use of existing capacity to minimise regional incineration overcapacity.
  7. Quotes from paragraphs found in EN-1 and EN-3 that would be relevant to this are set out in Annex C.
  8. With regard to the need to update the National Planning Policy for Waste (NPPW) it should be noted that the NPPW is a material consideration for any planning application for new EfW incineration capacity, and that the NPPW has not been updated since 2014.
  9. This remains the case despite the Resources and Waste Strategy having stated in December 2018 that the Government would: "Work to align the National Planning Policy for Waste and planning practice guidance with the Resources and Waste Strategy…”
  10. In addition to the specific matters outlined above, any updated NPPW should maximise support for reduction, repair, reuse, recycling and the circular economy over EfW incineration.
  11. In the event that EN-1 and EN-3 adopt a moratorium on new waste incineration capacity then this should be reflected in an equivalent moratorium being adopted in the NPPF.

 

May 2025

Annex A – Quotes from the Wheelebrator Kemsley North (WKN) decision (EN010083)

Secretary of State decision

4.19…the ExA [Examining Authority] noted that WKN would be in conflict with the National Planning Policy for Waste because it would put at risk the achievement of revised recycling and composting targets in the Kent Minerals and Waste Local Plan.

4.20 The Secretary of State sees no reason to disagree with the ExA’s conclusions in this matter.

6.2 …the ExA’s consideration of all the issues, particularly in respect of arguments about where the incineration of waste stood in the waste hierarchy and how this related to adopted policies in relevant local plans, led to the conclusion that WKN, while offering some benefits (particularly from the 42MW of electricity that would be generated), did not accord with the relevant provisions in the National Policy Statements, the National Planning Policy Framework and in relevant local plans. The ExA recommended, therefore, that WKN should not benefit from the grant of consent.

Examining Authority report

4.10.134. The Applicant has made it clear throughout the Examination that its view is that the waste hierarchy is delivered both through good intentions and market forces. In my view this approach fails sufficiently to recognise that compliance with the waste hierarchy is a legal obligation under the rWFD, as well as set out in NPS EN-3, notably in paragraph 2.5.66 (Section 4.10.4 of this Report) requiring an assessment of conformity of the scheme with the hierarchy and its effect on relevant waste plan or plans. Compliance is also a requirement of local policy and addressed in KMWLP Policies, including in Policy CSW2, unchanged in the EPR, requiring the proposal to demonstrate how it will help drive waste to ascend the Waste Hierarchy whenever possible.

4.10.135. As with other parties involved in waste management the Applicant has a duty to implement the waste hierarchy. The Proposed Development would be two projects among a mix of facility type and sizes required to deliver the waste hierarchy, as recognised in the KMWLP, and energy recovery facilities are among a network of other facilities that ensure sustainable management of wastes.

4.10.136. The Applicant’s Response to Submissions at D7 [REP8-015] at paragraph 3.3.1 et seq, makes a case that KCC’s assertion that “most” waste going to landfill by definition is not suitable for use as a feedstock in the proposed plants, is untenable. However there are several uncertainties in coming to any firm conclusion as to the exact proportion of waste that might be diverted from landfill. In the first place clearly there are some waste types unsuitable for combustion…Then there are uncertainties over what future proportion of waste arising could be expected to be recycled…There is no reliable information about the particular composition of feedstock used in the Consented K3 Facility in terms of post-recycled solid recovered fuel waste, commercial and industrial waste and pre-treated municipal solid waste…

4.10.137. With uncertainties come risks which in this case are twofold, namely the risk of underestimating the future capacity requirements to treat waste arisings necessary and desirable to be treated by EfW facilities, and the risk that by over providing facilities a more sustainable management of waste would be prejudiced for many years to come. The waste hierarchy has to be applied from the top down. The evidence does not lead me to conclude that there is a capacity gap clearly sufficient to justify assuming the risk of prejudicing a successful outcome to the implementation of the key development plan policies. Therefore the Proposed Development would be in conflict with KMWLP Policy CSW6 which requires it to be: “demonstrated that waste will be dealt with further up the hierarchy… and where such uses are compatible with the development plan” and Policy CSW7 “provided that: 1. it moves up the Waste Hierarchy”. (emphasis added)


Annex B – Quotes from the North Lincolnshire decision (EN010116)

Examining Authority report

5.14.95. Based on the Applicant’s forecast we conclude that in Yorkshire & Humber and East Midlands the operation of the ERF component of the Proposed Development in 2030 would be forecast to cause an over capacity of 746 ktpa in that area and would cause the over-capacity in England to increase to 2601 ktpa. This would be 21% and 17% of the Applicant’s forecast of RDF available in Yorkshire & Humber and East Midlands and England respectively by 2030.

5.14.96. In terms of sensitivity to the year of first operation, we consider that in the event that the ERF component began operation in 2026, as indicated by the Applicant [REP6-032], this forecast situation would not be materially different as the Applicant already forecasts an over capacity in England (239 ktpa) and a capacity gap for Yorkshire & Humber and East Midlands (475 ktpa) in 2026. That would be less than the capacity of the ERF component of the Proposed Development, hence a forecast overcapacity would still be caused in that area [REP6-032].

5.14.97. In the event that the ERF component began operation later than 2030, for example as a result of delays in securing a water supply for the purposes of construction or operation as outlined by the Applicant [AS033], we consider this would exacerbate the over capacity already forecast by the Applicant, for example by 2035 in England the Applicant’s forecast is 3392 ktpa and for Yorkshire & Humber and East Midlands 305 ktpa [REP6-032].

5.14.98. Hence, we disagree with the Applicant’s assertion [REP8-020] that there “will not be an excess of energy from waste capacity as a result of the Proposed Development, at a local, national or regional level.”

5.14.99. Draft EN-1 paragraphs 3.3.40 and 5.15.7 and draft EN-3 paragraphs 3.7.7 and 3.7.29, as important and relevant considerations and indicators of the direction of travel of government policy, all aim to prevent over-capacity of EfW treatment at local or national level, and that proposed plant should not compete with greater prevention, re-use, or recycling, or result in over-capacity of EfW waste treatment at a national or local level.

5.14.100. We consider that the Proposed Development is of a scale that would prejudice the achievement of local or national waste management targets in England and that the Applicant has not demonstrated conformity with the waste hierarchy, as expected in paragraph 2.5.69, or that the availability of waste as fuel relative to the capacity of plants for processing is consistent with EN-3 paragraph 2.5.70.

5.14.101. We do not consider the Applicant’s statement that “some resilience is necessary in the system to ensure as least waste as possible is going to landfill” [REP6-032] is sufficient to justify deviation from the policy, on the scale forecast by the Applicant, having regard for draft EN-1 and EN3 statements in relation to over-capacity of EfW waste treatment.

5.14.102. We consider that the statutory duties imposed through regulation, in particular the Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011, that aim to achieve conformity with the waste hierarchy fall mainly on those upstream of the Applicant. Transferors of RDF to the Applicant or those further upstream could diverge from the hierarchy through considerations of “economic viability” as stated in regulation 12 (3). We consider this to be consistent with the EA’s final response [REP9-046] on the matter which placed the responsibility for driving waste up the waste hierarchy in a given area and for considering the implications of energy from waste treatment capacity in that area, with the relevant planning authority. We consider this can reasonably be interpreted as the SoS when dealing with National Infrastructure decisions.

5.14.103. We consider it highly likely that EWC codes would be specified on an environmental permit issued for the ERF component of the Proposed Development under The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016. We consider this would limit the types of waste the ERF may receive, for example to ensure only non-hazardous solid wastes suitable for incineration would be processed. However, the EA confirmed [REP6-040] that this does not provide any certainty that the waste would be unsuitable for treatment further up the hierarchy, for example re-use or recycling.

5.14.104. We do not agree with the Applicant [REP8-020] that regulatory controls can be relied upon to deliver conformance with the waste hierarchy. If they were completely effective in driving waste up the waste hierarchy, we consider there would be no need for policy statements such as EN3 2.5.70 or draft EN-1 paragraphs 3.3.40, footnote 62 to 3.3.83 and 5.15.7, and draft EN-3 paragraphs 3.7.7 and 3.7.29 which all recognise that the decisions of waste producers and processors are primarily driven by the waste market.

5.14.109. In terms of SoS decision making at EN-3 paragraph 2.5.70 we conclude that the Proposed Development would not be “in accordance with the waste hierarchy” and would not be “of an appropriate type and scale so as not to prejudice the achievement of local or national waste management targets in England”.

5.14.110. We also consider, with reference to EN-3 paragraph 2.5.70, that the Applicant has not provided sufficient evidence “as to why this is not the case or why a deviation from the relevant waste strategy or plan is nonetheless appropriate and in accordance with the waste hierarchy”.

5.14.111. In conclusion, considered against EN-1 and EN-3 and having had due regard for draft EN-1 and draft EN-3, the LIR, and other important and relevant matters, we ascribe very substantial weight to matters relating to the issue against the making of the Order.

Secretary of State decision

4.20. He [the Secretary of State] acknowledges the uncertainty surrounding assessments of waste availability and EfW treatment capacity and considers that market forces and the aforementioned amendments to requirements 16 and 24 should go some way towards ensuring compliance with the waste hierarchy…

4.83. In terms of recycling targets, 2011 NPS EN-3 para. 2.5.70 states that where there are concerns in terms of a possible conflict with waste management targets, evidence should be provided to the Secretary of State by the applicant as to why this is not the case or why a deviation from the relevant waste strategy or plan is nonetheless appropriate and in accordance with the waste hierarchy. The Applicant has supplied such evidence in response to the Secretary of State’s consultations in the form of a revised assessment and has argued that their ‘median’ scenario is the most appropriate as they consider it unlikely that the Government will reach its recycling targets to increase household recycling rates to 65% household waste recycling by 2035, 70% by 2042 and 80% Commercial & Industrial waste recycling by 2042.

4.84. In response to this, the Secretary of State considers that the success (or otherwise) of the Government’s recycling targets is dependent on subsequent accompanying policy or guidance and the appetite of local authorities to achieve these targets, therefore, without any further evidence to indicate that the Applicant’s view is possible, a positive outcome is just as probable as a negative outcome. The Secretary of State agrees with the Applicant’s modelling assumption in its ‘conservative’, which is that the Government achieves its recycling targets by 2035 and 2042.

4.89. In relation to the Applicant’s arguments on deviations from the relevant waste strategy or plan, the Secretary of State notes in REP6-032 that the Applicant considers that a system which is operating at under capacity for Energy from Waste (EfW) will result in additional waste in landfill and the optimum position is therefore to have a slight overcapacity in EfW facilities to ensure that there is no residual waste. In their consultation response dated January 2024, the Applicant argues that planned and permitted capacity may not be delivered for various reasons, including altered developer priorities or an inability to find funding or to secure fuel and as a result, planning for ‘just enough’ capacity to meet the need to divert residual waste from landfill is almost certain to result in insufficient capacity being available in practice. Therefore, they argue that capacity to provide some contingency or resilience in the system will be required if as little waste as possible is to be landfilled. Defra’s note includes similar arguments as its statistics estimating the total amount of residual waste (excluding major mineral wastes) indicate that there is also likely a need for alternative treatment options to landfill for non-municipal residual wastes, which may result in development of residual waste treatment capacity over the coming years in excess of infrastructure requirements for the 2042 residual waste reduction target. However, it goes on to state that as further wastes are prevented and recycling improves to meet this target, it is likely that the oldest, least efficient facilities or those facilities that are no longer viable will be decommissioned. The Secretary of State accepts that it is unlikely that all the planned and permitted EfW developments will come forward and agrees that planning for ‘just enough’ capacity could result in less waste being diverted from landfill. Whilst the Secretary of State does not consider there to be any conflict with the relevant waste management strategies, for the avoidance of doubt he considers that ensuring the ‘contingency or resilience’ described by the applicant would have represented an appropriate deviation from the relevant waste strategy or plan as it aims to ensure compliance with the waste hierarchy by diverting as much waste from landfill as possible.

4.90. 2024 EN-1 para.3.2.3 states that it is not the role of the planning system to deliver specific amounts or limit any form of infrastructure covered by this NPS, with the exception of new coal or large-scale oil-fired electricity generation. Footnote 36 then states that a further exception to this is Energy from Waste plants where the primary function is to treat waste and planning decisions will be made on the demand for waste energy infrastructure. The Secretary of State considers that in this case there is no certainty that there will be overcapacity as; there is great uncertainty in forecasting waste availability and consequently EfW treatment capacity; market forces may work in the Applicant’s favour; and the Applicant’s arguments around ‘contingency or resilience’ would represent an appropriate deviation from the relevant waste strategy or plan in the event that a conflict arose.


Annex C – Quotes from EN-1 and EN-3 April 2025 Draft to incorporate into NPPF

Concepts from the April 2025 EN-1 that give rise to the need for amendments to the NPPF or to related national policies and guidance, such as the National Planning Policy for Waste, include the following:

3.3.40 “As the primary function of EfW plants, or similar processes, is to treat waste, applicants must demonstrate that proposed facilities meet the strict criteria set out by government, that their projects: • Meet a clearly defined need to facilitate the diversion of nonrecyclable waste away from landfill, or enable the replacement of older, less efficient waste incinerators; • Can be built Carbon Capture ready, in accordance with the government’s ‘Decarbonisation Readiness’ requirements once they come into force; and • Demonstrate that making use of the heat they produce is viable and they can connect to a heat network within three years of the plant’s operation.”

3.3.42 “…The availability of feedstock will reduce over time in accordance with the statutory residual waste reduction target.”

Footnote 23: “[An exception to the general principle that there should not be a limit to energy generation capacity includes] EfW plants where the primary function is to treat residual waste and planning decisions will be made on the demand for waste infrastructure.”

4.3.20 “Thirteen legally binding targets have been set for England under the Environment Act 2021, covering the areas of: biodiversity; air quality; water; resource efficiency and waste reduction; tree and woodland cover; and Marine Protected Areas. Meeting the legally binding targets will be a shared endeavour that will require a whole of government approach to delivery. The Secretary of State [decision maker] should have regard to the ambitions, goals and targets set out in the government’s Environmental Improvement Plan for improving the natural environment and heritage. This includes having regard to the achievement of statutory targets set under the Environment Act.”

5.10.2 “Among the features which are common to a number of different thermal combustion technologies, cooling towers and exhaust stacks and their plumes have the most obvious impact on landscape and visual amenity. Visual impacts may be not just the physical structures but also visible steam plumes from cooling towers.”

5.15.6 “Applicants must ensure that all proposals align with circular economy objectives. In England, applicants must demonstrate that development proposals are in line with Defra’s policy statement on the role of EfW in treating residual waste.”

5.15.9 “The applicant must consider the Circular Economy and how to ensure that their project aligns with the government’s circular economy ambitions…”

5.15.18 “The Secretary of State should have regard to any potential impacts on the achievement of resource efficiency and waste reduction targets set under the Environment Act 2021 and circular economy objectives.”

Concept from EN-3 that should result in such amendments to the NPPF or related national policies and guidance, such as the National Planning Policy for Waste, include the following:

2.6.1 & 2.6.2 “Where details are still to be finalised, applicants should explain in the application which elements of the proposal have yet to be finalised, and the reason why this is the case.

Where flexibility is sought in the consent as a result, applicants should, to the best of their knowledge, assess the likely worst-case environmental, social and economic effects of the proposed development to ensure that the impacts of the project as it may be constructed have been properly assessed.”

2.7.2 “...CNP [Critical National Priority] policy, as set out in Section 4.2 of EN1, does not apply to applications for EfW projects.”

2.7.6 “As the primary function of EfW [Footnote 14: In this context Energy from Waste includes conventional waste to energy facilities (i.e. electricity and heat generation) and Advanced Thermal Treatment and Advanced Conversion Technologies that process residual wastes to create a syngas or liquid fuel.] plants is to treat waste, applicants must demonstrate that proposed EfW plants will meet a clearly defined need to facilitate the diversion of non-recyclable waste sent to landfill, or enable the replacement of older, less efficient waste combustion facilities. In line with Defra’s policy statement [Footnote 15: Government to crack down on waste incinerators with stricter standards for new builds - GOV.UK], development consent will not be granted for further EfW developments in England unless these criteria are met.”

2.7.15 “Applications related to biomass and waste combustion as part of an EfW facility must detail how the plant will maximise the amount of heat available and provide heat to a heat network within three years of entering operation.”

2.7.39 “Applicants should take into account the presence of Air Quality Management Areas, NO2 Programme Clean Air Plans and proximity to large numbers of people and vulnerable receptors (e.g. health facilities, care homes and schools) when considering site selection.”

2.7.40 “For combustion plant using CCS [Carbon Capture and Storage], the ES [Environmental Statement] should reflect the latest evidence on the air quality impacts of carbon capture using amine-based solvents.”

2.7.45-47 “In accordance with the waste hierarchy, EfW developments in England must demonstrate that they will help lower the amount of non-recyclable waste sent to landfill or help enable the replacement of older, less efficient facilities.             

Applicants should set out how they intend to ensure that recyclable materials, including those that may be recyclable in the future, will be separated and sent for appropriate treatment. In accordance with the waste hierarchy, recyclable material must not be combusted.             

Applicants should undertake an assessment of the proposed waste combustion generating station, examining the conformity of the scheme with the management of waste in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the effect of the scheme on the relevant Waste Local Plan, or plans where a proposal is likely to involve more than one local authority.             

Applicants should set out the extent to which the generating station and capacity proposed is compatible with, and supports the statutory, long-term residual waste reduction target for England, taking into account existing residual waste treatment capacity and that already in development. Applicants should also consider the declining availability of residual waste arisings in context of the government’s commitment to transition to a circular economy.”              

(Note: The phrase “already in development” is useful here as it goes further than the National Planning Policy for Waste requirement to consider “the extent to which the capacity of existing operational facilities would satisfy any identified need”)

2.7.48 “Applicants should set out the extent to which the generating station and capacity proposed is compatible with, and supports the statutory, long-term residual waste reduction target for England, taking into account existing residual waste treatment capacity and that already in development. Applicants should also consider the declining availability of residual waste arisings in context of the government’s commitment to transition to a circular economy.”

2.7.50 “Where EfW developments are developed to enable the replacement of older, less efficient facilities, capacity should not necessarily be replaced like for like and must reflect updated waste management capacity needs.”             

(Note: That is to say, it should be clarified that just because a certain tonnage was previously consented to be processed on a site does not mean that justification does not need to be made for extending the life at this tonnage because the principle of waste management into the future needs to be reconsidered on first principles because it has not been established for the extended lifetime of the plant)

2.7.51 “The results of the assessment of the conformity with the waste hierarchy and the effect on relevant waste plans should be included in the application to the Secretary of State.”

2.7.57 “Applicants should include the production and recovery or disposal of residues as part of the ES. Any proposals for recovery of ash and mitigation measures should be described.”

2.7.58 “Applicants should set out the consideration they have given to the existence of accessible capacity in waste management sites for dealing with residues for the planned life of the power station.”

2.7.59 “Applicants must ensure proposals do not result in an overcapacity of EfW waste treatment provision at a local or national level”.

2.7.84 “The Secretary of State should not grant consent to an EfW development where they are not convinced that the proposals will meet a clearly defined need to facilitate the diversion of nonrecyclable waste away from landfill or enable the replacement of an older, less efficient waste combustion facility. The Secretary of State should also be satisfied that a proposed EfW development is feasible for the duration of its proposed lifecycle in light of declining residual waste volumes and will not be reliant on material that is recyclable.”

2.7.98 “Although Decarbonisation Readiness requirements will be assessed through the Environmental Permitting Regime the Secretary of State should be satisfied that facilities will be able to pass the “space requirement” feasibility test. Proposed EfW developments should be built in accordance with the government’s Decarbonisation Readiness requirements once they come into force.”

2.7.109 “In line with Defra’s current policy statement, the Secretary of State should not grant development consent for further EfW plants in England unless satisfied that the proposal will help lower the amount of non-recyclable waste sent to landfill, or enable the replacement of older, less efficient facilities.”

2.7.110 “The Secretary of State should be satisfied that the proposed EfW development will not prevent recyclable materials, including those that may be recyclable in the future, being separated and sent for appropriate treatment.”

2.7.111 “The Secretary of State should be satisfied, with reference to the relevant waste strategies and plans, that the proposed EfW plant is in accordance with the waste hierarchy and of an appropriate type and scale so as not to prejudice the achievement of local or national waste management targets in England.”