Written evidence submitted by Mr Ryan Nabil (SDY0053)

Dear Ms Onwurah,

My name is Ryan Nabil, and I serve as Director of Technology Policy and Senior Fellow at the National Taxpayers Union Foundation in Washington, DC, where my research focuses on US and international technology and AI policy issues. Prior to this role, I was a Research Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute and a Fox International Fellow at Sciences Po Paris, where I conducted research on Europe–China relations and Sino-Russian approaches to global governance.

Given the timely relevance of the topic, I particularly welcome the Committee’s inquiry into the UK’s international science strategy and the role of science diplomacy in a changing geopolitical environment. I am pleased to submit the attached written evidence, which reflects my independent views and draws on comparative perspectives from the United States and the European Union, regarding how the UK can position itself as a leading science power in an increasingly contested and fragmented international landscape.

I hope these insights prove useful to the Committee as it continues its inquiry into the UK’s science diplomacy and broader international engagement in science and innovation.

Yours sincerely,

Ryan Nabil

Q1. To what extent is the UK considered a global leader in science and innovation and how does this contribute to its soft power on the global stage?

The UK is widely regarded as a leading global actor in science and innovation, but this characterisation might not be sufficiently nuanced to provide meaningful insights into Britain’s precise position within the international scientific landscape. A more granular typology of science powers, a clearer sense of the UK’s place within that typology, and a realistic appraisal of its capabilities and constraints will be essential—both for shaping domestic science policy and for the future of British science diplomacy—especially as the international environment becomes increasingly fragmented.

The first tier of global science powers, or systemic shapers, includes the United States, China, and, to a lesser extent, the European Union when taken as a bloc. What these powers share is a combination of exceptionally large R&D budgets, leadership in international standard-setting bodies, and end-to-end innovation ecosystems—despite internal challenges in each case.[1]

These are followed by selective or asymmetric science powers—countries that are world-class in certain domains but not across the full spectrum of scientific capability.[2] While they have the potential to shape the global science agenda, their influence is often contingent on working in conjunction with others. The French and German governments, for example, have played leading roles through EU institutions in shaping international AI governance norms.[3]

Countries such as Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Canada, though not comprehensive science powers, have built mature scientific infrastructures and enjoy strong international reputations. However, the influence of such countries as middle-sized science powers tends to derive from depth in specific areas rather than breadth across the full range of scientific domains. Crucially, these countries often seek to pursue an internationally orientated approach to science diplomacy, using bilateral and multilateral partnerships, regulatory cooperation, and research collaboration as key levers of influence.

Among selective science powers, the UK arguably stands—and is well-positioned to consolidate its role—as the world’s leading asymmetric science power. It combines internationally respected institutions, regulatory leadership, and deep expertise in key domains, despite lacking the scale and systemic dominance of actors like the United States and China.

Finally, the coming decades will likely see the growing importance of several emerging science powers—such as India, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey—with varying degrees of long-term potential to contribute to and shape the international science system.[4] While still developing their institutional capacity and research ecosystems, some of these actors may come to play influential roles as regional or selective powers with leadership in specific domains.

Recognising this evolving landscape provides the UK with a distinct strategic advantage. As an asymmetric science power with comparative advantages in regulatory infrastructure and institutional credibility, the UK occupies a position few countries share. Despite these strengths, the UK continues to face persistent structural challenges that limit its global influence, particularly chronic underinvestment in research and development (R&D), inadequate and inconsistent funding, weak pathways for scaling innovation, under-leveraged academic–industry collaboration, and limitations in market size and strategic depth.[5] Despite recent improvements, these constraints continue to hinder the UK’s ability to translate scientific excellence into sustained international leadership. Capitalising on the UK’s strengths while addressing these systemic weaknesses will be key to its long-term future as a global science power.

Given the nature of the UK’s scientific profile—as an asymmetric power with an outsized role in regulatory leadership and a highly internationalised research and technology base—British diplomacy must rise to the demands of a more challenging and rapidly evolving global environment. As the Committee rightly recognises, the shifting international order, and with it the structure of international science, presents new and complex challenges for the UK government.[6] In the coming decades, the global geopolitical environment is likely to become increasingly multipolar and fragmented—marked by a growing diversity of actors: from systemic shapers such as the US, China, and the EU, to middle-sized science powers like Japan and South Korea, and emerging-market countries with expanding scientific and technological capacity, including Brazil, India, and Mexico.

In the face of these shifts, the UK’s longstanding diplomatic tradition—grounded in pragmatism, reason, and creativity—must continue to guide its engagement. British science diplomacy will need to navigate not only systemic shapers but also middle and emerging powers, whose interests may align with those of the UK in some areas and diverge in others. Ultimately, the UK’s comparative advantage in science diplomacy may lie not only in deepening economic and technological cooperation with allied and like-minded countries, but also in its capacity to engage constructively across a diverse range of actors—bridging gaps where interests diverge and enabling cooperation where priorities align.

Q2. How has this agenda been impacted by the current geopolitical environment, including the international activities of Russia and China?

While the changing geopolitical environment has undoubtedly made the international context more challenging for UK diplomacy, it has compounded—rather than caused—the longer-term structural weaknesses in the UK’s science and innovation system. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has understandably dominated recent geopolitical analysis, its direct implications for UK science diplomacy have been limited, given Russia’s diminished role as a global science power and the relatively narrow scope of UK–Russia scientific cooperation even before February 2022.[7]  The more consequential effects appear to stem from shifts in the UK’s relationships with major partners, as well as broader geopolitical volatility, which have made it more difficult for the UK to operate within the kind of international environment that previously amplified its strengths.

More specifically, as an asymmetric science power with a comparative advantage in international regulatory leadership, the UK is most effective when embedded within an open, internationally orientated environment. It is in this context that the UK is well-positioned to play a convening or intermediary role between larger economic and geopolitical blocs or groupings of countries; however, that context has deteriorated for several reasons, most notably due to the weakening of UK–EU academic and scientific ties post-Brexit.[8] In recent years, restricted access to the EU’s academic institutions, scientific networks, funding mechanisms, and talent pool has arguably had a more immediate impact on British science than any ongoing military conflict.[9] At the same time, the growing securitisation of science and technology policy across Asia, Europe, and the United States—particularly in strategic areas such as AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors—risks limiting opportunities for international scientific and technological cooperation. These trends are compounded by a broader decline in support for multilateralism and international institutions among several of the UK’s key partners in science and diplomacy. Navigating these constraints will require a careful, flexible, and well-calibrated response on the part of British diplomacy.

Nevertheless, while science diplomacy has an important role to play in reinforcing the UK’s position as a leading global science actor, it can only be effective if anchored in a strong and credible research and innovation system. The UK should continue to leverage its distinctive strengths in regulatory diplomacy, but this must be matched by a sustained commitment to reversing long-term underinvestment in science and undertaking broader reforms to support research, commercialisation, and the growth of science-based industries.

That is particularly important given the UK’s position as an asymmetric science power. The only way it can remain globally competitive vis-à-vis systemic science powers is by placing a disproportionately high emphasis on science and innovation, as smaller nations like Singapore and South Korea have done.[10] These states have demonstrated that it is possible to exert outsized influence in the international scientific landscape through sustained, strategic prioritisation of research and innovation. For the UK, making science and innovation a national strategic priority is not merely desirable—it is essential to sustaining its global leadership in an increasingly contested, capability-driven environment. Ultimately, addressing structural weaknesses and rebuilding the foundations of national scientific capacity will not only make British science diplomacy more effective but also help position the UK as a more credible and serious global science power.

Q6. What are the key international scientific relationships for the UK?

The UK’s most important international scientific relationships should reflect the strategic imperatives of an asymmetric science power operating in an increasingly fragmented global environment. As a country with recognised strengths in regulatory design, higher education, and institutional credibility—but more limited scale relative to systemic science powers—the UK derives disproportionate value from relationships that offer access to research scale, support regulatory alignment, and enable participation in global agenda-setting.[11] In this context, the Starmer government is right to prioritise closer ties with both the United States and the European Union.

The United States is the UK’s most significant scientific partner at the country level, supported by long-standing collaboration in key areas including artificial intelligence, life sciences, clean energy, and defence-related innovation.[12] Closer ties with US scientific and educational institutions, regulatory bodies, and research networks would strengthen British access to frontier ecosystems and strengthen its technological and regulatory leadership in priority sectors. While the recently concluded US–UK trade agreement may provide general economic momentum, targeted science-specific agreements and memoranda will be necessary to institutionalise meaningful collaboration across research, regulation, and commercialisation.[13]

At the subnational level, deeper engagement with individual US states also offers an important avenue for cooperation. While the UK has made some progress in developing relationships at this level, a more systematic approach is warranted, especially since educational and professional standards in many science and technology-adjacent professions are often regulated at the state level in the United States.[14] Partnerships with key states—such as California (AI applications and life sciences), Massachusetts (higher education and biotechnology), Texas (energy and space), and North Carolina (advanced manufacturing)—would allow British firms and institutions to access distributed innovation ecosystems that are otherwise difficult to engage through federal channels.

In parallel, UK–EU scientific cooperation remains a critical pillar of international engagement, particularly regarding near-term institutional access, regulatory alignment, and funding mechanisms. Although the UK’s re-entry into Horizon Europe was a positive step,[15] it might benefit from more sustained efforts to be viewed as a constructive, technically capable, and politically reliable partner by EU institutions and major European countries.[16] To that end, renewed participation in EU science advisory processes, standards platforms, and research ethics frameworks should be prioritised not only for access but also for the influence and credibility that come with active participation in these scientific partnerships and institutional frameworks.

Beyond the US and the EU, mid-sized science powers—including Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia—represent strategically important collaborators who share the UK’s commitment to open science, research integrity, and responsible innovation.[17] Deeper bilateral engagement would support high-trust cooperation in strategically important domains such as biomedical innovation, quantum technologies, semiconductors, and climate science.

Finally, the UK should maintain a pragmatic, constructive, and balanced approach to engaging with emerging science powers. In addition to China and India, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and Vietnam are becoming active contributors to global science and technology, not only as markets and innovation hubs but also as potential contributors to developing international regulatory frameworks.[18] Engaging with these countries where interests align—and maintaining constructive dialogue where they diverge—would reinforce the UK’s reputation as a trusted scientific actor. Through a balanced, well-calibrated science diplomacy, the UK can consolidate its comparative advantages and bolster its international relevance as a major science power in a more contested, multipolar international landscape.

9th May 2025

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