Written evidence from The Centre for Long – Term Resilience (SUK0041)
The Centre for Long-Term Resilience (CLTR) is an independent nonprofit think tank with a mission to transform global resilience to extreme risks: high-impact threats with global reach. We do this by working with governments and other institutions to understand the risks and improve relevant governance, processes and decision-making.
We believe we are strongly placed to advise on impactful approaches to financing and scaling UK science and technology. As experts within the biosecurity field, we bring foundational scientific expertise, significant experience collaborating with and briefing Government departments, and specialised knowledge in both the UK bioeconomy and UK supply chain resilience. We recently published two reports relevant to this call for evidence: Growing the UK Bioeconomy and Boosting UK supply chain resilience.
We at the Centre for Long-Term Resilience (CLTR) recommend that, in order to translate S&T into global companies - specifically within the life sciences manufacturing sector - this new administration should take a different approach to UK public sector financing of life sciences R&D institutions. The decision to sell the UK’s Vaccine Manufacturing Innovation Centre (VMIC) to a US-based company was a disadvantageous one; however, the issue is more fundamental. The structure chosen by previous Governments in setting up the VMIC meant that the Government had very little ability to prevent the sale, as the centre was administered by the private entity VMIC Ltd, in which the Government retained no stake, despite its investment. This is a textbook example of socialising risk and privatising reward. Future investments and co-investments from the public purse should lead to lasting, tangible economic benefits for public funds. We further recommend that future sales of critical infrastructure related to life scenes and medical countermeasure manufacturing be subject to additional scrutiny, whether by Parliament or an independent reviewing body. The UK Government should consider how it can best implement such additional scrutiny, which would likely be welcome in other sectors with assets underpinning national security (e.g. steel, nuclear power, aerospace, etc.) [For further information, please see our 2025 report: Boosting supply chain resilience, CLTR]
Firstly, the UK should consolidate the information regarding available government-based innovation funding opportunities into a centralised hub that is easily navigable for UK S&T, academia and industry. This will signpost those in research looking to apply science and create industrial spin-outs to what the government’s priorities are. It will also increase the catchment of UK-based innovation and S&T, which could be leveraged for economic and strategic benefit. Currently, there are a multitude of government-based funding and innovation call-outs, which are extremely difficult to navigate. For example, there are at least nine government departmental strategies containing overlapping interests in biotechnologies and biological security, and at least twelve different UK innovation funding entities or initiatives of relevance to biotechnology, biomanufacturing or biosecurity. This excludes other international charitable grant funders who work with the UK Government (e.g., the Wellcome Trust) to generate breakthroughs in biosecurity areas such as infectious disease.
Second, one of the biggest issues the government faces in maximising the benefits of S&T for defence and security is scaling up spin-out entities into larger companies with global reach. The government needs to make better use of existing public-private contracting frameworks and strengthen these relationships to deliver high yield and provide (where possible) direct defence and security benefits.
We recommend the government forge closer working public-private sector relationships, where responsible innovation and national security issues may be discussed securely, to improve the effectiveness of these relationships, which will likely become increasingly relevant to mitigating national security threats and delivering economic prosperity. The increased adoption of existing, trusted public-private sector frameworks is one viable mechanism through which S&T and commercial entities can deliver outputs more aligned with national priorities. The Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) is a proven, trusted and expedient model that enables the rapid contracting of industry and academia to meet UK Government challenges. Additionally, the model does not disadvantage smaller enterprises from entering Government-led competition callouts. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (dstl) runs the ‘R-Cloud’ system on behalf of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which provides defence with a trusted cohort of suppliers to address security challenges. This ranges from non-traditional defence suppliers, micro-businesses, small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and academic institutions to large organisations. In conjunction with an R-Cloud type system (Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 2022), a DASA-type model should be more widely rolled out to generate an extensive, trusted S&T, industry and academic community from which the Government can rapidly contract to meet other priority areas of defence and security need. This would be an influential convening forum through which industry, academia and the third sector could tackle the most critical national security issues. This systems approach would also facilitate an environment where confidential public-private conversations may be held to address national security concerns and align industry with UK strategic priorities.
Where the Government identifies cross-cutting functions, outcomes, or dependencies (e.g., data fusion and knowledge management) HMG must prioritise its resources and take on higher levels of responsibility for governance and delivery.
Third, related to scale up, is the fact that the UK is widely recognised as the most attractive startup ecosystem for biotechnology in Europe (McKinsey & Company 2021) and the world’s second most attractive startup ecosystem for biotechnology companies behind the United States. With engineering biology being one of the government's critical technologies, this is an area that is crying out for intelligent investment and strategic exploitation for security purposes. The UK biotechnology companies’ share price increases are larger than the United States’ or Europe’s, and the UK produces many startups, which larger American corporations subsequently acquire (McKinsey & Company 2021). However, multiple sources (Nguyen 2023; Macon-Cooney et al. 2024; ARC 2024), make it abundantly clear there remains a long-standing and worsening lack of UK success in scaling up and retaining these commercial startups. There were no life sciences initial public offerings (IPOs) in the UK in 2023, compared to nine IPOs in 2021.
Whilst other countries have also experienced similar declines, the United States and China have retained their lead, and this shortage of IPO activity strongly indicates limited scale-up opportunities for UK biotechnology startups (Nguyen 2023). Furthermore, the increasing shortfall of UK investment at and above the £50 million mark makes for stark reading. As of 2023, 94.3% of deals over £50m involved foreign investors, compared to 89.7% (2019-2023 average). For smaller deals (£20m-£50m), foreign involvement was 87.1% of deal value in 2023, compared to 80.1% (2019-2023 average) (BVCA 2024).
The recent House of Lords Science and Technology Committee report further articulates the issue and need for increased capital investment to overcome challenges in scaling the UK life sciences economy (House of Lords Science and Technology Committee 2025). Informed risk appetite and capital investment are the primary routes to changing this decline in UK-based growth. However, more intelligent use of existing, large, UK-based entities also provides an affordable solution to successfully scale up UK startups and SMEs. Other economic sectors, such as UK aerospace engineering, make excellent use of large UK companies which are adept at investing in smaller UK companies and scaling them up. Large companies in this sector have also helped HMG exploit economic opportunities, producing a white paper on solution options for scale-up of UK Industry (BAE Systems 2022).
We recommend that this approach should be encouraged and adopted e.g., within the life sciences sector, as those who excel at innovation may not be the best equipped to scale up. This partnering of S&T, SMEs with higher-tier companies who have experience working in the sector is also being used in defence (Defence and Security Accelerator 2024), and this model should be applied to areas such as biotechnology.
AI in UK biotechnology and the wider life sciences
We recommend that the Government consult with relevant cross-sector experts to inform and generate a long-term strategy for the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in UK biotechnology and wider life sciences. The accompanying ‘Biotechnology Action Plan: Government Response’ should address key touchpoints, including guidance on responsible innovation and data-sharing legislation for economic and security purposes.
The government has an economic growth mission and has also identified critical technologies which hold enormous transformative potential for our health, the economy and national resilience and security. Biotechnology (engineering biologically specifically) is one of these critical technologies. It is a rapidly expanding field, becoming increasingly intertwined with advances in AI (another critical technology) and machine learning. Building better defensive technology to tackle some of the biggest threats we face (such as pandemics) should be a national priority. In particular, the power of AI should be leveraged for developments in rapid diagnostics, drug discovery, vaccine development, biosurveillance anomaly detection, personal protective equipment, microbial forensics, and biosecurity-relevant data integration and management. However, given the dual-use nature of growing capabilities in engineered biology, the misuse risks from AI need to be thoroughly assessed and managed (Moulange et al. 2024; Rose et al. 2023; Smith et al. 2023). Create a UK biotechnology action plan with a strategic focus on the adoption of AI in biotechnology to meet national strategic aims. [For further information, please see our 2025 report: Growing the Bioeconomy, CLTR]
Whilst AI can revolutionise biosecurity-relevant technologies and capabilities through enhanced detection, analysis, decision support and response to biological events, no Government strategy specifically addresses the integration of AI with biotechnology. The Government has published an ‘AI Opportunities Action Plan: Government Response (2025)’ (Department of Science Innovation and Technology 2025) however, it does not provide details on leveraging AI in the life sciences. A recent House of Lords report on AI and creative technology scale-ups (House of Lords Science and Technology Committee 2025) provides valuable information on the cross-cutting barriers and solutions to industry scale-up but does not address the integration of AI in the life sciences, which will require a nuanced approach.
We recommend the Government publish a ‘Biotechnology Action Plan: Government Response’ which describes how AI and biotechnology will converge and be integrated for strategic economic and security benefits. In line with the UK’s longstanding commitment to responsible innovation, we recommend that the risks of AI in the life sciences be thoroughly assessed, and proportional mitigation measures should be taken where appropriate.
Double down on UK’s world-leading strength in ‘omics’, including metagenomics
We recommend that the government double down on the UK’s unique strength within the life sciences, and more specifically within the field of ‘omics’. The applications of omics-based technologies are already widespread, spanning medicine, agriculture, biosecurity, etc. Their importance in pathogen surveillance, health and environmental monitoring makes this biotechnology a clear candidate for targeted Government uplift.
The UK genomics sector is thriving, with a projected market cap of £50 billion by 2040 (UK BioIndustry Association 2023). The UK is a global leader in genomics research and innovation with world-class research infrastructure. It has spearheaded numerous landmark initiatives like the 100,000 Genomes Project, UK BioBank, Our Future Health, and the NHS Genomic Medicine Service. These projects have led to new diagnoses for patients and the integration of cutting-edge genomics research into routine health care (Genomics England 2025), aligning with the Government's mission to build an NHS fit for the future.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK's genomics capabilities shone, through the COVID-19 Genomics UK Consortium (COG-UK), which helped the UK contribute ~20% of all global SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences (Peacock 2023). The £32.2M invested in COG-UK generated an invaluable dataset of ~1 million viral genomes by 2021. Coupled with other UK sequencing efforts this enabled real-time tracking of COVID-19 variants, informed public health efforts and will remain useful to health professionals for decades to come.
The UK's genomics sector also has immense potential to drive further economic growth and improved healthcare outcomes. The main challenge lies in scaling up these successes to maintain the UK's status as a genomics superpower.
The UK’s experience of conducting landmark initiatives, coupled with advanced research facilities and associated technologies (e.g., computational tools and high-throughput sequencing), places it in a strong position for leveraging new, cutting-edge, applied research in omics, such as genomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, and metagenomics. This field of science is integral to developing biosurveillance tools, vaccines and therapeutics against biological threats.
Biological surveillance will be crucial as part of an integrated early warning system to rapidly identify future disease outbreaks and reduce the likelihood and impact of diseases becoming pandemic-level events. The UK Government spent £321 billion on COVID-19 when the UK’s Biological Security Strategy was released in 2023 (see page 14). The estimated lifetime cost of government spending due to COVID-19 will likely increase as the cost of living with COVID-19 continues. It makes sense from an economic and national security perspective to invest in UK strengths such as omics-based sciences, which have both commercial and defence benefit potential. Increased application of omics science can speed up the diagnosis of infected individuals and inform medical therapies (see the government’s 100 Day Mission within the national Biological Security Strategy), leading to increased national resilience and reduced impact of future biological events upon national security and the economy.
CLTR recommends it is critical to capitalise upon the UK's strong foundations and invest in maintaining a world-class status in research and generating UK-based omics-based capabilities that deliver biosecurity and economic benefits. [For further information, please see our 2025 report: Growing the Bioeconomy, CLTR]
More intelligent use of existing, large, UK-based entities would provide an affordable solution to successfully exploit S&T, scale up UK startups and Small, Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Other economic sectors, such as UK aerospace engineering, make excellent use of their large UK companies, which are adept at investing in smaller UK companies and scaling them up. Large companies in this sector have also helped HMG exploit economic opportunities, producing a white paper on solution options for the scale-up of UK Industry (BAE Systems 2022). This approach should be encouraged and adopted within the life sciences sector, as those who excel at innovation may not be the best equipped to scale up. This partnering of SMEs with higher-tier companies who have experience working in the sector is also being used in defence (Defence and Security Accelerator 2024), and this model should be applied to the bioeconomy.
The UK is uniquely positioned to foster meaningful growth and scaling up of novel biotechnology research and start-ups, thanks to its public health system. In its own words, the NHS “is one of the biggest commercial organisations in the country, buying on behalf of the fifth biggest employer in the world” (NHS England). This means the organisation “collectively spends approximately £8 billion annually on buying medical equipment and consumables, from gloves and paper to stents and prosthetic hips” (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2024).
The Government has an opportunity to leverage an approach that encourages investment into UK-based biotechnologies in a manner that benefits society and homeland security. This would increase the proportion of technologies and products - for instance, sequencing-based diagnostics - developed and manufactured in the UK and used within the NHS. This incentive structure would provide impetus for further development of domestic manufacturing, whether by British or foreign innovators. Integrating novel technologies as part of dedicated ‘testbed’ sites could also help small and medium enterprises scale the production of their technologies and trial them in real-world conditions prior to broader rollout.
This would require creative regulatory approaches to promote a pipeline unhindered by pre-existing frameworks but would ultimately embolden innovation and provide investor confidence for SMEs to grow. Informing the NHS, and connecting them with UK-based companies who can innovate in manufacturing and deliver products (e.g., lateral flow devices for business-as-usual purposes (Gates Foundation 2022; CBInsight 2025)), which the NHS has a clear demand for (e.g., seasonal flu or sexually transmitted infections), creates an economic environment in which UK companies can develop and scale production. Utilising the NHS’s scale and budget to incubate such companies has the added benefit of retaining UK-onshored capabilities that can be readily repurposed and scaled to address specific needs in the event of a new disease outbreak.
In addition, HMG recognises that security, trade, and foreign policy objectives can mutually reinforce one another. Through international development spending, the Government can improve security and resilience for partner countries and create new markets and opportunities for UK businesses. More effectively utilising the NHS and UK industry to support HMG’s security and resilience capability delivery could benefit UK prosperity through future commercial exports. The UK bioeconomy holds enormous potential for increased global competitiveness and trade growth, with the opportunity to displace reliance upon sole-nation providers of health-related products. By enhancing public-private sector partnerships and launching new initiatives for scaling up manufacturing, the UK will foster a robust and worthwhile total addressable market in which to invest.
Additionally, CLTR recommends that a UK cross-sector event be convened in 2025 to identify and agree on priority domains for increased state investment to best serve security outcomes, while boosting the economy. Taking a specific look at biotechnology and biosecurity, the event should firmly adopt a One Health approach to secure biosecurity for humans, plants, animals, and the environment, which will ensure the UK increases its resilience to strategic shocks such as long-term trends in climate change and disease outbreaks.
The cross-sector event should include the attendance of the Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Minister of State for Science, Research and Innovation, Minister for AI and Digital Government, Representation from National Wealth Fund, Department for Science, Innovation & Technology (DSIT), Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC), MOD, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Senior Responsible Owner of the Biological Security Strategy (BSS), as well as representation from the House of Lords, the Biotechnology Industry Association (BIA), the Engineering Biology Advisory Panel, the Responsible Innovation Advisory Panel (RIAP), the Wellcome Trust, the Biotechnology and Biological Science Research Council (BBSRC) and UK Research and Innovation (UKRI). [For further information, please see our 2025 report: Growing the Bioeconomy, CLTR]
The UK actually excels in science and technology innovation. Where it fails is scaling up from the innovation stage and small start-up entities into large companies. It frequently loses out to foreign investment, which then removes UK-based skills and corporate profit and relocates them outside of the UK.
These organisations need a clear route to scaling up funding. This will require the Government to incentivise investment within the UK for the express purpose of scaling up. Numerous factors, including high energy prices and poor infrastructure, make scaling up prohibitive within the UK.
Through international development spending, the Government can improve security and resilience for partner countries and create new markets and opportunities for UK businesses. More effectively utilising unique attributes such as the NHS and UK defence and security industry to support HMG’s security and resilience drive could benefit UK prosperity through future commercial exports. The UK bioeconomy holds enormous potential for increased global competitiveness and trade growth, with the opportunity to displace reliance upon sole-nation providers of health-related products. By enhancing public-private sector partnerships and launching new initiatives for scaling up manufacturing, the UK can foster a robust and worthwhile total addressable market in which to invest. See answer to 3.a).
CLTR recommends that the government make better use of its public-private sectors relationships, reduce energy costs, improve critical infrastructure and provide targeted investment into specific technology areas identified as having transformative impact on the economy (e.g., AI and Engineering biology) and invest judiciously (informed through cross-sector workshops) in these areas to scale-up sovereign capabilities and companies. [For further information, please see our 2025 report: Growing the Bioeconomy, CLTR]
Targeted HMG intervention and state investment are needed to bridge this well-trodden ‘valley of death’ that the UK experiences regarding scale-up. We both welcome the Government’s mission of economic growth (GOV.UK) and recognise it has finite resources to invest. Therefore, we recommend convening a UK cross-sector event as early as practicable in 2025, aiming to reach a consensus on priority domains within engineering biology and biomanufacturing that should receive state-level investment. This selection process should factor in capabilities and technologies directly relevant to biosecurity applications, economic market potential, and demand. In exceptional circumstances, this may even include identifying current UK commercial entities that should be subject to UK state-level investment instead of foreign direct investment support and scale-up, where they are deemed vital to national security and sovereign capability.
We recommend that the Government centralise its priority challenges and call-outs regarding innovation challenges into a single hub that the UK cross-sector communities can easily navigate.
Research conducted by the Centre for Long-Term Resilience identified that experts from across sectors within the UK have repeatedly highlighted that visibility and clarity on the Government’s priority biosecurity challenges and the full range of funding opportunities is a situational awareness pinch point. This recommendation requires no new capital investment money in and of itself. Instead, it makes more efficient use of existing information and funding streams. Communicating the launch of this central hub effectively will generate broader industry input to solving national security-relevant challenges and enhance the value for money of UK Government investments.
For the Government to best leverage the innovative solutions that industry can provide in overcoming national biosecurity challenges, UK industry needs to be informed about the Government’s external priority challenges and efficiently signposted to the relevant innovation funding streams. Such information remains disparate and scattered across multiple websites with little or no interconnectivity. Navigating these various entities, their visions and challenges, and synthesising them into the highest-priority challenges that meet national security aims is complex and opaque. The Government also needs to demonstrate that it is a good customer by clearly showing there is a pathway to scale up from innovation-level funding with the Government through to larger HMG contracts, should any commercial enterprise be successful in meeting a Government innovation challenge. For further information, please see our 2025 report: Growing the Bioeconomy, CLTR.