The document expresses my personal opinions and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing those of the Scott Polar Research Institute or the University of Cambridge. It relates specifically to the Arctic and Sub-Arctic, which are my area of specialisation.
The Arctic (in which I also include the Sub-Arctic) is a region of rapidly increasing global significance, both environmentally and geopolitically. Its relevance intersects several aspects of science diplomacy, including international collaboration, national security, soft power and technological innovation. The forthcoming Fifth International Polar Year (IPY5: 2032–33), currently under active planning, provides a major context for future British engagement in Arctic science and diplomacy. Although the UK has no arctic territory, of all countries that lie outside the region, it is geographically the closest. The decadal ICARP (International Conference on Arctic Research Planning) process is currently completing its assessment of research priorities across seven areas, all of which intersect with science diplomacy, and the UK is represented on five of these Research Priority Teams including RPT4, focussed on Arctic Research Cooperation and Diplomacy.
The UK has a strong, longstanding and internationally respected tradition of scientific research in the Arctic, particularly in atmospheric, oceanographic, cryospheric and terrestrial natural and social sciences. Commitment is demonstrated widely across the university sector, as well as through the support provided by UKRI NERC, British Antarctic Survey (despite its name also active in Arctic research and infrastructure, and importantly including the Ny Ålesund research station on Svalbard) and the coordination and knowledge exchange organised by the UK Arctic Office. Research by British-based researchers, or that includes them as collaborating authors in international research, is extensive and respected. The UK also plays a convening role in international science networks such as the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC – whose current President is British) and contributes to the Arctic Council through its national observer status. It is relevant to note that the UK was one of the first countries to acquire observer status, at the Iqaluit Ministerial meeting in 1998, along with Germany, the Netherlands and Poland. Since then, ten other countries have joined as observers as interest in the Arctic has expanded.
These activities enhance UK soft power by demonstrating a commitment to evidence-based policy, environmental stewardship, and constructive global engagement. The Arctic is a proving ground for cooperative science in politically sensitive regions, and previous International Polar Years have successively represented the largest and most complex international scientific research collaborations to date, with highly impactful consequences (such as: discovery of the structure of the upper atmosphere and the mid-Atlantic ridge, establishment of international data collection protocols and the World Data Centres, understanding the role that the polar regions play in the global system, initiating the Antarctic Treaty, and paving the way towards recognising the need for satellite-based observation of the Earth’s environment). Continued and visible UK participation in polar and specifically arctic collaborative research affirms a commitment to science diplomacy and multilateralism.
The current geopolitical environment relating to the Arctic remains dominated by the consequences of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia from February 2022, although other factors also threaten further fragmentation of the one-Arctic consensus. The subsequent isolation of Russian institutions from many western scientific collaborations has significantly disrupted pan-Arctic science. Over half of the Arctic’s landmass and much of its terrestrial cryosphere lie within Russia, meaning key environmental data—including from permafrost, boreal forests and tundra, and regarding greenhouse gas fluxes—are increasingly inaccessible to international researchers. Similarly, half of the Arctic’s roughly four million human population and one quarter of its roughly 400 thousand indigenous people, live within Russia. Pathways for indigenous knowledge informing environmental decision making have been generally weakened. On the other hand, disruption of the exchange of knowledge may have contributed to beneficial enhanced scrutiny of how researchers engage with indigenous knowledge systems.
China’s increased investment in arctic science infrastructure and presence in multilateral arctic fora (e.g. its Arctic Council observer status since 2013, and the Polar Silk Road concept), and uncertainty about the United States’ strategic ambitions towards the arctic and stance on climate-related research, have also altered the diplomatic landscape. The UK should continue to position itself as a principled and proactive collaborator in this changing environment.
Scientific understanding of Arctic change has direct implications for British and global security, particularly in relation to climate tipping points, sea level rise, and extreme weather patterns. The Arctic itself is a hotspot of climate change, experiencing a rate of warming that is typically stated as between 3 and 4 times the global average. This clearly has important implications for people and environments within the region, but also beyond it. It is now commonly stated that ‘what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic’. Sea ice, the Greenland ice sheet, and the huge stocks of carbon stored in the terrestrial Arctic, all exert global influence and are implicated in some of the climate tipping points that may make climate change much harder to unwind if they are exceeded. The UK Met Office uses arctic climate data to improve weather forecasting. Science-led monitoring of methane release, permafrost thaw, and Arctic wildfires is essential to anticipating transboundary risks.
Improved forecasting, climate modelling, and understanding of Arctic-mediated hazards all support national and supranational resilience. However, institutional mechanisms to link research outputs to policy responses—particularly in the areas of disaster preparedness, infrastructure planning, and energy security—need strengthening. Researchers and policymakers do not always use the same language as one another. This can be improved.
The British government has expressed its commitment to the relevance of the Arctic through its Arctic Policy Framework (2013, updated 2018) and this provides a useful high-level overview, but there is scope for more detail on future research priorities and capacity building. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology could play an enhanced strategic role by integrating arctic science objectives into national climate, innovation, and foreign policy strategies, particularly as we approach IPY5. The adoption of an international science strategy would certainly be advantageous in general, and a strategy that included a specific arctic component would enable coherent alignment of research, innovation, and diplomacy. Such a strategy should address long-term commitments to environmental monitoring, data sharing, infrastructure, and international capacity-building. The Science and Technology Network can raise the UK’s visibility and credibility in strategic regions like the Arctic, building on the work of its predecessor Science and Innovation Network. Prioritising climate, environmental science, and indigenous partnerships in arctic regions would demonstrate values-based leadership. Environmental security, digital and climate infrastructure, and resilience in arctic regions should be added or enhanced as priorities. The Defence Innovation Unit is perhaps of less direct relevance. While overt military applications are beyond the scope of most Arctic research, dual-use technologies (e.g. satellite surveillance, instrumented submarine data cables, autonomous sensors) can support both scientific understanding and national resilience. Ethical guidelines and civil-scientific partnerships should be part of this agenda.
In the arctic context, strengthened partnerships with – especially – Nordic countries, Canada, the US, and Germany are essential. Collaboration through IASC, the EU Polar Cluster, and the European Space Agency’s polar-focussed missions (e.g. CryoSat) are particularly valuable. The UK should also advocate for science diplomacy mechanisms that encourage the eventual reintegration of Russian arctic science into international efforts when this become politically feasible. One important mechanism in this regard is through ISIRA, the International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic, which is in effect IASC’s ‘contact group’ with Russia and which has had active UK membership since its inception.
Meaningful exchange of knowledge depends on relationships of trust and understanding, and ultimately these are relationships between individuals although often mediated through institutions. It should therefore be recognised that relevant international relationships may exist at all levels from governments to individual researchers, and that existing peer-to-peer networks of researchers need be nurtured. Trust takes longer to establish than to destroy, and trust networks decay if they are not maintained. While the experience of those who have been active in the field for a long time is clearly of great value, it is also essential to create new links between early-career researchers and indeed to prepare the next generation of researchers and policy makers through arctic-focussed education and cultural exchange at all levels. The benefit:cost ratio of exchange and education programmes, though difficult to quantify, is undoubtedly high.
Various metrics are possible as ways of measuring the impact of Science Diplomacy. The 2010 Royal Society-AAAS framework for Science Diplomacy identified three aspects: Science in Diplomacy, Diplomacy for Science, and Science for Diplomacy. Of these, the first two are more straightforward to identify and measure. Appropriate metrics could include the flow of scientific knowledge from the research sector to FCDO; the quantity and – obviously harder to define – quality of joint publications, data-sharing agreements, and policy co-development; the quantity and outcome of joint Arctic projects (e.g. MOSAiC expedition); and participation in multilateral governance and planning for IPY 2032–33. The third aspect, Science for Diplomacy, refers to improvement in international relations through scientific activity. Essentially this a centripetal propagation of trust from individual and institutional networks towards central government. Quantification is at least conceivable.
The UK’s role in Arctic science diplomacy stands at a critical juncture. With the next International Polar Year fast approaching, now is the time to reinvigorate national arctic strategy, reassert leadership in international collaborations, and ensure science remains a facilitator of peace and global resilience in the face of geopolitical tension.
9th May 2025
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